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PERFCTL: A STEALTHY MALWARE TARGETING MILLIONS OF LINUX SERVERS

Security Threat

Assaf MoragIdan Revivo
October 3, 2024


In this blog post, Aqua Nautilus researchers aim to shed light on a Linux
malware that, over the past 3-4 years, has actively sought more than 20,000
types of misconfigurations in order to target and exploit Linux servers. If you
have a Linux server connected to the internet, you could be at risk. In fact,
given the scale, we strongly believe the attackers targeted millions worldwide
with a potential number of victims of thousands, it appears that with this
malware any Linux server could be at risk.



We discovered numerous incident reports in community forums, all describing
indicators of compromise linked to this malware. The community has widely
referred to it as the “perfctl malware,” and we have adopted this name. 

This post will explore the malware’s architecture, components, defense evasion
tactics, persistence mechanisms, and how we managed to detect it. Perfctl is
particularly elusive and persistent, employing several sophisticated techniques,
including: 

 * It utilizes rootkits to hide its presence. 

 * When a new user logs into the server, it immediately stops all “noisy”
   activities, lying dormant until the server is idle again. 

 * It utilizes Unix socket for internal communication and TOR for external
   communication. 

 * After execution, it deletes its binary and continues to run quietly in the
   background as a service. 

 * It copies itself from memory to various locations on the disk, using
   deceptive names. 

 * It opens a backdoor on the server and listens for TOR communications. 

 * It attempts to exploit the Polkit vulnerability (CVE-2021-4043) to escalate
   privileges. 

In all the attacks observed, the malware was used to run a cryptominer, and in
some cases, we also detected the execution of proxy-jacking software. During one
of our sandbox tests, the threat actor utilized one of the malware’s backdoors
to access the honeypot and started deploying some new utilities to better
understand the nature of our server, trying to understand what exactly we are
doing to its malware. 




ELUSIVE MALWARE DOMINATES DEVELOPER FORUMS 

Our story begins with an attack we monitored on one of our honeypots. Typically,
we check if anyone has already documented the attack, as this allows us to
analyze it more thoroughly and compare our findings with those of other
researchers. However, in this case, we found no report about the malware that
had targeted our honeypot. 

What we did find, though, were numerous references to a perfctl malware, this
immediately drew our attention, as this was one of the names of our malware.
These are in various languages across several developer communities and forums,
we carefully reviewed these posts and found that the indicators of compromise
mentioned in them are the same as the ones we’ve seen in our attack. Usually in
some of these posts you can find replies with links to reports about the malware
written by researchers. But in this case, however, none of these had links to
such reports. Here are some of the posts we came across: Reddit, freelancer,
Stack Overflow (Spanish), forobeta (Spanish), brainycp (Russian), natnetwork
(Indonesian), Proxmox (Deutsch), Camel2243 (Chinese), svrforum (Korean),
exabytes, virtualmin, serverfault and many others. 

The name perfctl comes from the cryptominer process that drains the system’s
resources, causing significant issues for many Linux developers. By combining
“perf” (a Linux performance monitoring tool) with “ctl” (commonly used to
indicate control in command-line tools), the malware authors crafted a name that
appears legitimate. This makes it easier for users or administrators to overlook
during initial investigations, as it blends in with typical system processes. 

Towards the end of our research, we saw the first report covered by the
researchers of Cado Security, but they only tell a very small part of the story
of perfctl malware. 




THE ATTACK FLOW 

After exploiting a vulnerability (as in our case) or a misconfiguration, the
main payload is downloaded from an HTTP server controlled by the attacker. 

In our case, the main payload was named httpd, and it demonstrated multiple
layers of execution, showcasing a deliberate design to ensure persistence and
evade detection. Once executed, the main payload copies itself from memory to a
new location in the ‘/tmp’ directory, runs the new binary from there, terminates
the original process, and then deletes the initial binary to cover its tracks. 

The main payload is now executed from the /tmp directory under a different name.
Based on what we’ve seen the malware chose the name of the process that
originally executed it, thus it looks less suspicious, if the system is
examined. 

In our case the malware was executed by sh, thus the name of the malware was
changed from httpd to sh. At this point, it functions as both a dropper and a
local command-and-control (C2) process. The malware contains an exploit to
CVE-2021-4043, which it is trying to run in order to gain root privilege on the
server. 

The malware continues to copy itself from memory to half a dozen other
locations, with names that appear as conventional system files. It also drops a
rootkit and a few popular Linux utilities that were modified to serve as user
land rootkits (i.e. ldd, lsof). A cryptominer is also dropped and in some
executions, we also observed some proxy-jacking software transferred from a
remote server and executed.   

As part of its command-and-control operation, the malware opens a Unix socket,
creates two directories under the /tmp directory, and stores data there that
influences its operation. This data includes host events, locations of the
copies of itself, process names, communication logs, tokens, and additional log
information. Additionally, the malware uses environment variables to store data
that further affects its execution and behavior. 

All the binaries are packed, stripped, and encrypted, indicating significant
efforts to bypass defense mechanisms and hinder reverse engineering attempts.
The malware also uses advanced evasion techniques, such as suspending its
activity when it detects a new user in the btmp or utmp files and terminating
any competing malware to maintain control over the infected system. 

Below is the complete attack flow: 

Figure 1: The entire attack flow

As noted earlier, numerous files are written to disk or modified, primarily in
the /tmp, /usr, and /root directories, as shown in the diagram below. 

Figure 2: Files dropped or written to disk

In this blog and its appendices, we will explain the purpose of these files and
the role each plays in the attack flow. 




PERFCTL ATTACK HIGHLIGHTS 

The main binary httpd is a packed, stripped and obfuscated ELF (MD5:
656e22c65bf7c04d87b5afbe52b8d800). If you type the download url in the browser
the integer 1 is printed to screen. If you try downloading the .php file without
a specific user agent, you will receive a file with the integer 1. This response
indicates that this file is completely innocent. But if you use the correct user
agent it will drop the malware (size of ~9mb). This is a clever way to conceal
the malware. 

After it is downloaded and executed the malware copies itself from memory using
another running process name, and it saves the process ID of that running
process under /tmp/.apid. 

Figure 3: httpd is copying itself from memory

Httpd then stops and deletes itself. This technique is called ‘process
masquerading’ or ‘process replacement’ and it’s done for defense evasion and
obfuscation. It can make security researchers life a bit harder to follow the
malware execution flow. 

The new Httpd binary is now saved in the /tmp directory under the name of the
process that executed it sh in our case, but we’ve also seen other names when we
used other processes to run it. The binary sh is also copying itself from memory
to various locations, as it saves itself as libpprocps.so and also as
/root/.config/cron/perfcc,  /usr/bin/perfcc, and /usr/lib/libfsnkdev.so. In
annex 3 – The main payload below, we discuss in detail about this and explain
our hypothesis to why the threat actor chose these names. This shows of a
thought in regard to persistence as the malware author creates a lot of
locations to which the malware is copied. 

PERSISTENCE 

The attacker modifies the ~/.profile script, which sets up the environment
during user login. This script is designed to execute the malware first,
followed by the legitimate workload expected to run on the server. It checks if
/root/.config/cron/perfcc is an executable file, and if so, it runs the
malware. 

Additionally, the script ensures that in Bash environments, the ~/.bashrc file
is executed, applying user-specific configurations such as aliases and
environment variables—likely to maintain normal server operations while the
malware runs. Finally, the script suppresses mesg errors to avoid any visible
warnings during execution. 

The binary wizlmsh is dropped to /usr/bin (MD5:
ba120e9c7f8896d9148ad37f02b0e3cb). It is a very small binary (12kb), that runs
as a service in the background. Initially, it receives argc, and argv, and
verify the execution of main payload (httpd) after it is written into /tmp
either as sh or bash or any other name. It is responsible for the persistence of
perfctl malware. 

Figure 4: wizlmsh main function

DEFENSE EVASION

The rootkit has several purposes. One of the main purposes is to hook various
functions and modify their functionality. The rootkit itself is an ELF 64-bit
LSB shared object (.so) file named libgcwrap.so (MD5:
835a9a6908409a67e51bce69f80dd58a). The rootkit is using LD_PRELOAD to load
itself before other libraries.  

Figure 5: The revised LD_Preload content

It does various interesting manipulations, including hooking to Libpam symbols.
Specifically, to the function pam_authenticate, which is used by PAM to
authenticate users. Hooking or overwriting this function could allow
unauthorized actions during the authentication process, such as bypassing
password checks, logging credentials, or modifying the behavior of
authentication mechanisms. 

Figure 6: Functions the rootkit hooks

In addition, the rootkit is also designed to hook Libpcap symbols, specifically
to the function pcap_loop, which is widely used for capturing network traffic.
This is used to prevent recording of the malware traffic.   

The threat actors are also using a few user land rootkits. They drop a few
legitimate utilities such as ldd. These utilities were modified to hide specific
attack elements. So, if the rigged crontab is used, for instance, it won’t show
cron jobs created during the attack.  

In the first step the malware replaces the /etc/profile so the path will be set
on /bin/.local/bin:$PATH. In this path the threat actor is bypassing the
directory where the utilities are called from. We’ve seen in some malware runs 2
binaries and in other 4 binaries, depending on which utilities exist originally
on the server.  

In our attacks the malware dropped crontab, lsof, ldd and top. These tweaked
binaries will hide malicious activities, in case someone is using them.  

Figure 7: The new content inserted by the threat actor to ‘/etc/profile’

In appendix 5 – User land rootkits we explain in detail why we think these
utilities were chosen by the threat actor. 

MAIN IMPACT

The main impact of the attack is resource hijacking. In all cases we observed a
monero cryptominer (XMRIG) executed and exhausting the server’s CPU resources.
The cryptominer is also packed and encrypted. Once unpacked and decrypted it
communicates with cryptomining pools. 

As reflected in Figure 8 below, the cryptomining pools are accessed via TOR. 

Figure 8: Cryptomining traffic

Moreover, in some of the attacks we’ve seen proxy-jacking via various vendors.
We’ve seen the communication with the following domains: bitping.com, earn.fm,
speedshare.app, and repocket.com. 

The domain repocket.com, for instance, is associated with the Repocket platform,
which is a service that allows users to earn money by sharing their unused
internet bandwidth.  

In addition, we can observe the usage of the bitping daemon usage, which provide
similar bandwidth payment services. 

Figure 9: Logging in to bitping

TOR COMMUNICATION

The binary sh is also initiating communication via Tor with few servers (i.e.
80.67.172.162, 176.10.107.180, 78.47.18.110, 95.217.109.36, 145.239.41.102). 

While the communication is encrypted, you can observe the TOR log left on our
honeypot. 



Figure 10: TOR sessions log




ADDITIONAL THREAT INTELLIGENCE 

We recorded several dozen attacks of perfctl. We saw 3 download servers involved
in these attacks (46.101.139.173, 104.183.100.189 and 198.211.126.180).  

The first two IP addresses seem to be linked to vulnerable servers that were
previously hacked by the threat actor and the third one could be owned by the
threat actor. All 3 IP addresses store and hide artifacts used in this
campaign.  

In most of the attacks we see that the binaries were dropped from IP address
46.101.139.173. An inspection of this IP address showed that this is a
compromised webserver. 

Figure 11: Compromised website serves as download server

Iterating over this download server, we see a compromised site on a server in
Germany. 

We noticed some artifacts, well-hidden between the site’s scripts. We see 3 main
payloads. One is avatar.php, which was used as part of the attack on our
honeypot. When using the browser to reach to the webpage with avatar.php or
downloading it without a specific user agent leads to 1 being displayed of
screen or a .php file with the digit 1.  

In addition, there is another file named aoip, which was uploaded 2 months later
and two others dark.css and csdark.css which were uploaded later. 

Figure 12: Files hosted on the webserver

 

Figure 13: Files hosted on the webserver

 

Figure 14: Files hosted on the webserver

The binary aoip is a replication of the main payload (sh/httpd). 

Csdark.css and dark.css weren’t analyzed during this research but look very
interesting. 

On IP address 198.211.126.180 we found just the file checklist.php which is the
main payload (sh/httpd). 

Figure 15: Compromised website serves as download server

On IP address 104.183.100.189 we found another innocent compromised website. 

Figure 16: Compromised website serves as download server

It looks like this website stores this XML file which when decoded (base64) is
actually the rconf script.  

Figure 17: malicious XML

From what we see on these websites, there are few artifacts used to execute the
exploitation of misconfigured and vulnerable (in our recorded attacks) Linux
servers. We identified a very long list of almost 20K directory traversal
fuzzing list, seeking for mistakenly exposed configuration files and secrets.
There are also a couple of follow-up files (such as the XML) the attacker can
run to exploit the misconfiguration. In the table below you can see the analysis
of the paths, which shows that perfctl is mainly looking to exploit
misconfigurations.  

Category  Count of Paths  Example Paths  Potential Vulnerability  Credentials 
1,717  /access_credentials.json, /access_keys.json, /accesskeys.php  Potential
for unauthorized access to credentials, sensitive token or key exposure 
Configuration  12,196  Typical files include .conf, .ini, .json, .xml
configurations  Misconfigurations could lead to security weaknesses  Login 
1,362  Paths include login, auth, signin, admin related files  Risks of
unauthorized access through login interfaces  Unknown  4,647  Paths not fitting
the above categories  Unknown, requires further investigation 




DETECTION OF “PERFCTL” MALWARE 

To detect Perfctl malware you look for unusual spikes in CPU usage, or system
slowdown if the rootkit has been deployed on your server. These may indicate
cryptomining activities, especially during idle times. 

MONITORING SUSPICIOUS SYSTEM BEHAVIOR

 1. Inspect /tmp, /usr, and /root directories for suspicious binaries,
    especially hidden or masquerading as system files (e.g., perfctl, sh,
    libpprocps.so, perfcc, libfsnkdev.so). Inspect your /home directory, look
    for /.local/bin directory with various utilities installed such as ldd,
    top etc. 
 2. Monitor processes for high resource usage, such as binaries like httpd or sh
    behaving unusually or running from unexpected locations like /tmp. 
 3. Check system logs for modifications to ~/.profile, and
    /etc/ld.so.preload files. 

NETWORK TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

 1. Capture network traffic to detect TOR-based communication to external IPs
    like 80.67.172.162, 176.10.107.180, etc. 
 2. Look for outbound connections to cryptomining pools or proxy-jacking
    services. 
 3. Monitor traffic to known malicious hosts or IPs (e.g., 46.101.139.173,
    104.183.100.189, and 198.211.126.180). 

FILE AND PROCESS INTEGRITY MONITORING

Detect modifications in key system utilities like ldd, top, lsof, and crontab,
which might have been replaced with trojanized versions. 

LOG ANALYSIS

Review logs for unauthorized use of system binaries, presence of suspicious cron
jobs, and errors in mesg to detect possible tampering.  




DETECTION OF “PERFCTL” MALWARE WITH AQUA SECURITY 

First, we can see some runtime incidents. Below you can see alerts indicating
some new binaries were dropped and executed, meaning a drift in our container,
in addition to shared object dropped during runtime. These are the additional
httpd malware files and the rootkit. 

Figure 18: Incidents screen on Aqua Security Platform

We can continue the investigation of this attack by examining the audit logs of
these incidents. During this incident there were above 22K audit events, thus we
will need to search for specific events, namely, to investigate the attack.  

Figure 19: Audit logs screen on Aqua Security Platform

We can filter on specific hosts, containers, enforce groups, cloud resources or
even pods. We decided to search for specific events based on the MITRE
framework. We used the masquerading technique which is used to describe dropped
and executed events. There were 465 incidents, we can now go over all the files
that were dropped (or modified) during the attack.

Figure 20: Audit logs screen on Aqua Security Platform

We can learn for instance about the swapping of some binaries with user land
rootkits.  

Figure 21: Audit logs screen on Aqua Security Platform

You can also learn about inbound traffic or setting up port listening. 



Figure 22: Audit logs screen on Aqua Security Platform




MITIGATION OF “PERFCTL” MALWARE 

 1. Patch Vulnerabilities: Ensure that all vulnerabilities are patched.
    Particularly internet facing applications such as RocketMQ servers and
    CVE-2021-4043 (Polkit). Keep all software and system libraries up to date.
 2. Restrict File Execution: Set noexec on /tmp, /dev/shm and other writable
    directories to prevent malware from executing binaries directly from these
    locations.
 3. Disable Unused Services: Disable any services that aren’t required,
    particularly those that may expose the system to external attackers, such as
    HTTP services.
 4. Implement Strict Privilege Management: Restrict root access to critical
    files and directories. Use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to limit what
    users and processes can access or modify.
 5. Network Segmentation: Isolate critical servers from the internet or use
    firewalls to restrict outbound communication, especially TOR traffic or
    connections to cryptomining pools. 
 6. Deploy Runtime Protection: Use advanced anti-malware and behavioral
    detection tools that can detect rootkits, cryptominers, and fileless malware
    like perfctl. 




APPENDICES 

APPENDIX 1: INITIAL ACCESS

CVE-2023-33246 is a vulnerability found in RocketMQ, which is a software that
manages messages. This vulnerability allows unauthorized execution of commands
on systems where RocketMQ is installed. This issue occurs because RocketMQ does
not adequately check who is trying to access it, which means anyone, even
without permission, can make changes or execute commands. The problem is made
worse because the parts of RocketMQ that handle storing and delivering messages
were not designed to be directly accessible over the internet, and they don’t
require authentication for performing sensitive operations like updating
settings. This makes it relatively easy for attackers to exploit this
vulnerability. 

The initial access was gained via this vulnerability (CVE-2023-33246), led to
download and execution of the shell script rconf with the following command:  

Figure 23: Execution script

In Figure 24 below, you can observe the entire rconf script, next we will do a
breakdown and explanation of the content.  

Figure 24: The rconf script

APPENDIX 2: EXECUTION SCRIPT ANALYSIS

As depicted in Figure 25 below, the script starts with a function that appears
to perform a simplified HTTP GET request using a TCP socket directly, mimicking
some basic behavior of the curl command. The threat actor is using this, in case
the targeted server doesn’t contain curl or wget. 

Figure 25: A snippet from the rconf script, illustrating implementation of a
HHTP get request command

As you can see in Figure 26 below, the script continues with a simple if
condition, that will ensure that the targeted attacked server OS architecture is
x86_64. This shows that the threat actor is targeting specific architecture and
won’t run on arm for instance.

Figure 26: A snippet from the rconf script, illustrating inspection of the
targeted host architecture

Next, the threat actor verifies that the /tmp directory exists and has read,
write, and execute permissions. This directory will be used later to store logs,
which the malware will update and from which the malware will read instructions
or system status. 

Figure 27: A snippet from the ‘rconf’ script, illustrating inspection the ‘/tmp’
path

As illustrated in Figure 28 below, the threat actor also verifies that the /tmp
directory is mounted with executable permissions. If the noexec option is found
in the mount options (no execution permissions), it remounts /tmp with the exec
option, allowing execution of binaries from the /tmp directory. This might be
necessary for scripts or applications that require executing temporary files
stored in /tmp. 

Figure 28: A snippet from the ‘rconf’ script, illustrating further inspection of
the ‘/tmp’ directory

In addition, the threat actor is creating two directories under /tmp path, which
will be used later as auxiliary when running the main payload. 

Figure 29: A snippet from the ‘rconf’ script, illustrating creation of
directories under the ‘/tmp’ path

Next the threat actor is setting the environment variable A2ZNODE to localhost,
if it is not already defined. 

Figure 30: A snippet from the ‘rconf’ script, illustrating inspection of the
environment variables

In addition, the threat actor is also setting the environment variable VEI to
rmq which can stand for vulnerability exploited index to RocketMQ or something
similar. Next, this script processes the /tmp/.xdiag/vei file by appending the
value of the VEI variable (rmq) to it. If the file /tmp/.xdiag/vei does not
exist or is empty, it checks if a secondary file /tmp/.xdiag/vei.1 exists. If it
does, the script processes the contents of /tmp/.xdiag/vei, sorts and removes
duplicates, and appends the value of VEI. If /tmp/.xdiag/vei.1 does not exist,
it directly writes the value of VEI to /tmp/.xdiag/vei. Finally, it unsets the
VEI variable 

Figure 31: A snippet from the ‘rconf’ script, illustrating preparation of the
‘/tmp’ directory for the malware operation and logging

Finally, this script manages the installation of the main payload by ensuring no
other instances are running, downloading the necessary file, and starting a web
server. It uses either curl, wget, or the custom download function (mentioned
above), verifies the downloaded file, and runs it if valid. The script also
includes safeguards to prevent multiple installations from occurring
simultaneously. This is important because the initial curl of this script
rconf runs iteratively various times throughout the attack. 

Figure 32: A snippet from the ‘rconf’ script, illustrating download and
installation of the malware under the name ‘httpd’

Now the main payload avatar.php was downloaded, renamed to httpd and executed,
we can focus on this binary. 

APPENDIX 3: THE MAIN PAYLOAD (‘HTTPD’ AND ‘SH’) ANALYSIS

Analysis of httpd 

The binary httpd is a packed ELF (MD5: 656e22c65bf7c04d87b5afbe52b8d800) bears
many detections in VirusTotal, including general Linux Trojan, Coinminer,
Exploitation tool for CVE-2021-4034, malware dropper etc. 

Our analysis shows that in a way all these detections are correct, as in a
nutshell this is a multipurpose malware-dropper that contains all the above. Its
operation is very interesting as it incorporates dozens of techniques to remain
hidden and persistent. Based on our analysis below we speculate the campaign
with this malware started about a year ago, and it remained quite anonymous and
undetected. 

As per the main payload, it is named in the download server as avatar.php, after
it is downloaded, it’s renamed to httpd. The machine is fingerprinted by various
commands such as uname −a, then it starts unpacking itself.  

Next, the httpd executable is copied from the running process into to /tmp
directory, as illustrated in Figure 33 below. What’s interesting is that it
finds the name of the process name that ran it, and saves itself under the /tmp
directory with the same name. It also saves the pid under the /tmp/.apid.
Lastly, httpd deletes itself. 

Figure 33: httpd copies itself from memory

This technique is called “process masquerading” or “process replacement”. It is
often done for the following reasons: 

 1. Defense Evasion: By deleting the original binary and copying itself to
    another location, the malware avoids detection from static file-based
    security measures that might be monitoring the original location. The
    /tmp directory is a common target because it is typically writable and
    frequently used for temporary files, making it less suspicious. 
 2. Obfuscation: Deleting the original binary and killing itself can make it
    harder for security analysts to trace back the activity to the original
    payload, thereby complicating forensic analysis. 

Analysis of sh 

The binary sh (MD5: 656e22c65bf7c04d87b5afbe52b8d800) is an exact copy of httpd.
After sh is executed, it sleeps for 10 minutes. Next it collects information
about the OS.  

Next, sh drops nine binaries. Four are exact duplication of sh/httpd. A
cryptominer and a rootkit (discussed below in ‘The Rootkit’ section). There are
3 lean binaries ldd, top and wizlmsh. The first 2 are user land rootkits, in
some executions we also saw lsof and crontab. Wizlmsh is used to ensure the
malware is running.

The malware opens a Unix socket to communicate with all the process it will run
in the future. Via /tmp/.xdiag/int/.per.s, it writes logs, which will later be
used by other dropped components as part of the attack.  

The malware is also running various operations such as shutting down security
controls, as seen in the example below: 

Figure 34: Shutting down security controls

The binary sh is also copying itself from memory to various location, as
illustrated below it saves itself as libpprocps.so and also as
/root/.config/cron/perfcc, /usr/bin/perfcc, and /usr/lib/libfsnkdev.so. 

Figure 35: sh copying itself from memory 

This is a tactic used for persistence, stealth, and possibly for privilege
escalation. Below we discuss the various path chosen: 

 1. The path /root/.config/cron/perfcc: This path is quite deceptive because it
    mimics a configuration directory under the root user, which might be
    overlooked by security scans assuming it’s a legitimate config file. The
    inclusion of cron in the path suggests an attempt to associate the malware
    with cron jobs. 
 2. The path /usr/bin/perfcc: The path /usr/bin is a standard directory for
    executable programs accessible to all users. Placing malware here could
    allow it to be executed like a normal system command, making detection
    harder. Naming the malware perfcc might be an attempt to masquerade as a
    legitimate system utility or command, reducing suspicion. 
 3. The binaries /usr/lib/libpprocps.so and /usr/lib/libfsnldev.so: These paths
    suggest the malware is impersonating shared libraries. /usr/lib is commonly
    used for storing shared libraries required by installed applications. The
    path libpprocps.so might be intended to appear related to the legitimate
    procps, a library and set of commands that includes utilities like ps, top,
    etc., which are used to display information about currently running
    processes.  

The choice of these paths generally reflects a strategy to blend in with normal
system operations, either by appearing as a utility or library that might
regularly be executed or loaded by other processes. 

APPENDIX 4: THE MAIN ROOTKIT (LIBGCWRAP.SO)

The rootkit has several purposes. One of the main purposes is to hook various
functions and modify their functionality. The rootkit itself is an ELF 64-bit
LSB shared object (.so) file named libgcwrap.so. The rootkit is using LD_PRELOAD
to load itself before other libraries.  

As illustrated in Figure 36 below, the rootkit strings are encrypted with XOR
and this function is iterating through an array, while performing XOR decryption
on each element in the array.  

Figure 36: XOR decrypt array

You can see in Figure 37 below the xor_decrypt function responsible to decrypt a
string by iterating over each byte of the input string, doing XOR with the key
0xAC. 

Figure 37: XOR decrypt  

It does various interesting manipulations, including hooking to Libpam symbols.
Specifically, to the function pam_authenticate, which is used by PAM to
authenticate users. Hooking or overwriting this function could allow
unauthorized actions during the authentication process, such as bypassing
password checks, logging credentials, or modifying the behavior of
authentication mechanisms.  

In addition, the rootkit is also designed to hook Libpcap symbols, specifically
to the function pcap_loop, which is widely used for capturing network traffic.  

Below we discuss what the attacker is trying to do with these hookings: 

 1. Network Traffic Manipulation: By hooking pcap_loop, an attacker could alter
    the behavior of applications that rely on libpcap for capturing network
    traffic. This could include security monitoring tools, network analyzers,
    and other systems that perform packet analysis. Manipulating this function
    could lead to missed detections, altered traffic logs, or leakage of
    sensitive data. 
 2. Data Eavesdropping: The hooked function might be modified to stealthily copy
    certain data passing through the network to a location controlled by an
    attacker, effectively creating a data exfiltration pathway. 
 3. Persistence and Evasion: Placing malicious code in /tmp and hooking critical
    functions like pcap_loop can be part of a strategy to maintain persistence
    on a host with minimal detection. This setup allows an attacker to continue
    malicious activities even after primary payloads are detected and removed. 

APPENDIX 5: USER LAND ROOTKITS ‘TOP’, ‘LDD’, ‘CRONTAB’ AND ‘LSOF’

The malware Perfctl is dropping in the path /home/???/.local/bin/ 4 binaries. In
our case top, ldd, lsof and crontab.  

Below is the snippet executing top: 

Figure 38: top execution

As seen in Figure 38 above, in the first row the script checks if the
environment variable ABWTRX is set, if it exists this shell script won’t run.
This is probably to check if the binary originally exists on the server or not. 

Next the variables r and m are defined as top and perfctl accordingly. We assume
that perfctl in this case is the object to hide which is the cryptominer. 

Next the script iterates over the /.local/bin binaries to save them in the
environment variable PATH. Now the script checks if the environment variable
AAZHDE is set. Just a reminder. The initial script, when the server is first
compromised, sets the environment variable AAZHDE. This is an inspection to
verify that the “normal” course of the execution of this malware remains.
Probably to evade sandbox execution. 

If AAZHDE is set, the binary top is executed passing all the arguments that were
passed during the script execution. 

If AAZHDE isn’t set, the script executes various commands. Including, 2 trap
commands. These trap commands execute deletion of the directory /tmp/smpr when
the script exists or if it is interrupted by a user. It then recreates /tmp/smpr
than it sets the environment variable AAZHDE as 1. 

Next, the cryptominer is stopped, and the file /tmp/.apid is deleted. Finally,
AAZHDE is unset and top is executed. 

Lastly, the environment variable AAZHDE is unset and the binary top is
executed. 

Below is the snippet executing ldd:

Figure 39: ldd execution

This snippet is very similar to the one of top. As seen in Figure 37 above, in
the first row the script checks if the environment variable ABWTRX is set, if it
exists this shell script won’t run. This is probably to check if the cryptominer
is running or not (we will get to that next), if the cryptominer is running this
script exits, otherwise it runs and executes the cryptominer. 

The binary top receives 2 parameters, as pointer to an executable and a pointer
to the argv. It performs multiple steps including initialization, environment
setup, cryptographic operations, data manipulation, and eventually executing
another program. It also runs infinite loop to keep the process running in the
background. 

Figure 40: top binary

You can see two functions modify_lookup_table_with_offset and libc_xor_cipher,
which are used to de-obfuscate various sections in memory. Next, there are
several checks of the environment variables and errors. 

Lastly, if all conditions are met, we see and execution of a binary (provided as
argument during top execution). 

Figure 41: top binary

Top is used for real-time monitoring of system performance and processes. Thus,
if a developer encounters a slowdown in the system corresponding to cryptomining
activity and asks to check the cpu of all running processes, the new tempered
with top will not show the cryptominer’s cpu consumption. 

Ldd is used to display the shared libraries (dynamic dependencies) required by
an executable or a shared library. It shows which libraries an application
depends on, as well as the paths to those libraries. The threat actor wants to
hide malicious libraries and dependencies used by the malware, preventing
detection during inspections.  

Crontab is used to schedule and manage recurring tasks (cron jobs) to run at
specified times on Linux/Unix systems. 

lsof Lists open files and shows which processes are using them, including files,
sockets, and network connections. 

This makes perfect sense that the threat actor is trying to modify the results
of these utilities as they may be used by developers or security engineers to
evaluate the server and understand what is attacking the machine.    

APPENDIX 6: UNIX SOCKET COMMUNICATION

The binary sh is opening a Unix socket to write and read from various files in
the /tmp directory. 

In the table below we review these files: 

# Path Use 1 /tmp/.xdiag/cp Malware pathname 2 /tmp/.xdiag/exi victim’s IP
address 3 /tmp/.xdiag/p Malware Int marker 4 /tmp/.xdiag/elog Events log 5
/tmp/.xdiag/ver Malware version (string) 6 /tmp/.xdiag/uid User ID 7
/tmp/.xdiag/int/.e.lock Malware Int marker 8 /tmp/.xdiag/hroot/cp Malware
pathname 9 /tmp/.xdiag/hroot/hscheck Heartbeat check 10
/tmp/.xdiag/tordata/control_auth_cookie.tmp Cookie 11
/tmp/.xdiag/tordata/cached-certs.tmp Certificates cache 12
/tmp/.xdiag/tordata/cached-microdesc-consensus.tmp Tor data 13
/tmp/.xdiag/tordata/state.tmp State of TOR logs

For instance, as illustrated in Figure 40 below, in the file below the malware
inserted the result of ls on the /tmp directory. 

Figure 42: lgctr file content

APPENDIX 7:




INDICATIONS OF COMPROMISE (IOCS)

Type Value Comment IP Addresses IP Addresses 211.234.111.116 Attacker IP IP
Addresses 46.101.139.173 Download server IP Addresses 104.183.100.189 Download
server IP Address 198.211.126.180 Download server Domains Domains bitping.com
Proxy-jacking service Domains earn.fm Proxy-jacking service Domains
speedshare.app Proxy-jacking service Domains repocket.com Proxy-jacking service
Files Binary file MD5: 656e22c65bf7c04d87b5afbe52b8d800 Malware Binary file MD5:
6e7230dbe35df5b46dcd08975a0cc87f Cryptominer Binary file MD5:
835a9a6908409a67e51bce69f80dd58a Rootkit Binary file MD5:
cf265a3a3dd068d0aa0c70248cd6325d Idd Binary file MD5:
da006a0b9b51d56fa3f9690cf204b99f top Binary file MD5:
ba120e9c7f8896d9148ad37f02b0e3cb wizlmsh

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Published under: SECURITY RESEARCH

Tags: Security Threats



Assaf Morag
Assaf is the Director of Threat Intelligence at Aqua Nautilus, where is
responsible of acquiring threat intelligence related to software development
life cycle in cloud native environments, supporting the team's data needs, and
helping Aqua and the broader industry remain at the forefront of emerging
threats and protective methodologies. His research has been featured in leading
information security publications and journals worldwide, and he has presented
at leading cybersecurity conferences. Notably, Assaf has also contributed to the
development of the new MITRE ATT&CK Container Framework.

Assaf recently completed recording a course for O’Reilly, focusing on cyber
threat intelligence in cloud-native environments. The course covers both
theoretical concepts and practical applications, providing valuable insights
into the unique challenges and strategies associated with securing cloud-native
infrastructures.


Idan Revivo
Idan is the Head of Security Research at Aqua Security. He manages a team of
researchers who are focused on threat hunting and vulnerability research in
containers, serverless, and cloud native technologies.


Related Blog Posts




Table of Contents
 * Elusive Malware Dominates Developer Forums 
 * The Attack Flow 
 * Perfctl Attack Highlights 
 * Additional Threat Intelligence 
 * Detection of “Perfctl” Malware 
 * Detection of “Perfctl” Malware with Aqua Security 
 * Mitigation of “Perfctl” Malware 
 * Appendices 

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