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THE EUROPEAN CHIPS ACT


What is the European Chips Act?

According to Article 1, the European Chips Act is a Regulation that establishes
a framework for strengthening the semiconductor ecosystem in the EU, in
particular through:

(a) the establishment of the Chips for Europe Initiative (the ‘Initiative’);

(b) setting the criteria to recognise and to support integrated production
facilities and open EU foundries that are first-of-a-kind facilities and that
foster the security of supply and the resilience of the Union’s semiconductor
ecosystem;

(c) setting up a coordination mechanism between the Member States and the
Commission for mapping and monitoring the Union’s semiconductor sector as well
as crisis prevention and response to semiconductor shortages and, where
relevant, consulting stakeholders from the semiconductor sector.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

30 November 2023 - The official inauguration of the Chips Joint Undertaking
(Chips JU)

The European Commission has officially inaugurated the Chips Joint Undertaking
(Chips JU), which will reinforce the European semiconductor ecosystem and
Europe's technological leadership. It will bridge the gap between research,
innovation and production thereby facilitating the commercialisation of
innovative ideas.

The Chips JU is the main implementer of the Chips for Europe Initiative
(expected total budget €15.8 billion until 2030). The Chips JU aims at
strengthening Europe's semiconductor ecosystem and economic security by managing
an expected budget of nearly €11 billion by 2030, provided by the EU and
participating states.

The Chips JU will:

- Set up pre-commercial, innovative pilot lines, providing industry
state-of-the-art facilities to test, experiment and validate semiconductor
technologies and system design concepts;

- Deploy a cloud-based Design Platform for design companies across the EU;

- Support the development of advanced technology and engineering capacities for
quantum chips;

- Establish a network of competence centres and promote skills development.

The work of the Chips JU reinforces Europe's technological leadership by
facilitating the transfer of knowledge from the lab to the fab, bridging the gap
between research, innovation and industrial activities, and by promoting the
commercialisation of innovative technologies by European industry including
start-ups and SMEs.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

21 September 2023 - The European Chips Act enters into force

The European Chips Act consists of three main pillars.

The first pillar - the Chips for Europe Initiative - reinforces Europe's
technological leadership, by facilitating the transfer of knowledge from the lab
to the fab, bridging the gap between research and innovation and industrial
activities and by promoting the industrialisation of innovative technologies by
European businesses. The Chips for Europe Initiative will be primarily
implemented by the Chips Joint Undertaking.

The Initiative will be supported by €3.3 billion of EU funds, which is expected
to be matched by funds from Member States. Concretely, this investment will
support activities such as the setting up of advanced pilot production lines to
accelerate innovation and technology development, the development of a
cloud-based design platform, the establishment of competence centres, the
development of quantum chips, as well as the creation of a Chips Fund to
facilitate access to debt financing and equity.

The Chips for Europe Initiative has the following five operational objectives:

1. Setting up a Design Platform.

2. Enhancing existing and developing new advanced pilot lines.

3. Building capacities for accelerating the development of Quantum chips and
associated semiconductor technologies.

4. Establishing a network of competence centres across the Union.

5. Setting up a Chips Fund to facilitate access to debt financing and equity, in
particular for start-ups, scale-ups, SMEs and small mid-caps.

With the exception of the Chips Fund (which will be implemented by the European
Innovation Council and InvestEU), the Initiative will mainly be implemented
through the Chips Joint Undertaking;— previously known as the Key Digital
Technologies Joint Undertaking.

The Initiative is supported by funding from the Horizon Europe and the Digital
Europe programmes.



Design Platform.

The design platform proposed in the Chips Act is a cloud-based virtual
environment to be made available across the Union, integrating a wide range of
design facilities, from IP libraries to Electronic Design Automation (EDA)
tools, as well as support services. The platform will be accessible in an open,
non-discriminatory and transparent way. It will stimulate wide cooperation
between users and key actors of the ecosystem and reinforce Europe’s chip design
capacity.

Pilot Lines.

The Chips for Europe Initiative includes a number of pilot lines for the purpose
of process development, test and experimentation, as well as small-scale
production. These will serve as a platform for European research and development
with an industrial perspective to bridge the gap from lab to fab.

A non-exhaustive list of three pilot line areas of strategic importance for
Europe has already been identified:

- Sub-2nm GAA process technology development

- FD-SOI technology at 10nm and below

- Heterogeneous integration

Quantum Chips and associated semiconductor technologies.

The Chips for Europe Initiative will also focus on the specific needs of the
future generation of information processing components exploiting non-classical
principles, notably chips exploiting quantum effects (i.e., quantum chips).

In particular, the Initiative will support the development of design libraries
for quantum chips, new or existing pilot lines, cleanrooms and foundries for
prototyping and producing quantum chips as well as facilities for testing and
validating advanced quantum chips produced by the pilot lines.


The second pillar of the European Chips Act incentivises public and private
investments in manufacturing facilities for chipmakers and their suppliers.

The second pillar creates a framework to ensure security of supply by attracting
investments and enhancing production capacities in semiconductor manufacturing.
To this end, it sets out a framework for Integrated Production Facilities and
Open EU Foundries that are “first-of-a-kind” in the Union and contribute to the
security of supply and to a resilient ecosystem in the Union interest. The
Commission has already indicated at the time of the Chips Act proposal that
State aid may be granted to first-of-a-kind facilities, in accordance with the
Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.

In its third pillar, the European Chips Act has established a coordination
mechanism between the Member States and the Commission for strengthening
collaboration with and across Member States, monitoring the supply of
semiconductors, estimating demand, anticipating shortages, and, if necessary,
triggering the activation of a crisis stage. As a first step, a semiconductor
alert system has been set up on 18 April 2023. It allows any stakeholder to
report semiconductor supply chain disruptions.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

18 April 2023 - The European Commission welcomes the political agreement on the
European Chips Act

The Commission welcomes the political agreement reached between the European
Parliament and the EU Member States on the European Chips Act.

Semiconductors are at the centre of strong geostrategic interests, and of the
global technological race. For this reason, the Commission proposed the European
Chips Act, which strengthens European competitiveness and resilience in this
strategic sector.

Chips are the essential building blocks of digital and digitised products. From
smartphones and cars, through critical applications and infrastructures for
healthcare, energy, defence, communications and industrial automation, chips are
central to the modern digital economy.

Recent shortages of semiconductors have highlighted Europe's dependency on a
limited number of suppliers outside of the EU, in particular Taiwan and
South-East Asia for manufacturing of chips, and the United States for their
design. To respond to critical dependencies, the European Chips Act will
strengthen manufacturing activities in the Union, stimulate the European design
ecosystem, and support scale-up and innovation across the whole value chain.
Through the European Chips Act, the European Union aims to reach its target to
double its current global market share to 20% in 2030.

The first pillar of the Act - the Chips for Europe Initiative - will reinforce
Europe's technological leadership, by facilitating the transfer of knowledge
from the lab to the fab, bridging the gap between research and innovation and
industrial activities and by promoting the industrialisation of innovative
technologies by European businesses.

The Chips for Europe Initiative will combine investments from the Union, Member
States and the private sector, through a strategic reorientation of the Key
Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking (renamed ‘Chips Joint Undertaking'). The
Initiative will be supported by €6.2 billion of public funds, of which €3.3
billion from the EU budget agreed today for the period until 2027, the end of
the current multi-annual financial framework.

This support will come in addition to €2.6 billion public funding already
foreseen for semiconductor technologies. The €6.2 billion will support
activities, such as the development of a design platform and setting up of pilot
lines to accelerate innovation and production.

The Initiative will also help the establishment of competence centres, located
across Europe, which will provide access to technical expertise and
experimentation, helping companies, SMEs in particular, to improve design
capabilities and developing skills. Together with design centres of excellence,
they will become poles of attraction for innovation and for new talent.
Moreover, to support start-ups and SMEs, access to finance will be ensured
through a Chips Fund and a dedicated semiconductor equity investment facility
established under InvestEU.

In addition to the Chips for Europe Initiative, the second pillar of the
European Chips Act will incentivise public and private investments in
manufacturing facilities for chipmakers and their suppliers. This will
contribute to the overall public investments in the sector estimated at €43
billion.

The second pillar of the European Chips Act will create a framework to ensure
security of supply by attracting investments and enhancing production capacities
in semiconductor manufacturing. To this end, it sets out a framework for
Integrated Production Facilities and Open EU Foundries that are
“first-of-a-kind” in the Union and contribute to the security of supply and to a
resilient ecosystem in the Union interest.

In its third pillar, the European Chips Act will also establish a coordination
mechanism between the Member States and the Commission for strengthening
collaboration with and across Member States, monitoring the supply of
semiconductors, estimating demand, anticipating shortages, and, if necessary,
triggering the activation of a crisis stage. To address such situations, the
European Chips Act establishes a dedicated toolbox of measures that can be
undertaken.

Already now, since the proposal for a European Chips Act, together with the
second Important Project of Common European Interest in microelectronics
currently under assessment, which involves 20 Member States and dozens of
participants, investment plans towards industrial deployment have reached €90 -
100 billion. The adoption of the European Chips Act will allow a faster
realisation of those projects and further progress in attracting investment to
secure Europe's supply chain in semiconductor.


Which is the next step?

The political agreement reached by the European Parliament and the Council is
now subject to formal approval by the two co-legislators.


1.12.2022 - The Council has formalized its negotiating position.

It provides the Council presidency with a mandate for negotiations with the
European Parliament, which will start as soon as the Parliament adopts its
position.

The European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)
appointed Mr Dan NICA as rapporteur on the Chips Act proposal. The ITRE
Committee is expected to vote on its amendments to the Commission’s proposal and
adopt the mandate for negotiations in January 2023, with the negotiating mandate
expected to be voted at Plenary in February 2023.

The European Chips Act is built on three pillars:

1. Pillar 1: setting up the Chips for Europe Initiative to support technology
capacity building and large-scale innovation across the EU to enable the
development and deployment of cutting-edge and next generation semiconductor and
quantum technologies that will strengthen the EU’s capabilities and competences
in advanced design, systems integration and component production; more
specifically, the Chips for Europe Initiative includes five operational
objectives related to: the development of pilot lines, to test and experiment
innovative process technology and design concepts; the development of a design
platform, to facilitate access to design resources; support to quantum chips;
the set-up of competence centres and the strengthening of skills, to increase
access and talent across the Union; and a Chips Fund, to support start-ups and
the scaling-up of SMEs;

2. Pillar 2: creating a framework to ensure security of supply by attracting
increased investment and production capacity in semiconductor manufacturing as
well as in packaging and advanced testing and assembly through first-of-a-kind
integrated production facilities and EU open foundries;

3. Pillar 3: establishing a mechanism for coordinating surveillance and crisis
response between Member States and the Commission to strengthen collaboration
with and between Member States, monitor the supply of semiconductors, estimate
demand, anticipate shortages, trigger the activation of a crisis phase and
deploy a dedicated toolbox.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


11.5.2022, Commission Staff Working Document, A Chips Act for Europe

On 8 February 2022, the European Commission proposed a comprehensive set of
measures for strengthening the EU’s semiconductor ecosystem, the European Chips
Act.

In this package, the Commission has adopted a Communication, outlining the
rationale and the overall strategy, a proposal for a Regulation for adoption by
co-legislators, a proposal for amendments to a Council Regulation establishing
the KDT Joint Undertaking, and a Recommendation to Member States promoting
actions for monitoring and mitigating disruptions in the semiconductor supply
chain.

To complement the proposed package, and as provided for in the Better Regulation
rules for cases where an Impact Assessment could not be prepared due to the
urgency of an initiative, this Staff Working Document (SWD) aims to explain why
Europe needs to act now to address shortcomings in key chip design and
manufacturing competences and facilities to ensure its resilience against supply
chain disruptions.

This SWD also provides additional information concerning the rationale behind
the proposed measures in the 3 pillars which are the foundations of the proposal
and explains further their implementation.

This would not have been possible without providing a panoramic description of
the characteristics of the semiconductor value chain, key market and technology
trends and opportunities, given the complexity of the technological context and
of the semiconductor ecosystem.

The SWD also intends to elucidate on the ongoing crisis and the pivotal role
semiconductors have acquired in the global context. Semiconductors are indeed at
the centre of geopolitical interests. Leading economies are keen to secure their
supply in the most advanced chips with significant investments, as this
increasingly conditions their capacity to act economically, industrially,
militarily, being the drivers of the digital transformation.


Unprecedented Global Semiconductor Shortages

Semiconductor supply chains are highly interconnected with many actors across
the globe and numerous choke points which can impact production. Over the past 2
years, Europe and other regions of the world have witnessed disruptions in the
supply of chips, causing shortages across multiple economic sectors with
potentially serious societal and economic consequences.

In a nutshell, the disruptions resulted from multiple factors, including the
acceleration of digital transformation in industry leading to an increased
demand in a large number of semiconductor components and devices; heightened
demand for computers, electronics and technology products as lockdowns related
to the COVID-19 pandemic led to a surge in remote working, home schooling and
digital entertainment; COVID-19-related closures of key fabs; dislocations in
global logistics and transportation networks coupled with shortages of raw
materials, key components and intermediary products.

The shortage of chips has impacted downstream sectors such as automotive,
energy, communications and health, as well as defence, security and space,
forcing delays in production and factory closures across the world. The impact
was severe and in the automotive sector, for instance, production in some
European Member States decreased by one third in 2021.


Why has the supply chain become so fragile?

Since the turn of the century, the semiconductor industry has responded to
market difficulties through consolidation and outsourcing to the Far East,
particularly concerning production, and assembly and testing. While this appears
to have led to better utilisation of existing capacity, however it has reduced
available spare capacity. Thus, given the high capital expenditure and time
required to set up new manufacturing facilities, there appears to be limited
possibility to increase production if demand goes up considerably as it did from
early 2020.

At the same time, the drive towards zero inventory approaches by some end user
industries has led to a situation where in case of a sudden increase in demand
for chips, there is very limited available inventory buffer to source from,
until production can catch up. The result of this is a high susceptibility
across the supply chain to surges in demand. A key problem is that once demand
exceeds supply it takes at least 2-3 years to recover as there is a need for
significant investment to increase capacity and inventory with a resulting long
lead time for components.

In recent years, geopolitical tensions have been simmering. China depends on
US-origin technology and imports of chips from Taiwan. With the “Made in China
2025” plan launched in 2015, China set itself the ambition of reaching 70%
autonomy in chip-making by 2025 and to this end earmarked USD 150 billion to
build up semiconductor design and manufacturing capacity. The creation of this
fund has been linked to the growth in pace of cross-border acquisitions in the
sector since 2015.

The U.S. government has responded to this “concerted push by China to reshape
the market in its favour”. In 2019, the US Department of Commerce broadened the
application of its Export Administration Rules (EAR) to curb the technological
advance of certain Chinese companies by cutting them off from critical US-origin
technology. Because of Europe’s strong dependence on US-origin technology for
chip design however, these measures have impacted European chipmakers trading
with China.

The shortages over the past two years have exposed structural vulnerabilities in
highly interdependent and global value chains already weakened by lean
production strategies and geopolitical frictions predating the pandemic. They
have furthermore served to highlight Europe’s dependency on supply from a
limited number of companies and geographies.


Edge Computing

Today, 80% of data is processed in the cloud and this market is characterised by
few US companies that currently take 80% of the revenue. However, the trend is
that the need for computing power at the edge (close to or on the device where
data is captured or generated) is growing much faster than the demand for
processing in the cloud. It is expected that in 5 years 80% of data processing
will take place at the edge reversing today’s balance. This represents a huge
opportunity for Europe to gain a strong foothold and be at the forefront of
leadership in this market.

Already there is a proliferation of so-called edge devices, e.g., smart watches,
smart meters, robots, sensors and there are many potential applications, e.g.,
monitoring the elderly in their homes, optimisation of renewal energy sources,
tracking and optimising resource use in factories, optimising pesticide and
water use by farm machinery, etc. In all cases, data is collected and analysed
locally, close to the device or person in question. By keeping data local, edge
computing provides benefits in terms of privacy and reduces energy consumption
as less data is sent to the cloud for remote processing. Linkages between
application domains, e.g., renewables with EV charging, are also possible to
provide further optimisation and generate new business cases.

Edge devices will get smarter and smarter as increasingly higher levels of
computational power can be embedded in a device. This will result in a paradigm
shift and already there are examples such as autonomous driving happening today
with the trialling of ad hoc 5G networks along major highway corridors.

In February 2020 the European Commission adopted the Data Strategy and new
legislation has been proposed. This naturally puts emphasis on sensors,
peripheral equipment and computers used in sectors such as transport, logistics,
agriculture, etc.

It is clear that Europe has strengths in systems design for key industrial
sectors such as manufacturing, automotive, etc. The key differentiator in future
will be in providing trusted hardware/software platforms that can support the
non-functional requirements of the application domains. This is an area where
Europe is a leader.


Increasing Security and Confidentiality Requirements

As the world has become more digitalised and interconnected, security has become
a key requirement for electronic devices from the point of view of safety, but
also from the point of view of confidentiality.

Security has become a major topic across many sectors including automotive,
industrial automation, communications, healthcare, aerospace and defence. For
industries such as automotive or healthcare, a security breach can lead to
physical injury and/or loss of customer confidence, introducing concerns over
liability.

With the introduction of GDPR in Europe personal data needs to be carefully
processed. With home working, people are using their own devices which may pose
multiple cybersecurity challenges. Devices which are used for both business and
personal use may run outdated or pirated software that hackers can exploit to
access confidential and valuable business data. It is also easier to gain access
to a private network. The average cost of a data breach has increased from USD
3.86 million to USD 4.24 million during 2021, due to people working from home.
Fewer than 3% of organisations protect their employees’ mobile devices.

Cybersecurity challenges come in many forms, including ransomware, phishing
attacks, malware attacks, etc. Ransomware attacks target desktops, laptops,
mobile phones and smart security devices. The aim is to compromise sensitive
user data in the device itself or render it unusable, or alternatively use it as
gateway to other devices for other malicious attacks. As cloud services are
being increasingly used for personal and professional data, they are subject to
increasing attacks. In phishing attacks, user data, such as login credentials
and credit card numbers, is stolen. Here the aim is not to block access but to
exploit access.

At the chip level there are concerns about third-party IP or unknowns in the
global supply chain that may lead to “backdoors” in devices. General approaches
currently used to boot securely and to authenticate firmware are not sufficient
when considering electronics deployed in cars, robots, drones, servers and
medical devices. There is a need for designed-in robust hardware security (see
Figure 34) considering different threats.

Designing active security into a device will impact complexity and power
consumption - an issue for battery powered devices. The added complexity may
also add other vulnerabilities. With complex designs making their way into
automotive, medical and industrial applications, where they are expected to be
used for up to 25 years, security needs to be well architected and flexible
enough to respond to future security holes and more sophisticated attack
vectors. There is a need to continually innovate to guard against future new
attacks.

Designing to reduce the risk of potential hardware breaches requires a solid
understanding of a chip’s architecture. This includes partitioning and
prioritisation of data movement and data storage, as well as obfuscation
techniques and activity monitoring. As chipmakers utilise more customisation and
heterogeneity, this is becoming more difficult. The drive for scaling is also
driving architects to package components together. This presents challenges as
not all components may be inherently secure and many customised accelerators and
IP blocks are provided as black boxes.

There is thus a need for ensuring that solutions can be fully audited and
checked/verified (e.g. possibility to look for back doors in open source IPs).
Notably this is not possible for IPs licensed from 3rd parties. Common Criteria
security certifications for simple hardware IP such as smart cards24 exist,
however, for more complex processors, security is still in its infancy and it is
not possible to buy a Common Criteria certified general purpose multicore
processor.

To get around this companies have to make liability limiting statements based on
the hardware’s documented interface. However, this may be insufficient as
highlighted by the Spectre/Meltdown vulnerabilities which appeared in 2018 which
were unexpected for almost all OS vendors.

EU Member States agreed to “work towards common standards and, where
appropriate, certification for trusted electronics, as well as common
requirements for procurement of secure chips and embedded systems in
applications that rely on or make extensive use of chip technology.” Reference
certification procedures for specific critical sectors and technologies with
potential high social impact are necessary. Certification of these chips for
trust and security should cover the value chain up to integration in end
products and should be reflected in public procurement and promoted in
international standardisation activities.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The European Chips Act

According to the European Commission, semiconductor chips are the essential
building blocks of digital and digitised products. From smartphones and cars,
through critical applications and infrastructures for healthcare, energy,
communications and industrial automation, chips are central to the modern
digital economy. The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed a weakness in the eco-system
within both Europe and other regions in the world experiencing significant
shortages of chips. EU industries manufacture many types of high-tech products,
of which chips are essential parts.

Europe must reinforce its capabilities in semiconductors to ensure future
competitiveness and maintain its technological leadership and security of
supply. The sector is both capital and knowledge intensive and chips supply
chains are global, complex and currently rely on a few manufacturing sites.

Europe has many strengths and some weaknesses in the semiconductor value chain.
The semiconductor sector is characterised by intense R&D activity, with
first-class companies reinvesting more than 15% of their revenues into research
in next generation technologies. The EU is home to world-leading research and
technology organisations and many excellent universities and research institutes
spread across the Union. These are pioneering the techniques behind the
production of some of the world's most advanced chips.

Moreover, Europe is very well positioned in terms of the materials and equipment
needed to run large chip manufacturing plants, with many companies playing
essential roles along the supply chain.

Despite these strengths, Europe has an overall global semiconductors production
market share of less than 10% and is heavily dependent on third-country
suppliers. In case of severe disruption of the global supply chain, Europe's
chips' reserves in some industrial sectors (e.g. automotive or healthcare
devices) could run out in a few weeks, bringing many European industries to a
standstill.

As the digital transformation accelerates and penetrates every part of society,
industrial needs for chips are set to increase, opening new market
opportunities.

The Chips Act is a unique opportunity for Europe to act jointly across all
Member States, to the benefit of the whole of Europe. However, the current chips
shortage is a systematic issue with no quick fix.

In the short term, the toolbox set out in the Recommendation will immediately
enable the coordination between the Member States and the Commission. This will
allow to discuss and decide on timely and proportionate crisis response
measures, if considered necessary.

In the medium term, the Chips Act will strengthen manufacturing activities in
the Union and support the scale-up and innovation of the whole value chain,
addressing security of supply and a more resilient ecosystem.

And, in the long-term, it will maintain Europe's technological leadership while
preparing the required technological capabilities that would support transfer of
knowledge from the lab to the fab and position Europe as a technology leader in
innovative downstream markets.


08 February 2022 - European Chips Act: Communication, Regulation, Joint
Undertaking and Recommendation.

Communication from the Commission: A Chips Act for Europe. You can find the
document in English, German and French.

A Chips Act for Europe.

Ein Chip-Gesetz für Europa.

Action europeenne sur les semi-conducteurs.


08 February 2022 - Proposal for a Regulation establishing a framework of
measures for strengthening Europe's semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act).

Proposal for a Regulation (Chips Act).

Annexes.

Semiconductor chips are central to the digital economy. They make digital
products work: from smartphones and cars, to critical applications and
infrastructures in health, energy, communications and automation to most other
industry sectors.

They are also key to the technologies of the future, including artificial
intelligence (AI) and 5G/6G communication. There is no “digital” without chips.

Within the past year, Europe has witnessed disruptions in the supply of chips,
causing shortages across multiple economic sectors and potentially serious
societal consequences. Many European sectors, including automotive, energy,
communication and health as well as strategic sectors such as defence, security,
and space are under threat by such supply disruptions. At the same time, fake
chips start appearing on the market, compromising the security of electronic
devices and systems.

The current crisis has revealed structural vulnerabilities of the European value
chains. The global semiconductor shortage has exposed European dependency on
supply from a limited number of companies and geographies, and its vulnerability
to third country export restrictions and other disruptions in the present
geopolitical context. Furthermore, this dependency is exacerbated by the
extremely high barriers to entry and capital intensity of the sector. For
example, the most computationally powerful chips require manufacturing to a
precision of a few nanometres (nm). Building such facilities entails an upfront
investment of at least EUR 15 billion and requires three years to achieve
production-readiness with adequate yields. The expenditures to design such chips
can range from EUR 0.5 billion to well over EUR 1.0 billion. Research and
development (R&D) intensity in the sector is high and more than 15%.

Today, European players invest mainly in R&D, but not enough in translating its
results into industrial benefits. Such R&D is a key enabler of miniaturisation
in semiconductor technologies required for the production of the next generation
computationally powerful chips. Europe is home to world-leading research and
technology organisations (RTOs). However, many results of European R&D are
industrially deployed outside the Union. The Union is strong in the design of
semiconductor components for power electronics, radio frequency and analogue
devices, sensors and microcontrollers that have a widespread use in the
automotive and manufacturing industries today. It is less strong in the design
of digital logic (processors and memory), which become essential as data, AI and
connectivity become increasingly pervasive.

The European Chips Strategy is articulated around five strategic objectives:

- Europe should strengthen its research and technology leadership;

- Europe should build and reinforce its own capacity to innovate in the design,
manufacturing and packaging of advanced chips, and turn them into commercial
products;

- Europe should put in place an adequate framework to increase substantially its
production capacity by 2030;

- Europe should address the acute skills shortage, attract new talent and
support the emergence of a skilled workforce;

- Europe should develop an in-depth understanding of global semiconductor supply
chains.


What is a semiconductor?

A semiconductor (or integrated circuit, microelectronic chip, or computer chip)
is an electronic device generally smaller than a postage stamp, that is composed
of billions of components that store, move, and process data.

All of these functions are based on the unique properties of semiconducting
materials, such as silicon and germanium, which allow for the precise control of
the flow of electrical current. Semiconductors give data storage and
communication capabilities to mobile phones, gaming systems, aircraft avionics,
industrial machinery, and military equipment and weapons. Hybrid electric
automobiles contain as many as 3,500 semiconductors.

Semiconductor chips are fundamental to emerging technologies such as artificial
intelligence, cloud computing, 5G, the Internet-of-Things (IoT), and large-scale
data processing and analytics and supercomputing.

Semiconductors can be classified into four major product groups, mainly based on
their function:

1. Microprocessors and logic devices are used for the interchange and
manipulation of data in computers, communication devices, and consumer
electronics. They perform a wide variety of tasks, such as running a word
processing program or a video game.

2. Memory devices are used to store information. This segment includes dynamic
random access memory (DRAM), a common and inexpensive type of memory used for
the temporary storage of information in computers, smartphones, tablets, and
flash memory, which retains data even when power is shut off.

3. Analog devices are used to translate analog signals, such as light, touch,
and voice, into digital signals. For example, they are used to convert the
analog sound of a musical performance into a digital recording stored online or
on a compact disc.

4. Optoelectronics, sensors, and discretes (commonly referred to as O-S-D).
Optoelectornics and sensors are mainly used for generating or sensing light, for
example, in traffic lights or cameras.

Silicon is still the most widely used basic material on which semiconductors are
fabricated. Five firms account for 90% of the world’s silicon wafer production;
two Japanese firms, Shin-Etsu and Sumco, account for around 60%. Silicon wafers
are manufactured in a number of countries around the world, including the United
States, Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom.


European-headquartered semiconductor firms

European-headquartered semiconductor firms accounted for about 10% (~$40
billion) of global semiconductor sales in 2019. Three firms based in the
European Union — STMicroeletronics, Infineon Technologies, and NXP
Semiconductors — ranked among the world’s top 15 semiconductor firms by sales in
2019.

European-headquartered semiconductor companies tend to specialize in niche
markets, including the automotive industry, energy applications, and industrial
automation; these firms do little production of computer- and consumer-related
chips. Some European companies are considered strong in chip architecture,
mobile telecommunications and industrial applications, and security chips (e.g.,
passports, IDs, and smartphones), a market dominated by NXP, Infineon, and
STMicroelectronics. Europe’s share of global revenues for fabless firms is small
(2%).

In May 2013, the European Commission (EC) announced an initiative aimed at
increasing Europe’s share of global semiconductor manufacturing by providing
$11.3 billion (€10 billion) in public and private funding for R&D activities in
an effort to induce about $113 billion (€100 billion) in industry investment in
manufacturing. The initiative called for a multipronged approach that included
easing access to capital financing by qualified companies; pooling European
Union (EU), national, and regional subsidies to enable larger-scale projects;
and improving worker training.

The Commission’s goal was for European firms to account for 20% of global chip
manufacturing by 2020. The years-long program may have helped prevent Europe’s
market share in wafer fabrication from declining. European-based fabs accounted
for 3% of global 300mm wafer fabrication production capacity in 2019, the same
share as in 2015. Bosch and Infineon, among the most important suppliers of
automotive semiconductors, are each constructing a new 300mm fab in Europe.

The European Commission and European governments continue to seek ways to
bolster Europe’s microelectronics sector. A 2018 report, Rebooting Electronics
Value Chains in Europe, prepared by Europe’s semiconductor companies for the
Commission, recommended that the EU provide additional funds for public-private
partnerships in microelectronics manufacturing and other electronics components
and systems.

France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom received Commission approval at
the end of 2018 for a $2 billion (€1.7 billion) joint microelectronics project
aimed at encouraging investments in internet-connected devices and connected car
technologies; this effort is scheduled for completion by 2024. The Commission
anticipates that this investment will stimulate roughly $6.7 billion (€6
billion) in private investment.


The shortage of semiconductors

The world is short of semiconductors. According to the European Commission, the
shortage has very concrete consequences on the EU economy, jobs and even
leisure. Carmakers postpone the production of vehicles. Broadband providers run
out of Internet routers. Gamers cannot get their hands on next-gen consoles.

The situation might last for a while. Semiconductors are at the core of our
world’s digitisation, but global supply is currently struggling to meet the
explosion of demand driven by smartphones, Internet of Things and connected
cars.

But it is not only about supply and demand. Semiconductors are at the centre of
strong geostrategic interests, and at the core of the global technological race.

Superpowers are keen to secure their supply in the most advanced chips as they
are well aware that it will condition their capacity to act (militarily,
economically, industrially) and drive digital transformation.

Chips are a strategic component of any industrial chain. The race for the most
advanced chips is a race about technological and industrial leadership.

The US are now discussing a massive investment under the American Chips Act
designed to finance the creation of an American research centre and to help open
up advanced production factories. The objective is clear: to increase the
resilience of US semiconductor supply chains.

Taiwan is positioning itself to ensure its primacy on semiconductor
manufacturing.

China, too, is trying to close the technological gap as it is constrained by
export control rules to avoid technological transfers.

On 19 October 2021, the European Commission published its 2022 Work Programme
with the key goals for 2022. Here we can read that the European Commission will
publish a proposal for a European Chips Act in the first half of 2022.


Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor technologies

The Alliance brings together key actors to design and produce microelectronics
chips.

The European Commission launched the European Alliance on Processors and
Semiconductor technologies in July 2021. From smartphones to 5G to the Internet
of Things and beyond, processors and semiconductor technologies are crucial for
a successful Digital Decade.

The overall objective of the Alliance is to identify current gaps in the
production of microchips and the technology developments needed for companies
and organisations to thrive, no matter their size. This will help the
competitiveness of companies, increase Europe’s digital sovereignty and address
the demand for the next generation of secure, energy-efficient, powerful chips
and processors.

The Alliance will enhance and foster collaboration across existing and future EU
initiatives. It will help to provide the EU with the necessary capabilities in
semiconductor technologies to power its critical digital infrastructure and
communication networks. And, it will support a range of sectors and
technologies, including automotive, industrial automation, healthcare and
AI-enabled systems.

This translates in 2 main lines of actions, addressing the main gaps Europe is
facing:

1. The reinforcement of the European electronics design ecosystem. This includes
design at leading-edge nodes and open-source hardware solutions, which will help
develop powerful and resource efficient processors.

2. The establishment of the necessary manufacturing capacity. This includes
assembly testing and advanced packaging, by a mix of local and global players,
to produce the next generation of trusted processors, electronic components and
technologies. This will translate into a twin track to be developed in parallel:
moving Europe towards producing technologies from 16 nanometres (nm) to 10 nm,
as well as from 5 nm to 2 nm and beyond. These most advanced type of
semiconductors which, in addition to performance increases, have the potential
to cut massively the energy used by everything from phones to data centres.

Any organisation with relevant existing or planned activities in the area of
processor and semiconductor technologies, including end-user companies,
associations, and research and technology organisations, can join the Alliance.
They can do so by signing the Declaration and filling in the application form
provided they meet the eligibility criteria set out in the Terms of Reference.


Semiconductors - the situation in the USA

According to the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), the U.S.
semiconductor industry employs over a quarter of a million workers and company
sales totaled $208 billion in 2020. Advances in semiconductor technology have
been, and continue to be, a linchpin of U.S. economic prosperity and national
security.

But there is currently a global shortage of semiconductors due to several
factors, including disruptions related to the COVID-19 pandemic and the
increased use of semiconductors in cars. The industry is also facing the
technical limits of conventional semiconductor materials. This portends the end
of “Moore's Law,” which for more than 50 years has held that, thanks to
miniaturization, the number of semiconductor devices called transistors that can
be packed on a chip doubles about every two years.

There is also a supply chain problem. Americans invented semiconductors and lead
the world in chip technology but provide only 12 percent of global semiconductor
manufacturing capacity, according to the SIA. Most chip manufacturing occurs in
Asia.

Moves are afoot to boost U.S. semiconductor manufacturing, research innovation
and supply chain security. Advances in measurement science, standards,
materials, instrumentation, testing, and manufacturing capabilities will be
needed to help design, develop and manufacture next-generation microelectronics.

According to the US Congressional Research Service, semiconductors enable nearly
all industrial activities, including systems that undergird U.S. technological
competitiveness and national security.

Many policymakers see U.S.strength in semiconductor technology and fabrication
as vital to U.S. economic and national security interests. The U.S.
semiconductor industry dominates many parts of the semiconductor supply chain,
such as chip design. Semiconductors are also a top U.S. export. Semiconductor
design and manufacturing is a global enterprise with materials, design,
fabrication, assembly, testing, and packaging operating across national borders.

Six U.S.-headquartered or foreign-owned semiconductor companies currently
operate 20 fabrication facilities, or fabs, in the United States. In 2019,
U.S.-based semiconductor manufacturing directly employed 184,600 workers at an
average wage of $166,400.

Some U.S.-headquartered semiconductor firms that design and manufacture in the
United States also have built fabrication facilities overseas. Similarly, U.S.-
headquartered design firms that do not own or operate their own fabrication
facilities contract with foreign firms located overseas to manufacture their
designs. Much of this overseas capacity is in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan,
and increasingly in China. Some Members of Congress and other policymakers are
concerned that only a small share of the world’s most advanced semiconductor
fabrication production capacity is in the United States.

Other have become increasingly concerned about the concentration of production
in East Asia and related vulnerability of semiconductor supply chains in the
event of a trade dispute or military conflict and other risks such as product
tampering and intellectual property theft.

Some Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers have expressed concerns
about the economic and military implications of a loss of U.S. leadership in
semiconductors. China’s state-led efforts to develop an indigenous vertically
integrated semiconductor industry are unprecedented in scope and scale. Many
policymakers are concerned that these efforts, if successful, could
significantly shift global semiconductor production and related design and
research capabilities to China, undermining U.S. and other foreign firms’
leading positions.

In October 2020, Ellen M. Lord, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and
Sustainment, testified:

"Reduced U.S. capability in microelectronics is a particularly troublesome area
for the [Defense Industrial Base]. Government incentives and low labor costs in
foreign countries have been the main drivers for the migration of
microelectronics manufacturing, packaging, and testing to off-shore suppliers.
This strains our ability to acquire and sustain microelectronic components
embedded in systems critical to national security and national defense. Reliance
on non-U.S. suppliers for microelectronics leaves DOD vulnerable. The risks of
this reality include: availability of microelectronics in case of embargo; loss
of U.S. intellectual property from offshore dependency; and loss of confidence
the technology will function as intended due to possible malicious activity by
foreign fabricators."

Although China’s current share of the global industry is still relatively small
and its companies produce mostly low-end chips, China’s industrial policies aim
to establish global dominance in semiconductor design and production by 2030.
Moreover, Chinese semiconductor competencies could support a range of technology
advancements, including military applications. Another issue for policymakers is
how to address competing interests: China is an important market for U.S.
semiconductor firms but U.S. and foreign industry are helping to advance China’s
capabilities.

China’s government outlays (an estimated $150 billion to date) and its role as a
central production point for global consumer electronics are generating strong
incentives and pressures on U.S. and foreign firms to focus on China. The
Chinese government views access to foreign capabilities in the near term as a
key pathway to accelerate China’s indigenous development. Also of concern to
many are China’s state-led efforts to acquire companies and access semiconductor
technology through both licit and illicit means; targeted intellectual property
(IP) theft; and technology-transfer pressures.

Issues before Congress include the appropriate role of government in assisting
U.S. industry; how best to focus federal financial assistance; the amount of
funding each proposed activity would need to accomplish its goals for sustaining
U.S. semiconductor competitiveness; how to coordinate and integrate federal
activities internally and with initiatives of the U.S. semiconductor and related
industries; and how to address China’s ambitious industrial plans, trade
practices of concern, and the role of U.S. firms in China’s emerging
semiconductor market.

Legislation has been introduced in the 116th Congress to increase federal
funding for semiconductor research and development efforts; collaboration
between government, industry, and academic partners; and tax credits, grants,
and other incentives to spur U.S. production. Two bills under consideration are
the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America
Act (S. 3933/H.R. 7178) and the American Foundries Act (AFA) of 2020 (S. 4130).
Some of the provisions of these acts have been included in other bills.


Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission President, 2021 State of the Union
address.

Digital is the make-or-break issue. And Member States share that view. Digital
spending in NextGenerationEU will even overshoot the 20% target.

That reflects the importance of investing in our European tech sovereignty. We
have to double down to shape our digital transformation according to our own
rules and values.

Allow me to focus on semi-conductors, those tiny chips that make everything
work: from smartphones and electric scooters to trains or entire smart
factories.

There is no digital without chips. And while we speak, whole production lines
are already working at reduced speed - despite growing demand - because of a
shortage of semi-conductors.

But while global demand has exploded, Europe's share across the entire value
chain, from design to manufacturing capacity has shrunk. We depend on
state-of-the-art chips manufactured in Asia.

So this is not just a matter of our competitiveness. This is also a matter of
tech sovereignty. So let's put all of our focus on it.

We will present a new European Chips Act. We need to link together our
world-class research, design and testing capacities. We need to coordinate EU
and national investment along the value chain.

The aim is to jointly create a state-of-the-art European chip ecosystem,
including production. That ensures our security of supply and will develop new
markets for ground-breaking European tech.

Yes, this is a daunting task. And I know that some claim it cannot be done.

But they said the same thing about Galileo 20 years ago.

And look what happened. We got our act together. Today European satellites
provide the navigation system for more than 2 billion smartphones worldwide. We
are world leaders. So let's be bold again, this time with semi-conductors.

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