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RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 15

Mar 15, 2022 - Press ISW
Download the PDF




Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 15

Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko

March 15, 5:30 pm ET

Local company- and battalion-level attacks by Russian forces northwest of Kyiv
on March 14-15 likely indicate the largest-scale offensive operations that
Russian forces attempting to encircle Kyiv can support at this time. Russian
forces did not conduct offensive operations northeast of the city, around Sumy,
and only limited (and unsuccessful) attacks southeast of Kharkiv. Russian force
generation efforts, including reservist and conscript call-ups and the ongoing
transport of Syrian fighters to Russia and Belarus, are unable to change the
balance of forces around Kyiv within the coming week. Russian forces have not
conducted simultaneous attacks along their multiple axes of advance across
Ukraine since March 4 and are unlikely to do so in the next week.[1]

Russian forces in southeastern Ukraine continue to demonstrate the greatest
capabilities to date and are steadily advancing in three directions: northeast
from Kherson, taking territory in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, and reducing the
Ukrainian pocket in Mariupol. Russian forces are unlikely to successfully
encircle Mykolayiv and threaten Odesa in the near future but retain uncommitted
Naval Infantry reserves that could conduct an amphibious operation or disembark
to reinforce Russian ground operations, as Russia has employed Naval Infantry
elsewhere. Russia may seek to encircle Zaporizhya by advancing northeast up the
west bank of the Dnipro River after failing to break through Ukrainian forces
directly south of the city on the east bank. Russian forces are making slow but
steady progress against Ukrainian defenders on the line of contact in Donbas and
likely seek to force them out of their prepared defensive positions.

With Russian forces likely unable to complete the encirclement of Kyiv or resume
mobile offensive operations in northeastern Ukraine in the near future, the
Russian capture of Mariupol will likely be the next key inflection in the
Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian forces have successfully encircled Mariupol
and are conducting daily assaults on the western and eastern outskirts of the
city. Russian air, missile, and artillery strikes continue to target residential
areas and civilian infrastructure to force the city to capitulate. Russian
forces have encircled the city to a depth that will likely prevent the defenders
from breaking out and prevent Ukrainian efforts to relieve the defenders.
Russian forces will likely be able to capture Mariupol or force it to capitulate
despite strong Ukrainian defenses. The Russian capture of Mariupol will free up
Russian forces, likely including large portions of the 8th Combined Arms Army,
to threaten Ukrainian defenders along the line of contact in Donbas with
encirclement or alternatively reinforce a Russian offensive toward Mykolayiv and
Odesa. This assessment assumes that the defenders in Mariupol will run out of
ammunition and/or water at some point in the relatively near future. Mariupol
has been heavily fortified for years, however, and it is possible that its
defenders secured sufficient supplies in advance to hold out longer. The
Russians will likely continue to escalate bombardments to the point of simply
destroying the city if that appears to be the case, but the reduction of
Mariupol in this way could take considerably longer.

Key Takeaways

 * Russian forces are unlikely to launch offensive operations to encircle Kyiv
   larger than the scattered Russian attacks observed northwest of Kyiv
   targeting Irpin on March 14 and Guta-Mezhyhirska on March 15 within the
   coming week but may launch further tactical attacks.
 * Russian forces continued to assault Mariupol from the east and west.
 * Russian forces did not conduct major offensive operations toward northeastern
   Kyiv in the past 24 hours.
 * Russian forces attempting to encircle Kharkiv continue to face supply
   shortages, particularly regarding ammunition.
 * The Russian military falsely claimed to have captured the entirety of Kherson
   Oblast on March 15 but did not conduct any major operations toward either
   Zaporizhya or Mykolayiv.
 * Russia is unlikely to launch an unsupported amphibious operation against
   Odesa until Russian forces secure a ground line of communication to the city,
   but Russian Naval Infantry retain the capability to conduct a landing along
   the Black Sea coast.

Click here to expand the map below.



Russian forces continue to face difficulties quickly mobilizing replacements for
combat losses but are continuing efforts to leverage conscripts and
international troops. Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russia has been
forced to suspend the mobilization of certain categories of workers in the
Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) to maintain local
governance but continues to conscript some DNR/LNR residents to replace Russian
losses.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 15 that Russia has
established mercenary training centers in Smolensk, Russia, and Homel and
Bobruisk, Belarus.[3]

Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:

 * Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
 * Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
   * Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk Oblast;
 * Supporting effort 2—Mariupol and Donetsk Oblast; and
 * Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward.

Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis are aimed at
encircling the city from the northwest, west, and east.

Russian forces conducted limited attacks against several towns close to the
western bank of the Dnipro River on March 15. Russian forces did not conduct
offensive operations east of Kyiv and continued to prioritize improving
logistics and reinforcing combat units. Russian forces are unlikely to launch
offensive operations to encircle Kyiv larger than the scattered Russian attacks
observed northwest of Kyiv targeting Irpin on March 14 and Guta-Mezhyhirska on
March 15 within the coming week but may launch further tactical attacks.

Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro        

Russian forces conducted several unsuccessful limited attacks toward
northwestern Kyiv on March 15. Ukrainian forces repulsed Russian attacks on
Guta-Mezhyhirska and Lyutyszh, directly on the western bank of the Dnipro River,
and on Makariv, directly west of Kyiv.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense
falsely claimed Russian paratroopers captured Guta-Mezhyhirska late on March 14
and seized a cache of “Western” weapons from “nationalists and foreign
mercenaries.”[5] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported ongoing
fighting along the length of the Russian effort to encircle Kyiv from the west
on March 15, but ISW assesses that Russian forces have not conducted any major
attacks.[6] Russian forces continued to deploy replacements and reinforcements
to the northern Kyiv axis.

Subordinate supporting effort—Chernihiv and Sumy axis

Russian forces did not conduct major offensive operations toward northeastern
Kyiv in the past 24 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian
forces continued to reinforce combat units and reinforce its logistics system
around Chernihiv as of noon local time on March 15 in preparation for resumed
attacks towards Brovary.[7] Ukrainian forces captured two Russian soldiers from
an unidentified unit in Velyka Dymerka, northeast of Brovary.[8] Limited
fighting occurred in Bohdanivka, Lukashi, and Slavutych on March 14-15, but
Russian forces did not conduct any major offensive operations.[9]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces have not abandoned
operations to surround Sumy and launched several unsuccessful local attacks late
on March 14-15.[10] Independent Ukrainian media additionally reported that
Russian and Ukrainian forces agreed to open several humanitarian corridors on
March 15 to evacuate Ukrainian citizens from Sumy, Konotop, Shostka,
Trostyanets, and Lebedyn.[11]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:

Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations toward Kharkiv or Izyum
on March 15 and continue to face supply shortages, particularly of
ammunition.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 14 that Russia
will likely deploy additional reserves to the Kharkiv axis of advance.[13] The
General Staff reported that Russia is forcing conscripts to sign contract
service agreements to replenish units of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA), which
is most likely active on the Kharkiv or Sumy fronts.[14] The continued ability
of Ukrainian forces to carry out successful local counterattacks indicate
Russian forces are unlikely to successfully bypass Kharkiv from the southeast to
advance toward Dnipro and Zaporizhia in the near term.

Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk Oblast:

Russian forces conducted several unsuccessful attacks around Horlivka late on
March 14.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces prioritized
reinforcing their positions in the western outskirts of Severodonetsk on March
15.[16] Ukraine’s 24th Motorized Rifle Brigade reported destroying three Russian
tanks and an armored personnel carrier (APC) in a Russian convoy in Luhansk
Oblast on March 15.[17]

Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol and Donetsk Oblast:

Russian and proxy forces conducted several assaults on Mariupol from the east
and west on March 14 and 15.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that
Ukrainian forces repulsed a major Russian assault on an unspecified location in
Mariupol on March 15, claiming to have inflicted 150 casualties and destroyed
nine Russian vehicles.[19] The Azov Regiment reported defeating one of the
“units” (likely a battalion or company) of the Russian 22nd Separate Guards
Special Purpose Brigade, a Spetsnaz unit.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff
additionally reported Ukrainian artillery and aviation destroyed 12 Russian
vehicles in columns around Mariupol on March 15.[21] Russian forces continue to
shell civilian infrastructure and residential areas of Mariupol to force the
city to capitulate.[22] DNR forces claimed to capture the towns of Rivnopil,
Zlatoustovka, and Blyzhnje north of Mariupol on March 15.[23]

Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and west:

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct any
offensive operations north and west of Kherson on March 15.[24] Russian forces
attacked Hulyaipole, Orihiv, and Kamyanske late on March 14, resuming operations
to advance directly north toward Zaporizhya.[25] The Russian Ministry of Defense
falsely claimed on March 15 to have captured the entirety of Kherson
Oblast.[26] Russian forces have conducted limited advances northeast of Kherson
city on March 13-15 but have not captured the entire Oblast. Russian forces may
intend to advance toward Kryvyi Rih to encircle Zaporizhya, but are unlikely to
have the forces necessary to do so while Russian forces in the south remain
committed to the encirclement of Mariupol.

Satellite imagery depicted 14 Russian vessels operating off the coast of Odesa
early on March 15, though the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that it has not
observed any Russian preparation for an amphibious landing anywhere in the Black
Sea.[27] Russian Naval Infantry likely retain the capability to conduct an
amphibious landing along the Black Sea coast. However, Russia is unlikely to
launch an unsupported amphibious operation against Odesa until Russian forces
secure a ground line of communication to the city—which they are unlikely to do
in the next week.

Immediate items to watch

 * Russian forces will likely capture Mariupol or force the city to capitulate
   within the coming weeks;
 * The Ukrainian General Staff continued to report that there is a high
   probability of Russian provocations aimed at involving Belarus in the war in
   Ukraine, though ISW continues to assess that Belarus is unlikely to open a
   new line of advance into Ukraine;
 * Ukrainian counterattacks and operations by Territorial Defense Forces in
   northeastern Ukraine threaten Russia’s exposed line of communicating,
   requiring Russia to redeploy forces away from the offensive toward eastern
   Kyiv;
 * Company and battalion-level attacks northwest of Kyiv likely represent the
   largest scale of offensive operations that Russian forces can currently
   undertake to complete the encirclement of the city;
 * Russian troops may drive on Zaporizhya City itself within the next 48-72
   hours, likely attempting to block it on both banks of the Dnipro River and
   set conditions for subsequent operations after Russian forces take Mariupol,
   which they are currently besieging.

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign....

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272694708376948.

[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272888168357602.

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272888168357602.

[5] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/14070845.

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272549558391463.

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272549558391463;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272888168357602.

[8] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1503716073576833024?s=20&t=1qCT-F_....

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272549558391463.

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272549558391463.

[11] https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1503598502412271618;
https://twitter.com/prm_ua/status/1503597976698163201.

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272549558391463;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272888168357602.

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272549558391463.

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272549558391463.

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272549558391463.

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272888168357602.

[17] https://www.facebook.com/24th.brigade/posts/2068716069963844.

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272888168357602

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272549558391463;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272694708376948.

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/273095601670192.

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272549558391463;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272694708376948.

[22] https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1503520625784238085.

[23] https://dnronline dot
su/pod-kontrol-dnr-pereshli-eshhe-tri-naselennyh-punkta-2/.

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272888168357602.

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272549558391463.

[26] https://iz dot
ru/1305208/2022-03-15/minoborony-rossii-soobshchilo-o-polnom-kontrole-khersonskoi-oblasti.

[27] https://twitter.com/CovertShores/status/1503732767569420296?s=20&t=oo9Bw... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272549558391463;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/272694708376948.

 

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