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Analysis, September 2014


CONVENTIONAL MILITARY HAS LOST ITS POWER

by Oregon PeaceWorks • September 10, 2014 • 0 Comments


BY STEPHEN KINZER

Today’s conflicts illustrate the declining value of conventional military
power. For many decades, the United States dominated the world mainly because we
had the most potent military. We still do — but that no longer brings the
dominance it once assured.

For much of history, power has been won on the battlefield. Victory depended on
your army. If it was bigger, stronger, and better led than the enemy, you would
probably win.

That charmingly simple equation is now evaporating. In the emerging new world,
cultural forces and webs of global politics and economics bind nations together
in ways that make the exercise of military power more difficult. The idea that a
big power can easily stop, win, or decisively intervene in an overseas conflict
by applying massive force is a relic of past centuries. Potent armies are less
valuable than they once were.


TRUISM FOR MILITARY AND SECURITY POLICIES: FIGHTING THE LAST WAR AND THE LAST
ATTACK

This is naturally troubling for the United States. No one wants to see the value
of a principal asset decline. Our military, however, is best prepared to fight
the kind of battles that are no longer fought. It is a truism that generals are
great at fighting the last war. Something similar could be said of American
security policies: They address past challenges, which are easy to see, but not
the more complex ones the future holds.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Iraq. A violently anti-American force has seized
a huge part of the country, and the state itself may be on the brink of
collapse. The United States, with all its military power, sits helplessly on the
sidelines. This is not because of fecklessness in the White House. It is because
in Iraq, as in many other places, our military power could achieve only
short-term success at best.

In fact, it was our use of military force that helped produce this disaster. Our
invasion in 2003 not only failed to produce victory in Iraq. It set off
processes that led, among other things, to a palpable decline in our global
power.

Another vivid example of the limited value of military force is now unfolding in
Gaza. Radicals there, armed with rudimentary weapons, have dragged the mighty
Israeli army into a bloody conflict. They win strength — and blacken
Israel’s name in the world — even as they suffer inevitable defeat on the
battlefield. Israel clings even more fervently than the United States to the
dangerously outmoded view that countries can guarantee their long-term security
by military means alone.

The United States has not won a war since 1945 — unless you count the defeat
of Grenada in 1983. Despite the application of huge resources, and enormous
sacrifices in blood and treasure, we lost major wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. This is despite the fact that by conventional standards, our
military is the world’s best.


CLINGING TO OLD CERTAINTIES AND FAILING TO QUESTION THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Tradition, inertia, and the natural impulse to cling to old certainties all
contribute to America’s refusal to confront the declining value of our prized
military. Something else also drives it: the defense industry.

Military contractors have mastered the art of applying campaign contributions to
gain political influence. They habitually divide major projects into pieces so
that powerful members of Congress depend on them not just for contributions, but
for employment in their districts. This naturally discourages the posing of
questions about the true value of projects like the F-35 fighter jet, which is
to cost taxpayers an eye-popping $1.45 trillion over the coming decades.

Centuries ago Christopher Marlowe asked, “What are kings, when regiment is
gone,/But perfect shadows in a sunshine day?” It is a fit question for the
modern United States. We are accustomed to being something like kings of the
world, but our regiment is now — not gone, but weakened. The decreasing value
of armies threatens our standing in the world. Given this reality, how can we
prevent ourselves from fading like shadows? How can we influence the world when
the instrument we wield best — military force — no longer allows us to
impose our will?

Successful countries of the 21st century will be those that are skillful at
public diplomacy, cultural politics, and alliance-building. In the past, because
of our military power, we have not had to develop those skills. We will have to
learn them if we hope to project power in the future.Φ

Stephen Kinzer is a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International
Studies at Brown University. Follow him on Twitter @stephenkinzer.

Tags: Afghanistan defense industry Gaza Grenada Iraq Stephen Kinzer


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