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Spotlight




DEMYSTIFYING EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE IN AFRICA’S TECHNOLOGY SECTOR

By Nate Allen

November 12, 2024

To mitigate vulnerabilities from foreign control over the supply of critical
technological infrastructure, African countries should prioritize cybersecurity,
diversity, and competition within the tech sector.






A China Mobile display at the 2023 Africa Tech Summit in Nairobi, Kenya. (Photo:
AFP/Xinhua/Han Xu)

Africa’s reliance on foreign suppliers for the continent’s technology
infrastructure is widely seen as a major cybersecurity vulnerability. The most
prominent example of this was when network engineers at the African Union (AU)
headquarters in Addis Ababa uncovered a massive ongoing cyber espionage campaign
at the Chinese-built facility. Dating back to 2012, troves of sensitive data
from AU systems were being transmitted to Shanghai each night between 12 and 2
a.m. Other cases of Chinese cyber espionage include the infiltration of key
government ministries in Kenya as the two countries wrangled over debt and
continued surveillance of the AU via Chinese-supplied closed-circuit television
cameras.

> The challenge for African countries is how best to reap the benefits from
> externally supplied technology while safeguarding Africa’s critical
> infrastructure.

These high-profile incidents are part of a pattern of external actors in Africa
and across the world leveraging their influence over technology infrastructure,
supply chains, and government buildings to engage in cyberattacks. Underscoring
this vulnerability, Chinese companies have built nearly 200 government buildings
in Africa and at least 14 sensitive intragovernmental telecommunications
networks. Beijing has also donated computers to at least 35 African governments.

Because information and communications-based infrastructure increasingly
underpins everyday life, opportunities for exploitation are likely to increase.
In the first quarter of 2023 alone, attacks were detected against one-third of
the continent’s computers that operate sensitive industrial control systems.
Cyberattacks, linked either directly or indirectly to external state actors,
have had major impacts on the finance, public services, and port infrastructure
sectors of various African countries in recent years.

At the same time, externally supplied information and communications
technologies make indispensable contributions to Africa’s technological
development and the well-being of millions of Africans. Foreign suppliers will
remain influential actors in tech spaces for the foreseeable future. The
challenge for African countries, then, is how best to reap the benefits from
externally supplied technology while safeguarding Africa’s critical
infrastructure.


UNPACKING THE TECH STACK

The technology sector is vast, incorporating everything from programming
languages that create software, to routers that provide wireless connectivity,
to satellites that power GPS systems. Analyses of external actor influence in
African technology spaces rarely examine the technology sector holistically.
Most focus only on the influence of one external actor, such as China or the
United States, or one aspect of the tech sector, such as hardware.

The concept of a technology stack, or tech stack, provides a useful framework
for thinking more comprehensively about the key actors and activities in the
technology sector. It consists of at least five layers, beginning with those
that interact most with the user and ending with technology service providers.
These include:




MAPPING EXTERNAL ACTOR INFLUENCE IN THE AFRICAN TECH STACK

Africa’s tech stack has numerous vulnerabilities to external influence across
and within each layer. A smartphone manufacturer can influence the user through
the security of the hardware it uses and the ecosystem of pre-loaded
applications it chooses. The maker of an application can either knowingly or
unknowingly introduce vulnerabilities via the update process. Through their
control over physical networks, service and infrastructure providers have
significant latitude to monitor, mediate, and even shut down the access of users
to telecommunications resources. Both private enterprises, through incentives to
make profits, and state actors, who have significant interests in the
information and cyber domain, have means of influencing each layer.

While external actors have substantial influence across most layers of Africa’s
tech stack, there is wide variation between and within each layer.


APPLICATION LAYER

 * China and the United States are the two most significant players in Africa’s
   application market. Chinese developers produced 36 of the top 100 apps
   employed by active users, followed by 23 from the United States, 11 from
   Europe, and 7 from Africa.
 * When it comes to Africa’s top five mobile apps by the number of active users,
   Google (Chrome, YouTube, and Calendar) and Meta (WhatsApp), hold the top four
   spots, with China-based CloudView’s Phoenix Browser is fifth.
 * U.S. companies such as Meta, Google, and LinkedIn operate the most used
   social and communications apps, where African users spend most of their time.
   Meta’s WhatsApp is far and away the continent’s most used messaging app, with
   over 90-percent usage in tech-driven African economies such as Kenya and
   South Africa. TikTok, owned by the China-based ByteDance, is quickly gaining
   market share.


OPERATING SYSTEM LAYER

 * The United States is by far the dominant player in the operating system
   layer. U.S. companies such as Google (Android), Microsoft (Windows), and
   Apple (iOS), possess over a 90-percent market share of Africa’s operating
   systems.
 * The United States’ dominance in this sector is not exclusive to Africa.
   Worldwide, these same companies and systems possess 97 percent of the market.
 * HarmonyOS, China-based Huawei’s operating system, is the nearest competitor.
   It has already become the second-best selling mobile operating system in
   China, and could challenge the dominance of U.S.-made operating systems as
   its availability becomes more widespread. Given the fact that many
   cyberattacks exploit vulnerabilities in operating systems, as well as the
   role that operating systems play in shaping the entire ecosystem of
   applications available to users, the implications could be significant.


CONSUMER PRODUCTS LAYER

 * In Africa’s consumer products layer, Asian countries such as China and South
   Korea are among the continent’s principal suppliers. Samsung, the Korean
   telecommunications giant, is the largest vendor of mobile devices in Africa,
   with 31 percent of the market.
 * The Chinese conglomerate, Transsion, which includes the vendors Techno and
   Infinix, is second, with a 21-percent market share. The Chinese companies
   Huawei and Xiaomi each possess about 7 percent of the market. This gives
   China-based enterprises 36 percent of the market share, the largest of any
   single country.
 * China is also becoming increasingly dominant in the provision of smartphones,
   now the most common device Africans use to access the internet. Two Chinese
   companies, Transsion and Xiaomi, supply over 60 percent of Africa’s
   smartphones. They have taken market share from Samsung, which now controls
   only 22 percent of the market. Apple (and its popular iPhone) is the third
   largest supplier with 13 percent of the market.

External Actor Involvement in Africa’s Technology Stack: Select Layers and
Markets

Sources: Datasparkle 2023 and 2024 (Application layer); StatsCounter (Operating
systems); StatsCounter, Many Possibilities (Consumer products); GSMA, Morocco
World News, Orange, Airtel, Vodacom, MTN (Service Providers).


INFRASTRUCTURE LAYER

 * By many accounts, China dominates the provision of Africa’s
   telecommunications infrastructure. Chinese companies such as ZTE and Huawei
   have reportedly built as much as three-quarters of Africa’s existing 3G, 4G,
   and emergent 5G network infrastructure.
 * China is also a major player in supplying other aspects of telecommunications
   infrastructure such as land-based fiber optic cables, routers, data centers,
   satellites, base stations and undersea cables.
 * The markets for some types of infrastructure, such as satellites, data
   centers, and undersea cables, are quite competitive. In looking at Africa’s
   top five suppliers of undersea cable by total overall bandwidth, China’s
   PEACE Cable barely cracks the top five. African (the DARE), European
   (EllaLink), and U.S. suppliers (Equiano) all run larger cables. Collectively,
   these five cables are responsible for two-thirds of all the undersea cable
   bandwidth serving Africa.
 * The largest undersea cable serving Africa, 2Africa, is managed by a
   consortium of companies that include China Telecom, Meta, MTN, Orange,
   Vodafone, Egypt Telecom, and WIOCC. The cable itself is built by Alcatel
   Submarine Networks, a subsidiary of the Finnish Company, Nokia.


SERVICE PROVIDERS

 * There is similar diversity among Africa’s top five major telecommunications
   providers, some of the largest and most influential entities in Africa’s tech
   sector. In contrast to other layers, neither the United States nor China is a
   major player.
 * The South Africa-based MTN, with close to 300 million subscribers, is
   Africa’s largest telecom, with 23 percent of the market.
 * Next is the UK-based Vodacom (200 million, 16 percent) and France-based
   Orange (150 million, 12 percent). The Indian firm, Airtel, is Africa’s fourth
   largest telecommunications provider, with about 11 percent of market share
   (150 million subscribers), followed by Maroc Telecom, with about 6 percent
   (80 million).
 * Collectively, these five companies account for about two-thirds of all
   telecommunications subscribers in Africa.

Across Africa’s tech stack, U.S.-based enterprises account for 9 and China-based
enterprises account for 6 of the largest providers. However, external firms are
neither limited to the United States or China nor are most layers without
diversity and competition. Outside of the operating systems layer, at least one
non-U.S. or Chinese actor possesses significant market share, be it Europe in
the application, infrastructure, and service provider layers, South Korea in the
consumer product layer, or India in the service provider layer.

Origin of Top Five Providers in Africa’s Tech Stack



Country

Applications
(Active Users)

Operating
SystemsTech Stack Layer

Consumer Products
(Mobile Vendors)

Infrastructure
(Cables)

Service
Providers

Total United StatesChrome
YouTube
WhatsApp
CalendarAndroid
Windows
iOSAppleEquiano9 ChinaPhoenix BrowserHarmonyOSTranssion
Huawei
XiaomiPEACE6 EuropeEllaLinkVodacom
Orange3 AfricaDAREMTN
Maroc
Telecom3 OtherLinuxSamsung2AfricaAirtel4 Total25

Sources: Datasparkle 2023 and 2024 (Application layer); StatsCounter (Operating
systems); StatsCounter, Many Possibilities (Consumer products); GSMA, Morocco
World News, Orange, Airtel, Vodacom, MTN (Service Providers)


GROUNDED IN AFRICAN AGENCY

Despite the importance of external actors, African enterprises, regulators,
consumers, and tech workers are the single most important players in Africa’s
tech sector. Their decisions determine how technology is deployed, mediated, and
used.

> What determines success is not the origin of the supplier but the suitability
> of a technology product to the African market.

While external actors supply much of Africa’s technology, African enterprises
play a critical role in the African tech stack’s application, infrastructure,
and service provider layers. The single largest telecommunications provider in
Africa, MTN, is a multinational firm based in South Africa. Other large
state-owned enterprises, such as Maroc Telecom and Ethio Telecom, are major
players as well. Africa’s fourth largest undersea cable by bandwidth, the
Djibouti Africa Regional Express (DARE) cable is owned and operated by a
consortium of Africa-based telecommunications firms. African developers are
major players in application markets such as e-commerce, where the Nigeria-based
Jumia is the second-most used app. In finance, Africa-based enterprises such as
OPay, PalmPay, and M-Pesa all rank in the top 10 most used apps.

Moreover, foreign companies that own parts of Africa’s tech stack depend heavily
on Africa-based franchises and workforces. In most cases, the relationship
between the external actors supplying hardware, software, or management
expertise, and African governments, consumers, and enterprises is symbiotic and
mutually beneficial.

For example, the UK-based Vodafone possesses a 40-percent management stake in
Safaricom, Kenya’s largest telecommunications company, which operates as a
semi-independent subsidiary. The government of Kenya retains a 35-percent stake,
generating revenue on licensing fees and taxes. Safaricom employs over 6,000
people, has around 45 million subscribers, and, according to company figures,
sustains 1.2 million jobs, or around five percent of the Kenyan workforce.

A girl browses products in a mobile shop in Ethiopia. (Photo: AFP)

African governments play a crucial role in driving investment and enforcing
regulations that set guardrails around how technology is deployed. Collectively,
African governments spend more on financing ICT infrastructure than external
state actors. Moreover, private investment in Africa’s digitization outnumbers
government-driven investment by a factor of four to one. African governments
possess a diverse array of legal, regulatory, and legislative frameworks. For
example, five African countries rank in the top tier of the International
Telecommunication Union’s Global Cybersecurity Index, while four rank among the
bottom. Some, such as Ghana, possess cybersecurity legal and regulatory
frameworks that are a potential model for other countries across the world.

Most importantly, it is citizens as the end users of technology that drive
demand. What determines success is not the origin of the supplier but the
suitability of a technology product to the African market. George Zhu, the
founder of Transsion, spent a decade in Africa before founding the company.
Transsion’s flagship Tecno-branded phones are highly adapted to the African
consumer and, in addition to low costs, include features such as long battery
life, space for multiple SIM cards, keyboards in local languages, and the
ability to recognize dark-skinned faces in low contrast. This attention to
detail is what has enabled the company to stand out in comparison to its
competitors.


MITIGATING EXTERNAL SOURCES OF CYBER RISK

Africa is far from unique in its dependency on external actors to supply
critical technologies. Due to the globalized nature of technology supply chains,
networks effects, and the highly specialized production of technologies such as
semiconductors and leading generative Artificial Intelligence models, all
countries possess technological dependencies.

> Diversity and competition within the tech sector … can help mitigate
> vulnerabilities.

Yet, a detailed view of Africa’s technology sector reveals that it is not under
the control of any one actor, and there are plenty of opportunities for Africans
to assert agency. By further fostering diversity and competition within the tech
sector, African governments can help mitigate the vulnerabilities that come from
external actor influence.

As Africa’s own technology industry continues its rapid growth, undertaking
additional cybersecurity priorities will help African governments ensure the
safety of their countries and citizens from cyber threats.

First, security-minded customers and strategically sensitive industries should
select products and work with firms that prioritize cybersecurity. Across
Africa, for example, Meta’s WhatsApp is the most popular messaging app, and is
commonly used by security and government officials to communicate. By contrast,
the messaging app Signal offers stronger encryption, collects less data on its
users, and does not share this data with advertisers or government. Like
WhatsApp, it is easy to download and free to use. For government, security
sector officials, and citizens with espionage concerns, Signal may be a superior
choice.

Second, for strategic technologies that cannot be produced or adequately
safeguarded within a country, African states should seek to foster diversity and
competition. For example, cuts to undersea cables serving Africa have
historically caused major problems, leading to disruptions or internet service
outages that last months. The greater the diversity and bandwidth of undersea
cables serving Africa, the more resilient internet service will be—and the more
options that become available for routing potentially sensitive traffic.

Third, African governments have a critical role to play in strengthening cyber
capabilities by establishing legal, legislative, and institutional frameworks to
mitigate cyber risk, particularly in critical sectors such as energy, finance,
telecommunications, and government. Nevertheless, many countries lack
comprehensive policies to protect critical information infrastructure. Even
those countries with policies often lack specificity about the assets that need
protecting, such as industrial control systems in power plants or automated
systems that unload assets in ports.

Finally, African governments should engage in regional and international efforts
to protect critical information infrastructure from cyberattacks, a critical
component of the universally agreed-upon norms of state behavior in cyberspace.
African governments have much to gain from increased diplomatic and defense
sector engagement on implementing these norms, which include global cyber
capacity building initiatives building to enable African governments to better
identify, detect, and respond to attacks themselves. African countries should
also deepen their engagement in efforts led by the AU, regional economic
communities, and national computer emergency response bodies to protect shared
critical infrastructure in the public, energy, maritime, financial, and
telecommunications sectors.







ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

 * Nate Allen, “Critical Information Infrastructure Protection in Africa,”
   Stellenbosch University Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in
   Africa (SIGLA) Research Brief, June 24, 2024.
 * Ayantola Alayande, “Africa and the U.S.-China Tech Competition,” Dataphyte,
   April 17, 2024.
 * Kenneth Adu-Amanfoh and Nate D.F. Allen, “Learning from Ghana’s
   Multistakeholder Approach to Cyber Security,” Spotlight, Africa Center for
   Strategic Studies, January 3, 2023.
 * Tom Hegel, “China’s Continental Takeover,” Sentinel Labs, September 2023.
 * Bulelani Jili, “Chinese ICT and Smart City Initiatives in Kenya,” The
   National Bureau of Asian Research, 2022.
 * Motolani Agbebi, “China’s Silk Road and Africa’s Technological Future,”
   Council on Foreign Relations, February 1, 2022.
 * Emily de La Bruyère, Doug Strub, and Jonathon Marek, eds., China’s Digital
   Ambitions: A Global Strategy to Supplant the Liberal Order, National Bureau
   of Asian Research (NBR), NBR Special Report No. 97, National Bureau of Asian
   Research, 2022.
 * Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu, “Partnering for Africa’s Digital Future:
   Opportunities for the United States, South Korea, and India,” Issue Brief,
   Atlantic Council, April 18, 2021.
 * Nate Allen and Noëlle van der Waag-Cowling, “How African States Can Tackle
   State-Backed Cyber Threats,” Brookings Institution, July 15, 2021.
 * Henry Tughendat, “The Evolving U.S.-China Tech Rivalry In Africa,” U.S.
   Institute of Peace, May 5, 2021.
 * Joshua Meservey, “Government Buildings in Africa are a Likely Vector for
   Chinese Spying,” The Heritage Foundation, May 20, 2020.

More On:  Africa’s Emerging Cyber Threats

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