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Effective URL:
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Submission: On July 17 via api (July 17th 2023, 8:49:43 am UTC) from DE — Scanned from DE

Form analysis
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Crimeware


CLOUDY WITH A CHANCE OF CREDENTIALS | AWS-TARGETING CRED STEALER EXPANDS TO
AZURE, GCP

Alex Delamotte / July 13, 2023

By Alex Delamotte, with Ian Ahl (Permiso) and Daniel Bohannon (Permiso)


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 * Throughout June 2023, an actor behind a cloud credentials stealing campaign
   has expanded their tooling to target Azure and Google Cloud Platform (GCP)
   services. Previously, this actor focused exclusively on Amazon Web Services
   (AWS) credentials.
 * Cloud service credentials are increasingly targeted as actors find more ways
   to profit from compromising such services. This actor targeted exposed Docker
   instances to deploy a worm-like propagation module.
 * These campaigns share similarity with tools attributed to the notorious
   TeamTNT cryptojacking crew. However, attribution remains challenging with
   script-based tools, as anyone can adapt the code for their own use.


BACKGROUND

In December 2022, the threat research team at Permiso Security reported about a
cloud credential stealer campaign that primarily targeted Amazon Web Services
(AWS) credentials from public-facing Jupyter Notebooks services. The actors
likely accessed these impacted services through unpatched web application
vulnerabilities.

From June 14, 2023 through the end of the month, we worked with the Permiso team
to track and analyze files related to a new incarnation of this campaign
targeting exposed Docker services. The hallmark shell scripts remain the core of
these campaigns, though we also identified an Executable and Linkable Format
(ELF) binary written in Golang. The research team at Aqua also recently reported
elements they observed from these actors’ abuse of Docker images.

SentinelLabs thanks the Permiso Security research team for their collaboration
on the research in this report. The Permiso team released a blog about this
campaign, which can be found here.


TOOLING UPDATES

Since the December campaign, the actor has made several updates to how their
tooling works.


SCRIPT FUNCTIONALITY

The December campaign targeted AWS credentials; the most recent campaigns added
functions that target credentials from Azure and GCP. The actor actively
modified these features as the campaigns evolved throughout June: Initially, a
script aws.sh contained references to Azure credentials, but the relevant
function was not called. A week later, samples emerged where the Azure
credential functions were called.

The actor stored the generic credentials in an array labeled CRED_FILE_NAMES.
The AWS-specific array from the original script ACF has been replaced with
AWS_CREDS_FILES. We dive into this in more detail in the next section. There are
also two new cloud service provider (CSP)-specific credentials variables:
GCLOUD_CREDS_FILES and AZURE_CREDS_FILES.

The actor made the script more modular as it grew larger and more complex. The
AWS functionality is now split into three smaller functions that are driven by
the run_aws_grabber function only if the system is identified as AWS. This
increases the efficiency of the script by running AWS commands only on AWS
systems, which also enhances the script’s stealth.


INFRASTRUCTURE

The actor no longer hosts files in an open directory, which complicates efforts
to track and analyze these campaigns. Instead, C2 activity relies on a hardcoded
username and password combination that are passed as arguments to the curl
command.

The older campaign infrastructure was hosted on a Netherlands-based IP
associated with Nice IT Services. The attacker has since moved infrastructure to
AnonDns, a dynamic domain name service (DDNS) provider. The campaigns through
June 2023 use one of several AnonDNS subdomains:

everlost.anondns.net
silentbob.anondns.net
ap-northeast-1.compute.internal.anondns.net



CREDENTIALS COLLECTION

The newer versions target credentials in newly added arrays GCLOUD_CREDS_FILES
and AZURE_CREDS_FILES. The versions emerging the week of 6/26/2023 added .env
and docker-compose.yaml; the version from 6/15/2023 has env without the period,
so the actor is apparently updating the tool to be more effective in the newest
campaign. The newest campaign also has a new variable, MIXED_CREDFILES which
contains only redis.conf.

The newer versions omitted the following credentials files that were present in
the December campaign’s ACF:

cloud
.npmrc
credentials.gpg


The credentials collection logic in the new campaign’s samples targets the
following services & technologies:

Technology Targeted File Amazon Web Services .boto, .passwd-s3fs, .s3b_config,
.s3backer_passwd, .s3cfg, credentials, s3proxy.conf Azure azure.json Google
Cloud Platform .feature_flags_config.yaml, .last_opt_in_prompt.yaml,
.last_survey_prompt.yaml, .last_update_check.json, access_tokens.db,
active_config, adc.json, config_default, config_sentinel, credentials.db, gce
Censys censys.cfg Docker docker-compose.yaml Filezilla filezilla.xml,
recentservers.xml, queue.sqlite3 Git .git-credentials Grafana grafana.ini
Kubernetes clusters.conf, kubeconfig, secrets Linux OS .netrc, netrc Ngrok
ngrok.yml PostgresQL .pgpass, postgresUser.txt, postgresPassword.txt Redis
redis.conf S3QL authinfo2 Server Message Block (SMB) .smbclient.conf,
.smbcredentials, .samba_credentials Uncategorized .env, accounts.xml, api_key,
resource.cache, servlist.conf

There is considerable overlap in the targeted files between these credential
stealer campaigns and the TeamTNT Kubelet-targeting campaign reported by Sysdig
in October 2022.

Arrays containing targeted credential file names in grab.sh

The script uses the cred_files function to search for credentials files on the
system, write them to a temporary file $EDIS, copy the new file to a master
credential-holding file $CSOF, then delete the temporary file. The $EDIS and
$CSOF variable file names and paths are randomly generated via the special use
Bash variable $RANDOM, meaning the value is an integer between 0 and 32767 that
changes each time $RANDOM is accessed.

The cred_files function in aws.sh


AWS

The new scripts show more attention to making the features modular, a natural
evolution as a script becomes more complex. The AWS-specific functionality is
driven by a function named run_aws_grabber. Most AWS-centric features from the
December campaign have been rolled into one of four functions driven by
run_aws_grabber:

 * get_aws_infos: Queries the AWS instance metadata service (IMDS) for IAM
   configuration and sets the output to $AWS_INFO, as well as security
   credential configuration from EC2 and IAM resources, which are set to
   $AWS_1_EC2 and $AWS_1_IAM_NAME, respectively.
 * get_aws_meta: Writes the values from each of the variables generated in
   get_aws_infos then parses the data for specific values via grep and extracts
   them using sed, writing the output to the $CSOF variable.
 * get_aws_env: Checks for values in AWS credential related variables, writes
   them to $CSOF when present. When the $AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI
   is found, the function calls curl against the URL, then modifies the response
   using sed to format specific values into an aws configure set command. For
   example, the string AccessKeyId in the response is transformed to aws
   configure set aws_access_key_id. The actor likely chose to format the values
   as a command so that the output feeds into additional automated actions.

The get_aws_env function in aws.sh
 * get_awscli_data: This function is only implemented in the two most recent
   versions: the function exists in the 6/15/2023 version of aws.sh, but it is
   not called. The function invokes aws sts get-caller-identity to collect the
   12-digit AWS account identifier and writes the result to $CSOF.


AZURE & GCP

A notable recent addition is logic specific to the Azure and Google Cloud
platforms. The get_azure and get_google functions are implemented in the newest
versions seen on 06/26/2023; the logic was present in the 6/15 campaign, but the
functions were not called. These changes indicate that these features are being
actively developed, so we expect more changes as the actors roll out and test
these features.

Newly implemented get_azure function in g.aws.sh


SYSTEM PROFILING

The attackers now perform system profiling through the aws.sh scripts as well as
other scripts delivered under certain conditions. Another new feature is the
get_docker function, which checks if the environment is a Docker container. When
it is, the function runs docker inspect against each running container and saves
the result to $CSOF. The output will not necessarily have credentials and this
likely serves as a mechanism for system profiling.

Additionally, the new version added the function get_prov_vars, which calls cat
/proc/*/env* to collect environment variable details from each running process
and writes the result to $CSOF. The actor likely does this to enumerate other
valuable services running on the system for manual targeting.

We also observed profiling activity from Data.sh, a post-exploitation script
that collects details from the system and sends it to the attacker’s server. The
script uses Bash to craft a web request to download the curl binary from the
attacker’s server through the bashload function. This is notable because attacks
against minimal systems–such as containers–can be limited by the absence of
ubiquitous binaries like curl.

The bashload function in Data.sh

The attacker sets variables for a lockfile and datafile in /var/tmp. The result
of the following reconnaissance commands is written to the datafile:

whoami Current user ls -al Lists all files in the current directory who List of
users with active terminal sessions lastlog Log of user login history cat
/var/spool/cron/* Contents of configured cron jobs ps aux Details about all
running processes netstat -anop Network connection and socket details docker ps
List of Docker containers, including stopped containers

The script then sends the results collected in the datafile to the C2 using curl
with a provided username and password.


CREDENTIALS EXFILTRATION

After collecting and processing the credentials, the credentials stealing
scripts use curl to exfiltrate the contents of the $CSOF file to an
AnonDNS-hosted server. The script contains hardcoded credentials that are used
to authenticate the request. The June 2023 campaigns use the following username,
password, and server URL combinations:

SHA1 5611cb5676556410981eefab70d0e2aced01dbc5 Name aws.sh Username
jegjrlgjhdsgjh Password oeireopüigreigroei Exfil URL
http[:]//everlost.anondns.net/upload.php

SHA1 61da5d358df2e99ee174b22c4899dbbf903c76f0 Name aws.sh (newer) Username 1234
Password 5678 Exfil URL http[:]//silentbob.anondns.net/insert/keys.php

SHA1 ac78d5c763e460db2137999b67b921e471a55e11 Name g.aws.sh Username 1234
Password 5678 Exfil URL
http[:]//ap-northeast-1.compute.internal.anondns.net/insert/keys.php

SHA1 dba0dcb8378d84abc8f7bf897825dd4f23e20e04 Name data.sh Username 8765
Password 4321 Exfil URL http[:]//everlost.anondns.net/data.php

The send_data function from g.aws.sh


PROPAGATION

In addition to the usual shell scripts, we observed the actor delivering a
UPX-packed, Golang-based ELF binary. The binary ultimately drops and executes
another shell script that scans an actor-specified range and attempts to
propagate to vulnerable targets. We believe the reason the actor used this
binary to deliver yet another script is due to the relatively noisy nature of
the scanning activity. The scanner is hidden as an embedded base64 object within
the packed Golang binary, adding more stealth than a standalone shell script.
Additionally, the binary drops Zgrab–a Golang network scanning tool–which
depends on Golang environment variables that are set by running the parent Go
binary.

The implemented code enables the binary to read a command from a string and
execute it using os_exec.

The main_main function

The main_main function decodes an embedded base64 blob, resulting in a Bash
script that is written and then executed by the main_runCommand function. In the
embedded script, the setupsomething function downloads the following packages on
systems using the Yum package manager:

 * Compiler and code processing: gcc make git jq
 * Network utilities: libpcap libpcap-devel curl

This function also downloads the following packages on systems that use the Apt
package manager:

 * Compiler and code processing: gcc make git jq
 * Network utilities: libpcap0.8 libpcap0.8-dev masscan curl

Next, setupsomething checks if masscan, docker, and zgrab are installed. If not,
the script downloads the dependencies from the attacker’s server, hosted at the
URI: /bin/[bin_name].

The dAPIpwn function takes the following arguments:

 * IP range: collected from the C2 server at /gr.php
 * Ports: 2375, 2376 – respectively used for Docker unencrypted and encrypted
   communications
 * Rate: 500,000 packets per second

The function passes these arguments to masscan, which scans the specified IP
ranges then passes the results to zgrab, which looks for http responses from the
remote endpoint /v1.16/version. The output is filtered using grep to search for
lines containing the strings 'ApiVersion' or 'client version 1.16'. Aqua also
detailed a step in the attack chain that looks for misconfigured Docker daemons
running version 1.16. Interestingly, a Shodan search revealed only apparent
honeypot systems responding with these strings on the specified ports.

When a system is deemed vulnerable, the script calls back to the C2 using curl
with the vulnerable IP address and port added to the request URI.

Embedded script that scans for vulnerable Docker instances


CONCLUSION

This campaign demonstrates the evolution of a seasoned cloud actor with
familiarity across many technologies. The meticulous attention to detail
indicates the actor has clearly experienced plenty of trial and error, shown in
choices like serving the curl binary to systems that do not already have it. The
actor has also improved the tool’s data formatting to enable more autonomous
activity, which demonstrates a certain level of maturity and skill.

While AWS has long been in the crosshairs of many cloud-focused actors, the
expansion to Azure and GCP credentials indicates there are other major
contenders holding valuable data.

We believe this actor is actively tuning and improving their tools. Based on the
tweaks observed across the past several weeks, the actor is likely preparing for
larger scale campaigns. The lack of threats explicitly targeting Azure and GCP
credentials up to this point means there are likely many fresh targets. The
current focus on Docker is ultimately arbitrary: this actor has previously
targeted other technologies and there are many other oft-forgotten vulnerable
applications.

Organizations can prepare against these attacks by ensuring that applications
are configured properly and patched as security fixes become available. Docker
access should be restricted to suit your organization’s needs while reducing
exposure from outside connections.


INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

SHA1 Description 0e1805fd9efa6a1c3fe9adb3f34373a9dcc7fe19 run.sh
18d28ac44c5501f1768f0fc155ad38aa56610881 chattr ELF binary
27414df2f9a687db65d2bc5fed011a1f0f550417 aws.sh v3
2ed9517159b89af2518cf65a93f3377dea737138 UPX-packed Golang ELF binary that drops
scanner script 37cb34a044c70d1acea5a3a91580b7bfc2a8e687 ELF binary, potentially
Tsunami 3d6aaed47135090326780727fef57ce1c1573aa2 tmate.sh
5611cb5676556410981eefab70d0e2aced01dbc5 aws.sh v2
6123bbca11385f9a02f888b21a59155242a96aba user.sh
61da5d358df2e99ee174b22c4899dbbf903c76f0 aws.sh v5
63fe964140907470427e035bdba5230f6a302056 b.sh (Install script)
654be7302f4a3638929fe5e67f6f2739a1801b07 clean.sh
828960576e182ec3206f457a263f25ee0531edbb curl.full
863bf9617f82c9c595cc9b09e84a346a306060c2 Embedded script from binary with
dAPIpwn function capability 8802f1bf8f83e354f14686fe79b5018cd36eb77f aws.sh v6
ac78d5c763e460db2137999b67b921e471a55e11 aws.sh v4
b13d62f15868900ab22c9429effdfb7939563926 aws.sh v7
c9edc82bc3ac344981231965bedec300fec31b1f xc3.sh
d79970f66a56f69667284c4c937f666758200ab4 grab.sh
dba0dcb8378d84abc8f7bf897825dd4f23e20e04 data.sh profiling script
eb3dff13ed97670e06649e8daaa6e4ab655477f6 aws.sh v1
f437aeac3721a0038c936bab5a2ac1ccdb0cf222 int.sh

MONERO WALLET ADDRESS, C3POOL XMR

43Lfq18TycJHVR3AMews5C9f6SEfenZoQMcrsEeFXZTWcFW9jW7VeCySDm1L9n4d2JEoHjcDpWZFq6QzqN4QGHYZVaALj3U 


DOMAINS

ap-northeast-1.compute.internal.anondns[.]net
everlost.anondns[.]netsilentbob.anondns[.]net
everfound.anondns[.]net


IPV4S

207.154.218.221
45.9.148.108


URLS

http[:]//silentbob.anondns.net/bin/chattr 
http[:]//silentbob.anondns.net/bin/a 
http[:]//silentbob.anondns.net/cmd/grab.sh 
http[:]//silentbob.anondns.net/cmd/clean.sh 
http[:]//silentbob.anondns.net/cmd/aws.sh 
http[:]//silentbob.anondns.net/cmd/xc3.sh 
http[:]//silentbob.anondns.net/bin/sysfix/curl.full 
http[:]//silentbob.anondns.net/bin/chattr 
http[:]//silentbob.anondns.net/insert/gscat.php 
http[:]//silentbob.anondns.net/insert/tmate.php 


Cloud Security Blog


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ALEX DELAMOTTE

Alex's passion for cybersecurity is humbly rooted in the early aughts, when she
declared a vendetta against a computer worm. Over the past decade, Alex has
worked with blue, purple, and red teams serving companies in the technology,
financial, pharmaceuticals, and telecom sectors and she has shared research with
several ISACs. Alex enjoys researching the intersection of cybercrime and
state-sponsored activity. She relentlessly questions why actors pivot to a new
technique or attack surface. In her spare time, she can be found DJing or
servicing her music arcade games.

Prev

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