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 1. Topics
 2. Foreign and security policy
 3. The enemy of my enemy…

Foreign and security policy 05.09.2023 | Ruslan Suleymanov
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THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY…
RUSSIA IS KEEN TO COOPERATE WITH ANYONE WITH ANTI-WESTERN POLICIES – INCLUDING
THE TALIBAN – JUST TO CLAIM THAT IT’S NOT ALONE WITH ITS SENTIMENT

Reuters/Tatyana Makeyeva
Member of Taliban arrive for a news conference in Moscow.
Artikel auf Deutsch lesenЧитать статью по-русски

The Taliban’s leaders have regularly visited Russia, despite being on the
Kremlin’s list of banned terrorist organisations. Ties between Moscow and the
‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ have further deepened since February 2022, when
Russia launched its large-scale invasion of Ukraine. Strong anti-American
sentiments in both Kabul and Moscow offer commonalities. In economic terms,
however, Russia’s local influence is limited and doesn’t compare with that of
major regional players such as Pakistan or China.

During the first period of Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001, Russian officials
were highly critical of the radical Islamist regime. The Kremlin was
particularly incensed by the Taliban’s recognition of Chechnya’s declaration of
independence, when a bloody conflict was still raging at the Russian
Federation’s southern tip. This was a key factor in the decision of its
then-young president, Vladimir Putin, to back the US-led alliance’s military
operation against the Taliban.

> Just two days after the fall of Kabul, Russian Ambassador Dmitry Zhirnov
> became the first foreign diplomat to publicly meet with the Taliban.

Since then, however, two decades have passed, and the world has changed. When
the Taliban retook Kabul without resistance on 15 August 2021, Western states’
ambassadors scrambled to get their staff out and hastily burned confidential
documents, while Russia’s embassy in Afghanistan remained unaffected and no one
needed evacuating.

Just two days after the fall of Kabul, Russian Ambassador Dmitry Zhirnov became
the first foreign diplomat to publicly meet with the Taliban. At the same time,
the Russian embassy, already making advances to the Taliban, put out a message
describing the overthrown Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s flight as
‘disgraceful’, accusing him of fleeing Kabul with cars full of cash. By the time
the Taliban marched triumphantly into the capital, Moscow had already
established close contacts with the radical Islamist group. Even before that,
‘Moscow format’ talks had been taking place in the Russian capital between
representatives of the former republic and the new emirate. These talks continue
today, albeit without the previous administration’s participation.


A PRESENCE WITH A COMPLICATED HISTORY

Following the withdrawal of Western troops, the Taliban spread the narrative
that Afghanistan had overcome a 20-year-long US occupation. At a time when
relations between Russia and the US were already steadily worsening, this helped
to strengthen Moscow’s perception despite the Soviet Union’s – the Russian
Federation’s predecessor – military presence in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989,
which was conveniently forgotten.

In the second half of the 20th century, the USSR was the primary foreign actor
in the country. Between the 1950s and 1980s, the Soviets participated in the
development of 130 Afghan industry and infrastructure projects – from airports
to irrigation systems. Even now, rusting equipment and cars that evoke bygone
Eastern Bloc years can often be found on Kabul’s streets, while Russian is still
widely spoken among older Afghans.

> In terms of soft power, Russia has a limited local presence in Afghanistan.

This heyday of Soviet influence is long gone, however. Today, young Afghans who
– faced with high unemployment and an ailing economy – dream of emigrating are
more likely to set their sights on the US than Russia, the latter being more a
fall-back option. More than that, Russia is by no means an easy option for young
Afghans: obtaining student visas entails major bureaucratic effort and reports
of drone attacks on the Russian capital are further diminishing Russia’s appeal
for war-weary emigrants. Even in terms of soft power, Russia has a limited local
presence in Afghanistan. There are no Russian-led education programmes or
humanitarian aid schemes, whereas Turkey, for instance, supports a network of
high schools and other school types.

From an economic perspective, Russia’s local presence is similarly limited;
figures for the current year from the national statistics agency NSIA put Russia
eighth in terms of trade volume, with $289 million, far behind Iran (1.4 bn),
China (1.2 bn) and Pakistan (1.2 bn). According to the World Bank, the Afghan
economy has contracted by some 35 per cent over the past two years and large
parts of its population are threatened by famine, while the UN reports that
two-thirds of Afghans live below the poverty line.

Against this backdrop, the Taliban has invested much hope in commodity imports
from Russia. In September 2022, Moscow and Kabul signed a major trade agreement
under which Russia will supply around one million tonnes of petrol per year, the
same quantity of diesel, as well as half a million tonnes of liquid natural gas.
In addition, Afghanistan is set to receive two million tonnes of wheat per year.
All these goods are likely to be transported by road and rail, and the Taliban
claim to be getting them at a discount compared to global market prices. Moscow
has confirmed the deal but has not commented on details.

> For the Kremlin, developing relations with the Taliban is evidently a
> priority.

In February 2023, the Russian ambassador announced an agreement between Russia
and the Taliban on the construction of a thermal power station in the north of
the country. He also stated that Russian pipe manufacturers would be involved in
the Afghan section of the new gas pipeline set to run from Turkmenistan to
Pakistan and India. So far though, these plans exist only on paper and there has
been no word yet on their actual implementation.

For the Kremlin, developing relations with the Taliban is evidently a priority.
It’s no coincidence that Russia is one of just a few countries to have granted
accreditation to a Taliban diplomat – the new chargé d’affaires at the Afghan
embassy in Moscow (though the flag of the now defunct Islamic Republic continues
to fly atop the embassy building). The Russian government is keen to cooperate
with anyone openly pursuing anti-Western policies, be it Iran, North Korea or
indeed the Taliban. Such ties allow Moscow to demonstrate that it’s not alone
with its anti-Western narrative, regardless of how extensive any economic
cooperation proves to be.

The Taliban’s next Russia trip has already been scheduled: on 29 September 2023,
representatives of the group will travel to Kazan to take part in an Afghanistan
conference involving various countries. This helps the Kremlin to counter
perceptions that Russia is isolated, demonstrating its ability to attract
foreign partners. Whether it is also serious about wanting to tackle the severe
problems facing Afghan society, however, is doubtful.

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Ruslan Suleymanov
Cairo

Ruslan Suleymanov is a Russian orientalist and journalist. He was the senior
Middle East correspondent of the TASS news agency in Cairo until February 2022.
He resigned from this post in protest against the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

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Ruslan Suleymanov
Cairo

Ruslan Suleymanov is a Russian orientalist and journalist. He was the senior
Middle East correspondent of the TASS news agency in Cairo until February 2022.
He resigned from this post in protest against the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

More articles


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