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CLIMATE FRAGILITY

 * Low (0 – 1)
 * Low - Medium (1 – 2)
 * Medium - High (2 – 3)
 * High (3 – 4)
 * Extremely High (4 – 5)
 * No Data

DATA: WRI

COUNTRIES LISTED ON CRISISWATCH

 * CrisisWatch highlighted countries
 * No Data

DATA: WRI | CRISISWATCH

PROJECTED WATER SUPPLY (ANNUAL MEAN) BY 2040

 * > 1,000 cm
 * 300 – 1000 cm
 * 100 – 300 cm
 * 30 – 100 cm
 * 10 – 30 cm
 * 3 – 10 cm
 * 1 – 3 cm
 * < 1 cm

DATA: WRI

PROJECTED CLIMATE-RELATED CHANGE IN WATER SUPPLY BY 2040

 * Decrease
 * > 1.7x
 * 1.4x
 * 1.2x
 * No Data

DATA: WRI

PROJECTED CLIMATE-RELATED CHANGE IN WATER SUPPLY BY 2040

 * Decrease
 * > 1.7x
 * 1.4x
 * 1.2x
 * Near Normal
 * 1.2x
 * 1.4x
 * > 1.7x
 * Increase  |
 * No Data

DATA: WRI

PROJECTED SEASONAL VARIABILITY (VARIABILITY WITHIN A YEAR) IN WATER SUPPLY BY
2040

 * Low < 0.33
 * Low–Medium 0.33 – 0.66
 * Medium–High 0.66 – 1.00
 * High 1.00 – 1.33
 * Extremely High > 1.33
 * No Data

DATA: WRI

PROJECTED CLIMATE-RELATED CHANGE IN SEASONAL VARIABILITY BY 2040

 * Decrease
 * > 1.3x
 * 1.2x
 * 1.1x
 * Near Normal
 * 1.1x
 * 1.2x
 * > 1.3x
 * Increase  |
 * No Data

DATA: WRI

TOTAL FATALITIES - LAND-RELATED VIOLENT INCIDENTS SINCE 2017

 * 1 Fatality
 * 1,100 Fatalities





DATA: ACLED

LAND USE, 2018

 * Grass
 * Agrirain
 * Agrimix
 * Agririg

DATA: ESA

RELATIVE FLOOD INTENSITY, JANUARY 2020 – JUNE 2021

 * Moderate  
 * 
 * 
 * 
 * 
 * 
 * 
 * Extremely Severe

DATA: NASA

TOTAL DISPLACEMENTS SINCE 2020

 * 4,500
 * 23,000

DATA: REACH

CURRENT AND PROJECTED WORK

 * Current Crisis Group focus areas
 * Future focus areas





HOW CLIMATE CHANGE FUELS DEADLY CONFLICT


THE DANGERS OF CLIMATE FRAGILITY

Climate fragility afflicts more and more countries in the world today. Flood and
drought, as well as changes in multi-year and seasonal variability, have become
major risk factors.

These are the most climate-fragile countries in the world today.

Half of the most climate-fragile countries also face conflict and crises.


AS THE WORLD WARMS, CLIMATIC DISTRESS PLAYS AN INCREASINGLY CENTRAL ROLE IN MANY
OF TODAY’S CONFLICTS.




CLIMATE CHANGE, WATER AND CONFLICT

From flood-induced livelihood insecurity to transboundary water disputes, the
majority of climate security risks revolve around water. Climate change will
continue to imperil the global water supply in coming decades.


A TALE OF EXTREMES

It is critical for all those with a stake in stability and prosperity to
understand the complex links among climate change, water supply and instability.

Parts of the world will suffer a decrease in water supply, frequently associated
with multi-year droughts and extreme heat.


IT IS NOT ONLY ABOUT DROUGHT

At the same time, many regions experiencing climate-related insecurity are
expected to witness increased water supply, like parts of the Horn of Africa.


LIVING WITH A ROGUE CLIMATE

Changes in water supply often manifest in extreme forms, such as prolonged dry
seasons followed by erratic and extreme precipitation. Extreme climatic
volatility often induces livelihood insecurity, which can exacerbate conflict.


CLIMATE SWINGS LIKELY TO INTENSIFY IN FRAGILE REGIONS

Crucially, many climate-fragile regions with the highest exposure to seasonal
variability are projected to become even more volatile in the coming decades.


REGIONS TO WATCH

Among the countries facing climate security risks, Crisis Group identifies the
most urgent to be in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, South East Asia, Central
America, and the Middle East and North Africa.

We focus particularly on Africa, where climatic distress, among other factors,
has wreaked havoc in recent years. It has resulted in resource competition and
displacement, and heightened other security risks.


CLIMATIC DISTRESS AND LAND-RELATED VIOLENCE IN AFRICA

In Africa, resource-related violence is concentrated in the climate-fragile
Sahel and Horn regions. Climate mapping alone, however, is insufficient to
predict conflict risks. To pin down the link between climatic stress factors and
conflict, Crisis Group pairs cutting-edge statistical analysis with
on-the-ground research to measure how climatic shocks interact with political
and social dynamics.


NIGERIA’S FARMER-HERDER VIOLENCE

Deadly conflicts between farmers and herders in Nigeria have claimed thousands
of lives. Climate change plays a role in the food insecurity, economic
inequality, displacement and criminality that aggravate ethnic and political
divides.


ANALYSIS FROM NIGERIA

Our Analysis: Crisis Group pairs remotely sensed land productivity assessments
with field insights to unpack farmer-herder conflicts at the local level,
showing that disputes are frequently concentrated in Nigeria’s grasslands and
along the agricultural fringe used by both groups – especially when land
productivity is very low.

What should be done: The federal government should ensure that all states
participating in the country’s livestock transformation plan adopt measures to
address climate change’s impact and consider future climate projections in
designating locations for ranches and grazing reserves. Making progress on pilot
ranches, donor commitments and staff training before the 2023 election and the
ensuing change of administration may help preserve the plan’s post-election
viability.


SOUTH SUDAN: FLOODS AND DISPLACEMENT

Three consecutive years of historic flooding in South Sudan exacerbated
widespread food and economic insecurity, displacing over half a million people,
driving pastoralists south and exacerbating violence in the Equatoria region.


“SNAKES AND PEOPLE WERE COMPETING FOR HIGHER GROUND”.

– Anonymous herder who fled Twic East county during the 2020 floods




ANALYSIS FROM SOUTH SUDAN

Our Analysis: Crisis Group’s quantitative analysis maps the flood’s impact on
displacement pathways, identifying an increased incidence of conflict where
displaced groups relocated. Paired with survey data, we can map and anticipate
migration routes, to help improve anticipatory action and crisis response.

What Should be Done: Build flood resilience to improve livelihood security.
Prevent long-distance displacement in the first place. Broker negotiations
between displaced and host communities to mitigate conflict when displacement is
unavoidable. Build new norms, sensitive to existing political dynamics, for
displaced-host communities interactions during climate displacements. Address
climate displacement in peace talks.


GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM

Background: Stalled negotiations between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan over the
filling and operating rules for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam have the
potential to escalate into conflict as climate change worsens, threatening
downstream Nile water supplies. The main obstacles to a deal are disagreements
on drought management protocols and a dispute resolution process.

Planned Work: Future work will explore how the dam could promote cooperation,
not just conflict, among states in the region.

(Image taken December 2019, prior to the first filling stage, Maxar
Technologies)


GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM

The dam’s reservoir after the second filling stage.

(Image taken December 2021, USGS, Landsat 8)


CLIMATE CHANGE AND PASTORALIST LIVELIHOODS IN KENYA

Background: Severe seasonal droughts and other weather extremes in Kenya’s
northern region helped intensify land and resource competition among rival
ethnic groups and contributed to intercommunal violence, particularly around
election cycles.

Planned Work: Future work will evaluate to what extent intercommunal conflicts
are caused or exacerbated by climate change and look at avenues for resolution.
In northern Kenya, we will research ongoing intercommunal conflicts, partially
driven by drought and depleting pastures, which have serious implications for
cross-border violence.


CRISIS GROUP’S CLIMATE AND CONFLICT RESEARCH

Crisis Group blends local research with climate science and state-of-the-art
quantitative methods to formulate effective policy recommendations that address
the root causes of conflict.

Read more of Crisis Group’s work on climate change and conflict here and on
Nigeria’s farmer-herder violence here and here.



CREDITS

Lead Contributor: Ulrich Eberle
Visualizations: Paul Franz
Support: Andrew Ciacci and Juan Sebastian Lozano



DATA SOURCES

ACLED. Raleigh, C., A. Linke, H. Hegre and J. Karlsen. 2010. “Introducing ACLED
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.” Journal of Peace Research.
47(5):651-660.
Aqueduct. Luck, M., M. Landis, and F. Gassert. 2015. “Aqueduct Water Stress
Projections: Decadal Projections of Water Supply and Demand using CMIP5 GCMs.”
World Resources Institute.
CCI Land Cover. 2017. European Space Agency.
CrisisWatch. September, 2021. International Crisis Group.
GADM. 2012. Database of Global Administrative Areas.
NASA. Policelli, F., et al. 2017. "The NASA Global Flood Mapping System." Remote
Sensing of Hydrological Extremes. 47-63.
REACH. 2020. “Population Movement Baseline Report: Movement and Displacement in
South Sudan, 1983-2019”.
USGS. December, 2021. Landsat-8 image of GERD.
OpenStreetMap
Mapbox and Mapbox Community Team



NOTES:

“Climate fragility” refers to the average countrywide exposure to interannual
variability, seasonal variability, riverine flood risk, coastal flood risk,
drought risk (equal weights). “The most climate-fragile countries” refers to the
top 50% of countries. Among those, exposure to conflict and crises is twice as
high as it is for the bottom 50% of less climate-fragile countries.

Climate projections are based on "business as usual" emission scenario, RCP8.5.
Results are comparable for RCP4.5. Water supply is defined as the “total blue
water (renewable surface water)”. Projected changes in water supply by 2040 are
based on a 21-year mean around the year 2040 divided by the baseline period
(1950–2010), based on WRI’s calculations.

Exclusive data access courtesy of REACH and ACLED.

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