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How We Got Here with Russia: The Kremlin's Worldview

In this 2019 report, Nataliya Bugayova breaks down the trajectory of Russian
foreign policy after the fall of the USSR. She argues that the US mistakingly
believed that a brief period of non-assertive foreign policy from the mid-1980s
to mid-1990s was the new norm for Russia.

Ukraine Crisis Coverage

A Russia-prosecuted war in Ukraine, Europe's largest country by landmass and
home to 44 million people, would be a generation-defining humanitarian and
geopolitical disaster. ISW is closely monitoring Russia's military posturing on
Ukraine's border.

Putin's Offset: The Kremlin's Geopolitical Adaptations since 2014

The West has had some success in countering the Kremlin since Russia’s illegal
occupation of Crimea, but Russian President Vladimir Putin has found ways to
offset external pressures on Russia without relinquishing his gains and goals.

The Russian Military's Lessons Learned in Syria

The Russian Armed Forces are applying lessons learned from their experience in
Syria to shape their development into a flexible and effective global
expeditionary force.

Russian Hybrid Warfare

America’s current strategy for responding to the Russian threat is based on a
misunderstanding of the Russian approach to war and exposes the United States
and its allies to a high risk of strategic defeats. Read the latest report in
ISW's Military Learning & The Future of War Series.

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LATEST FROM ISW


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 24

Mar 24, 2022 - Press ISW

Russian forces continue to make slow but steady progress in Mariupol, entering
the city center on March 24, but conducted few offensive operations elsewhere in
the country. Ukrainian counterattacks northwest of Kyiv in the past several days
continue to relieve pressure on the city, and Russian forces continued to dig
in. Ukrainian forces repelled limited Russian attacks northeast of the city and
around Kharkiv.

 


 * Read more about Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 24


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 23

Mar 23, 2022 - Press ISW

Russian forces continued to settle in for a protracted and stalemated conflict
over the last 24 hours, with more reports emerging of Russian troops digging in
and laying mines—indications that they have gone over to the defensive.
Ukrainian forces continued to conduct limited and effective counterattacks to
relieve pressure on Kyiv, although the extent of those counterattacks is likely
less than what some Ukrainian officials are claiming. Russian efforts to
mobilize additional forces to keep their offensive moving continue to be halting
and limited. Russian progress in taking Mariupol city remains slow and grinding.
Increasing Russian emphasis on using air, artillery, and rocket/missile
bombardments of Ukrainian cities to offset forward offensive momentum raises the
urgency of providing Ukraine with systems to defend against these attacks.

 


 * Read more about Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 23


UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATES

Mar 23, 2022 - Press ISW

This page collects ISW and CTP's updates on the conflict in Ukraine. In late
February 2022, ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events
related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.

 


 * Read more about Ukraine Conflict Updates


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 22

Mar 22, 2022 - Press ISW

Russian forces did not make any major advances on March 22 and Ukrainian forces
conducted local counterattacks northwest of Kyiv and around Mykolayiv. Russian
forces around Kyiv and other major cities are increasingly prioritizing
long-range bombardment after the failure of Russian ground offensives but are
unlikely to force major cities to surrender in this manner. Russian forces did
not conduct any offensive operations toward the northeastern Ukrainian cities of
Chernihiv, Sumy, or Kharkiv in the last 24 hours. Russian forces continued to
further reduce the Mariupol pocket.

 


 * Read more about Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 22


WHAT STALEMATE MEANS IN UKRAINE AND WHY IT MATTERS

Mar 22, 2022 - Press ISW

The initial Russian campaign to invade and conquer Ukraine is culminating
without achieving its objectives—it is being defeated, in other words. The war
is settling into a stalemate condition in much of the theater. But the war isn’t
over and isn’t likely to end soon. Nor is the outcome of the war yet clear. The
Russians might still win; the Ukrainians might win; the war might expand to
involve other countries; or it might turn into a larger scale version of the
stalemate in Ukraine’s east that had persisted from 2014 to the start of
Russia’s invasion in February 2022. The failure of Russia’s initial military
campaign nevertheless marks an important inflection that has implications for
the development and execution of Western military, economic, and political
strategies. The West must continue supplying Ukraine with the weapons it needs
to fight, but it must now also expand its aid dramatically to help keep Ukraine
alive as a country even in conditions of stalemate.

 


 * Read more about What Stalemate Means in Ukraine and Why it Matters


UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 18

Mar 22, 2022 - Press ISW

The Kremlin retains its maximalist political demands in ongoing negotiations
with Ukraine and is unlikely to soften them despite the Russian military failing
to achieve its objectives. Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s
political demands in a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on
March 17. The Kremlin demands that Ukraine become “neutral” by renouncing its
NATO membership ambitions, demilitarize by halting all western military aid or
weapons sales to Ukraine, and “denazify.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
defined the “denazification” of Ukraine as the abolition of any laws that
discriminate against Russian-speaking populations on March 18—the first time a
senior Kremlin official has publicly stated the Kremlin’s definition of
Ukrainian “denazification.” Putin additionally stated that Ukrainian negotiators
must resolve these issues before he will engage in leadership-level negotiations
with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the status of Crimea and Donbas.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Ukraine on March 18 of prolonging the
negotiations and delaying an agreement with Russia.

 


 * Read more about Ukraine Conflict Update 18


FEATURED REPORT

Ukraine Conflict Updates

Mar 23, 2022




This page collects ISW and CTP's updates on the conflict in Ukraine. In late
February 2022, ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events
related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.


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