blog.cyble.com
Open in
urlscan Pro
192.0.78.213
Public Scan
URL:
https://blog.cyble.com/2023/01/18/aurora-a-stealer-using-shapeshifting-tactics/
Submission: On February 14 via api from DE — Scanned from DE
Submission: On February 14 via api from DE — Scanned from DE
Form analysis
3 forms found in the DOMGET https://blog.cyble.com
<form class="hfe-search-button-wrapper" role="search" action="https://blog.cyble.com" method="get" data-hs-cf-bound="true">
<div class="hfe-search-form__container" role="tablist">
<input placeholder="Search " class="hfe-search-form__input" type="search" name="s" title="Search" value="">
<button id="clear-with-button" type="reset">
<i class="fas fa-times" aria-hidden="true"></i>
</button>
<button class="hfe-search-submit" type="submit">
<i class="fas fa-search" aria-hidden="true"></i>
</button>
</div>
</form>
GET https://blog.cyble.com
<form class="hfe-search-button-wrapper" role="search" action="https://blog.cyble.com" method="get" data-hs-cf-bound="true">
<div class="hfe-search-form__container" role="tablist">
<input placeholder="Search Our Blog" class="hfe-search-form__input" type="search" name="s" title="Search" value="">
<button id="clear" type="reset">
<i class="fas fa-times clearable__clear" aria-hidden="true"></i>
</button>
</div>
</form>
<form id="jp-carousel-comment-form" data-hs-cf-bound="true">
<label for="jp-carousel-comment-form-comment-field" class="screen-reader-text">Write a Comment...</label>
<textarea name="comment" class="jp-carousel-comment-form-field jp-carousel-comment-form-textarea" id="jp-carousel-comment-form-comment-field" placeholder="Write a Comment..."></textarea>
<div id="jp-carousel-comment-form-submit-and-info-wrapper">
<div id="jp-carousel-comment-form-commenting-as">
<fieldset>
<label for="jp-carousel-comment-form-email-field">Email</label>
<input type="text" name="email" class="jp-carousel-comment-form-field jp-carousel-comment-form-text-field" id="jp-carousel-comment-form-email-field">
</fieldset>
<fieldset>
<label for="jp-carousel-comment-form-author-field">Name</label>
<input type="text" name="author" class="jp-carousel-comment-form-field jp-carousel-comment-form-text-field" id="jp-carousel-comment-form-author-field">
</fieldset>
<fieldset>
<label for="jp-carousel-comment-form-url-field">Website</label>
<input type="text" name="url" class="jp-carousel-comment-form-field jp-carousel-comment-form-text-field" id="jp-carousel-comment-form-url-field">
</fieldset>
</div>
<input type="submit" name="submit" class="jp-carousel-comment-form-button" id="jp-carousel-comment-form-button-submit" value="Post Comment">
</div>
</form>
Text Content
Skip to content Search for your darkweb exposure * Home * About Us * Products * Cyble Vision * AmiBreached * Cyble Hawk * The Cyber Express * Newsroom * Research Reports * Careers * Partner with us Menu * Home * About Us * Products * Cyble Vision * AmiBreached * Cyble Hawk * The Cyber Express * Newsroom * Research Reports * Careers * Partner with us Request Demo AURORA – A STEALER USING SHAPESHIFTING TACTICS * January 18, 2023 THREAT ACTORS LEVERAGING POPULAR APPLICATIONS TO TARGET USERS Threat Actors (TAs) are increasingly using phishing sites to trick victims into stealing sensitive information or downloading malware such as Information stealer, Remote Access Trojans (RATs), and other malware. The links to these phishing pages are often distributed via email, online ads, and other channels. Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) has also been regularly monitoring various phishing campaigns and discussing them. Aurora Stealer is the latest example of this that we have encountered. We have observed it using phishing sites to imitate popular applications to infect the maximum possible number of victims. SHAPESHIFTING BEHAVIOR Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) initially identified a phishing site, “hxxps[:]//messenger-download[.]top”, that was impersonating a legitimate chat application website on January 16th, 2023. The next day, January 17th, 2023, the same phishing site was found to be mimicking a legitimate TeamViewer website, showing that the threat actors behind this campaign are actively changing and customizing their phishing websites to target multiple popular applications. The initial infection occurs when the user clicks on the “Download” button on the phishing website, which then downloads malware named “messenger.exe” and “teamviewer.exe” from the following URLs: * hxxps[:]//download[.]balint[.]info[.]hu/messenger[.]exe * hxxps[:]//kodfem[.]hemsida[.]eu/downloads/teamviewer[.]exe The image below shows the phishing site downloading Aurora stealer with the file name “teamviewer.exe”. Figure 1 – Messenger phishing page downloading Aurora stealer as teamviewer.exe The “messenger.exe” and “teamviewer.exe” files that have been downloaded are actually malicious Aurora Stealer samples, which have been padded with extra zeroes at the end to increase their size to around 260MB. TAs use this method to evade detection by antivirus software, as larger files can be harder for AV to process. Aurora is a type of malware that aims to steal personal information; it targets data from web browsers, crypto wallets, browser extensions, Telegram, and specific user directories. After gathering all the necessary information, it saves the data in JSON format, compresses it using GZIP, and converts it into Base64 encoding format before sending it to the Command-and-Control (C&C) server. We have analyzed and explained the detailed behavior of Aurora in the Technical Analysis section. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS We have taken the below sample hash for our analysis: (SHA256), fd17b39833ee0fae6cc8549dfa602adff3cf002cd0a0ef8fa63876ec50a74552, which is a 32-bit Golang executable file. The unique build ID of the Go compiled binary is shown below. Figure 2 – Go build ID Upon executing the malware file, it attempts to identify if the file is running in a WINE environment by checking the wine_get_version() function via the GetProcAddress() API. Then, the malware file uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) commands to gather system information, including the operating system’s name, the graphics card’s name, and the processor’s name. * wmic os get Caption * Returns the caption or name of the operating system * wmic path win32_VideoController get name * Returns the name of the video controller or graphics card on the computer * wmic cpu get name * Returns the name of the processor After gathering the system details, the malware proceeds to collect additional information about the system, such as the username, Hardware Identification (HWID), Random-Access Memory (RAM) size, screen resolution, and IP address, as shown below. Figure 3 – Collected system information After collecting system information, the malware queries the directories of installed browsers on the victim’s machine and searches for specific browser-related files stored in SQLite format 3, including: * Cookies * History * Login Data * Web Data Then, the stealer begins to extract information related to crypto wallets by querying and reading files from specific directories. The stealer targets the following crypto wallets: * “\\AppData\\Roaming\\Armory” * “\\AppData\\Roaming\\bytecoin” * “\\AppData\\Roaming\\Exodus” * “\\AppData\\Roaming\\Ethereum\\keystore” * “\\AppData\\Roaming\\Electrum\\wallets” * “\\AppData\\Roaming\\com.liberty.jaxx\\IndexedDB” * “\\AppData\\Roaming\\Guarda\\Local Storage\\leveldb” * “\\AppData\\Roaming\\Atomic\\Local Storage\\leveldb” * “\\AppData\\Roaming\\Zcash\\User Data\\Local State” In addition to accessing crypto wallets through specific directories, Aurora stealer also steals data from crypto wallet browser extensions. These extensions are hard-coded into the stealer binary, and over 100 extensions have been targeted. Some of the targeted extensions are shown in the image below. Figure 4 – Targeted Crypto wallets with the extension ID The malware continues its data collection by searching for FTP client software, Telegram, Discord, and Steam applications in the victim’s machine and steals important information from their config and session data files. The malware also grabs specific files from directories like the Desktop and Documents and takes screenshots of the victim’s system. Finally, the Aurora stealer processes the stolen information by converting it into JSON format, creating a GZIP archive of it, and encoding the GZIP archive in Base64 format for exfiltration. The figure below illustrates the structure of the JSON content that is used by the malware to store the stolen information. Figure 5 – JSON format to store stolen data The table below describes the keys of the JSON content. TypeType of the stolen data (Browser, Screenshot, files, etc.)Info { Name BuildID GroupID OS HWID GPU CPU RAM Location Screen IP } Victims’ device name Build name used by TA GroupID used by TA Operating system version Victims’ machine hardware ID Graphics card information Processor information RAM size Malware file path Victims’ machine screen resolution Victims’ system IP, empty alwaysBrowserBrowser name (Chrome, brave, edge, etc.)CacheEncoded in base64 content of the stolen fileType_GrabTarget file info (Cookie, Password, etc.)FilePTarget browser file (Cookies, Login Data, etc.) COMMAND & CONTROL Aurora Stealer communicates with the below C&C server IP (port 8081) and sends the stolen information. * 45[.]15[.]156[.]210:8081 The below figure shows the network communication of the malware’s data exfiltration. Figure 6 – Exfiltrated data CONCLUSION Information stealers are a form of malware that pose a significant threat to corporate networks by allowing unauthorized access. TAs employ various methods to deliver malware to their victims. In this case, we have observed that they are using phishing websites that mimic legitimate messenger sites to deliver Aurora Stealer. Recently, we have seen a rise in the number of malware samples padded with unnecessary data to increase their size in order to evade detection. This technique was also observed in other stealers, such as RedLine, Vidar, and RecordBreaker. Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) will continue monitoring the new malware strains and phishing campaigns in the wild and update blogs with actionable intelligence to protect users from such notorious attacks. OUR RECOMMENDATIONS * The initial infection may happen via phishing websites, so enterprises should use security products to detect phishing websites. * Avoid downloading pirated software from Warez/Torrent websites. The “Hack Tool” present on sites such as YouTube, Torrent sites, etc., contains such malware. * Use strong passwords and enforce multi-factor authentication wherever possible. * Turn on the automatic software update feature on your computer, mobile, and other connected devices. * Use a reputed antivirus and internet security software package on your connected devices, including PC, laptop, and mobile. * Refrain from opening untrusted links and email attachments without first verifying their authenticity. * Educate employees on protecting themselves from threats like phishing/untrusted URLs. * Block URLs that could be used to spread the malware, e.g., Torrent/Warez. * Monitor the beacon on the network level to block data exfiltration by malware or TAs. MITRE ATT&CK® TECHNIQUES TacticTechnique IDTechnique NameExecutionT1204 T1059 T1047User Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter Windows Management InstrumentationDefense EvasionT1027 T1497Obfuscated Files or Information Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionCredential AccessT1003 T1056 T1552OS Credential Dumping Input Capture Credentials in RegistryDiscoveryT1082 T1518 T1083 T1087System Information Discovery Security Software Discovery File and Directory Discovery Account DiscoveryCollectionT1005Data from Local SystemCommand and ControlT1071 T1095Application Layer Protocol Non-Application Layer Protocol INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOCS) IndicatorsIndicator TypeDescriptionb810b7d416251367ef790bc9a8a9830a69760ba5c1b83055e9a0647270629d9cSha256messenger.exe fd17b39833ee0fae6cc8549dfa602adff3cf002cd0a0ef8fa63876ec50a74552Sha256messenger.exe removed zero padding44b64cb2be0a5e9fd51528f00a308df71ead226c7cf733ed2568ada07c9044a8Sha256teamviewer.exec7f43e2afe62a622f77f888f56712a41aec56d5a765a95585f69e870359119c9Sha256teamviewer.exe removed zero paddinghxxps[:]//messenger-download[.]topDomainPhishing sitehxxps[:]//download[.]balint[.]info[.]hu/messenger[.]exeURLMalware download URLhxxps[:]//kodfem[.]hemsida[.]eu/downloads/teamviewer[.]exeURLMalware download URL45[.]15[.]156[.]210:8081IP: PortC&C RECENT BLOGS INCREASE IN FAKE DONATION SCHEMES FOLLOWING MASSIVE EARTHQUAKE IN TURKEY February 13, 2023 U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES TARGETED, CONSUMERS HIT HARDEST February 10, 2023 THE ROYAL MENACE SPREADS TO LINUX: A DEEP DIVE INTO THIS NEW RANSOMWARE February 9, 2023 PrevPreviousRansomware Extortion Techniques: A Growing Concern for Organizations NextGigabud RAT: New Android RAT Masquerading as Government AgenciesNext February 13, 2023 Cyble investigates the trend of fake donation schemes following the devastating Kahramanmaras earthquake in Turkey and Syria. Read More » February 10, 2023 CRIL investigates underground forums regarding large-scale attacks on US Telecommunications firms and their impact on their customers. Read More » February 9, 2023 Cyble analyzes a sample of Royal ransomware, tailored to specifically target Linux platforms & ESXi servers. Read More » About Us Cyble is a global threat intelligence SaaS provider that helps enterprises protect themselves from cybercrimes and exposure in the Darkweb. Its prime focus is to provide organizations with real-time visibility to their digital risk footprint. Backed by Y Combinator as part of the 2021 winter cohort, Cyble has also been recognized by Forbes as one of the top 20 Best Cybersecurity Start-ups To Watch In 2020. Headquartered in Alpharetta, Georgia, and with offices in Australia, Singapore, Dubai and India, Cyble has a global presence. To learn more about Cyble, visit www.cyble.com. Cyble is a global threat intelligence SaaS provider that helps enterprises protect themselves from cybercrimes and exposure in the Darkweb. Its prime focus is to provide organizations with real-time visibility to their digital risk footprint. Backed by Y Combinator as part of the 2021 winter cohort, Cyble has also been recognized by Forbes as one of the top 20 Best Cybersecurity Start-ups To Watch In 2020. Headquartered in Alpharetta, Georgia, and with offices in Australia, Singapore, Dubai and India, Cyble has a global presence. To learn more about Cyble, visit www.cyble.com. Offices: We’re remote-friendly, with office locations around the world: San Francisco, Atlanta, Rome, Dubai, Mumbai, Bangalore, Singapore, Jakarta, Sydney, and Melbourne. UAE: Cyble Middle East FZE Suite 1702, Level 17, Boulevard Plaza Tower 1, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Boulevard, Downtown Dubai, Dubai, UAE contact@cyble.com +971 (4) 4018555 USA : Cyble, Inc. 11175 Cicero Drive Suite 100 Alpharetta, GA 30022 contact@cyble.com +1 678 379 3241 India: Cyble Infosec India Private Limited A 602, Rustomjee Central Park, Andheri Kurla Road Chakala, Andheri (East), Maharashtra Mumbai-400093, India contact@cyble.com +1 678 379 3241 Australia : Cyble Pty Limited Level 32, 367 Collins Street Melbourne VIC 3000 Australia contact@cyble.com +61 3 9005 6934 Singapore: Cyble Singapore Private Limited 38 North Canal Road, Singapore 059294 contact@cyble.com +1 678 379 3241 © 2023. Cyble Inc. All Rights Reserved Twitter Linkedin Scroll to Top Loading Comments... Write a Comment... Email Name Website We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue to use this site we will assume that you are happy with it.Ok × We Value Your Privacy Settings NextRoll, Inc. ("NextRoll") and our advertising partners use cookies and similar technologies on this site and use personal data (e.g., your IP address). If you consent, the cookies, device identifiers, or other information can be stored or accessed on your device for the purposes described below. You can click "Allow All" or "Decline All" or click Settings above to customize your consent. NextRoll and our advertising partners process personal data to: ● Store and/or access information on a device; ● Create a personalized content profile; ● Select personalised content; ● Personalized ads, ad measurement and audience insights; ● Product development. For some of the purposes above, our advertising partners: ● Use precise geolocation data. Some of our partners rely on their legitimate business interests to process personal data. View our advertising partners if you wish to provide or deny consent for specific partners, review the purposes each partner believes they have a legitimate interest for, and object to such processing. If you select Decline All, you will still be able to view content on this site and you will still receive advertising, but the advertising will not be tailored for you. You may change your setting whenever you see the Manage consent preferences on this site. Decline All Allow All Manage consent preferences