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Submitted URL: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3971772/smart-power-or-strategic-apathy-the-new-zealand-defence-force-and-t...
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Effective URL: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3971772/smart-power-or-strategic-apathy-the-new-zealand-defence-force-and-t...
Submission: On November 21 via api from RU — Scanned from DE
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<h1>Smart Power or Strategic Apathy?: The New Zealand Defence Force and the Politics of Capability Building and Deployment in the Indo-Pacific</h1>
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<ul>
<li>Published <time pubdate="" datetime="Nov. 20, 2024">Nov. 20, 2024</time></li>
<li> By Dr. Juhn Chris P. Espia </li>
</ul>
</div>
<strong class="article-detail-dateline">Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs -- </strong>
<div>
<div style="clear:both">
<p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; text-indent: 36pt; line-height: normal; text-align: right;"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/19/2003590177/-1/-1/1/JIPA%20FEATURE%20-%20ESPIA.PDF/JIPA%20FEATURE%20-%20ESPIA.PDF">View PDF version here</a>.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; text-indent: 36pt; line-height: normal; text-align: right;"> </p>
</div>
<div style="background:#eee;border:1px solid #ccc;padding:5px 10px;">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; line-height:normal"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><strong>Abstract</strong></span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin:12pt 54pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;">This article examines how the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)
builds and deploys its capabilities in the evolving Indo-Pacific strategic environment. Geography, domestic politics, and historical moments shape defense policy and spending. The NZDF continues traditional
deployments—peacekeeping, logistics, maritime security, and humanitarian operations—aiming to maintain an independent foreign policy while contributing modestly to the international order. The NZDF plays a critical
role in humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, areas where New Zealand enjoys goodwill. However, despite improved troop quality, New Zealand’s defense spending and
personnel numbers have declined, eliminating its air combat capabilities. While HADR and other nontraditional roles grow, including search, rescue, and resource protection, the NZDF shifts away from its traditional
role of border defense. Coupled with reluctance to formalize alliances beyond Australia, this approach in a riskier environment seems like a dangerous gamble.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; line-height:normal"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><strong>***</strong></span></span></span>
</p>
</div>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"> </p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">New Zealand’s national anthem, “God Defend New
Zealand,” references how the country should deal with military threats: “make mountains into ramparts,” “make us then a mighty host,” and “put our enemies to flight.” This sequence—territorial defense followed by
mobilizing the populace for a counterattack—now seems outdated, reflecting neither the strategic position nor the capabilities of the New Zealand Defence Force
(NZDF).<a name="_ftnref1"></a></span><a href="#_ftn1" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[1]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">New Zealand faces no direct military threat but
has diverse security interests requiring specific capabilities. However, defense spending has plummeted to a little more than one percent of gross domestic product (GDP), roughly two-thirds less than four decades
ago. The air combat capability was scrapped in 2001.<a name="_ftnref2"></a></span><a href="#_ftn2" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[2]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;">
Regular Force personnel numbers fell from 12,400 in 1985 to 8,946 in 2024.<a name="_ftnref3"></a></span><a href="#_ftn3" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[3]</sup></span></a><span
style="color:#000000;"> Some analysts call this a crisis, pointing to failing NZDF assets and personnel
exodus.<a name="_ftnref4"></a></span><a href="#_ftn4" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[4]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">In recent discussions, some politicians and
analysts have raised concerns about the decline in the NZDF’s numbers and capabilities. Additionally, certain actors have proposed the abolition of the Defence Force, suggesting that its budget could be better
utilized for nonviolent alternatives.<a name="_ftnref5"></a></span><a href="#_ftn5" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[5]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> However, several
developments since 2022 indicate a shift in New Zealand's strategic outlook. Then-Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern attended the NATO Summit that year. In 2023, under Chris Hipkins’ government, Defence Minister Andrew
Little unveiled a <em>Defence Policy Strategy Statement</em>, acknowledging that New Zealand “no longer lives in a benign strategic environment.” The current three-party center-right coalition appears more inclined
to increase defense spending, despite facing a structural fiscal deficit and an expanded public
service.<a name="_ftnref6"></a></span><a href="#_ftn6" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[6]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;">Considering these seeming shifts, this article
examines how the NZDF’s capability-building and deployment patterns shape its overall military capacity in the evolving Indo-Pacific strategic environment. It argues that geography, domestic politics, and significant
historical events have influenced policy makers’ views on the military, directing defense policy and spending. With New Zealand’s reluctance to formalize alliances beyond Australia, the article concludes that the
country is taking a dangerous gamble in a riskier environment.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; line-height:normal"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><strong>Small States and the
Military</strong></span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">In general, small states are perceived as
lacking military power. Some scholars argue that the defining characteristic of small states is their inability to provide for their security, relying on others—states, institutions, and developments—for
protection.<a name="_ftnref7"></a></span><a href="#_ftn7" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[7]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> However, their small size does not mean they
do not maintain military forces. This military function, along with economic and diplomatic ones, is constrained by their relatively narrow economic base, gaps in organizational capacity, and low levels of diplomatic
and military capabilities.<a name="_ftnref8"></a></span><a href="#_ftn8" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[8]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">In the contemporary security environment, small
budgets and rigid defense bureaucracies continue to limit small states.<a name="_ftnref9"></a></span><a href="#_ftn9" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[9]</sup></span></a><span
style="color:#000000;"> However, more opportunities now exist for them to employ these capabilities and gain
influence.<a name="_ftnref10"></a></span><a href="#_ftn10" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[10]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Small states have become adept at utilizing
<em>smart power</em>—the intelligent linking and integration of hard and soft
power.<a name="_ftnref11"></a></span><a href="#_ftn11" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[11]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Militaries have been deployed for more complex
mission environments beyond conventional combat, such as contributing to regional peace and stability missions, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), and regional
diplomacy.<a name="_ftnref12"></a></span><a href="#_ftn12" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[12]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Thus, while small states may no longer be
expected to credibly project their warfighting capability, there are many other exigencies under the wider umbrella of military operations that support the international rules-based order and meet small states’
interests.<a name="_ftnref13"></a></span><a href="#_ftn13" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[13]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">The defense policies and strategies of states
reflect their domestic and external environments. This analysis focuses on three factors: the role of geography, specific historical junctures, and domestic politics. In realist scholarship, researchers and
strategists have consistently investigated the importance of geographical characteristics in their analyses of security situations and military
strategies.<a name="_ftnref14"></a></span><a href="#_ftn14" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[14]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Whether a state has a land and sea power
nexus, strategic depth and natural defenses, and proximity to friendly and threatening great powers, matters. Colin Gray argues that geographical characteristics, along with historical experience, also contribute to
a nation’s strategic culture. Geography predisposes states and their military establishments toward certain ways of conducting
warfare.<a name="_ftnref15"></a></span><a href="#_ftn15" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[15]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Strategic culture, as a set of shared
understandings within a particular community, channels influence from historical experiences, geography, and other factors into policymaking and
practice.<a name="_ftnref16"></a></span><a href="#_ftn16" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[16]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Previous experiences, such as wars, become
formative lessons that can be passed down to those who did not live through
them.<a name="_ftnref17"></a></span><a href="#_ftn17" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[17]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Past successes generally lead to policy
continuity, while failures often result in policy change.<a name="_ftnref18"></a></span><a href="#_ftn18" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[18]</sup></span></a><span
style="color:#000000;"> In certain cases, previous experiences influence the choice between pursuing alliances or adopting neutrality—a policy of neutrality that maintains peace is likely to continue, while its
failure pushes states toward alliances.<a name="_ftnref19"></a></span><a href="#_ftn19" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[19]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Decision
makers often use these experiences to rationalize their policy choices. Historical experiences can thus serve as part of the policy learning process or as a rhetorical device for advancing an agenda. In both cases,
they impact the ability of decision makers to make choices.<a name="_ftnref20"></a></span><a href="#_ftn20" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[20]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Foreign policy decision making can be described
as the process of carrying the nation’s past and problems along.<a name="_ftnref21"></a></span><a href="#_ftn21" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[21]</sup></span></a><span
style="color:#000000;"> Together with geography, they form national strategic cultures where national conceptions of roles and identities shape what are considered appropriate actions. External shocks and
“strategical dilemmas” can challenge these identities. In the latter case, established identities and values may conflict with each
other.<a name="_ftnref22"></a></span><a href="#_ftn22" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[22]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Domestic politics is often cited as a reason
states pursue suboptimal foreign policies. Domestic political institutions, cultures, economic structures, or leadership goals unrelated to a state’s relative power help explain why states make particular foreign
policy choices.<a name="_ftnref23"></a></span><a href="#_ftn23" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[23]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> The role of domestic politics is also
often expressed in terms of the preferences of selectorates and competing interest groups. In democratic systems, defense policy has been analyzed in terms of how lobbies operate, particularly regarding the existence
of a military-industrial complex.<a name="_ftnref24"></a></span><a href="#_ftn24" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[24]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> However, this is of
little relevance to small states. Conversely, the role of party ideology and military spending has been theorized, highlighting the interests of domestic political factions controlling the state and their influence
on military strategy and force structure.<a name="_ftnref25"></a></span><a href="#_ftn25" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[25]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; line-height:normal"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><strong>The NZDF Today: The Roles of
Geography, History, and Domestic Politics</strong></span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">New Zealand, a maritime state in the South
Pacific Ocean, is the 77th largest country in terms of surface area and boasts a coastline of 15,134 kilometers. With a population of 5,161,211, it ranks as the 125th most populous country
globally.<a name="_ftnref26"></a></span><a href="#_ftn26" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[26]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Located in a remote part of the Pacific, New
Zealand holds the fourth-largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the world and has territorial claims in Antarctica. Additionally, it is formally responsible for the defense of Niue, Tokelau, and the Cook
Islands.<a name="_ftnref27"></a></span><a href="#_ftn27" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[27]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Geographically isolated and without direct
military threats, New Zealand enjoys significant maneuverability on a broad range of international
issues.<a name="_ftnref28"></a></span><a href="#_ftn28" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[28]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Its security partnerships and outlook are
deeply influenced by its colonial history. As a dominion and former colony, it supported the British Empire and the United Kingdom, sending forces to the Boer War and both World Wars, thus developing an expeditionary
nature to its armed forces. The security relationship with Australia was formalized in 1944, followed by the signing of the Australia, New Zealand, and United States (ANZUS) Treaty in 1951, further deepening ties
with the United States. The end of the ANZUS relationship in the 1980s increased New Zealand’s reliance on Australia. Between the 1950s and 1980s, it stationed forces in Malaysia and Singapore, forming closer
security ties with both countries.<a name="_ftnref29"></a></span><a href="#_ftn29" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[29]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">The absence of a direct invasion threat means
that the NZDF has a broad structure, but its capabilities remain modest due to limitations. The NZDF consists of 8,946 regular, 3,226 reserve, and 3,309 civilian personnel, distributed across the Royal New Zealand
Navy, New Zealand Army, Royal New Zealand Air Force, and Defence Headquarters.<a name="_ftnref30"></a></span><a href="#_ftn30" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[30]</sup></span></a><span
style="color:#000000;"> The Army is the largest force with 6,399
personnel.<a name="_ftnref31"></a></span><a href="#_ftn31" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[31]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">The NZDF’s current mandate, established under
the Defence Act of 1990 and operationalized in the <em>2016 Defence White Paper</em>, outlines its principal roles: defending New Zealand’s sovereign territory, contributing to national resilience and security
objectives, meeting alliance commitments with Australia, supporting civilian presence in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, leading operations in the South Pacific, supporting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific
region, contributing to international peace and security and the rule of law, advancing New Zealand’s security partnerships, monitoring the strategic environment, and responding to sudden shifts in the strategic
environment.<a name="_ftnref32"></a></span><a href="#_ftn32" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[32]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">These roles are ambitious and reflect a shift
from Cold War-era thinking based on force mobilization and collective
security.<a name="_ftnref33"></a></span><a href="#_ftn33" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[33]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Despite significant changes in the strategic
environment and defense goals, the NZDF’s force structure has seen little change since the end of the Cold War. New Zealand has lost its Air Combat Wing and two of its four frigates. Much of the NZDF’s doctrine and
training focus on conventional operations with minimal expansion of special forces. Its expeditionary capability remains limited due to a lack of airlift and sealift capabilities.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;">The conservatism and continuity in the NZDF’s
structure are arguably driven by economic factors rather than strategic ones. The defense budget has declined in real terms, limiting the ability to test new concepts or expand the defense force. New Zealand’s
maritime forces, while maintaining limited blue-water combat capabilities, primarily conduct surveillance, patrol, resource and border protection, and search and rescue (SAR) operations. The Air Force, lacking air
combat capabilities, assists the Navy with maritime patrols and helicopter support and conducts surveillance, reconnaissance, SAR, combat operations, and international security assistance.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">The New Zealand Army can deploy in combined arms
operations up to the battalion level, conduct peacekeeping operations, provide security assistance, and support civilian authorities in New Zealand. The Special Operations Forces (SOF) handle domestic
counterterrorism and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and serve as deployable force elements in domestic and coalition tasks abroad. The NZDF is developing capabilities for independent, low-intensity operations
through the Joint Task Force (JTF) concept.<a name="_ftnref34"></a></span><a href="#_ftn34" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[34]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> The New
Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS) Regiment, modeled after the British SAS, is the premier combat unit of the NZDF, comprising six squadrons. It has been extensively deployed as part of New Zealand’s international
commitments since the Malayan Emergency in 1955 and has seen extended deployments in Afghanistan since
2001.<a name="_ftnref35"></a></span><a href="#_ftn35" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[35]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Since 1991, the overall trend in the New Zealand
Defence Force (NZDF) has been a reduction in forces and continuity in policy. There has been some slight restructuring, but this has been confined to areas that did not require additional major funding, such as
service roles, doctrine, and command structure. Major capital acquisitions have occurred only in the naval
forces.<a name="_ftnref36"></a></span><a href="#_ftn36" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[36]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;">Currently, New Zealand has very limited force
elements that it can utilize for its international commitments: four P-8A Poseidon aircraft (replacing the aging P3K2 Orion squadron), five C-130H Hercules, two ANZAC-class frigates (HMNZS <em>Te Kaha</em> and HMNZS
<em>Te Mana</em>), and the NZSAS Regiment. Until recently, there have been no significant events (apart from the 2019 Christchurch mosque attacks) that have changed the threat calculus. Even then, the rise of
terrorism and new security risks has not prompted major policy and institutional changes. Thus, while the NZDF appears capable of being deployed in a broad range of tasks, its size and current capabilities are
limited, and its ability to sustain them is in question.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">The isolation and lack of direct threats have
made defense a low-salience area in New Zealand politics, resulting in low levels of
funding.<a name="_ftnref37"></a></span><a href="#_ftn37" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[37]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Comparable social democracies in similar
benign environments, such as Sweden, Norway, and Finland, spend between 1.5 to 2.0 percent of GDP on
defense.<a name="_ftnref38"></a></span><a href="#_ftn38" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[38]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Tonga, much smaller than New Zealand, spent
1.6 percent of its GDP on defense in 2023, while Fiji spent 1.3 percent.<a name="_ftnref39"></a></span><a href="#_ftn39" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[39]</sup></span></a><span
style="color:#000000;"> In 2010, New Zealand’s defense spending was only around 1 percent of GDP, despite the ambitious agenda set out in the <em>Defence White Paper</em> of that
year.<a name="_ftnref40"></a></span><a href="#_ftn40" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[40]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> From 1960 to 2022, there has been a general
decline in New Zealand’s defense spending as a percentage of GDP, from 2.69 percent to 1.18 percent.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Although there has been an increase in total
expenditure in 2024 (NZD 4.5 billion), it has not been enough for New Zealand to meet its defense needs. This trend reflects New Zealand’s tendency to provide minimal funding for the defense force, except during
periods of total war.<a name="_ftnref41"></a></span><a href="#_ftn41" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[41]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Over the years, there has been
little concern from the public and Parliament regarding defense spending.<a name="_ftnref42"></a></span><a href="#_ftn42" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[42]</sup></span></a><span
style="color:#000000;"> Since the Helen Clark government in 1999, the view that New Zealand’s security encompasses more than just defense, and thus requires a balanced allocation of resources among various aspects of
foreign policy, has persisted in policy circles.<a name="_ftnref43"></a></span><a href="#_ftn43" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[43]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;">
Figure 1 summarizes the general decline in military spending as a percentage of GDP.</span></span></span></p>
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<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;"><strong>Figure 1. New Zealand defense spending
as percentage of GDP, 1960–2022. </strong>(Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Military Expenditure Database,”
</span><a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><strong>https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex</strong></span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.)</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Defense issues do not have a significant
constituency in New Zealand and are usually reserved for a small group of political elites. The public’s view of defense seems to be stuck in the era of antinuclear legislation, the retrenchment of New Zealand’s
strategic horizons, and the end of ANZUS, which downgraded US-NZ relations from “allied” to
“friendly.”<a name="_ftnref44"></a></span><a href="#_ftn44" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[44]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Current and immediate past governments
have taken different positions on the issue.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Historically, New Zealand’s two major political
parties have different stances on international relations and the role of the military. The Labour Party, described as liberal internationalist, has been antimilitarist since 1916. The National Party, with a more
realist perspective, has always been concerned with national defense. Despite this, neither party can be considered significant defense spenders. Notably, during Helen Clark’s Labour government, New Zealand disbanded
its air combat arm. However, a Labour-led government sent NZSAS personnel to Afghanistan, and a frigate was dispatched to the Persian Gulf in response to the September 11 attacks in the United
States.<a name="_ftnref45"></a></span><a href="#_ftn45" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[45]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Among more recent coalition members, NZ First,
which holds a politically conservative position, has long called for renewing relationships with traditional partners, such as Australia and the United States. It attempted to do so with coalition partner Labour in
2017. While NZ First held both the defense and foreign affairs portfolios, the New Zealand Defence Ministry in 2018 focused more on working with other nations in areas such as HADR operations, the role of women in
peace and security, and the expansion of peacekeeping operations—a position supported by Labour’s other coalition partner, the Green
Party.<a name="_ftnref46"></a></span><a href="#_ftn46" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[46]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">The current coalition government, led by the
National Party, has expressed a desire to spend more on defense and play a more significant role but faces budgetary constraints. The lack of sustained investment over the years means that much of the new funding
will be spent on improving readiness and addressing the assets and equipment backlogs of the past
decades.<a name="_ftnref47"></a></span><a href="#_ftn47" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[47]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; line-height:normal"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><strong>The NZDF and the Changing Strategic
Environment in the Indo-Pacific</strong></span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;">The NZDF plays an outsized role in supporting
the country’s foreign policy objectives, raising questions about New Zealand's reliance on the NZDF as a "one-stop-shop" for foreign engagements. Successive New Zealand governments have articulated two main foreign
policy objectives in which the NZDF plays a crucial role: supporting the Pacific Region, with an emphasis on Australia as a partner, and being a good international citizen through international organizations and
multinational operations.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">The NZDF typically engages in offshore
activities such as HADR, SAR, defense and diplomacy exercises, support to Antarctica, Building Partner Capacity (BPC), surveillance and interception, counterpiracy, and involvement in UN peacekeeping
operations.<a name="_ftnref48"></a></span><a href="#_ftn48" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[48]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (MFAT) considers the NZDF key in its exercise of defense diplomacy. This includes visits, exchanges, and deliberations on military matters as well as nonconventional and “soft”
threats.<a name="_ftnref49"></a></span><a href="#_ftn49" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[49]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Defense diplomacy has become a more frequently
used soft power tool, especially with the growth of China’s influence in the region and rising regional tensions, which have led to more assertive militaries in the Pacific. Within the Pacific, New Zealand’s defense
diplomacy efforts have been notably effective, with NZDF personnel viewed as friendly, trustworthy, and well-respected. New Zealand’s long-term engagement with the Pacific Islands and its ability to understand the
priorities of Pacific peoples have given it an important edge, with Pacific Island Countries (PIC) recognizing the quality and achievements of New Zealand's
efforts.<a name="_ftnref50"></a></span><a href="#_ftn50" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[50]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">The NZDF’s involvement in peacekeeping
operations dates back to 1951, when its officers served as unarmed observers in the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. Since then, New Zealand has participated in 40 peace operations in more than 25 countries over
the past seven decades, either under UN auspices or as part of coalitions.<a name="_ftnref51"></a></span><a href="#_ftn51" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[51]</sup></span></a><span
style="color:#000000;"> The New Zealand government uses the term <em>peace support operations</em> to describe this involvement, encompassing a broad range of activities beyond UN peacekeeping operations, including
peace enforcement and other forms of military deployment.<a name="_ftnref52"></a></span><a href="#_ftn52" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[52]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">In Afghanistan, for instance, the NZSAS was
extensively involved in Special Forces operations, provincial reconstruction activities, and the training of local
forces.<a name="_ftnref53"></a></span><a href="#_ftn53" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[53]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> The NZDF’s deployments represent an effective
way of deploying smart power—leveraging its limited resources to fulfill international commitments while meeting broad security goals.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">The strategic rivalry between the United States
and China, along with China’s growing assertiveness in the region, looms large for New Zealand. China remains the largest market for New Zealand exports. Since 2006, the People's Republic of China’s (PRC) presence in
the Pacific has expanded dramatically. In November 2018, Xi Jinping attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Port Moresby and met with all Pacific leaders with whom the PRC had diplomatic
relations.<a name="_ftnref54"></a></span><a href="#_ftn54" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[54]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Prior to this, Xi labeled the South Pacific
as the “southern leg” of the Maritime Silk Road, which eventually transformed into the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI).<a name="_ftnref55"></a></span><a href="#_ftn55" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[55]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> The PRC’s extended Maritime Silk Road map
issued in 2015 included parts of the South Pacific. In the last 20 years, China has become a key aid, investment, and trade partner for most states in the
Pacific.<a name="_ftnref56"></a></span><a href="#_ftn56" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[56]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">New Zealand’s response to China’s increasing
presence in the Pacific, despite initial silence and eventual denial, was the Pacific Reset policy. This policy includes an allocation of NZ$714.2 million to New Zealand’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Fund
and the establishment of 14 new diplomatic posts in the region.<a name="_ftnref57"></a></span><a href="#_ftn57" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[57]</sup></span></a><span
style="color:#000000;"> Despite some recent setbacks, the NZ–China relationship continues to flourish, even as New Zealand deepens its security relationship with the United States. According to one analysis, part of
the reason China does not seem troubled by this is the general weakness of New Zealand’s armed
forces.<a name="_ftnref58"></a></span><a href="#_ftn58" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[58]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Nonetheless, New Zealand has taken a cautious
approach, maintaining freedom of navigation and open trade routes.<a name="_ftnref59"></a></span><a href="#_ftn59" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[59]</sup></span></a></span></span>
</p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">The end of the ANZUS alliance has made New
Zealand less willing to openly take sides in any contest between great powers, marking the hallmark of its “independent foreign policy.” This position has several facets. It is first anchored on the continued
commitment to a rules-based international order, allowing New Zealand to be a liberal free-trading nation. Second, it has been articulated in terms of New Zealand’s nuclear-free stance. Third, this same independence
has been invoked to justify New Zealand’s deepening ties with Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, while mending ties with the United States. Lastly, New Zealand sees itself as an honest player among Pacific
Island states, assisting them in a variety of pressing regional
issues.<a name="_ftnref60"></a></span><a href="#_ftn60" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[60]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;">This independent foreign policy position
justifies why New Zealand has not sought alliances beyond Australia and its apparent reluctance in the Five Eyes alliance. For decades, New Zealand has enjoyed a position where it can afford a small military and rely
on its economy to be independent in a system governed by rules. However, recent events have challenged the rules-based order that New Zealand has depended on, and the use of force as a means of pursuing foreign
policy has become a primary choice for some states. How long can New Zealand play this gamble while appearing to go it alone?</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Beyond the question of New Zealand’s independent
foreign policy are real concerns about its military capabilities and the continuing impact of its unique geographical situation. Several cases illustrate this. First, in 2019, New Zealand was asked to supplement
British patrols in the Strait of Hormuz. Then-Minister of Defence Ron Mark declared that New Zealand could not send any forces as they were still in Canada for upgrades, and it could barely keep two of its P3 Orions
flying. This highlighted the issue of capability for sustained operations beyond its
shores.<a name="_ftnref61"></a></span><a href="#_ftn61" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[61]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">The view that the NZDF is a one-stop-shop for
fulfilling some of New Zealand’s foreign policy objectives makes this situation particularly dire if the burden is not shared with other New Zealand government agencies, especially considering the total reduction in
personnel by around 30 percent in 2023.<a name="_ftnref62"></a></span><a href="#_ftn62" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[62]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Second, New Zealand’s maritime domain is 20
times its land area. However, it does not yet have a coherent national plan or the capacity to comprehensively monitor this
domain.<a name="_ftnref63"></a></span><a href="#_ftn63" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[63]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> This is particularly important for New
Zealand, especially given increased operations by China’s Distant Water Fleets (DWF) in the
Pacific.<a name="_ftnref64"></a></span><a href="#_ftn64" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[64]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> These areas are productive for squid fishing,
trawling, and long-lining. PRC fishing vessels have been accused of turning off their automatic identification system (AIS) and fishing in other nations’ EEZs without
consent.<a name="_ftnref65"></a></span><a href="#_ftn65" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[65]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Additionally, there is an indication that
China intends to use these vessels as fishing militias, as it has done in Northeast and Southeast Asia.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;">In 2024, the PRC registered 26 China Coast Guard
(CCG) vessels to operate in areas under the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Convention Area. New Zealand has the fourth-largest EEZ in the world (at 4.2 million square kilometers) and the
ninth-longest coastline (at more than 15,000 kilometers). The South Pacific is vulnerable to illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing (IUUF) by DWFs and the use of PRC’s fishing militia. The significant gap in
New Zealand’s naval assets means it is unable to monitor this area effectively, allowing a range of threats—from gray-zone tactics and drug smuggling (the zone is considered a drug-trafficking highway) to human
trafficking—to continue unabated.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Third, given New Zealand’s relatively small size
and limited military capability, cooperation with Australia is essential during moments of regional instability, such as the Bougainville crisis in 1997. New Zealand’s defense policy and spending have largely been
seen as free-riding on the efforts of larger states—initially the United Kingdom and the United States during the Cold War, and later on Australia’s efforts after the relationship with the United States was
downgraded. Within the range of small-state strategies, New Zealand can be viewed as <em>shelter-seeking</em>, where small states seek political, economic, and social shelter from larger states and international
organizations during crises.<a name="_ftnref66"></a></span><a href="#_ftn66" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[66]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> This approach has allowed
New Zealand to do only as much as its unique interests require and as much as its larger partners will
permit.<a name="_ftnref67"></a></span><a href="#_ftn67" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[67]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">However, the <em>2023 Defence Policy Strategy
Statement</em> indicates a recognition that New Zealand no longer exists in a benign strategic environment and that the NZDF cannot adequately respond to increasing security threats or defend New Zealand’s
territory and interests, as well as those of neighboring PICs.<a name="_ftnref68"></a></span><a href="#_ftn68" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[68]</sup></span></a><span
style="color:#000000;"> The PRC’s actions in the Solomon Islands and other PICs could create competing regional security architectures that New Zealand is currently unprepared to
address.<a name="_ftnref69"></a></span><a href="#_ftn69" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[69]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Three policy documents released in 2023 seem to
indicate a shift in direction: the <em>2023 Defence Policy and Strategy Statement</em>, the <em>Future Force Design Principles</em>, and New Zealand’s inaugural <em>National Security Strategy</em>. These documents
recognize that New Zealand is facing a more challenging strategic environment than it has for decades. New Zealand’s 2023<em> Future Force Design Principles</em> acknowledge that the NZDF will need to deploy more
often and in more diverse situations due to the changing strategic environment, necessitating more government investment in the short, medium, and long
term.<a name="_ftnref70"></a></span><a href="#_ftn70" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[70]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">New Zealand first needs to invest in its naval
assets. Despite having one of the largest maritime domains, New Zealand currently has one of the smallest navies in the world, consisting of nine vessels—frigates, patrol vessels, and logistical support
vessels.<a name="_ftnref71"></a></span><a href="#_ftn71" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[71]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> In contrast, Singapore, with one of the
smallest EEZs and shortest coastlines in the world, has 40 warships.<a name="_ftnref72"></a></span><a href="#_ftn72" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[72]</sup></span></a><span
style="color:#000000;"> As the discussion above highlights, the NZDF’s weaknesses in the maritime domain are glaring and need to be addressed immediately.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">Second, in addition to increased funding, New
Zealand needs to continue leveraging the NZDF’s ability to be interoperable with like-minded militaries and allies. Accessing advanced technologies under Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) Pillar Two will
be critical to ensuring that the NZDF does not fall further into technical obsolescence and maintains access to cutting-edge technology in a fast-changing strategic and technological
environment.<a name="_ftnref73"></a></span><a href="#_ftn73" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[73]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;">The current framing of New Zealand potentially
joining AUKUS’ Pillar Two component reveals much about how foreign policy and academic circles discuss security for New Zealand, which may impact whether the NZDF will receive much-needed funding support. The
pro-AUKUS camp sees its utility given China’s growing assertiveness and New Zealand’s vulnerability due to its lack of technological capabilities in the event of an actual conflict. Conversely, the anti-AUKUS camp
views AUKUS as antithetical to New Zealand’s independent foreign policy and antinuclear stance.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><span style="color:#000000;">A third perspective argues that these initial
positions miss an important point: New Zealand’s role as a champion of the Blue Pacific
narrative.<a name="_ftnref74"></a></span><a href="#_ftn74" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[74]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> This view suggests that joining AUKUS would
undermine support for Pacific priorities, framing the choice for New Zealand as one between the Pacific and the
Anglosphere.<a name="_ftnref75"></a></span><a href="#_ftn75" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[75]</sup></span></a></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; line-height:normal"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><strong>Conclusion</strong></span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;">This article argues that the NZDF’s capacity in
the evolving strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific has been severely hampered by years of underspending and policy conservatism. Since 1991, the trend has been a reduction of forces and continuity in policy,
while restructuring has been modest. Geography, domestic politics, and specific historical junctures have shaped policymakers' views on the military and consequently, the direction of defense policy and
spending.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;">Despite this, the NZDF plays an outsized role in
supporting New Zealand’s foreign policy objectives. However, this comes at the cost of its ability to contribute more to traditional security commitments and to monitor and secure the maritime domain, raising
questions about its independent foreign policy. Small states like New Zealand have always been hampered by their lack of military power. Nevertheless, New Zealand has the opportunity and a compelling reason for the
public to consent to increased defense spending.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:115%"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;">On paper, New Zealand’s security interests are
broad and encompass a wide array of traditional and nontraditional concerns. To meet these goals, a well-equipped, highly trained, and sufficiently staffed NZDF is essential. The evolving security environment in the
Indo-Pacific demands that New Zealand back its commitments with appropriate funding. ♦</span></span></span></p>
<hr>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;"><strong>Dr. Juhn Chris P.
Espia</strong></span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="color:#000000;"><span style="font-size:larger;"><span style="font-family:arial;">Dr. Espia is a nonresident senior research
fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs. He is an assistant professor of political science at the University of the Philippines at Visayas and holds a PhD in political science from the University of
Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand. He researches state-civil society relations, disaster studies, public policy, foreign policy, and comparative politics in the Indo-Pacific.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<hr style="width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left">
<div id="_ftn1">
<h3 style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10pt; text-indent: 36pt; line-height: normal; font-size: 10pt;"><strong>Notes</strong></h3>
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref1" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[1]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Stephen Hoadley, “From Defence to Security: New Zealand's
Hard Power, Soft Power, and Smart Power,” <em>New Zealand International Review </em>32, no. 5 (2007): 18–21,
</span><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45235669" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.jstor.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn2">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref2" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[2]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> M.L. Cavanaugh, “New Zealand’s Dangerous Strategic Apathy
in an Uncertain Age,” <em>The Strategist</em>, 12 February 2020,
</span><a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-zealands-dangerous-strategic-apathy-in-an-uncertain-age/" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn3">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref3" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[3]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> “Our People, Structure, and Leadership,” New Zealand
Defence Force, 2024, accessed 15 September 2024,
</span><a href="https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/nzdf/who-we-are/our-people-structure-and-leadership/" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">;
and Cavenaugh, “New Zealand’s Dangerous Strategic Apathy.”</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn4">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref4" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[4]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> David Fisher, “NZ Defence Force in Crisis—Our Ships Can’t
Sail, Planes Can’t Fly and Soldiers Have Left in Droves,” <em>New Zealand Herald</em>, 2024,
</span><a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/politics/nz-defence-force-in-crisis-our-ships-cant-sail-planes-cant-fly-and-soldiers-have-left-in-droves/YP5RTDCFWBE7FFG23IJIK634UU/#google_vignette" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.nzherald.co.nz/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn5">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref5" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[5]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Griffin Manawaroa Leonard, Joseph Llewellyn, and Richard
Jackson, <em>Abolishing the Military: Arguments and Alternatives</em> (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2023).</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn6">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref6" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[6]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Tim Hurdle, “New Zealand Is Waking up to Threats,” <em>The
Strategist</em>, 23 May 2024,
</span><a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-zealand-is-waking-up-to-threats/" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn7">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref7" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[7]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Robert L. Rothstein, <em>Alliances and Small Powers</em>
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 29.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn8">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref8" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[8]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver Neumann, <em>Small States
and Status Seeking: Norway's Quest for International Standing</em> (New York Routledge, 2015).</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn9">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref9" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[9]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Rob De Wijk, “The Implications for Force Transformation:
The Small Country Perspective,” in <em>Transatlantic Transformations–Equipping Nato for the 21st Century</em>, ed. D.S. Hamilton (Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2004), 144.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn10">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref10" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[10]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Jan Willem Honig, “The Tyranny of Doctrine and Modern
Strategy: Small (and Large) States in a Double Bind,” <em>Journal of Strategic Studies </em>39, no. 2 (2016): 261–79,
</span><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1115036" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://doi.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn11">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref11" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[11]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Joseph S. Nye, “State Smart Power Strategies,” in
<em>Soft Power and Great-Power Competition: Shifting Sands in the Balance of Power between the United States and China</em>, ed. Joseph S. Nye (Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2023), 21–28.</span></span></span>
</p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn12">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref12" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[12]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Alan Chong, “Smart Power and Military Force: An
Introduction,” <em>Journal of Strategic Studies</em> 38, no. 3 (2015): 233–44,</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn13">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref13" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[13]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Vernon Noel Bennett, “Military Force Structures in Small
States: Providing for Relevant and Credible Military Capability” (PhD dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 2018), 61,
</span><a href="https://dml.armywarcollege.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Bennett-Small-State-Force-Structure-dissertation-2018.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://dml.armywarcollege.edu/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">. </span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn14">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref14" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[14]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, <em>Politics
among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace</em> (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993).</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn15">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref15" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[15]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Colin S. Gray, <em>Strategy and History: Essays on
Theory and Practice</em> (New York: Routledge, 2007), 137–39.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn16">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref16" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[16]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Håkan Edström, Dennis Gyllensporre, and Jacob Westberg,
<em>Military Strategy of Small States: Responding to External Shocks of the 21st Century</em> (New York: Routledge, 2018), 25.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn17">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref17" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[17]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Robert Jervis, <em>Perception and Misperception in
International Politics</em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn18">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref18" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[18]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a
Conceptual Minefield,” <em>International Organization </em>48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 279–312,
</span><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706933" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.jstor.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn19">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref19" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[19]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Dan Reiter, “Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The
Weight of the Shadow of the Past,” <em>World Politics </em>46, no. 4 (July 1994): 490–526,
</span><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2950716" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://doi.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn20">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref20" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[20]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Jack Snyder, <em>Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and
International Ambition,</em> vol. 160 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn21">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref21" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[21]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Stanley Hoffmann, <em>The European Sisyphus: Essays on
Europe, 1964–1994</em> (New York: Routledge, 2019).</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn22">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref22" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[22]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> John Lantis and Daryl Howlett, “Strategic Culture,” in
<em>Strategy in the Contemporary World</em>, ed. John Baylis, James Wirtz, and Colin S Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn23">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref23" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[23]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> James D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and
Theories of International Relations,” <em>Annual Review of Political Science </em>1, no. 1 (1998): 289–313,
</span><a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.289" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://doi.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn24">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref24" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[24]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Rebecca U. Thorpe, <em>The American Warfare State: The
Domestic Politics of Military Spending</em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020).</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn25">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref25" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[25]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Benjamin O. Fordham, “Domestic Politics, International
Pressure, and the Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending,” <em>Journal of Politics </em>64, no. 1 (February 2002): 63–88,
</span><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2691665" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.jstor.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn26">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref26" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[26]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Central Intelligence Agency, “New Zealand,” <em>World
Factbook</em>, 2024, </span><a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/new-zealand/#geography" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.cia.gov/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn27">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref27" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[27]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> <em>Defence White Paper 2016 </em>(Wellington: Ministry
of Defence, June 2016),
</span><a href="https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/publications/defence-white-paper-2016-2.pdf" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.defence.govt.nz/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn28">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref28" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[28]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Robert Patman, “Sovereignty, Globalisation and New
Zealand Foreign Policy,” in <em>New Zealand in a Globalising World</em>, ed. Ralph Pettman (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 44–65.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn29">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref29" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[29]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Robert Ayson, “Australasian Security,” in <em>Strategy
and Security in the Asia-Pacific: Global and Regional Dynamics</em>, ed. Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball (London: Routledge, 2020), 242–56.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn30">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref30" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[30]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Figures cited here are as of 31 August
2024.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn31">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref31" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[31]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> “Our People, Structure, and
Leadership.”</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn32">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref32" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[32]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> <em>Defence White Paper 2016</em>,
11.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn33">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref33" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[33]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> James Rolfe, <em>The Armed Forces of New Zealand.</em>
(St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1999), 18.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn34">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref34" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[34]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Bennett, “Military Force Structures in Small States,”
106–07.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn35">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref35" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[35]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> “Peace & Security,” New Zealand Defence Force,
n.d., </span><a href="https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/nzdf/what-we-do/peace-and-security/" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn36">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref36" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[36]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Zhivan Alach, “New Zealand’s Future Defence: Force
Change or Stagnation?,” <em>Security Challenges </em>2, no. 3 (October 2006): 63–76,
</span><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26459042" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.jstor.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn37">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref37" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[37]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> David McCraw, “Change and Continuity in Strategic
Culture: The Cases of Australia and New Zealand,” <em>Australian Journal of International Affairs </em>65, no. 2 (2011): 167–84,
</span><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2011.550102" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://doi.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn38">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref38" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[38]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Alach, “New Zealand’s Future Defence,”
74.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn39">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref39" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[39]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Central Intelligence Agency, “Military Expenditures
Comparison,” <em>World Factbook</em>,
2024, </span><a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/military-expenditures/country-comparison/" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.cia.gov/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn40">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref40" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[40]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Rod Lyon, “The New Zealand Defence White Paper: A More
Strategically-Extroverted Kiwi?,” <em>Policy Analysis</em> 69, 11 November 2010,
</span><a href="https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/import/Policy_Analysis69_NZ_White_Paper.pdf?VersionId=e9rPi1gRaXNqfNAbIeT74_szWZKet24Q" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn41">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref41" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[41]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Rhys Ball, “The Strategic Utility of New Zealand Special
Forces,” <em>Small Wars & Insurgencies </em>22, no. 1 (2011): 119–41,
</span><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2011.546594" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://doi.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">. </span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn42">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref42" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[42]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Alach, “New Zealand’s Future Defence,”
70.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn43">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref43" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[43]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Hon Derek Quigley, “The Evolution of New Zealand Defence
Policy,” <em>Security Challenges </em>2, no. 3 (October 2006): 41–61,
</span><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26459041" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.jstor.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn44">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref44" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[44]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Lyon, “The New Zealand Defence White Paper,”<em>
</em>1.<em> </em></span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn45">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref45" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[45]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> David McCraw, “New Zealand’s Defence Policy: The Triumph
of Ideology?,” <em>New Zealand International Review</em> 31, no. 1 (January 2006): 23–27</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn46">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref46" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[46]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> “Defence and Peacekeeping Policy,” New Zealand Green
Party, 2018, </span><a href="https://www.greens.org.nz/defence_and_peacekeeping_policy" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.greens.org.nz/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">. </span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn47">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref47" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[47]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Lucy Craymer and Lewis Jackson, “New Zealand Proposes
6.6% Smaller Defence Budget Amid Personnel and Equipment Woes,” <em>Reuters</em>, 22 May 2024,
</span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-zealand-proposes-66-cut-defence-spending-amid-personnel-equipment-woes-2024-05-22/" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.reuters.com/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn48">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref48" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[48]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> B. K. Greener, “The New Zealand Defence Force Role in
New Zealand Foreign Policy,” in <em>Small States and the Changing Global Order: New Zealand Faces the Future</em>, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Cham: Springer, 2019), 43–52.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn49">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref49" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[49]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Hoadley, “From Defence to Security,”
19.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn50">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref50" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[50]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Kendra L. Roddis and Alexander C. Tan, “Defence
Diplomacy: Battling for the Heart of the Pacific,” <em>Outre-Terre</em>, no. 58–59 (2020): 327–48,
</span><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/oute2.058.0328" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">http://dx.doi.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn51">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref51" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[51]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> “Peace Support Operations,” New Zealand Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Trade, 2021,
</span><a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/peace-rights-and-security/international-security/peace-support-operations" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.mfat.govt.nz/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn52">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref52" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[52]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> “Peacekeeping,” <em>Te Ara—the Encyclopedia of New
Zealand</em>, 2015, </span><a href="https://teara.govt.nz/en/peacekeeping/page-1" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://teara.govt.nz/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn53">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref53" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[53]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> “Peace & Security.”</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn54">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref54" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[54]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> “China, Pacific Island Countries Lift Ties to
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” <em>Xinhua</em>, 17 November 2018,
</span><a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/17/c_137612239_3.htm" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">http://www.xinhuanet.com/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn55">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref55" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[55]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Derek Grossman, <em>Chinese Strategy in the Freely
Associated States and American Territories in the Pacific: Implications for the United States</em> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2023),
</span><a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CTA2768-1.html" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.rand.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn56">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref56" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[56]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Anthony Bergin, David Brewster, and Aakriti Bachhawat,
“Pacific Island Countries,” in <em>Ocean Horizons: Strengthening Maritime Security in Indo-Pacific Island States </em>(Canberra:<em> </em>Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2019), 17–28,
</span><a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep23122.5" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">http://www.jstor.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn57">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref57" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[57]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Iati Iati, “China’s Impact on New Zealand Foreign Policy
in the Pacific: The Pacific Reset,” in <em>The China Alternative:</em> <em>Changing Regional Order in the Pacific Islands</em>, ed. Graeme Smith and Terence Wesley-Smith (Canberra: ANU Press, 2021),
143–66.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn58">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref58" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[58]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Robert G. Sutter et al., <em>Balancing Acts: The Us
Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability</em> (Washington: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, 2013).</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn59">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref59" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[59]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Steven Paget, “Water under the Bridge?: The Revival of
New Zealand–United States Maritime Cooperation,” <em>Naval War College Review </em>74, no. 3 (2021): 41–64,
</span><a href="https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss3/5" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn60">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref60" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[60]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Guy C. Charlton and Xiang Gao, “Re-Thinking New
Zealand’s Independent Foreign Policy,” <em>The Diplomat</em>, 14 June
2024, </span><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/06/re-thinking-new-zealands-independent-foreign-policy/" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://thediplomat.com/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn61">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref61" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[61]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Boris Jancic, “New Zealand Has No Boats to Send to
Strait of Hormuz: Defence Minister Ron Mark,” <em>New Zealand Herald</em>, 20 August 2019,
</span><a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/new-zealand-has-no-boats-to-send-to-strait-of-hormuz-defence-minister-ron-mark/NLVEG5U4EEJVT64GFSBVD3CQJY/#google_vignette" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.nzherald.co.nz/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn62">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref62" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[62]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> “New Zealand Defence Force Tells New Minister of High
Attrition, Staff Shortages,” <em>Radio New Zealand</em>, 1 February
2024, </span><a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/508181/new-zealand-defence-force-tells-new-minister-of-high-attrition-staff-shortages" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.rnz.co.nz/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn63">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref63" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[63]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Joanne O’Callaghan et al., “Developing an Integrated
Ocean Observing System for New Zealand,” <em>Frontiers in Marine Science </em>6 (March 2019),
</span><a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2019.00143" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://doi.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn64">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref64" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[64]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> According to the index by the Global Initiative Against
Transnational Organized Crime, the PRC is the worst IUUF offender. Of the 152 states in the IUUF Index, PRC is rated as the worst flag state, the second-worst port state, and the worst state
overall.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn65">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref65" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[65]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Joseph Hammond, “Chinese Fishing Fleet Poses Threat to
Pacific Island Economies,” <em>Indo-Pacific Defense Forum</em>, 21 June 2021,
</span><a href="https://ipdefenseforum.com/2021/06/chinese-fishing-fleet-poses-threat-to-pacific-island-economies/#:~:text=Across%20the%20Indo%2DPacific%2C%20oversize,American%20Samoa%2C%20Guam%20and%20Hawaii" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://ipdefenseforum.com/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn66">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref66" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[66]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Anne-Marie Brady and Baldur Thorhallsson, “Small States
and the Turning Point in Global Politics,” in <em>Small States and the New Security Environment</em>, ed. Anne-Marie Brady and Baldur Thorhallsson (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021),
5.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn67">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref67" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[67]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Mark Thomson, “New Zealand Defence Economics,” in
<em>The Cost of Defence ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2017–18 </em>(Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017), 263–78,
</span><a href="http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep04253.13" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">http://www.jstor.com/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn68">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref68" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[68]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> <em>Defence Policy and Strategy and Statement
</em>(Wellington: Ministry of Defence, 2023),
</span><a href="https://www.defence.govt.nz/publications/defence-policy-review-defence-policy-and-strategy-statement-2023/" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.defence.govt.nz/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn69">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref69" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[69]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Craig McCulloch and Russell Palmer, “Changing Global
Tensions Prompt New Zealand to Ramp up Security and Defence Resources,” <em>Radio New Zealand</em>, 3 August
2023, </span><a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/495115/changing-global-tensions-prompt-new-zealand-to-ramp-up-security-and-defence-resources" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.rnz.co.nz/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn70">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref70" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[70]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> <em>Future Force Design Principles</em> (Wellington
Ministry of Defence, 2023),
</span><a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-08/Future%20Force%20Design%20Principles%202023.PDF" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://www.beehive.govt.nz/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn71">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref71" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[71]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> A survey ship, HMNZS <em>Manawanui</em>, sank on 05
October 2024 off the coast of Samoa.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn72">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref72" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[72]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Alexander C. Tan and Neel Vanvari, “Protecting Our
‘Taonga’: How New Zealand Can Contribute to Regional Stability,” <em>The Diplomat</em>, 26 July 2023,
</span><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/07/protecting-our-taonga-how-new-zealand-can-contribute-to-regional-stability/" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://thediplomat.com/</span></a><span
style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn73">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref73" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[73]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Reuben Steff, “The Strategic Case for New Zealand to
Join AUKUS Pillar 2,” <em>Australian Journal of International Affairs</em>, 2024, 1–9,
</span><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2024.2399338" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://doi.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">. </span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn74">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref74" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[74]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Nicholas Ross Smith and Lauren Bland, “The Aukus Debate
in New Zealand Misses the Big Picture,” <em>Australian Journal of International Affairs </em>(2024): 1–8,
</span><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2024.2391336" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://doi.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftn75">
<p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-indent:36pt; line-height:normal; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-size:12px;"><span
style="font-family:arial;"><a href="#_ftnref75" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;"><sup>[75]</sup></span></a><span style="color:#000000;"> Marco de Jong, “Losing the Pacific to the Anglosphere:
Aukus and New Zealand’s Regional Engagement,” <em>Australian Journal of International Affairs </em>(2024): 1–8,
</span><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2024.2403735" style="text-decoration:none"><span style="color:#000000;">https://doi.org/</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">.</span></span></span></p>
</div>
</section>
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<a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JIPA/journals/Volume-03_Issue-1/Baker.pdf">
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<figure>
<div class="image-box">
<div class="image" style="background-image: url(https://media.defense.gov/2020/Feb/19/2002251760/300/300/0/200219-F-YT915-0001.JPG); background-position: 0% 0%;"></div>
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<figcaption>
<h2 class="title">New Zealand's Strategic Challenge</h2>
<div class="date">March 11, 2020</div>
<div class="summary">
Major Maia Baker, New Zealand Army In addressing the particular strategic challenges that China poses to New Zealand, this article explores what best practices can be drawn from other Western democratic states such as Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Ultimately, the
</div>
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<a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3047371/ontological-power-narrative-in-a-new-era-of-competition/">
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</div>
<figcaption>
<h2 class="title">Ontological Power: Narrative in a New Era of Competition</h2>
<div class="date">June 1, 2022</div>
<div class="summary">
This article offers four tenets of ontological power and recommendations on how to command this newest domain of power in the era of great-power competition.
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</article>
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<a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2880386/smart-power-is-hard-power-a-liberal-position-on-the-us-approach-to-china/">
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<figcaption>
<h2 class="title">“Smart Power” Is Hard Power: A Liberal Position on the US Approach to China</h2>
<div class="date">Dec. 21, 2021</div>
<div class="summary">
Traditionally, power is measured by states’ ability to coerce using hard power; however, the diffusion of power largely due to increased interdependence and advanced technology development has rendered these traditional sources of power less effective in achieving desired outcomes. Today, it
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<h2 class="title">Reshaping the Indo-Pacific Construct through Strategic Geopolitical Convergences: AUKUS as a Harbinger of a Multipolar Hegemony in the Region</h2>
<div class="date">Jan. 20, 2022</div>
<div class="summary">
As the rivalry between the United States and China intensifies with the changing political and security dynamics in the region, a shift in international politics and geostrategic priorities is inevitable. Since the end of World War II, the United States has projected power across this region, and
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SMART POWER OR STRATEGIC APATHY?: THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE AND THE POLITICS
OF CAPABILITY BUILDING AND DEPLOYMENT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
* Published Nov. 20, 2024
* By Dr. Juhn Chris P. Espia
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs --
View PDF version here.
Abstract
This article examines how the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) builds and
deploys its capabilities in the evolving Indo-Pacific strategic environment.
Geography, domestic politics, and historical moments shape defense policy and
spending. The NZDF continues traditional deployments—peacekeeping, logistics,
maritime security, and humanitarian operations—aiming to maintain an independent
foreign policy while contributing modestly to the international order. The NZDF
plays a critical role in humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) in
the Pacific and Southeast Asia, areas where New Zealand enjoys goodwill.
However, despite improved troop quality, New Zealand’s defense spending and
personnel numbers have declined, eliminating its air combat capabilities. While
HADR and other nontraditional roles grow, including search, rescue, and resource
protection, the NZDF shifts away from its traditional role of border defense.
Coupled with reluctance to formalize alliances beyond Australia, this approach
in a riskier environment seems like a dangerous gamble.
***
New Zealand’s national anthem, “God Defend New Zealand,” references how the
country should deal with military threats: “make mountains into ramparts,” “make
us then a mighty host,” and “put our enemies to flight.” This
sequence—territorial defense followed by mobilizing the populace for a
counterattack—now seems outdated, reflecting neither the strategic position nor
the capabilities of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF).[1]
New Zealand faces no direct military threat but has diverse security interests
requiring specific capabilities. However, defense spending has plummeted to a
little more than one percent of gross domestic product (GDP), roughly two-thirds
less than four decades ago. The air combat capability was scrapped in 2001.[2]
Regular Force personnel numbers fell from 12,400 in 1985 to 8,946 in 2024.[3]
Some analysts call this a crisis, pointing to failing NZDF assets and personnel
exodus.[4]
In recent discussions, some politicians and analysts have raised concerns about
the decline in the NZDF’s numbers and capabilities. Additionally, certain actors
have proposed the abolition of the Defence Force, suggesting that its budget
could be better utilized for nonviolent alternatives.[5] However, several
developments since 2022 indicate a shift in New Zealand's strategic outlook.
Then-Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern attended the NATO Summit that year. In 2023,
under Chris Hipkins’ government, Defence Minister Andrew Little unveiled a
Defence Policy Strategy Statement, acknowledging that New Zealand “no longer
lives in a benign strategic environment.” The current three-party center-right
coalition appears more inclined to increase defense spending, despite facing a
structural fiscal deficit and an expanded public service.[6]
Considering these seeming shifts, this article examines how the NZDF’s
capability-building and deployment patterns shape its overall military capacity
in the evolving Indo-Pacific strategic environment. It argues that geography,
domestic politics, and significant historical events have influenced policy
makers’ views on the military, directing defense policy and spending. With New
Zealand’s reluctance to formalize alliances beyond Australia, the article
concludes that the country is taking a dangerous gamble in a riskier
environment.
Small States and the Military
In general, small states are perceived as lacking military power. Some scholars
argue that the defining characteristic of small states is their inability to
provide for their security, relying on others—states, institutions, and
developments—for protection.[7] However, their small size does not mean they do
not maintain military forces. This military function, along with economic and
diplomatic ones, is constrained by their relatively narrow economic base, gaps
in organizational capacity, and low levels of diplomatic and military
capabilities.[8]
In the contemporary security environment, small budgets and rigid defense
bureaucracies continue to limit small states.[9] However, more opportunities now
exist for them to employ these capabilities and gain influence.[10] Small states
have become adept at utilizing smart power—the intelligent linking and
integration of hard and soft power.[11] Militaries have been deployed for more
complex mission environments beyond conventional combat, such as contributing to
regional peace and stability missions, humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief (HADR), and regional diplomacy.[12] Thus, while small states may no
longer be expected to credibly project their warfighting capability, there are
many other exigencies under the wider umbrella of military operations that
support the international rules-based order and meet small states’
interests.[13]
The defense policies and strategies of states reflect their domestic and
external environments. This analysis focuses on three factors: the role of
geography, specific historical junctures, and domestic politics. In realist
scholarship, researchers and strategists have consistently investigated the
importance of geographical characteristics in their analyses of security
situations and military strategies.[14] Whether a state has a land and sea power
nexus, strategic depth and natural defenses, and proximity to friendly and
threatening great powers, matters. Colin Gray argues that geographical
characteristics, along with historical experience, also contribute to a nation’s
strategic culture. Geography predisposes states and their military
establishments toward certain ways of conducting warfare.[15] Strategic culture,
as a set of shared understandings within a particular community, channels
influence from historical experiences, geography, and other factors into
policymaking and practice.[16]
Previous experiences, such as wars, become formative lessons that can be passed
down to those who did not live through them.[17] Past successes generally lead
to policy continuity, while failures often result in policy change.[18] In
certain cases, previous experiences influence the choice between pursuing
alliances or adopting neutrality—a policy of neutrality that maintains peace is
likely to continue, while its failure pushes states toward alliances.[19]
Decision makers often use these experiences to rationalize their policy choices.
Historical experiences can thus serve as part of the policy learning process or
as a rhetorical device for advancing an agenda. In both cases, they impact the
ability of decision makers to make choices.[20]
Foreign policy decision making can be described as the process of carrying the
nation’s past and problems along.[21] Together with geography, they form
national strategic cultures where national conceptions of roles and identities
shape what are considered appropriate actions. External shocks and “strategical
dilemmas” can challenge these identities. In the latter case, established
identities and values may conflict with each other.[22]
Domestic politics is often cited as a reason states pursue suboptimal foreign
policies. Domestic political institutions, cultures, economic structures, or
leadership goals unrelated to a state’s relative power help explain why states
make particular foreign policy choices.[23] The role of domestic politics is
also often expressed in terms of the preferences of selectorates and competing
interest groups. In democratic systems, defense policy has been analyzed in
terms of how lobbies operate, particularly regarding the existence of a
military-industrial complex.[24] However, this is of little relevance to small
states. Conversely, the role of party ideology and military spending has been
theorized, highlighting the interests of domestic political factions controlling
the state and their influence on military strategy and force structure.[25]
The NZDF Today: The Roles of Geography, History, and Domestic Politics
New Zealand, a maritime state in the South Pacific Ocean, is the 77th largest
country in terms of surface area and boasts a coastline of 15,134 kilometers.
With a population of 5,161,211, it ranks as the 125th most populous country
globally.[26] Located in a remote part of the Pacific, New Zealand holds the
fourth-largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the world and has territorial
claims in Antarctica. Additionally, it is formally responsible for the defense
of Niue, Tokelau, and the Cook Islands.[27]
Geographically isolated and without direct military threats, New Zealand enjoys
significant maneuverability on a broad range of international issues.[28] Its
security partnerships and outlook are deeply influenced by its colonial history.
As a dominion and former colony, it supported the British Empire and the United
Kingdom, sending forces to the Boer War and both World Wars, thus developing an
expeditionary nature to its armed forces. The security relationship with
Australia was formalized in 1944, followed by the signing of the Australia, New
Zealand, and United States (ANZUS) Treaty in 1951, further deepening ties with
the United States. The end of the ANZUS relationship in the 1980s increased New
Zealand’s reliance on Australia. Between the 1950s and 1980s, it stationed
forces in Malaysia and Singapore, forming closer security ties with both
countries.[29]
The absence of a direct invasion threat means that the NZDF has a broad
structure, but its capabilities remain modest due to limitations. The NZDF
consists of 8,946 regular, 3,226 reserve, and 3,309 civilian personnel,
distributed across the Royal New Zealand Navy, New Zealand Army, Royal New
Zealand Air Force, and Defence Headquarters.[30] The Army is the largest force
with 6,399 personnel.[31]
The NZDF’s current mandate, established under the Defence Act of 1990 and
operationalized in the 2016 Defence White Paper, outlines its principal roles:
defending New Zealand’s sovereign territory, contributing to national resilience
and security objectives, meeting alliance commitments with Australia, supporting
civilian presence in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, leading operations in
the South Pacific, supporting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region,
contributing to international peace and security and the rule of law, advancing
New Zealand’s security partnerships, monitoring the strategic environment, and
responding to sudden shifts in the strategic environment.[32]
These roles are ambitious and reflect a shift from Cold War-era thinking based
on force mobilization and collective security.[33] Despite significant changes
in the strategic environment and defense goals, the NZDF’s force structure has
seen little change since the end of the Cold War. New Zealand has lost its Air
Combat Wing and two of its four frigates. Much of the NZDF’s doctrine and
training focus on conventional operations with minimal expansion of special
forces. Its expeditionary capability remains limited due to a lack of airlift
and sealift capabilities.
The conservatism and continuity in the NZDF’s structure are arguably driven by
economic factors rather than strategic ones. The defense budget has declined in
real terms, limiting the ability to test new concepts or expand the defense
force. New Zealand’s maritime forces, while maintaining limited blue-water
combat capabilities, primarily conduct surveillance, patrol, resource and border
protection, and search and rescue (SAR) operations. The Air Force, lacking air
combat capabilities, assists the Navy with maritime patrols and helicopter
support and conducts surveillance, reconnaissance, SAR, combat operations, and
international security assistance.
The New Zealand Army can deploy in combined arms operations up to the battalion
level, conduct peacekeeping operations, provide security assistance, and support
civilian authorities in New Zealand. The Special Operations Forces (SOF) handle
domestic counterterrorism and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and serve as
deployable force elements in domestic and coalition tasks abroad. The NZDF is
developing capabilities for independent, low-intensity operations through the
Joint Task Force (JTF) concept.[34] The New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS)
Regiment, modeled after the British SAS, is the premier combat unit of the NZDF,
comprising six squadrons. It has been extensively deployed as part of New
Zealand’s international commitments since the Malayan Emergency in 1955 and has
seen extended deployments in Afghanistan since 2001.[35]
Since 1991, the overall trend in the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) has been a
reduction in forces and continuity in policy. There has been some slight
restructuring, but this has been confined to areas that did not require
additional major funding, such as service roles, doctrine, and command
structure. Major capital acquisitions have occurred only in the naval
forces.[36]
Currently, New Zealand has very limited force elements that it can utilize for
its international commitments: four P-8A Poseidon aircraft (replacing the aging
P3K2 Orion squadron), five C-130H Hercules, two ANZAC-class frigates (HMNZS Te
Kaha and HMNZS Te Mana), and the NZSAS Regiment. Until recently, there have been
no significant events (apart from the 2019 Christchurch mosque attacks) that
have changed the threat calculus. Even then, the rise of terrorism and new
security risks has not prompted major policy and institutional changes. Thus,
while the NZDF appears capable of being deployed in a broad range of tasks, its
size and current capabilities are limited, and its ability to sustain them is in
question.
The isolation and lack of direct threats have made defense a low-salience area
in New Zealand politics, resulting in low levels of funding.[37] Comparable
social democracies in similar benign environments, such as Sweden, Norway, and
Finland, spend between 1.5 to 2.0 percent of GDP on defense.[38] Tonga, much
smaller than New Zealand, spent 1.6 percent of its GDP on defense in 2023, while
Fiji spent 1.3 percent.[39] In 2010, New Zealand’s defense spending was only
around 1 percent of GDP, despite the ambitious agenda set out in the Defence
White Paper of that year.[40] From 1960 to 2022, there has been a general
decline in New Zealand’s defense spending as a percentage of GDP, from 2.69
percent to 1.18 percent.
Although there has been an increase in total expenditure in 2024 (NZD 4.5
billion), it has not been enough for New Zealand to meet its defense needs. This
trend reflects New Zealand’s tendency to provide minimal funding for the defense
force, except during periods of total war.[41] Over the years, there has been
little concern from the public and Parliament regarding defense spending.[42]
Since the Helen Clark government in 1999, the view that New Zealand’s security
encompasses more than just defense, and thus requires a balanced allocation of
resources among various aspects of foreign policy, has persisted in policy
circles.[43] Figure 1 summarizes the general decline in military spending as a
percentage of GDP.
Photo Details / Download Hi-Res
Figure 1. New Zealand defense spending as percentage of GDP, 1960–2022. (Source:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Military Expenditure
Database,” https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.)
Defense issues do not have a significant constituency in New Zealand and are
usually reserved for a small group of political elites. The public’s view of
defense seems to be stuck in the era of antinuclear legislation, the
retrenchment of New Zealand’s strategic horizons, and the end of ANZUS, which
downgraded US-NZ relations from “allied” to “friendly.”[44] Current and
immediate past governments have taken different positions on the issue.
Historically, New Zealand’s two major political parties have different stances
on international relations and the role of the military. The Labour Party,
described as liberal internationalist, has been antimilitarist since 1916. The
National Party, with a more realist perspective, has always been concerned with
national defense. Despite this, neither party can be considered significant
defense spenders. Notably, during Helen Clark’s Labour government, New Zealand
disbanded its air combat arm. However, a Labour-led government sent NZSAS
personnel to Afghanistan, and a frigate was dispatched to the Persian Gulf in
response to the September 11 attacks in the United States.[45]
Among more recent coalition members, NZ First, which holds a politically
conservative position, has long called for renewing relationships with
traditional partners, such as Australia and the United States. It attempted to
do so with coalition partner Labour in 2017. While NZ First held both the
defense and foreign affairs portfolios, the New Zealand Defence Ministry in 2018
focused more on working with other nations in areas such as HADR operations, the
role of women in peace and security, and the expansion of peacekeeping
operations—a position supported by Labour’s other coalition partner, the Green
Party.[46]
The current coalition government, led by the National Party, has expressed a
desire to spend more on defense and play a more significant role but faces
budgetary constraints. The lack of sustained investment over the years means
that much of the new funding will be spent on improving readiness and addressing
the assets and equipment backlogs of the past decades.[47]
The NZDF and the Changing Strategic Environment in the Indo-Pacific
The NZDF plays an outsized role in supporting the country’s foreign policy
objectives, raising questions about New Zealand's reliance on the NZDF as a
"one-stop-shop" for foreign engagements. Successive New Zealand governments have
articulated two main foreign policy objectives in which the NZDF plays a crucial
role: supporting the Pacific Region, with an emphasis on Australia as a partner,
and being a good international citizen through international organizations and
multinational operations.
The NZDF typically engages in offshore activities such as HADR, SAR, defense and
diplomacy exercises, support to Antarctica, Building Partner Capacity (BPC),
surveillance and interception, counterpiracy, and involvement in UN peacekeeping
operations.[48] The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)
considers the NZDF key in its exercise of defense diplomacy. This includes
visits, exchanges, and deliberations on military matters as well as
nonconventional and “soft” threats.[49]
Defense diplomacy has become a more frequently used soft power tool, especially
with the growth of China’s influence in the region and rising regional tensions,
which have led to more assertive militaries in the Pacific. Within the Pacific,
New Zealand’s defense diplomacy efforts have been notably effective, with NZDF
personnel viewed as friendly, trustworthy, and well-respected. New Zealand’s
long-term engagement with the Pacific Islands and its ability to understand the
priorities of Pacific peoples have given it an important edge, with Pacific
Island Countries (PIC) recognizing the quality and achievements of New Zealand's
efforts.[50]
The NZDF’s involvement in peacekeeping operations dates back to 1951, when its
officers served as unarmed observers in the India-Pakistan conflict over
Kashmir. Since then, New Zealand has participated in 40 peace operations in more
than 25 countries over the past seven decades, either under UN auspices or as
part of coalitions.[51] The New Zealand government uses the term peace support
operations to describe this involvement, encompassing a broad range of
activities beyond UN peacekeeping operations, including peace enforcement and
other forms of military deployment.[52]
In Afghanistan, for instance, the NZSAS was extensively involved in Special
Forces operations, provincial reconstruction activities, and the training of
local forces.[53] The NZDF’s deployments represent an effective way of deploying
smart power—leveraging its limited resources to fulfill international
commitments while meeting broad security goals.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China, along with China’s
growing assertiveness in the region, looms large for New Zealand. China remains
the largest market for New Zealand exports. Since 2006, the People's Republic of
China’s (PRC) presence in the Pacific has expanded dramatically. In November
2018, Xi Jinping attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in
Port Moresby and met with all Pacific leaders with whom the PRC had diplomatic
relations.[54] Prior to this, Xi labeled the South Pacific as the “southern leg”
of the Maritime Silk Road, which eventually transformed into the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI).[55] The PRC’s extended Maritime Silk Road map issued in 2015
included parts of the South Pacific. In the last 20 years, China has become a
key aid, investment, and trade partner for most states in the Pacific.[56]
New Zealand’s response to China’s increasing presence in the Pacific, despite
initial silence and eventual denial, was the Pacific Reset policy. This policy
includes an allocation of NZ$714.2 million to New Zealand’s Official Development
Assistance (ODA) Fund and the establishment of 14 new diplomatic posts in the
region.[57] Despite some recent setbacks, the NZ–China relationship continues to
flourish, even as New Zealand deepens its security relationship with the United
States. According to one analysis, part of the reason China does not seem
troubled by this is the general weakness of New Zealand’s armed forces.[58]
Nonetheless, New Zealand has taken a cautious approach, maintaining freedom of
navigation and open trade routes.[59]
The end of the ANZUS alliance has made New Zealand less willing to openly take
sides in any contest between great powers, marking the hallmark of its
“independent foreign policy.” This position has several facets. It is first
anchored on the continued commitment to a rules-based international order,
allowing New Zealand to be a liberal free-trading nation. Second, it has been
articulated in terms of New Zealand’s nuclear-free stance. Third, this same
independence has been invoked to justify New Zealand’s deepening ties with
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, while mending ties with the United
States. Lastly, New Zealand sees itself as an honest player among Pacific Island
states, assisting them in a variety of pressing regional issues.[60]
This independent foreign policy position justifies why New Zealand has not
sought alliances beyond Australia and its apparent reluctance in the Five Eyes
alliance. For decades, New Zealand has enjoyed a position where it can afford a
small military and rely on its economy to be independent in a system governed by
rules. However, recent events have challenged the rules-based order that New
Zealand has depended on, and the use of force as a means of pursuing foreign
policy has become a primary choice for some states. How long can New Zealand
play this gamble while appearing to go it alone?
Beyond the question of New Zealand’s independent foreign policy are real
concerns about its military capabilities and the continuing impact of its unique
geographical situation. Several cases illustrate this. First, in 2019, New
Zealand was asked to supplement British patrols in the Strait of Hormuz.
Then-Minister of Defence Ron Mark declared that New Zealand could not send any
forces as they were still in Canada for upgrades, and it could barely keep two
of its P3 Orions flying. This highlighted the issue of capability for sustained
operations beyond its shores.[61]
The view that the NZDF is a one-stop-shop for fulfilling some of New Zealand’s
foreign policy objectives makes this situation particularly dire if the burden
is not shared with other New Zealand government agencies, especially considering
the total reduction in personnel by around 30 percent in 2023.[62]
Second, New Zealand’s maritime domain is 20 times its land area. However, it
does not yet have a coherent national plan or the capacity to comprehensively
monitor this domain.[63] This is particularly important for New Zealand,
especially given increased operations by China’s Distant Water Fleets (DWF) in
the Pacific.[64] These areas are productive for squid fishing, trawling, and
long-lining. PRC fishing vessels have been accused of turning off their
automatic identification system (AIS) and fishing in other nations’ EEZs without
consent.[65] Additionally, there is an indication that China intends to use
these vessels as fishing militias, as it has done in Northeast and Southeast
Asia.
In 2024, the PRC registered 26 China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels to operate in
areas under the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Convention
Area. New Zealand has the fourth-largest EEZ in the world (at 4.2 million square
kilometers) and the ninth-longest coastline (at more than 15,000 kilometers).
The South Pacific is vulnerable to illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing
(IUUF) by DWFs and the use of PRC’s fishing militia. The significant gap in New
Zealand’s naval assets means it is unable to monitor this area effectively,
allowing a range of threats—from gray-zone tactics and drug smuggling (the zone
is considered a drug-trafficking highway) to human trafficking—to continue
unabated.
Third, given New Zealand’s relatively small size and limited military
capability, cooperation with Australia is essential during moments of regional
instability, such as the Bougainville crisis in 1997. New Zealand’s defense
policy and spending have largely been seen as free-riding on the efforts of
larger states—initially the United Kingdom and the United States during the Cold
War, and later on Australia’s efforts after the relationship with the United
States was downgraded. Within the range of small-state strategies, New Zealand
can be viewed as shelter-seeking, where small states seek political, economic,
and social shelter from larger states and international organizations during
crises.[66] This approach has allowed New Zealand to do only as much as its
unique interests require and as much as its larger partners will permit.[67]
However, the 2023 Defence Policy Strategy Statement indicates a recognition that
New Zealand no longer exists in a benign strategic environment and that the NZDF
cannot adequately respond to increasing security threats or defend New Zealand’s
territory and interests, as well as those of neighboring PICs.[68] The PRC’s
actions in the Solomon Islands and other PICs could create competing regional
security architectures that New Zealand is currently unprepared to address.[69]
Three policy documents released in 2023 seem to indicate a shift in direction:
the 2023 Defence Policy and Strategy Statement, the Future Force Design
Principles, and New Zealand’s inaugural National Security Strategy. These
documents recognize that New Zealand is facing a more challenging strategic
environment than it has for decades. New Zealand’s 2023 Future Force Design
Principles acknowledge that the NZDF will need to deploy more often and in more
diverse situations due to the changing strategic environment, necessitating more
government investment in the short, medium, and long term.[70]
New Zealand first needs to invest in its naval assets. Despite having one of the
largest maritime domains, New Zealand currently has one of the smallest navies
in the world, consisting of nine vessels—frigates, patrol vessels, and
logistical support vessels.[71] In contrast, Singapore, with one of the smallest
EEZs and shortest coastlines in the world, has 40 warships.[72] As the
discussion above highlights, the NZDF’s weaknesses in the maritime domain are
glaring and need to be addressed immediately.
Second, in addition to increased funding, New Zealand needs to continue
leveraging the NZDF’s ability to be interoperable with like-minded militaries
and allies. Accessing advanced technologies under Australia–United
Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) Pillar Two will be critical to ensuring that the
NZDF does not fall further into technical obsolescence and maintains access to
cutting-edge technology in a fast-changing strategic and technological
environment.[73]
The current framing of New Zealand potentially joining AUKUS’ Pillar Two
component reveals much about how foreign policy and academic circles discuss
security for New Zealand, which may impact whether the NZDF will receive
much-needed funding support. The pro-AUKUS camp sees its utility given China’s
growing assertiveness and New Zealand’s vulnerability due to its lack of
technological capabilities in the event of an actual conflict. Conversely, the
anti-AUKUS camp views AUKUS as antithetical to New Zealand’s independent foreign
policy and antinuclear stance.
A third perspective argues that these initial positions miss an important point:
New Zealand’s role as a champion of the Blue Pacific narrative.[74] This view
suggests that joining AUKUS would undermine support for Pacific priorities,
framing the choice for New Zealand as one between the Pacific and the
Anglosphere.[75]
Conclusion
This article argues that the NZDF’s capacity in the evolving strategic
environment in the Indo-Pacific has been severely hampered by years of
underspending and policy conservatism. Since 1991, the trend has been a
reduction of forces and continuity in policy, while restructuring has been
modest. Geography, domestic politics, and specific historical junctures have
shaped policymakers' views on the military and consequently, the direction of
defense policy and spending.
Despite this, the NZDF plays an outsized role in supporting New Zealand’s
foreign policy objectives. However, this comes at the cost of its ability to
contribute more to traditional security commitments and to monitor and secure
the maritime domain, raising questions about its independent foreign policy.
Small states like New Zealand have always been hampered by their lack of
military power. Nevertheless, New Zealand has the opportunity and a compelling
reason for the public to consent to increased defense spending.
On paper, New Zealand’s security interests are broad and encompass a wide array
of traditional and nontraditional concerns. To meet these goals, a
well-equipped, highly trained, and sufficiently staffed NZDF is essential. The
evolving security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands that New Zealand back
its commitments with appropriate funding. ♦
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Juhn Chris P. Espia
Dr. Espia is a nonresident senior research fellow at the Institute for
Indo-Pacific Affairs. He is an assistant professor of political science at the
University of the Philippines at Visayas and holds a PhD in political science
from the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand. He researches
state-civil society relations, disaster studies, public policy, foreign policy,
and comparative politics in the Indo-Pacific.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTES
[1] Stephen Hoadley, “From Defence to Security: New Zealand's Hard Power, Soft
Power, and Smart Power,” New Zealand International Review 32, no. 5 (2007):
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[2] M.L. Cavanaugh, “New Zealand’s Dangerous Strategic Apathy in an Uncertain
Age,” The Strategist, 12 February 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/.
[3] “Our People, Structure, and Leadership,” New Zealand Defence Force, 2024,
accessed 15 September 2024, https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/; and Cavenaugh, “New
Zealand’s Dangerous Strategic Apathy.”
[4] David Fisher, “NZ Defence Force in Crisis—Our Ships Can’t Sail, Planes Can’t
Fly and Soldiers Have Left in Droves,” New Zealand Herald, 2024,
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/.
[5] Griffin Manawaroa Leonard, Joseph Llewellyn, and Richard Jackson, Abolishing
the Military: Arguments and Alternatives (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books,
2023).
[6] Tim Hurdle, “New Zealand Is Waking up to Threats,” The Strategist, 23 May
2024, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/.
[7] Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1968), 29.
[8] Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver Neumann, Small States and Status Seeking:
Norway's Quest for International Standing (New York Routledge, 2015).
[9] Rob De Wijk, “The Implications for Force Transformation: The Small Country
Perspective,” in Transatlantic Transformations–Equipping Nato for the 21st
Century, ed. D.S. Hamilton (Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations,
2004), 144.
[10] Jan Willem Honig, “The Tyranny of Doctrine and Modern Strategy: Small (and
Large) States in a Double Bind,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 2 (2016):
261–79, https://doi.org/.
[11] Joseph S. Nye, “State Smart Power Strategies,” in Soft Power and
Great-Power Competition: Shifting Sands in the Balance of Power between the
United States and China, ed. Joseph S. Nye (Singapore: Springer Nature
Singapore, 2023), 21–28.
[12] Alan Chong, “Smart Power and Military Force: An Introduction,” Journal of
Strategic Studies 38, no. 3 (2015): 233–44,
[13] Vernon Noel Bennett, “Military Force Structures in Small States: Providing
for Relevant and Credible Military Capability” (PhD dissertation, Victoria
University of Wellington, 2018), 61, https://dml.armywarcollege.edu/.
[14] Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among Nations: The
Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993).
[15] Colin S. Gray, Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice (New
York: Routledge, 2007), 137–39.
[16] Håkan Edström, Dennis Gyllensporre, and Jacob Westberg, Military Strategy
of Small States: Responding to External Shocks of the 21st Century (New York:
Routledge, 2018), 25.
[17] Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).
[18] Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual
Minefield,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 279–312,
https://www.jstor.org/.
[19] Dan Reiter, “Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of
the Past,” World Politics 46, no. 4 (July 1994): 490–526, https://doi.org/.
[20] Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition,
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[21] Stanley Hoffmann, The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964–1994 (New
York: Routledge, 2019).
[22] John Lantis and Daryl Howlett, “Strategic Culture,” in Strategy in the
Contemporary World, ed. John Baylis, James Wirtz, and Colin S Gray (Oxford:
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[23] James D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of
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[24] Rebecca U. Thorpe, The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of
Military Spending (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020).
[25] Benjamin O. Fordham, “Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the
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1 (February 2002): 63–88, https://www.jstor.org/.
[26] Central Intelligence Agency, “New Zealand,” World Factbook, 2024,
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[27] Defence White Paper 2016 (Wellington: Ministry of Defence, June 2016),
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[28] Robert Patman, “Sovereignty, Globalisation and New Zealand Foreign Policy,”
in New Zealand in a Globalising World, ed. Ralph Pettman (Wellington: Victoria
University Press, 2005), 44–65.
[29] Robert Ayson, “Australasian Security,” in Strategy and Security in the
Asia-Pacific: Global and Regional Dynamics, ed. Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball
(London: Routledge, 2020), 242–56.
[30] Figures cited here are as of 31 August 2024.
[31] “Our People, Structure, and Leadership.”
[32] Defence White Paper 2016, 11.
[33] James Rolfe, The Armed Forces of New Zealand. (St. Leonards: Allen and
Unwin, 1999), 18.
[34] Bennett, “Military Force Structures in Small States,” 106–07.
[35] “Peace & Security,” New Zealand Defence Force,
n.d., https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/.
[36] Zhivan Alach, “New Zealand’s Future Defence: Force Change or Stagnation?,”
Security Challenges 2, no. 3 (October 2006): 63–76, https://www.jstor.org/.
[37] David McCraw, “Change and Continuity in Strategic Culture: The Cases of
Australia and New Zealand,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no.
2 (2011): 167–84, https://doi.org/.
[38] Alach, “New Zealand’s Future Defence,” 74.
[39] Central Intelligence Agency, “Military Expenditures Comparison,” World
Factbook, 2024, https://www.cia.gov/.
[40] Rod Lyon, “The New Zealand Defence White Paper: A More
Strategically-Extroverted Kiwi?,” Policy Analysis 69, 11 November 2010,
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[41] Rhys Ball, “The Strategic Utility of New Zealand Special Forces,” Small
Wars & Insurgencies 22, no. 1 (2011): 119–41, https://doi.org/.
[42] Alach, “New Zealand’s Future Defence,” 70.
[43] Hon Derek Quigley, “The Evolution of New Zealand Defence Policy,” Security
Challenges 2, no. 3 (October 2006): 41–61, https://www.jstor.org/.
[44] Lyon, “The New Zealand Defence White Paper,” 1.
[45] David McCraw, “New Zealand’s Defence Policy: The Triumph of Ideology?,” New
Zealand International Review 31, no. 1 (January 2006): 23–27
[46] “Defence and Peacekeeping Policy,” New Zealand Green Party, 2018,
https://www.greens.org.nz/.
[47] Lucy Craymer and Lewis Jackson, “New Zealand Proposes 6.6% Smaller Defence
Budget Amid Personnel and Equipment Woes,” Reuters, 22 May 2024,
https://www.reuters.com/.
[48] B. K. Greener, “The New Zealand Defence Force Role in New Zealand Foreign
Policy,” in Small States and the Changing Global Order: New Zealand Faces the
Future, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Cham: Springer, 2019), 43–52.
[49] Hoadley, “From Defence to Security,” 19.
[50] Kendra L. Roddis and Alexander C. Tan, “Defence Diplomacy: Battling for the
Heart of the Pacific,” Outre-Terre, no. 58–59 (2020): 327–48,
http://dx.doi.org/.
[51] “Peace Support Operations,” New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs Trade,
2021, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/.
[52] “Peacekeeping,” Te Ara—the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, 2015,
https://teara.govt.nz/.
[53] “Peace & Security.”
[54] “China, Pacific Island Countries Lift Ties to Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership,” Xinhua, 17 November 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/.
[55] Derek Grossman, Chinese Strategy in the Freely Associated States and
American Territories in the Pacific: Implications for the United States (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2023), https://www.rand.org/.
[56] Anthony Bergin, David Brewster, and Aakriti Bachhawat, “Pacific Island
Countries,” in Ocean Horizons: Strengthening Maritime Security in Indo-Pacific
Island States (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2019), 17–28,
http://www.jstor.org/.
[57] Iati Iati, “China’s Impact on New Zealand Foreign Policy in the Pacific:
The Pacific Reset,” in The China Alternative: Changing Regional Order in the
Pacific Islands, ed. Graeme Smith and Terence Wesley-Smith (Canberra: ANU Press,
2021), 143–66.
[58] Robert G. Sutter et al., Balancing Acts: The Us Rebalance and Asia-Pacific
Stability (Washington: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, 2013).
[59] Steven Paget, “Water under the Bridge?: The Revival of New Zealand–United
States Maritime Cooperation,” Naval War College Review 74, no. 3 (2021): 41–64,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/.
[60] Guy C. Charlton and Xiang Gao, “Re-Thinking New Zealand’s Independent
Foreign Policy,” The Diplomat, 14 June 2024, https://thediplomat.com/.
[61] Boris Jancic, “New Zealand Has No Boats to Send to Strait of Hormuz:
Defence Minister Ron Mark,” New Zealand Herald, 20 August 2019,
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/.
[62] “New Zealand Defence Force Tells New Minister of High Attrition, Staff
Shortages,” Radio New Zealand, 1 February 2024, https://www.rnz.co.nz/.
[63] Joanne O’Callaghan et al., “Developing an Integrated Ocean Observing System
for New Zealand,” Frontiers in Marine Science 6 (March 2019), https://doi.org/.
[64] According to the index by the Global Initiative Against Transnational
Organized Crime, the PRC is the worst IUUF offender. Of the 152 states in the
IUUF Index, PRC is rated as the worst flag state, the second-worst port state,
and the worst state overall.
[65] Joseph Hammond, “Chinese Fishing Fleet Poses Threat to Pacific Island
Economies,” Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, 21 June 2021,
https://ipdefenseforum.com/.
[66] Anne-Marie Brady and Baldur Thorhallsson, “Small States and the Turning
Point in Global Politics,” in Small States and the New Security Environment, ed.
Anne-Marie Brady and Baldur Thorhallsson (Cham: Springer International
Publishing, 2021), 5.
[67] Mark Thomson, “New Zealand Defence Economics,” in The Cost of Defence ASPI
Defence Budget Brief 2017–18 (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
2017), 263–78, http://www.jstor.com/.
[68] Defence Policy and Strategy and Statement (Wellington: Ministry of Defence,
2023), https://www.defence.govt.nz/.
[69] Craig McCulloch and Russell Palmer, “Changing Global Tensions Prompt New
Zealand to Ramp up Security and Defence Resources,” Radio New Zealand, 3 August
2023, https://www.rnz.co.nz/.
[70] Future Force Design Principles (Wellington Ministry of Defence, 2023),
https://www.beehive.govt.nz/.
[71] A survey ship, HMNZS Manawanui, sank on 05 October 2024 off the coast of
Samoa.
[72] Alexander C. Tan and Neel Vanvari, “Protecting Our ‘Taonga’: How New
Zealand Can Contribute to Regional Stability,” The Diplomat, 26 July 2023,
https://thediplomat.com/.
[73] Reuben Steff, “The Strategic Case for New Zealand to Join AUKUS Pillar
2,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2024, 1–9, https://doi.org/.
[74] Nicholas Ross Smith and Lauren Bland, “The Aukus Debate in New Zealand
Misses the Big Picture,” Australian Journal of International Affairs (2024):
1–8, https://doi.org/.
[75] Marco de Jong, “Losing the Pacific to the Anglosphere: Aukus and New
Zealand’s Regional Engagement,” Australian Journal of International Affairs
(2024): 1–8, https://doi.org/.
New Zealand Defence Force Indo-Pacific smart power defense policy Strategic
Environment capability building humanitarian assistance maritime security
defense diplomacy AUKUS New Zealand
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