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HomeBuilding Digital Solidarity: The United States International Cyberspace &
Digital Policy Strategy …United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy
Strategy
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UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL CYBERSPACE & DIGITAL POLICY STRATEGY
Towards an Innovative, Secure, and Rights-Respecting Digital Future
TABLE OF CONTENTS
* Preface
* Introduction
* The Digital World: Opportunities and Challenges
* Cyber Attacks and National Security Threats
* Competing Internet Norms
* Threats to Internet and Digital Freedom
* Challenges of the Digital Economy
* The Future of AI Technologies Governance
* Working with the Private Sector and Civil Society
* Building Digital Solidarity
* ACTION AREA 1: Promote, Build, and Maintain an Open, Inclusive, Secure, and
Resilient Digital Ecosystem
* ACTION AREA 2: Align Rights-Respecting Approaches to Digital and Data
Governance with International Partners
* ACTION AREA 3: Advance Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace and Counter
Threats to Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure by Building Coalitions
and Engaging Partners
* ACTION AREA 4: Strengthen and Build International Partner Digital Policy
and Cyber Capacity
* Conclusion
PREFACE
We are in a pivotal period of international relations, characterized by acute
competition between nations, and shared global challenges like climate change,
food and health security, and inclusive economic growth.
Technology will play an increasingly critical role in addressing these
challenges. That is why at the State Department we have prioritized building
capacity and expertise in cyber, digital, and emerging technology issues as part
of our broader efforts to modernize diplomacy and ensure U.S. foreign policy
delivers on the issues that matter most to the lives and livelihoods of the
American people. As a key milestone in this work, I am pleased to share here the
Department’s International Cyberspace and Digital Policy Strategy.
Central to our strategy is the effort to build digital solidarity – working
together to offer mutual assistance to the victims of malicious cyber activity
and other digital harms; assist partners – especially emerging economies – in
deploying safe, secure, resilient, and sustainable technologies to advance their
development goals; and builds strong and inclusive innovation economies that can
shape our economic and technological future. We are rallying coalitions of
governments, businesses, and civil society to shape the digital revolution at
every level of the technology “stack” – from building subsea cables and
telecommunication networks, to deploying cloud services and trustworthy
artificial intelligence, to promoting rights-respecting data governance and
norms of responsible state behavior.
The United States will work with any country or actor that is committed to
developing and deploying technology that is open, safe, and secure, that
promotes inclusive growth, that fosters resilient and democratic societies, and
that empowers all people.
Antony J. Blinken
Secretary of State
INTRODUCTION
The United States seeks to work with allies, partners, and stakeholders across
the globe to shape the design, development, governance, and use of cyberspace
and digital technologies to advance economic prosperity and inclusion; enhance
security and combat cybercrime; promote and protect the exercise of human
rights, democracy, and the rule of the law; and address transnational
challenges. The United States believes in the critical role that the responsible
uses of digital technologies and interconnected networks play in empowering
people, and that an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet enables
new solutions to global challenges. Autocratic states and other actors, however,
have used cyber and digital tools to threaten international peace and stability,
harm others, exert malign influence, and undermine the exercise of human rights.
An innovative, rights-respecting international cyberspace and digital technology
policy strategy is foundational to U.S. strategic, security, economic, and
foreign policy interests.
Leadership in cyberspace, the digital economy, and emerging digital technologies
is central to advancing the U.S. vision set forth in the October 2022 National
Security Strategy (NSS) of a “free, open, secure, and prosperous world.” As the
lead foreign policy agency for the United States, the Department of State is
advancing the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS) and its objectives of
forging international partnerships to build an open, resilient, defensible, and
rights-respecting digital ecosystem. It is also strengthening the Strategy’s
dual approach of 1) rebalancing responsibility for defending cyberspace onto the
government and private sector organizations that are the most capable and best
positioned to reduce risks and of 2) realigning incentives to favor long term
investment in cybersecurity through diplomacy, partnerships, and
information-sharing. This strategy will be complemented by the U.S. Agency for
International Development’s (USAID) forthcoming Digital Policy.
To advance the NSS and NCS, the Department of State, working with other federal
agencies, has developed an international cyberspace and digital policy strategy
focused on building broad digital solidarity through three guiding principles
and four areas of action to be prioritized over the next three to five years.
Digital solidarity is a willingness to work together on shared goals, to help
partners build capacity, and to provide mutual support.[1] Digital solidarity
recognizes that all who use digital technologies in a rights-respecting manner
are more secure, resilient, self-determining, and prosperous when we work
together to shape the international environment and innovate at the
technological edge. Central to the tenets of digital solidarity are efforts to
support allies and partners, especially emerging economies, to fully seize the
opportunities presented by new technologies and sustainably pursue their
economic and development goals. Digital solidarity aligns U.S. national
interests with those of our international partners through compatible approaches
to technology governance, sustains strong partnerships with civil society and
the private sector, and embraces cybersecurity resilience built on a diversity
of products and services made by trusted technology vendors. It highlights the
mutual support that the United States and its partners offer one another to
counter and respond to malicious cyber operations, cybercrime, and other digital
harms, and promotes cooperative efforts among states and civic actors to defend
and advance human rights. In addition, the concept of digital solidarity rests
on efforts to build digital and cyber capacity so that partners are not only
better able to build a defensible and resilient digital ecosystem over the long
term but are also able to respond and recover quickly when incidents that
threaten security, safety, and rights happen. The actions and efforts of this
strategy are intended to demonstrate and build digital solidarity with partners
across the globe.
The Department of State, with interagency partners, will build digital
solidarity through four areas of action, fundamentally supported by three
principles:
* First, the Department of State will pursue an affirmative vision for
cyberspace and digital technologies focused on delivering the benefits of
technology and grounded in international commitments and international law,
including international human rights law. The United States is committed to
working with allies and partners toward a future in which people around the
world use digital technologies safely to seek, receive, and impart
information and ideas online as they participate in free, open, and informed
societies; access educational and economic opportunities in order to drive
inclusive economic growth; and reliably receive critical services and
information from their governments.
* Second, the Department of State will integrate cybersecurity, sustainable
development, and technological innovation throughout our approach.
Cybersecurity, data security, and cyber-resilience are prerequisites for and
enablers of economic growth and healthy civic spaces where citizens can
exercise their rights; countries cannot build and support an innovative
digital ecosystem that benefits everyone without first securing it.
* in Third, the Department of State will implement a comprehensive policy
approach that uses the appropriate tools of diplomacy and international
statecraft across the entire digital ecosystem. This ecosystem includes but
is not limited to hardware, software, protocols, technical standards,
providers, operators, users, and supply chains spanning telecommunication
networks, undersea cables, cloud computing, data centers, and satellite
network infrastructure, operational technologies, applications, web
platforms, and consumer technologies as well as Internet of Things (IoT),
artificial intelligence (AI) and other critical and emerging technologies.
[2]
In line with these three principles, the Department of State will build digital
solidarity through four areas of action, which flow from creating and governing
digital ecosystems to defending against malicious actions and delivering
assistance and building resilience:
1. Promote, build, and maintain an open, inclusive, secure, and resilient
digital ecosystem;
2. Align rights-respecting approaches to digital and data governance with
international partners;
3. Advance responsible state behavior in cyberspace, and counter threats to
cyberspace and critical infrastructure by building coalitions and engaging
partners;
4. Strengthen and build international partner digital and cyber capacity.
The Department of State will reinforce efforts to forge digital solidarity by
its proactive participation in international, multilateral, and multistakeholder
bodies where obligations, norms, standards, and principles are developed that
impact cyberspace, digital, Internet, and technology issues. While progress in
these venues can be slow and incremental – frequently as a function of their
objectives—but a lack of U.S. leadership in international fora may allow
adversaries to fill the void and shape the future of technology to the detriment
of U.S. interests and values.
Nearly all foreign policy issues – from international security to democracy and
human rights to global health and climate change – will be shaped by today’s
investments in cyberspace and digital technology diplomacy. The Department of
State will lead the interagency process to set, coordinate, and integrate cyber
and digital technology diplomacy efforts to advance U.S. national interests and
values over the next decade and beyond. The efficacy of U.S. efforts and related
messaging, however, depends in part on consistency and action at home, both in
policy and on execution. For example, U.S. technology companies are the leaders
in the first wave of digitalization and are now pushing the innovative edge on
AI systems. The United States, therefore, should be a leader in promoting
accountability for technology platforms. We need to help lead the responsible
design, development, governance, and use of the next wave of technologies in
line with democratic values and respect for human rights.
The United States has great strengths that serve us in shaping the future of
digital technologies: strong alliances and partnerships; the world’s most
innovative technology companies; a transparent, inclusive, and enabling policy
environment; and robust and engaged civil society and technical communities. The
United States is mobilizing these resources to implement this affirmative and
proactive international cyberspace and digital strategy.
THE DIGITAL WORLD: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
Figure 1. Abstract representation of a digital, connected world. (Adobe Stock
photo.)
Digital technologies have revolutionized how we live, work, and learn. They,
along with expanded connectivity, not only power economic growth but also
facilitate the exercise of human rights and improve access to education,
financial, and social services. Digital technologies have created new markets
and opportunities and have enabled businesses to reach a vast customer base
beyond their country’s borders. New digital tools have energized civic and
political engagement, democratized information and knowledge, been used to hold
governments and companies accountable, and increased the transparency,
efficiency, and responsiveness of public services.
Looking ahead, these technologies can unlock unparalleled opportunities to
address some of the most pressing global challenges, including climate change,
economic and social inequality, and health crises. By harnessing the power of
data analytics, AI, and real-time connectivity, we can create smarter, more
sustainable cities, improve agricultural yields using fewer resources, and make
healthcare accessible to even the most remote communities. These technologies
enable the development of green energy solutions, fostering a transition towards
cleaner and less expensive energy. Advances in data collection, modeling,
simulation, and analysis will allow scientists to accelerate research and
discovery and identify patterns invisible to humans alone, catalyzing rapid and
unexpected breakthroughs. By connecting people and information like never
before, digital technologies can foster a more inclusive, equitable world where
opportunities for prosperity and well-being are abundant for all.
At the same time, significant harms have accompanied the rapid expansion and
evolution of digital technologies. The geopolitics of cyberspace are competitive
and complex. Malicious state and non-state actors have developed the
capabilities and demonstrated the intent to place critical infrastructure,
national critical functions, and even individual citizens at risk. Authoritarian
states are promoting competing forms of technology governance that use mass
surveillance, privacy-invasive data collection practices, and online censorship
tools that threaten the open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet.
Technology provides new vectors and tools for crime, and the dramatic spread of
personal information online has expanded the threat environment. The
proliferation and misuse of commercial spyware is a threat to national security,
targeting U.S. officials abroad; commercial spyware has also been used to,
target and intimidate perceived opponents, facilitate efforts to curb dissent,
and thus undermine democratic values. Journalists, activists, educators,
researchers, women and girls, and marginalized groups are often the victims of
unlawful surveillance, online harassment, and abuse. Countries and technology
platforms each have a role to play in mitigating algorithmic bias and
information manipulation, as well as violent extremist messaging, child sexual
abuse material (CSAM), technology-facilitated gender-based violence, and other
harmful content.
These challenges are pressing and high stakes. Innovation, partnerships,
collaboration, coalition building, information sharing, mutual support,
assistance, and the other tools of diplomacy are essential to ensuring that
digital technologies defend and advance individual freedom and promote economic
prosperity.
CYBER ATTACKS AND NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS
Adversarial cyber campaigns can cumulatively produce strategic loss for the
United States and its allies, and they increasingly put the development goals of
emerging economies at risk. Cyber threats continue to intensify in both
frequency and severity, with increased risks of escalatory or uncontrolled cyber
activity. State actor and non-state actors, including criminals, terrorists, and
violent extremists, have tremendous incentives to invest in and exploit digital
technologies to threaten our and other’s national interests.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) presents the broadest, most active, and
most persistent cyber threat to government and private sector networks in the
United States. Beijing has mounted cyber espionage operations against
government, commercial, and civil society actors and has increased its ability
to carry out destructive and disruptive cyberattacks. The PRC is capable of
launching cyberattacks that could disrupt oil and gas pipelines, rail systems,
and other critical infrastructure services within the United States or its
allies and partners. Attempts to compromise critical infrastructure by PRC
actors are designed in part to pre-position themselves to be able to disrupt or
destroy critical infrastructure in the event of a conflict—either to either
prevent the United States from being able to project power into Asia, or to
affect our decision-making during a crisis by instigating societal chaos inside
the United States. Both state-sponsored activity and that of PRC-linked actors
are part of the PRC cyber approach.
A persistent cyber threat, the Russian government is refining its cyber
espionage, cyberattack, influence, and information manipulation capabilities to
threaten other states and to weaken U.S. alliances and partnerships. Russia
continues to provide safe haven to transnational cybercriminal actors, such as
disruptive ransomware gangs. Russia’s cyberattacks in support of its 2022
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine were intended to destabilize the Ukrainian state
and military and have resulted in spillover effects onto civilian critical
infrastructure in other European countries. As the war continues, Russian
government and Russian government-aligned cyber actors have targeted Ukraine
with cyber operations against the public and private sectors, information
manipulation and online influence operations, and attempts to divert and censor
Ukrainians’ access to the Internet. Russia appears particularly focused on
improving its ability to target critical infrastructure in the United States to
demonstrate its ability to damage infrastructure during a crisis.
The governments of the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK) and
Iran have both increased the scale of their malicious cyber activities. Facing
multiple rounds of international sanctions, the DPRK evades controls through
cybercrime and the theft of cryptocurrencies. DPRK hackers continue to gather
intelligence on military technology targets as well as academia and think tanks.
In addition, the DPRK dispatches thousands of skilled IT workers around the
world to generate fraudulent revenue that ultimately contributes to its weapons
of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs despite U.S. and UN
sanctions.
Iran’s growing expertise and willingness to conduct cyber operations threaten
the security of networks and data globally. Iran’s opportunistic approach to
cyberattacks makes critical infrastructure owners in the United States
susceptible to being targeted by Iranian actors, particularly when Tehran
believes that it must demonstrate it can push back against the United States in
other domains. Iranian actors have engaged in a wide range of
intelligence-gathering operations around the world, and—in the wake of Hamas’
atrocities on October 7, 2023, and Israel’s military operations in Gaza—have
conducted wiper, website takedown, hack and leak operations, espionage, and
online information manipulations campaigns. Iranian actors have also conducted
malicious activity against operational technology devices used in the water
sector and other industries.
Cyber criminals and criminal syndicates operating in cyberspace now represent a
specific threat to the economic and national security of countries around the
world. Cybercrime and online fraud cause significant harm to economic
development, with small- to medium-sized enterprises and financial service
providers especially at risk. According to one estimate, the global cost of
cybercrime is estimated to top $23 trillion in 2027. [3]
Ransomware incidents have disrupted critical functions, services, and
businesses, from energy pipelines and food companies to schools and hospitals.
Ransomware attacks against the healthcare industry can undercut the level of
care provided to patients and others under care. Total economic losses from
ransomware attacks worldwide continue to climb, reaching into the billions of
U.S. dollars annually. Ransomware groups often operate out of safe haven
jurisdictions whose governments, often adversaries like Russia, do not cooperate
with law enforcement and sometimes encourage, direct, sanction, or tolerate
their activities.
Terrorists’ and violent extremists’ use of digital technologies also represents
a threat to the national security of the United States and its allies and
partners. Malign activities include the use of information and communications
technologies (ICT) to spread violent propaganda; encourage radicalization and
mobilization to commit violent acts; recruit individuals to terrorist
organizations; to train, plan, and coordinate attacks; and finance terrorist
acts.
COMPETING INTERNET NORMS
Russia, the PRC, and other authoritarian states have promoted a vision of global
Internet governance that centers on domestic control and top-down, state-centric
mechanisms over the existing bottom-up multistakeholder processes. Russia and
the PRC attempt to use multilateral fora like the UN to exert their influence on
and appeal to developing countries, with the aim of reshaping the global cyber
and technology policy landscape to advance an authoritarian agenda while
hampering the United States and its allies. Russia, the PRC, and others seek to
reshape norms governing cyberspace, undermine the technical underpinnings of the
Internet, and dilute accountability for authoritarian countries’ malicious use
of cyberspace capabilities.
Authoritarian governments are working to weaken global commitment to universal
human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
international legal instruments, such as the UN Charter and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Authoritarian governments, most notably
the PRC, are actively working to co-opt and redefine well-established
terminology related to “democracy” and “human rights” in the context of
international technology policy development, including through their input into
the UN Pact for the Future process and its Global Digital Compact.
THREATS TO INTERNET AND DIGITAL FREEDOM
Authoritarian and illiberal states are seeking to restrict human rights online
and offline through the misuse of the Internet and digital technologies.
Governments are closing and siloing the Internet: suppressing dissent through
Internet and telecommunications shutdowns, virtual blackouts, restricted
networks, and blocked websites.
The PRC has developed a massive system of surveillance, and its firms are now
exporting their regulatory approach and technical capabilities to facilitate
other governments’ monitoring and repression. Beijing has also used cyber means
to target people beyond its borders, including journalists, dissidents, and
individuals it views as threats to Chinese Communist Party narratives, policies,
and actions. In the wake of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the
Russian government blocked access to foreign websites and increased censorship
and surveillance of domestic users. The Iranian government continues to rely on
Internet restrictions, filtering, and surveillance to repress opposition to the
regime.
A growing number of governments, including backsliding democracies, are misusing
digital tools in ways that violate or abuse the individual’s right to be free
from arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy, and restricting and
threatening individuals’ rights to freedoms of expression, association and
peaceful assembly. Commercial spyware, AI-enabled facial recognition software,
and other surveillance technologies are misused against journalists, human
rights defenders and other activists, women, and members of marginalized groups,
including beyond countries’ borders. Technology-facilitated gender-based
violence (TFGBV) chills speech, impedes privacy and freedom of expression, and
undermines the ability of women, girls, and LGBTQI+ individuals to participate
in democracy, governance, and civic life.
The proliferation of online manipulation, in combination with threats posed by
foreign adversaries seeking to interfere with information integrity, pose
fundamental threats to democracy, undermining trust in institutions, threatening
electoral processes, and sowing discord within and between countries. PRC actors
have increased their capabilities to conduct covert influence operations and
disseminate disinformation. Even if Beijing sets limits on these activities,
individuals not under its direct supervision may attempt election influence
activities they perceive are in line with the PRC’s goals. The Russian
government remains a serious foreign influence threat because of its
wide-ranging efforts to try to divide Western alliances and undermine U.S.
global standing. Recently, Russian influence actors have adapted their efforts
to better hide their hand.
CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
Some 2.6 billion people still do not have access to the Internet, leaving a
third of the world unconnected. This situation presents an economic development
challenge for many countries and a strategic challenge for the United States and
its allies and partners. Left unaddressed, the digital divide not only imperils
efforts to build a strong digital ecosystem, but also threatens to increase
income inequality and instability in emerging economies. The digital divide
disproportionately affects women and other marginalized groups. For example, 80
percent of women in low-income countries do not use the Internet. [4]
As the world has increasingly digitalized, countries around the world are
grappling with how to approach the digital economy in a way that takes
advantages of its benefits, addresses its risks, and expands its reach to more
people. Governments are developing differing regulatory approaches to a range of
policy issues, such as protecting children’s safety, health, and privacy,
tackling TFGBV, addressing anti-competitive behavior, guaranteeing equitable
access to connectivity and technology, building trusted digital infrastructure,
and promoting trusted cross-border data flows.
A growing number of countries are promoting digital public infrastructure (DPI)
as critical to achieving economic growth, good governance, and the UN
sustainable development goals (SDGs). The definition of DPI is evolving, but
generally encompasses networked open technology standards designed for the
public interest, an enabling regulatory environment, and a community of market
players driving innovation. While some of the most prominent models have
included digital identification, digital payments, and data platforms for
sharing and storing data, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. DPI models
need to be grounded in safeguards, including human rights protections, and such
models should be interoperable.
U.S. government and private sector actors seek to leverage data and the digital
economy for positive economic and social benefits: preserving openness while
protecting privacy, promoting safety, and mitigating harms. The Department of
State, working with other agencies, looks to shape markets and safeguard
innovation from regulatory excesses. Although there is an increasing willingness
by some countries to embrace narratives of digital sovereignty and protectionism
by blocking access to their markets, unduly preventing cross-border data flows,
and preferencing domestic manufacturers and service providers, we continue
international engagement to enhance interoperability, security, and market
access.
Many states are promoting digital technologies for economic growth while trying
to maintain autonomy and neutrality. They are looking to build digital
infrastructure quickly and cheaply and seeking assistance to combat cybercrime
and develop cybersecurity capacities. Yet the PRC government distorts markets to
advantage PRC-based hardware, software, and services suppliers that compromise
the security of the customer. By contrast, the United States seeks to provide
the emerging and developing world with financially sound alternatives to
unsustainable initiatives. The Department of State is committed to working with
allies and partners to offer and deploy secure technologies that allow countries
and civic actors around the world to build digital infrastructure and improve
cybersecurity across sectors, offering direct benefits to governments while
helping to ensure the protection of the human rights and privacy of their
citizens that will enable an inclusive digital economy.
THE FUTURE OF AI TECHNOLOGIES GOVERNANCE
The uncertainty and complexity that characterizes the geopolitical competition
over these digital technologies is compounded by the fact that we sit at the
cusp of another technological revolution. The revolution in AI systems may occur
at an even faster pace than the development and adoption of the Internet. AI
technologies could be powerful tools for expanding knowledge, increasing
prosperity and productivity, and addressing global challenges, and AI tools may
help advance the seventeen UN SDGs. AI applications have the further potential
to improve many aspects of citizens’ lives including food security, health
applications, good governance and democratic consolidation, and natural disaster
preparedness and prevention.
The rapid growth of AI technology, however, comes with the significant risk that
its use may exacerbate inequality and economic instability, stifle competition,
cause consumer harm, aggravate discrimination and bias, invade privacy, enhance
malicious cyber activity, and improve authoritarian capabilities for
surveillance and repression. AI will challenge how we compensate for the uses of
intellectual property as well as authenticate, label, or detect synthetic
content. AI may also require workforce adaptations across economies; the rising
energy demands of high-end AI chips and data centers could become a significant
barrier to developing local capabilities.
Further, state and non-state actors have been observed using generative AI
systems for malicious purposes, including to manipulate and disseminate
disinformation at speed and scale. Many AI technologies are also dual use,
lending themselves to new military and national security capabilities that may
lack appropriate human rights and civil liberty protections and other
safeguards. AI can advantage both the attacker and defender in cyberspace, and
the systems themselves are subject to data poisoning and other types of
malicious activities.
The question of how to balance risk and rewards looms large for governments and
civil society around the world. The United States is working with allies and
partners to move quickly to address the ways in which artificial intelligence
can potentially destabilize societies while preserving its benefits—and,
crucially, staying true to democratic values and protecting human rights. A
critical part of this work is not only safeguarding an open and independent
research environment but also partnering with emerging economies in the
development and deployment of AI technologies. Helping to provide unrestricted
access to an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet while
demonstrating how AI can serve a shared agenda across the globe can help reduce
the risk that the AI revolution will contribute to global instability and
diminish our ability to address global challenges.
WORKING WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Competition, consumer choice, vibrant private sector investment, and a robust
civil society are the hallmarks of an open, inclusive, and secure digital
ecosystem. The Department of State cannot accomplish its objectives without
strong partnerships with the private sector, civil society, academic, and
technical communities. New innovations spring from the private sector, and the
decisions tech companies make on how their systems are developed and deployed
have profound implications for how U.S. values and interests are
realized—including protecting users’ safety and privacy. U.S. officials rely on
a range of private sector, academic, and civic actors for insights into
technology developments, and private sector and trade association stakeholders
often provide early warning of discriminatory regulations that explicitly target
American companies. Trusted technology suppliers, including small- and
medium-sized enterprises, are essential partners in efforts to expand
connectivity through open, secure, and resilient networks across the globe.
Civil society groups are working to ensure that individuals can access and
pursue opportunities online free from unlawful surveillance and privacy-invasive
data collection practices and are working to counter harmful propaganda and
disinformation in digital spaces. Civil society and the technical community are
often the first to recognize, warn of, and seek solutions to threats to human
rights online and offline. As Internet freedom continues to decline in parts of
the world, civil society activists, human rights defenders, and the journalists
covering their activism are often leading the push back in digitally repressive
societies, often at great personal risk. Additionally, civil society, the
academic and technical community, and private sector actors play a crucial role
in upholding the multistakeholder model of Internet governance, which is
increasingly under threat.
The private sector, civil society, and the technical community are essential in
helping defend against malicious cyber activities. In 2022, the private sector
aided Albania in the wake of Iranian cyberattacks and, during Russia’s
full-scale invasion of Ukraine, technology firms and cybersecurity companies
provided services, tools, and threat intelligence to help Ukraine defend
government and critical infrastructure networks. They migrated data storage and
cloud hosting services to counteract Russian efforts to erase critical data and
provided Internet and telecommunication services that helped keep government
agencies and businesses operating. Non-governmental organizations and academic
research groups have exposed the threat posed by the proliferation and misuse of
commercial spyware against journalists, activists, and marginalized groups.
Public-private partnerships are essential to cyber and digital diplomacy, and
they need to be flexible and adaptable. Cyber defense may require new ways to
scale, supply, and license cyber defense services and products in a crisis and
may be difficult to launch and sustain in a different regional context.
Repressive governments are developing new methods to control digital
technologies and to manipulate and interfere with information flows. To address
these and other evolving challenges, the Department of State will continue to
expand contact with and solicit input from a wide range of civil society and
private sector actors. In addition, the United States will continue to work with
allies and partners to advance a multistakeholder approach to digital and data
governance.
BUILDING DIGITAL SOLIDARITY
The United States believes digital technologies can and should be used to put
people on a path to prosperity, solve global challenges, and build a better
future for all. The Department of State will work with allies, partners, and
stakeholders to promote an affirmative vision for cyber and digital
technologies: one in which people around the world use cyberspace and digital
technologies to advance economic prosperity and inclusion; enhance security and
combat cybercrime; promote and protect human rights, gender equity and equality,
democracy, and the rule of the law; and address transnational challenges. As
part of this approach, the United States, allies, and partners will demonstrate
the advantages of an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet; serve
as the partner of choice in the research, design, development, and deployment of
digital and emerging technologies; and jointly impose consequences for behavior
that runs counter to internationally accepted norms of state behavior. The
Department of State will also work with and support emerging economies’ efforts
to improve cybersecurity and increase their cyber-resilience.
Each of the Strategy’s four action areas—promote, build, and maintain an open,
inclusive, secure, and resilient digital ecosystem; align rights-respecting
approaches to digital governance; advance responsible state behavior, counter
malicious activity, and offer mutual support; and strengthen digital and cyber
capacity building assistance—reflects aspects of the Department of State’s
vision of digital solidarity. Moving forward, the Department of State will work
to bring a wide range of partners across the globe into the process of building
and extending digital solidarity. We welcome all those who seek to develop and
deploy technologies that are open and secure, promote inclusive growth, foster
resilient and democratic societies, and empower all, including the most
vulnerable.
Figure 2. Secretary Blinken and Deputy Secretary Sherman Visit the new
Cyberspace and Digital Policy Bureau at the U.S. Department of State in
Washington, D.C., on April 4, 2022. (U.S. Department of State photo.)
ACTION AREA 1: PROMOTE, BUILD, AND MAINTAIN AN OPEN, INCLUSIVE, SECURE, AND
RESILIENT DIGITAL ECOSYSTEM
Digital solidarity rests on and is reinforced by innovation across an open,
inclusive, secure, and resilient digital ecosystem. Though the United States is
a major power in digital, critical, and emerging technologies, we are not able
to—nor should we—go it alone. Rather, the United States, allies, and partners
are all made more prosperous, self-determining, and resilient when we work
together to catalyze, support, and sustain rapid technological development on a
range of critical technologies.
In close coordination with allies, partners, the private sector, and civil
society, the Department of State continues to campaign for open, interoperable,
secure, trusted, and reliable telecommunication networks, especially on
fifth-generation wireless networks (5G). The White House, Department of State,
USAID, Department of Commerce, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
are engaged in discussions with allies and partners about deploying 5G mobile
networks using trusted vendors and the future of 6G. Digital technologies are
not limited to wireless technologies, and the Department of State and other
agencies are coordinating with allies and partners on the development,
deployment, and security of cloud infrastructure and data centers, undersea
cables, and satellite communications. In addition, at all UN bodies the United
States aims to promote—at a high level—the development, deployment, and use of
rights-respecting digital technologies.
LINE OF EFFORT 1: PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT AND ADOPTION OF OPEN, INCLUSIVE, SECURE,
AND RESILIENT TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS
5G applications are rapidly evolving—expanding digital connectivity in new ways
and creating new cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Telecommunication networks
should be built using products from trusted suppliers that operate, and have
supply chain partners that operate, primarily in countries that respect rights
through consistent application of the law through an independent judiciary, in
accordance with the principles reflected in the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Declaration on Government Access to Personal
Data Held by Private Sector Entities. Telecommunications networks should not be
built using products from suppliers subject to the control or influence of an
authoritarian regime, and without meaningful, independent checks and balances or
judicial recourse against government demands. International 5G-related
principles, such as the Prague Proposals on 5G Security and Prague Proposals on
Telecommunications Supplier Diversity, support market competitiveness and the
diversity of trusted 5G equipment vendors.
These efforts also extend to the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and
Investment’s Digital Infrastructure pillar. Recognizing that cost is often the
primary driving factor in ICT procurements, the United States is supporting
governments, middle-mile internet infrastructure providers, and Internet service
providers to develop greater competition and diversity in telecommunications
supply chains, particularly through the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity
Partnership (DCCP). DCCP is a whole-of-government effort, led by the Department
of State, to provide capacity building, technical assistance, and project design
and financing in support of an open Internet and enhanced cybersecurity.
In addition, the CHIPS and Science Act allocated $500 million to the
International Technology Security and Innovation (ITSI) Fund for the Department
of State to support the development and adoption of secure semiconductor supply
chains and telecommunications networks. The United States will use this funding
to continue to work with partners to put in place policy and regulatory
frameworks for secure ICT ecosystems and to level the playing field for secure
and trustworthy vendors.
Along with helping build secure networks, digital solidarity is also expressed
through efforts to build digital infrastructure that promotes competition,
advances consumer choice, and puts communities and individuals in charge of
their digital lives and resources. Recognizing the need to attract capital and
de-risk potential digital infrastructure investment, USAID—with funding from
DCCP—launched a blended finance program called Digital Invest that partners with
fund managers and project developers to expand access to Internet connectivity
and digital financial services in emerging markets worldwide. To date, Digital
Invest’s 13 partners have leveraged an initial $8.45 million in Department of
State and USAID funding to raise over $300 million in investment capital for
digital finance and Internet service providers in emerging markets that use
secure network equipment, catalyzing an additional $1.15 billion in follow-on
funding from third-party investors.
U.S. foreign assistance programs will also increase competition in the market
and promote telecommunications supplier diversity by advancing the development
of open and interoperable interfaces and protocols, such as Open Radio Access
Networks (Open RAN). This open network architecture eases the ability for new
suppliers to enter the market, lowers costs for deployment, and speeds
innovation. Open RAN presents opportunities for emerging economies to
participate directly in the supply chain, such as through local assembly and
software development. Just as important, Open RAN offers alternatives for the
reliance on technology from untrusted vendors. As a result, the Department of
State will continue to support efforts such as funding commercial trials,
feasibility studies, reverse trade missions, and workforce education and
awareness activities that promote Open RAN. The United States will continue
collaborating with the governments of Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United
Kingdom on telecommunications supply chain diversification and related issues
through the Global Coalition on Telecommunications, launched in October 2023.
Working with other governments and the private sector, the United States is also
preparing for a new wave of innovation. Within the next decade, 6G will within
the next decade bring even higher speeds, larger capacity, and lower latency to
wireless communication. Building open and interoperable network architectures
such as Open RAN into 6G development from the beginning will help ensure
supplier diversity and supply chain resilience. In February 2024, the United
States—with Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—endorsed shared principles for
the research and development of 6G wireless communication systems.
LINE OF EFFORT 2: FURTHER COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS AND SHARED PRINCIPLES FOR THE
SECURE USE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS OF CLOUD SERVICES, DATA CENTERS, AND RELATED
INFRASTRUCTURE TECHNOLOGIES
Cloud computing has become an essential enabler of the digital transformation of
economies and businesses. By providing on-demand access to scalable computing
resources in a reliable and cost-effective manner, cloud services allow
governments and businesses to deliver more secure and resilient services to
their citizens and customers. Moreover, cloud services were proven to be a
strategic asset as Russian forces physically destroyed Ukrainian facilities
holding critical data. Migration of government information technology
infrastructure to the cloud improved resilience and preserved information
essential to the operation of the economy and government.
U.S. cloud computing and data center firms compete globally and offer services
to a broad international customer base while, in parallel, the United States
government actively partners with foreign governments to promote the fair and
safe use of cloud computing resources. At the same time, providers from
authoritarian states are globalizing, and they are often more responsive to
short-term local economic development goals, providing packages that include
financial subsidies, local cloud infrastructure, and workforce training. Cloud
services and data centers are also a source of tension with close trade
partners. Some have threatened to exclude U.S. cloud providers from their
markets in part because of concerns about access to and control of data, despite
the U.S. Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act providing for
agreements to allow for consistent protections based on the rule of law. The
Department of State is committed to reaching a common understanding with our
international partners on the fair and safe use of cloud computing resources.
In addition, the Department of State will work with international partners and
the private sector to address the costs and increase support for building secure
cloud infrastructure in emerging economies. DCCP is reinforcing these efforts
through the support of feasibility studies, reverse trade missions, financing,
and training programs, such as training grants in the Philippines to support the
provision of cloud computing capabilities.
Figure 3. Global Submarine Cable Map 2024. (Illustration by TeleGeography)
LINE OF EFFORT 3: ENHANCE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE OF UNDERSEA CABLES
Undersea cables carry more than 95 percent of the world’s digital traffic. As
data continues to proliferate and increase exponentially, so too does demand for
cables and other transmission systems. Disruption or destruction of the cables
as a result of accidents, natural disasters, or malicious actions could isolate
a county, threaten national security, and result in billions of dollars of
damage to the economy. Choices made about which vendors to rely on for undersea
cable infrastructure, maintenance, and repair operations can either drive
development and innovation or lead to new forms of dependency and insecurity. As
a result, the Department of State, in coordination with other agencies, will
prioritize enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables.
U.S. firms and other trusted suppliers are leading producers of many network
components, embedded technologies, and related services for undersea cables, and
they are investing in and financing new undersea cables connecting all regions
of the world. The U.S. government will continue to support U.S. and other
trusted suppliers in the installation, operation, maintenance, and repair of
secure infrastructure as well as to promote a regulatory environment that
enables continued investments.
Since 2021, the Department of State has implemented the CABLES program
throughout the East Asia Pacific region, responsibly informing essential
telecommunications and cables infrastructure stakeholders of the perils of
choosing untrusted suppliers. The United States provided capacity building to
support five countries using U.S. technology for the South-East Asia-Middle
East-Western Europe 6 cable (SMW6), and separately it provided over $22 million
in partnership with Australia and Japan to help fund the East Micronesia Cable
being built by a Japanese firm. In October 2023, the United States announced
that, working with Congress, it would provide, along with Australia, investments
totaling $65 million to fund future undersea cable connectivity for Pacific
Island countries in order to facilitate access to global markets and the
realization of regional connectivity goals. In support of these policy
objectives, the United States will continue engaging with the G7 and other
multilateral groups to strengthen trusted, multi-layered global connectivity
that provides data route diversity, resiliency, and redundancies.
LINE OF EFFORT 4: PURSUE SHARED INTERESTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT, USE, RESILIENCE,
AND SECURITY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
Satellite communications remain a vital capability for connecting the world and
delivering global access to information. Geostationary orbit (GEO) satellites
have served this mission for decades and will continue to do so for decades to
come. Newly deployed satellite technologies, including low-earth orbit (LEO)
satellites, are increasingly important to the United States, its allies, and
partners as we work to connect the unconnected. The distributed nature of
proliferated satellite constellations offers resilience, and LEO satellite
communication services can increasingly be deployed rapidly to cover disaster or
conflict zones. Moreover, the ability of LEO satellite services to bring
broadband communications to almost every inch of the planet raises the
possibility of expanding Internet access in a rights-respecting manner, closing
the digital divide, and advancing UN Sustainable Development Goals.
U.S. firms lead in the development and deployment of GEO and LEO satellite
communication services, but other countries, including our strategic
competitors, are investing in new technology capacities. The PRC is planning a
constellation of about 13,000 satellites, with a clear government mandate and
significant financial subsidies. Some states, concerned that LEO satellite
capabilities will undermine their ability to control information flows, are
raising market access barriers, such as setting stringent domestic equipment
requirements or forbidding foreign ownership. Some governments and
non-government stakeholders have also raised concerns in multilateral bodies
about increased space debris, interference with astronomy, increased cases of
radio frequency interference among LEO satellites or from LEO to GEO satellites,
and other potential negative impacts of LEO satellite networks. Some countries,
although they are interested in the connectivity benefits LEO satellite systems
could bring, are unfamiliar with the systems and lack effective regimes to
support market entry and licensing. In addition, space systems and assets
introduce vulnerabilities to U.S. and allies’ critical infrastructure that our
adversaries are willing to exploit.
The Department of State will cooperate with partners and allies to pursue shared
interests in the development, use, resilience, and security of LEO satellite
systems. The Department of State will work to expand global access to secure
services through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), remove
barriers to LEO satellite system providers, and increase multilateral assistance
for satellite services for underserved areas. The Department of State, along
with other agencies, will also facilitate international cooperation on research
and development in LEO satellites. The United States will also promote norms,
guidelines, and best practices, including the development of licensing and
regulatory regimes, for the secure, safe, and sustainable use of LEO satellites,
as well as work with allies and partners on enhancing space cybersecurity and
critical infrastructure resilience and security.
LINE OF EFFORT 5: ENHANCE THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION’S
EFFECTIVENESS, TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Responsible, forward-looking, inclusive, and transparent leadership by the ITU
on telecommunications standards, telecommunications and ICT development, closing
digital divides, and radio frequency spectrum is vital to U.S. development,
defense, and economic priorities. The United States has long supported the work
of the ITU in its core competencies, including global radiofrequency spectrum
harmonization and advancing the development of the world’s telecommunications
networks by enhancing connectivity and interoperability. Since Secretary-General
Doreen Bogdan-Martin’s 2022 election, the United States has been working with
other member states and partners to help her deliver on her vision to expand
digital connectivity and inclusion; strengthen partnerships and stakeholder
collaboration; empower and engage youth; and enhance the ITU’s organizational
effectiveness, transparency, and accountability to achieve its overall goals.
ACTION AREA 2: ALIGN RIGHTS-RESPECTING APPROACHES TO DIGITAL AND DATA GOVERNANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS
Digital solidarity recognizes the necessity of the domestic governance of
digital and emerging technologies but seeks to develop shared mechanisms that
will help maintain an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet as well
as trusted cross-border data flows. It works to foster democratic values-based
and rights-respecting policies.
To advance the NSS and the NCS effectively, promoting, building, and maintaining
a secure digital ecosystem must be accompanied by efforts to make digital and
data governance compatible across allies and partners through greater alignment,
mutual recognition, and reciprocity of policies. The Department of State, along
with other federal agencies, is building and reinforcing digital solidarity
through support for the trusted flow of data; advocacy for multistakeholder,
risk-based approaches to digital and data governance; and the promotion of
shared values and governance principles for critical and emerging technologies.
The Department of State, in collaboration with the Department of Commerce and
other agencies, is expanding its capacity to engage in international standards
development organizations and to coordinate with industry and civil society to
ensure robust participation by U.S. stakeholders in standards setting processes
and other international fora. The United States is also working with allies and
partners to advance a common, rights-respecting vision for the digital future;
negotiate a rights-respecting cybercrime treaty; and defend information
integrity.
LINE OF EFFORT 1: SUPPORT THE TRUSTED FLOW OF DATA AND ADVOCATE FOR
MULTISTAKEHOLDER, RISK-BASED APPROACHES TO DIGITAL AND DATA GOVERNANCE
Digital solidarity is further built and reinforced through the joint
development, harmonization, and mutual recognition of rights-respecting
approaches to data governance and digital trade. This work is currently ongoing
through mechanisms such as Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity
(IPEF), Digital Transformation with Africa initiative (DTA), the Americas
Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP), the G7, OECD, TTC, and the Quad.
The United States supports the trusted free flow of data and an open Internet
with strong and effective protections for individuals’ human rights and privacy
and measures to preserve governments’ abilities to enforce laws and advance
policies in the public interest. Legitimate concerns about data privacy can be
addressed through protective mechanisms that follow the data while at the same
time facilitate cross-border data flows and strengthen global cooperation among
enforcement authorities. The United States will continue championing trusted
cross-border data flows by promoting data transfer mechanisms that improve
interoperability between different data privacy regimes. Working alongside our
interagency partners, the Department of State supported the negotiation and
implementation of the EU- U.S. Data Privacy Framework; the development of the
OECD Declaration on Trusted Government Access to Data Held by the Private
Sector, which identifies commonalities in the privacy safeguards democratic
governments follow when accessing data for legitimate law enforcement and
national security purposes; as well as initiatives on Data Free Flow with Trust
at both the G7 and the OECD. The Department of State works with the Department
of Justice to clarify application of the U.S. Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of
Data (CLOUD) Act and to negotiate bilateral agreements under the act.
Along with Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan, the United States launched the Global
Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) Forum in April 2022, building on the
previously established Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CBPR system. The
CBPR provides a data privacy certification backed by relevant authorities that
facilitates data flows by promoting interoperable, enforceable data protection
standards. Officials from the Departments of State and Commerce will continue
efforts to bring new countries into the agreement, building on efforts such as
workshops held in Kenya, Mexico, Chile, Brazil, UK, Israel, Jordan, Panama,
Colombia, Fiji, and Barbados as well as ASEAN countries.
While the United States and its likeminded trade partners share many of the same
values, we often have differing approaches to how to regulate the digital
economy. The U.S. government advocates for multistakeholder, risk-based
approaches that target the challenges we face while providing the flexibility to
realize the benefits of new and emerging technologies. Unilateral approaches in
digital taxation and the imposition of network usage fees often do not address
the core issues of accessibility and fairness expressed by their proponents.
Additionally, the rise of a growing digital sovereignty narrative that has been
embraced by some of our close partners and allies has the potential to undermine
key digital economy and cybersecurity objectives. The Department of State,
working with other agencies, will continue to argue against data localization,
network usage fees, digital services taxes as well as other market access
barriers that contribute to the perception of increased control, but in reality
often can undermine growth and security objectives.
LINE OF EFFORT 2: PROMOTE COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS OF TRUST, INTEROPERABLE
STANDARDS, AND SHARED VALUES AND GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR CRITICAL AND EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES
One of the most pressing challenges for digital solidarity is developing common
approaches to governing critical and emerging technologies such as AI. The speed
of innovation, the scale of the competition, and the stakes for our values,
security, and prosperity demand concerted action. With AI technologies, we will
not have the luxury of time or of pursuing narrow interests that have often
slowed our ability to develop shared principles and interoperable regulatory
approaches in other parts of the digital economy.
Shaping shared values and governance principles on the development, deployment,
and use of AI is increasingly central to American digital diplomacy. The United
States is engaging allies, partners, the private sector, civil society, the
technical community, and other stakeholders in discussions at the G7, Global
Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, the Council of Europe, OECD, UN, UNESCO,
and other fora to manage the risks of AI and ensure its benefits are widely
distributed. In addition, we will need to work together to invest in the science
research and infrastructure necessary to measure, evaluate, and verify advanced
AI technology systems.
In July 2023, President Biden announced voluntary commitments from seven leading
AI companies to advance the safe, secure, and transparent development of AI
technology. Eight more companies (including one foreign-based company) signed on
to the commitments in September. The United States internationalized and
expanded on the voluntary commitments through the G7 Hiroshima AI process led by
Japan to tackle generative AI, with leaders releasing an International Code of
Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI systems in October 2023. We
continue to work on broadening acceptance of the Code of Conduct by more
countries and companies beyond G7 member countries.
The United States joined twenty-seven other countries at the UK AI Safety Summit
and signed the Bletchley Declaration, which encourages transparency and
accountability from actors developing frontier AI technology. The United States
and the United Kingdom have also signed a memorandum of understanding between
their respective AI Safety Institutes advancing the science of measuring,
evaluating, and addressing AI risks as a first step toward a global consensus on
the scientific underpinnings of AI safety. These efforts outline a role for
national governments, promote international cooperation, and encourage
innovation by providing technically rigorous guidelines for introducing safe,
secure, and trustworthy AI technology. At the same time, USAID and several other
international development donors entered into a partnership to promote safe,
secure, and trustworthy AI development in low- and middle-income countries in
Africa and other parts of the world.
Hiroshima Principles for Generative AI
Take appropriate measures throughout the development of advanced AI systems,
including prior to and throughout their deployment and placement on the market,
to identify, evaluate, and mitigate risks across the AI lifecycle.
Develop and deploy reliable content authentication and provenance mechanisms,
where technically feasible, such as watermarking or other techniques to enable
users to identify AI-generated content.
Identify and mitigate vulnerabilities, and, where appropriate, incidents and
patterns of misuse, after deployment including placement on the market.
Prioritize research to mitigate societal, safety and security risks and
prioritize investment in effective mitigation measures.
Publicly report advanced AI systems’ capabilities, limitations and domains of
appropriate and inappropriate use, to support ensuring sufficient transparency,
thereby contributing to increase accountability.
Prioritize the development of advanced AI systems to address the world’s
greatest challenges, notably but not limited to the climate crisis, global
health and education.
Work towards responsible information sharing and reporting of incidents among
organizations developing advanced AI systems including with industry,
governments, civil society, and academia.
Advance the development of and, where appropriate, adoption of international
technical standards.
Develop, implement, and disclose AI governance and risk management policies,
grounded in a risk-based approach – including privacy policies, and mitigation
measures, in particular for organizations developing advanced AI systems.
Implement appropriate data input measures and protections for personal data and
intellectual property.
Invest in and implement robust security controls, including physical security,
cybersecurity and insider threat safeguards across the AI lifecycle.
In October 2023, President Biden issued an Executive Order on the Safe, Secure,
and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence. This Order
establishes a process to develop new standards for AI safety and security and
seeks to protect citizens’ privacy, promote innovation and competition, and
advance equity and human rights. The Order tasked the Department of State with
strengthening U.S. leadership abroad on AI issues. The Department of State and
USAID, in collaboration with the Department of Commerce, are leading an effort
to establish an AI in Global Development Playbook to harness AI’s benefits and
manage its risks. Relatedly, the Department of State plans to lead an
interagency task force on detecting, authenticating, and labeling synthetic
content, which aims to facilitate information sharing and mobilize global
commitments to both label authentic government-produced content and detect
synthetic content. In addition, working with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the Department of State is engaging international partners to help
prevent, respond to, and recover from potential critical infrastructure
disruptions resulting from the incorporation of AI into critical infrastructure
systems or the malicious use of AI against those systems. The Department of
State and USAID are also working with interagency partners, including the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Science
Foundation (NSF), and Department of Energy, to develop a human rights risk
management framework for AI and a global AI research agenda.
The Department of State is also building broad-based support for the Political
Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy. While there are
important discussions ongoing in Geneva under the framework of the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) – which the United States will continue to
support – the scope of those discussions only covers one possible military use
of AI, namely autonomous weapon systems. The Political Declaration is the first
effort to articulate principles and best practices covering all military
applications of AI technologies.
LINE OF EFFORT 3: ENSURE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS PROCESSES ARE TRANSPARENT,
OPEN, INCLUSIVE, AND IMPARTIAL
International technology standards facilitate technology advancement, trade,
global economic growth, and market access, particularly for startups and small-
and medium-sized enterprises. They are also an area of strategic and economic
competition, with the PRC in particular pushing top-down approaches to standards
development process and using its economic influence to compel support for its
standard proposals. In May 2023, the Biden-Harris White House published the
first ever U.S. Government National Standards Strategy for Critical and Emerging
Technology (USG NSSCET). As outlined in the USG NSSCET, the United States will
work with allies, partners, the private sector, and civil society to ensure that
international standards development embraces transparency, openness,
impartiality and consensus, effectiveness and relevance, coherence, and broad
multistakeholder participation. The Department of State, in cooperation with the
Department of Commerce and other agencies, is building enhanced capacity to
engage directly in international standards development organizations and to
coordinate with industry and civil society to ensure robust participation by
U.S. stakeholders in standards making processes.
Working with the FCC, NIST, National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), and other federal agencies, the Department of State
supports standards development processes for a wide range of critical and
emerging technologies and platforms, including IoT, energy grids, smart cities,
and connected vehicles. The United States will continue to promote and leverage
cybersecurity and privacy standards and guidelines developed by NIST through
open processes with a strong connection to international standards.
This approach reinforces the U.S. policy for standards: a private-sector led,
industry-driven approach with government participation that emphasizes the use
of international standards developed in open, transparent, and consensus-based
processes. This alignment helps stakeholders reduce the burden of international
regulatory and legal regimes, leading to a reduced cost of operation and a
greater understanding of international policies. It also highlights the value of
a bottom-up approach for other governments as they develop their cybersecurity
priorities.
The U.S. government has developed formal and informal methods of information
sharing and standards development monitoring through regular engagement with
partners and allies. Quad partners and members of the TTC, for example, have
signed memoranda of cooperation to enable increased information sharing,
coordination, and influence in international standards development. The
Department of State has also supported increasing participation in standards
development organizations from historically underrepresented nations.
LINE OF EFFORT 4: EXPAND AND DIVERSIFY CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN
MULTISTAKEHOLDER PROCESSES
The United States and its partners remain committed to the multistakeholder
model of Internet and digital governance. Active and meaningful participation of
all stakeholders, including governments, civil society, the private sector,
academia, and the technical community, is essential to informing our discussions
and policymaking, promoting transparency and accountability, and strengthening
implementation and sustainable development. Through foreign assistance programs,
the Department of State is advancing policy and advocacy initiatives through
which civil society stakeholders engage with national governments, regional
governance bodies, and international standard-setting entities to encourage
Internet and digital governance policies consistent with democratic values and
international human rights. The Department of State will continue its efforts to
expand and diversify the groups who are working to promote interoperable,
rights-respecting, and secure digital technologies. It will also continue to
prevent and defend against efforts by repressive governments to exclude civil
society and other stakeholders from participation in relevant fora.
The United States strongly supports the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as the
preeminent global body bringing together all stakeholders through a bottom-up
process to discuss rights-respecting solutions to Internet public policy issues.
It will continue to work with allies and partners to sustain and bolster the
IGF’s relevance.
LINE OF EFFORT 5: ADVANCE A COMMON, RIGHTS-RESPECTING VISION FOR THE DIGITAL
FUTURE
Digital solidarity is built on a shared commitment to human-rights based
technology governance. The Advancing Digital Democracy (ADD) initiative,
launched by USAID at the Summit for Democracy in 2021, fosters an open, secure,
and inclusive digital ecosystem through programs such as partnerships with
governments, private sector and civil society to strengthen legal and regulatory
frameworks for data and digital technologies, and increased support for software
engineers, tech companies, and researchers working to embed respect for human
rights and democratic values across the tech lifecycle. In April 2022, the
United States and 60 countries launched the Declaration for the Future of the
Internet (DFI), bringing together a broad, diverse coalition of partners around
a common, rights-respecting vision for an open, interoperable, reliable, and
secure digital future. As chair of the Freedom Online Coalition in 2023, the
United States prioritized protecting fundamental freedoms online; countering and
building resilience to the misuse of digital technologies; advancing norms,
principles, and safeguards regarding the development and use of artificial
intelligence; and strengthening digital inclusion. Similarly, the United States,
working with 13 other countries, launched the Global Partnership for Action on
Gender-Based Online Harassment and Abuse. This partnership, which emerged from
the first Summit for Democracy, is a response to the need to address
technology-facilitated gender-based violence as part of a shared global agenda
to promote peace, security, and stability.
The United States will continue working with allies and partners to ensure
digital technologies are used in a responsible and rights-respecting manner.
Along with 45 partners, the United States endorsed in March 2023 Guiding
Principles on Government Use of Surveillance Technologies, which are intended to
prevent the misuse of surveillance technologies by governments. In addition, the
Department of State will continue to advance programs that enable at-risk,
vulnerable, and marginalized populations, or those who protect them, to prepare
for, prevent, identify, investigate, and obtain remedy for digital abuses or
other types of digital repression.
The United States supports several multistakeholder efforts working to address a
range of online challenges while respecting freedoms of opinion and expression,
including the Christchurch Call to Action in 2019, the French-led Child Online
Protection Laboratory, Freedom Online Coalition, and the Global Partnership for
Action on Gender-Based Online Harassment and Abuse. The United States will
continue to advocate for a rights-respecting approach consistent with protecting
freedoms of opinion and expression and promoting gender equity and equality as
governments around the world propose increased regulation of online platforms.
Further strengthening domestic policy will enable deeper coordination with
international partners on a range of digital issues. The Executive Order on the
Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence,
for example, has reinforced the position of the United States in international
discussions on the governance of AI. The National Cybersecurity Strategy
supports legislative efforts to impose robust, clear limits on the ability to
collect, use, transfer, and maintain personal data and provide strong
protections for sensitive data like geolocation and health information. The NCS
specifically calls for this legislation to mitigate privacy risks arising from
data processing and set national requirements to secure personal data.
LINE OF EFFORT 6: NEGOTIATE A RIGHTS-RESPECTING CYBERCRIME TREATY
The United States, its allies, and partners as well as civil society groups have
long supported the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (commonly known as
the Budapest Convention) as the most effective tool for providing global
standards for criminalizing malicious cyber activities, obtaining electronic
evidence, and fostering international cooperation on computer-related crimes.
The Convention was drafted to be global and open to all regions. Seventy-eight
countries, including the United States, are currently parties to the Convention,
and 21 additional countries have been invited to accede.
While supporting accession to the Budapest Convention, the United States and its
partners are also actively working to ensure that negotiations in the UN Ad Hoc
Committee to elaborate a convention against cybercrime reach a positive outcome:
a rights-respecting cybercrime treaty that would enable all UN member states to
cooperate better in the fight against cybercrime. The United States and its
partners will continue to oppose overly broad definitions of cybercrime that
could be used to stifle freedom of expression, infringe on privacy, and or
endanger individuals and communities. The United States will also continue to
advocate for necessary and sufficient safeguards commensurate to the scope of
the domestic powers and international cooperation provided for in the
convention. Maintaining an open, inclusive, and transparent process will best
allow states to negotiate a binding agreement with the participation of
interested stakeholders.
LINE OF EFFORT 7: DEFEND INFORMATION INTEGRITY
Information integrity challenges are not new, but determined foreign state
adversaries and rapid technological advances, especially AI-enabled
human-machine interactions, create complex dynamics that compound information
risks by enabling rapid, large-scale, and targeted dissemination of AI-enabled
synthetic content. Building a resilient information environment—one in which
there is open, free public debate and consistent access to diverse sources of
fact-based information—is an ongoing priority for the United States and its
allies and partners. These features are essential for citizens to inform their
opinions and exercise their human rights, including freedom of expression,
freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the right to vote. Information
manipulation is destabilizing and can harm national security, democratic
processes, economic welfare, the environment, crisis response, human rights, and
public health. While foreign actors seeking to interfere with or manipulate the
information environment pose significant risks, there are additional challenges
open societies face around the quality of information online and deteriorating
trust.
With allies and partners, the Department of State will continue to work to build
civic information resilience, counter foreign state and non-state extremist
propaganda online, and mitigate risks of AI to information integrity while
protecting freedom of expression. The U.S. Government will work to protect the
integrity of elections and other democratic processes across the globe. At the
TTC, OECD, and G7, the United States develops shared approaches to building
healthy and resilient information ecosystems. The United States and France are
co-chairing the DIS/MIS Information Resource Hub, the OECD’s leading information
integrity initiative. At the Hub, the Department of State is focused on
increasing cooperation around sharing of best practices and strengthening
information resilience, both among OECD and non-OECD countries, and developing a
framework to guide whole-of-society efforts in this area. Through the Promoting
Information Integrity and Resilience Initiative (Pro-Info), USAID aims to
bolster healthy information ecosystems and help address information manipulation
through multi-stakeholder engagement, donor coordination, and capacity building
efforts.
At the third Summit for Democracy in 2024, the United States launched a
democratic roadmap for building civic resilience to global digital manipulation
that highlights the importance of the digital information manipulation challenge
as a threat to the functionality and vitality of society; recognizes that
building information integrity can be consistent with freedom of opinion and
expression; reinforces private sector digital platforms’ ability to strengthen
civic resilience; and prioritizes efforts to address generative AI
(GAI)—particularly in the context of global 2024 elections. The United States
has also endorsed the Global Declaration on Information Integrity Online,
launched by Canada and the Netherlands. The Declaration, grounded in
international human rights law, establishes high-level international commitments
by participating states to protect and promote information integrity online.
In addition, the Department of State has announced a Framework to Counter
Foreign State Information Manipulation. This Framework seeks to develop a common
understanding of the threat and establish a common set of action areas from
which the United States, with its allies and partners, can develop coordinated
responses to foreign information manipulation and protect free and open
societies.
ACTION AREA 3: ADVANCE RESPONSIBLE STATE BEHAVIOR IN CYBERSPACE AND COUNTER
THREATS TO CYBERSPACE AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE BY BUILDING COALITIONS AND
ENGAGING PARTNERS
At the UN and regional security bodies, the United States, along with its allies
and partners, is working to advance responsible state behavior in cyberspace
based on a UN General Assembly-endorsed framework, underpinned by the
applicability of existing international law, adherence to globally accepted and
voluntary norms of state behavior in peacetime, development and implementation
of confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict in cyberspace,
and a commitment to building states’ capacities to implement the elements of the
framework.
Despite a global consensus on the framework for responsible behavior in
cyberspace, the norms are not self-enforcing. Some states act in ways contrary
to it. When a state engages in significant destructive, disruptive, or otherwise
destabilizing malicious cyber activity contrary to the framework, responsible
states must cooperate to hold that irresponsible state accountable.
Digital solidarity in this context is demonstrated by sustained mutual support
and coordinated campaigns. The United States and its partners share cyber threat
information to help build resilience to and disrupt malicious activities; show
solidarity to victims by helping respond to significant incidents, thereby
signaling to adversaries they cannot isolate a target country through malicious
operations; and ensure accountability for destructive, disruptive, and otherwise
destabilizing cyber activities in concert with likeminded countries. The United
States and some allies also have affirmed the application to cyberspace of their
respective mutual defense treaty obligations. In addition, the Department of
State and other federal agencies are working with allies and partners to disrupt
ransomware and other criminal networks and safeguard democratic processes and
institutions. Looking forward, the United States will continue efforts like
these to advance responsible behavior in cyberspace, and counter threats to
cyberspace and our critical infrastructure by building coalitions and engaging
partners.
LINE OF EFFORT 1: PURSUE ACTION-ORIENTED DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON NORM
IMPLEMENTATION AT THE UN
Sustained engagement over almost two and a half decades and across four previous
administrations has yielded a framework of responsible state behavior in
cyberspace repeatedly supported by all members of the UN General Assembly, which
affirms the applicability of international law to states’ use of information and
communication technologies, endorses adherence to voluntary norms of responsible
state behavior in peacetime, and proposes practical confidence-building measures
to help reduce the risk of conflict stemming from cyber incidents. The framework
is the core of our vision for a cyberspace in which states behave appropriately,
manage the risk of unwanted escalation, hold bad actors accountable for
irresponsible activities, and work together to respond to and recover from
significant cyber incidents. Implementation of these norms, however, is critical
to their effectiveness.
We will pursue more action-oriented discussions at the UN focused on how member
states and institutions can work together to implement the framework’s essential
elements and build all states’ capacity to manage cyber-related threats. To
accommodate this evolving conversation, the United States and its partners have
proposed a more action-oriented forum, a Program of Action (POA), as a future
permanent mechanism for dialogue on cyber issues related to international
security at the UN. Designed to be flexible enough to address future threats,
with member states setting its direction over time, the POA will also
incorporate the views of civil society, the private sector, and other non-state
stakeholders.
As part of advancing responsible state behavior in cyberspace, the United States
and our partners will also continue to work together in regional security and
other fora, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation, Organization
of American States, and the ASEAN Regional Forum, to develop and implement cyber
confidence building measures.
UN Framework of Responsible State Behavior
Figure 4. Four components that make up the UN framework of responsible state
behavior in cyberspace. (Australian Strategic Policy Institute/United Nations
General Assembly illustration.)
LINE OF EFFORT 2: DISRUPT AND BUILD RESILIENCE TO MALICIOUS STATE ACTIVITY
Given the interconnected nature of cyberspace, international cooperation is
crucial to deny, disrupt, and counter adversary activities in and through
cyberspace.
The Department of State leads efforts, including facilitating international
outreach, to address the rising threat of disruptive or destructive cyberattacks
on the critical infrastructure of the United States and its allies and partners.
This includes sharing through diplomatic channels joint cybersecurity advisories
with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), and National Security Agency (NSA), and allies and
partners on threats; capacity building and information sharing with new and
existing partners to mitigate cyber threats and ensure the resilience of their
critical infrastructure; and using bilateral, multilateral, and other fora to
clarify and communicate expectations about adherence to international law and
the framework for responsible behavior in cyberspace. In addition, members of
the Quad have developed joint principles for the cybersecurity of critical
infrastructure and NATO members have committed to ensuring the resilience of
critical infrastructure, enhanced protection of critical infrastructure through
training and exercises, and shared intelligence on threats.
As part of its counter adversary cyber activity, the Department of State
provides foreign policy guidance and uses diplomatic engagements to support the
Department of Defense (DoD)’s efforts to campaign in and through cyberspace
below the level of armed conflict to reinforce deterrence and frustrate
adversaries. As laid out in the 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy, U.S. Cyber Command
continues to defend forward to discover, expose, and protect against the sources
of malicious cyber activities and to reinforce responsible state behavior by
encouraging adherence to international law and internationally recognized
cyberspace norms. The DoD Cyber Strategy also notes that cyber operations are
most effective when used in concert with other instruments of national power,
including diplomatic engagement and cyber capacity building.
The Department of State, in close coordination with interagency and
international partners, will continue to organize and execute sustained
diplomatic pressure campaigns to raise international and public awareness of
significant cyber threats and to increase the costs and risks to malicious cyber
actors. For example, the United States has worked with allies, partners, and the
private sector to disrupt DPRK revenue-generation efforts through cybercrime,
crypto theft, and IT workers. U.S. Cyber Command, NSA, DHS, DOJ, and the FBI
have exposed North Korean malware, seized malicious cyber infrastructure, seized
cryptocurrency and fiat currency, and shared actionable threat intelligence with
the private sector. The Department of State coordinates action with the Republic
of Korea through a bilateral DPRK Cyber Working Group, including information
sharing and policy coordination. Also, the United States, Japan, and the
Republic of Korea coordinate efforts to counter DPRK cyber threats through a
trilateral working group announced during the Camp David Summit in August 2023.
The Department of State has also briefed officials around the world on threats
posed by DPRK IT workers and cyber actors and deployed foreign assistance funds
to build capacity to detect and defend against DPRK cyber and crypto threats.
LINE OF EFFORT 3: SUPPORT ALLIES AND PARTNERS AMID MALICIOUS ACTIVITY
A core element of digital solidarity is standing with partners when they are
impacted by significant disruptive or destabilizing cyber incidents. The
Department of State will continue to work with allies and partners – through our
embassies on the ground and our cyber experts in Washington – to coordinate
appropriate support during the investigation, mitigation, and recovery from such
cyber incidents. This support can include, as appropriate, the provision of
advice by embassy cyber experts; facilitation of remote or on-the-ground
investigative, hunt, and malware analysis activities; foreign assistance
projects; or coordination of cyber assistance efforts with partner countries.
The Department of State views such activities as critical to strengthen
collective cyber defense and resilience and to help countries resist
cyberattacks aimed at coercing them or otherwise interfering with their
sovereignty.
LINE OF EFFORT 4: HOLD IRRESPONSIBLE STATES ACCOUNTABLE
To constrain our adversaries effectively and counter malicious activities below
the threshold of armed conflict, we will continue to work with our allies and
partners to condemn this activity and impose meaningful consequences. These
efforts use all the tools of statecraft, including diplomatic isolation, law
enforcement, counter-cyber operations, and economic sanctions. In September
2019, 27 countries publicly pledged in a U.S.-led Joint Statement on Advancing
Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace to collaborate voluntarily to hold
states accountable when they act contrary to the framework. The number of states
willing to publicly hold states accountable reached 39 in July 2021 when NATO,
the EU, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Japan all
publicly condemned the PRC’s involvement in the Microsoft Exchange server data
breach incident and other malicious cyber activities. More recently, likeminded
coalitions attributed Russia’s cyberattack on Viasat’s KA-SAT satellite
communications network on the eve of its invasion of Ukraine and stood in
solidarity with Albania in the wake of Iran’s disruptive cyber operations. The
United States will continue to work to expand the coalition of those willing to
hold states accountable for disruptive and destabilizing cyber activity and to
utilize appropriate multilateral groupings to support each other and to assist
the victims of such behavior.
LINE OF EFFORT 5: AFFIRM APPLICATION OF MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATIES WITH CERTAIN
ALLIES TO THE CYBER DOMAIN
In line with the long-standing U.S. recognition that existing international
law applies in cyberspace, obligations under treaties and other international
agreements may apply in cyberspace. Over the past several years, the United
States and certain allies have made public statements affirming the application
in cyberspace of obligations in their respective mutual defense treaties,
including the 1951 Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United
States (ANZUS) (2011); the North Atlantic Treaty (2014); the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (2019); and the
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea
(2023). The Departments of State and Defense will continue to work together with
allies to engage in pre-contingency planning and to raise awareness further with
alliance partners that existing mutual defense treaties may apply in cyberspace
and that cyberattacks rising to the level of an armed attack may trigger mutual
defense obligations under such treaties.
Figure 5. The Second International Counter Ransomware Initiative Summit November
2022; Vice President Kamala Harris center left and Deputy National Security
Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology Anne Neuberger center right with
leaders from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lithuania, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States,
and Ukraine, and the European Union. (U.S. Department of State photo.)
LINE OF EFFORT 6: COUNTER CRIMINAL AND RANSOMWARE ACTORS
For many countries, the greatest risk to their digital security and economies is
online scams, criminal hacking, and other financial crimes. Ransomware in
particular has emerged in recent years as a clear threat to national security,
public safety, and economic prosperity. Operating from safe havens like the PRC,
DPRK, Iran, Russia, and certain other countries, ransomware operators have
disrupted government services, hospitals, schools, pipeline operations, and
civil society entities. With some states using ransomware actors as proxies or
turning a blind eye to their activities and the significant impact of their
cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, it is increasingly clear that
ransomware activity can threaten international peace and security. Digital
solidarity is clearly expressed through the Department of State’s efforts to
leverage its diplomatic capabilities to support the whole-of-government fight
against ransomware and other forms of cybercrime, including by building partner
capacity; developing coalitions to prevent, disrupt, and punish criminal
behavior; and fostering cooperation with the private sector.
The Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice will continue to
participate in the U.S. Joint Ransomware Task Force and to partner with private
industry and international allies to disrupt online criminal infrastructure and
resources, take down botnets, and seize cryptocurrency garnered from ransomware
campaigns. For example, the U.S. Transnational and High-Tech Crime Global Law
Enforcement Network (GLEN) program—a long-standing partnership between the
Departments of State and Justice—is a global law enforcement capacity-building
network of DOJ International Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (ICHIP)
regional advisors, computer forensic analysts, and federal law enforcement
agents. Twelve ICHIP attorney advisors are located around the world. The ICHIP
advisor based in The Hague facilitated cooperation among the United States,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Romania, and Latvia in the
largest ever takedown of the botnet and malware known as Qakbot in August 2023.
The network also delivers training and technical assistance to foreign law
enforcement partners, prosecutors, and judicial authorities to combat
intellectual property theft and cybercrime activity, as well as to assist in the
collection and use of electronic evidence to combat all types of crime. The
program improves U.S. security by reducing the use of foreign computing
infrastructure for malicious activities targeting U.S. networks and by showing
that no malicious actor can evade the rule of law.
The GLEN has stood up five regional cryptocurrency working groups around the
globe, which are dedicated to information sharing and capacity building to
address criminal misuse of cryptocurrency, including in ransomware. Additional
priorities for capacity building include Internet fraud and combating the
growing scourge of online child sexual exploitation and abuse.
The Department of State will continue to use its diplomatic engagements and
capacity building to broaden and strengthen participation in the International
Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI). The CRI is a unique and geographically
diverse coalition of nearly 60 countries, plus multilateral institutions such as
the European Union, Interpol, and Organization of American States, committed to
building collective resilience to ransomware, cooperating to disrupt ransomware
and pursue the actors responsible, countering the illicit finance that underpins
the ransomware ecosystem, and working with the private sector to defend against
ransomware attacks. As a complement to the CRI, the Department of State, in
coordination with the U.S. Joint Ransomware Task Force, will continue to develop
bilateral and multilateral efforts designed to discourage states from sponsoring
ransomware or permitting their territories to be used as safe havens by cyber
criminals.
The work of the CRI supports the implementation of the framework for responsible
state behavior in cyberspace, including the voluntary norm that “states should
respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another state whose critical
infrastructures are subject to malicious ICT acts,” in addition to “appropriate
requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity aimed at the critical infrastructure
of another State emanating from their territory, taking into account due regard
for sovereignty.” [5]
LINE OF EFFORT 7: SAFEGUARD DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS
With more than 70 countries and nearly half the world’s population experiencing
elections in 2024, their vulnerability to cyber-enabled interference—including
potential cyberattacks that disrupt electoral processes; espionage,
surveillance, and intimidation of politicians, activists, and journalists; and
cyber-enabled malign influence activities that seek to impact election outcomes
and undermine public confidence in elections—is particularly acute. The United
States has highlighted publicly and in international engagements that it
considers election infrastructure to be part of critical infrastructure. It has
also noted some states’ efforts to use cyber means to destabilize democratic
processes. The United States, allies, and partners will continue to expose and
defend against malicious operations designed to destabilize democratic processes
and societies, including by sharing threat information and strengthening the
resilience of election commissions and other key institutions. The United
States, for example, joined a United Kingdom-led effort in 2023 to call out
Russia-backed online influence actors and hackers for operations targeting UK
politicians and democratic processes. This diplomatic effort was accompanied by
the Department of Justice concurrently announcing criminal charges against two
of the responsible actors.
LINE OF EFFORT 8: COMBAT THE PROLIFERATION AND MISUSE OF COMMERCIAL SPYWARE
The proliferation and misuse of commercial spyware poses a significant threat to
both U.S. national security—including counterintelligence interests—and to
democratic values and human rights around the globe by enabling the
surveillance, repression, and targeting of journalists, human rights defenders,
anti-corruption activists, and other civil society members. In March 2023,
President Biden signed an executive order limiting U.S. government operational
use of commercial spyware that poses significant counterintelligence or security
risks to the United States, or significant risks of improper use, including
committing human rights abuses, by a foreign government or foreign person. At
the same time, the Department of State launched a Joint Statement on Efforts to
Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware with 10 other
countries committed to undertaking concrete efforts to counter the misuse and
proliferation of commercial spyware, which an additional 6 countries joined in
March 2024.
Moving forward, the U.S. government will continue to work to disincentivize
misuse and positively reshape the commercial spyware market by driving out or
encouraging reform by businesses associated with the misuse of these tools. The
Department of State will continue to engage diplomatically to urge the countries
that have already joined the Joint Statement to take concrete steps to counter
the misuse and proliferation of commercial spyware, induce additional countries
to join, and persuade countries that misuse or enable the misuse of spyware to
implement safeguards to deviate less from U.S. policy. The Department of State
will continue to partner with the Departments of Commerce and Treasury to
promote accountability for those who misuse—or enable or benefit from the
misuse—of commercial spyware through tools like sanctions, visa restrictions,
and export controls. In addition, the Department of State will continue to
elevate this issue in multilateral and public forums as well as engage closely
with civil society, journalists, tech platforms, and the investment community.
ACTION AREA 4: STRENGTHEN AND BUILD INTERNATIONAL PARTNER DIGITAL POLICY AND
CYBER CAPACITY
Digital and cyber capacity building activities are powerful signs of digital
solidarity in action. They assist partners build secure, diverse, and resilient
ICT infrastructure and grow global markets for interoperable, secure ICT goods
and services. They are also critical for emerging economies to achieve the SDGs.
Adversaries, and the PRC in particular, understand this and look to out-match
the United States and like-minded partners by offering holistic support for ICT
development from full package training programs to higher-level education and
scholarships. The Department of State, working with other federal agencies,
international allies and partners, and the private sector, seeks to mobilize
technology as well as processes and people in support of our partners’ economic
and development goals. This assistance often has a catalytic effect, encouraging
partner countries to prioritize and invest further in cybersecurity and
resilience. It also increases understanding of the benefits of the cybersecurity
and digital policy approaches advocated by the United States.
In an effort to increase digital solidarity in the realm of foreign assistance,
USAID launched the Donor Principles for Human Rights in the Digital Age in
partnership with Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC), and
in collaboration with the Department of State. These principles – endorsed by 38
partner governments – offer a unified framework and set of benchmarks to promote
an inclusive, rights-respecting approach to foreign assistance on digital
issues.
To achieve our goals, we must work to ensure we can act quickly and effectively
in supporting foreign partners’ needs for incident response, trusted
infrastructure development, and capacity building.
LINE OF EFFORT 1: SUPPORT AND EXPAND DIGITAL POLICY, LEGAL, AND REGULATORY
CAPACITY BUILDING EFFORTS
For digital infrastructure to reach and effectively serve the public, countries
need to have the appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks. It is not enough
to promote secure, resilient technology infrastructure; an effective regulatory
framework that is transparent, flexible, and technology neutral must be in place
to ensure meaningful connectivity. Thus, U.S. foreign assistance focuses on
developing and strengthening relevant legislative and regulatory frameworks as
well as building local technical capacity and addressing workforce issues.
The Department of State will continue to provide partners the expertise and
training they need to develop and govern secure, rights-respecting digital
ecosystems. Through technical assistance, ICT and telecom policy capacity
building, and training grants, DCCP has facilitated pro-competitive legal and
regulatory reforms. For example, Promoting American Approaches to ICT Policy and
Regulation (ProICT), another DCCP activity led by the Department of State and
USAID , has helped clear the way for new entrants into 5G markets and provided
technical advisory support for a 5G spectrum auction.
The Department of State, USAID, NTIA, and FCC, working with industry and the
private sector, will continue to provide training programs and technical
assistance to developing country officials involved in managing spectrum,
deploying wireless and satellite technologies, and acquiring cloud services.
LINE OF EFFORT 2: AUGMENT PARTNER CYBER CAPACITY BUILDING EFFORTS
Figure 6. A global map of the Digital Connectivity & Cybersecurity Partnership
activities (2018-2024). (U.S. Department of State, CDP)
Cyber capacity building efforts—which usually focus on strengthening a nation’s
ability to adopt and develop cyber policies and strategies or improving their
technical ability to detect, respond to, and recover from cyber incidents—have a
direct and positive impact on international cyber stability and the security of
U.S. citizens. Assistance directed at policy- and strategy-making increases
states’ credibility and engagement in international discussions. It provides
them with the national-level capabilities needed to implement the norms
developed under the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, to
conform with the standards of the Budapest Cybercrime Convention, to hold
irresponsible actors accountable in cyberspace, and to develop a national-level
approach to counter persistent cyber threats and build long-term resilience.
Improving partner operational capabilities makes it more likely they will be
able to combat transnational cybercrime threats, share useful cyber threat and
incident information with the United States, and successfully partner with the
United States in operations to disrupt malicious cyber activity.
Over the last two decades, the Department of State has collaborated with other
agencies, international partners, regional organizations, and the private sector
to build cyber capacity abroad. Officials and private sector professionals from
around the world participate in workshops on industrial control systems held
with CISA. The United States assists efforts by the Organization of American
States in areas such as cyber incident response, national cybersecurity strategy
development and implementation, cybersecurity awareness, and cyber workforce
development. The United States is a leading donor to Council of Europe programs
designed to expand adoption of the Budapest Cybercrime Convention. The Global
Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE), of which the United States is a founding and
active member, provides a global platform to connect cyber policymakers,
practitioners, and experts and to match assistance programs with recipients.
Multiple agencies have supported international partners in using and adapting
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, and the Department of State has supported
international participation in the development of version 2.0 of the framework.
The NICE Workforce Framework for Cybersecurity (NICE Framework) has been
leveraged to support talent development and management. The Department of
Commerce, NIST, USAID, and the Department of State will engage international
partners to promote the development of critical and emerging technology
standards in areas such as best practices regarding data capture, processing,
privacy, handling, and analysis; trustworthiness, verification, and assurance of
AI systems and AI risk management; and content authentication and provenance,
synthetic content detection, and content labeling. In addition, NIST has
selected four algorithms designed to withstand cyberattacks by quantum computers
and is developing standards for U.S. Government use. The Department of State
will work with NIST to internationalize – including through ongoing engagements
in international standards bodies – these post quantum cryptography standards so
that organizations around the world can integrate them into their encryption
infrastructure. They will also continue engaging international partners in
developing and implementing cybersecurity best practices in areas such as Zero
Trust, IoT cybersecurity, digital identity, operational technology, software
security, and supply chain risk management.
Figure 7. A global map of the Digital Connectivity & Cybersecurity Partnership
countries benefitting from Cyber & Digital Training (2018-2024). (U.S.
Department of State, CDP)
The Department of State will continue coordinating closely with DoD, DOJ, DHS,
CISA, NIST, NTIA, USAID, Department of Treasury, Department of Energy,
Department of Commerce, and other federal agencies to help ensure that multiple
streams of capacity building feed into and support strategic interests.
Figure 8. (Left) Nathaniel C. Fick U.S. Ambassador at Large for Cyberspace and
Digital Policy, (center) Rodrigo Chaves Robles President of Costa Rica, (right)
Anne Neuberger Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging
Technology at a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) event on
August 30, 2023. (CSIS photo.)
LINE OF EFFORT 3: DEVELOP NEW TOOLS TO DELIVER DIGITAL AND CYBER ASSISTANCE
QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY
The demand for cybersecurity and cybercrime assistance, in particular cyber
defense, incident response, and skills to combat criminal misuse of
cryptocurrency, is growing in scale. After cyberattacks against Ukraine, Costa
Rica, and Albania, the United States and its allies shared threat intelligence;
facilitated operational collaboration; enabled access to commercial
cybersecurity companies’ services, including hardware, software, and embedded
technical support; and funded longer term capacity building.
From these and other cases, the State Department has learned the importance of
regular and close coordination across the U.S. government and with international
partners, as well as the importance of mobilizing private-sector technology and
expertise. Modernizing authorities and mechanisms to provide technology-related
foreign assistance at the speed and scale necessary is crucial. We must adapt
our foreign assistance resources and authorities to support long-term U.S.
leadership and foster digital solidarity.
Recognizing the urgent and growing need for additional tools to advance U.S.
cyber and digital foreign policy, Congress created, through the Department of
State Authorization Act of 2023 and funded, through the Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Program Appropriations Act, 2024, the
Cyberspace, Digital Connectivity, and Related Technologies Fund. This fund will
provide the Department of State with authorities and dedicated funding to
support strategically important cyber, digital, and technology-related foreign
assistance programs. This is a significant step in advancing U.S. foreign
policy. The Department will work to operationalize and implement these new
authorities.
Ukraine
The United States, allies, and partners have invested in Ukrainian cyber
capacity building for years, providing a foundation for more immediate
assistance in mitigating and recovering from attacks. Before Russia’s full-scale
invasion of Ukraine, U.S. agencies, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Cyber Command, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency, shared cyber intelligence with Ukrainian partners. Since the
invasion, the United States, United Kingdom, and EU Governments have delivered
more than $100 million in cyber foreign assistance and enabled Ukrainian
agencies to access the services of commercial cybersecurity companies. In 2023,
the U.S. and nine close partners established the Tallinn Mechanism, a donor
coordination group that aims to deliver assistance quickly and efficiently in
support of Ukraine’s most urgent cybersecurity needs.
Costa Rica
Following a year of repeated ransomware attacks on Costa Rica’s government
networks that impacted critical services such as health care, tax collection,
and customs, and resulted in a national emergency, the United States announced
an $25 million assistance package to address immediate critical cyber
vulnerabilities, including hardware, software, licenses, and embedded technical
support. Working with the Costa Rican Ministry of Science, Innovation,
Technology, and Telecommunications, the United States helped establish and equip
a centralized security operations center to monitor, prevent, detect,
investigate, and respond to cyber threats. The United States is also supporting
medium- and longer-term technical projects and workforce development to help
Costa Rica develop a secure, resilient, and locally sustainable cyber ecosystem.
Albania
In the case of Albania, after a request from the prime minister in July 2022,
the U.S. rapidly deployed technical teams in response to a destructive
cyberattack, which featured ransomware and wiper malware against public sector
networks, including some Albania had designated as critical infrastructure. The
U.S. government and the private sector attributed the attack to Iran, and the
State Department coordinated a diplomatic campaign that included U.S. sanctions
and NATO and EU statements of condemnation. After these more immediate
responses, the State Department turned to longer-term capacity building,
including implementing over $50 million in U.S. assistance to civilian and
military agencies to harden their networks. International partners such as the
UK and EU have also provided cybersecurity assistance. U.S. agencies, including
the Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Cyber Command,
and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency continue to collaborate
with Albanian cyber authorities following subsequent smaller scale cyberattacks
in 2023 and 2024.
CONCLUSION
As the NSS and NCS note, the 2020s are a decisive decade, and actions taken now
will shape the contours of cyberspace, digital technologies, and the digital
economy for the future. As it implements this strategy, the Department of State
will work with Congress and interagency partners to evaluate current cyber
authorities and to amend or create authorities as needed for the Department to
keep pace with evolving cyber and digital technologies.
Building innovative, secure, and rights-respecting digital ecosystems is a
process that will extend beyond the timespan of this strategy, and likely to be
characterized by progress, pauses, and reversals. There will be, however, some
early signposts that will indicate the United States, allies, and partners are
moving forward.
First, the United States, allies, and partners, along with the private sector
and civil society, will build on the early successes of the G7-Hiroshima Code of
Conduct, the Biden-Harris Executive Order on AI, and the UK AI Safety Summit. We
will reach consensus on guiding principles that foster innovation and the
development of responsible AI as well as make significant investments to build
the knowledge and infrastructure necessary to measure, evaluate, and verify
advanced AI systems, including through the launch of the U.S. AI Safety
Institute. We will advance global norms on the responsible and rights-respecting
use of AI-enabled technologies.
Second, the United States allies, and partners, along with the private sector,
will develop common understandings and shared principles for security and
trustworthiness in subsea cable, cloud services, and data centers and will
increase support for extending access to cloud services to emerging economies.
Third, the United States, allies, and partners will succeed in pushing forward
more action-oriented discussions at the UN on international security issues in
cyberspace. These discussions will focus on how member states can work together
to implement critical elements of the framework for responsible state behavior
and on building all states’ capacity to manage cyber-related threats.
Fourth, the Department of State will draw on the Cyberspace, Digital
Connectivity, and Related Technologies Fund to provide rapid incident response
and cyber aid quickly and effectively, as well as longer-term capacity and
resilience building. These strategic investments will not only strengthen the
role of the United States as a digital partner, but also generate larger,
self-sustaining investments by host countries in their own cybersecurity and
digital transformation.
Moving forward, the United States will strive for a future in which cyberspace
and digital technologies are used to advance economic prosperity and inclusion,
enhance security, promote and protect human rights and democracy, and address
transnational challenges. The Department of State will build and extend digital
solidarity to partners across the globe. The United States recognizes the need
to work together to align approaches to data and digital governance and to
promote the research, development, and deployment of critical and emerging
technologies. The United States seeks to be the partner of choice in improving
cybersecurity, building resilience, responding to, and recovering from malicious
cyber activity. Digital solidarity aims to connect people and information like
never before, fostering a more inclusive, secure, prosperous, rights-respecting,
safe, and equitable world.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTES
[1] The idea of digital solidarity was first promoted by Pablo Chavez, “Toward
Digital Solidarity,” Lawfare, June 28, 2022,
https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/toward-digital-solidarity [back to 1]
[2] Fast Track Action Subcommittee on Critical and Emerging Technologies,
Critical and Emerging Technologies Update, National Science and Technology
Council, February 2024,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-2024-Update.pdf
[back to 2]
[3] Anna Fleck, “Cybercrime Expected To Skyrocket in Coming Years,” Statista,
February 22, 2024,
https://www.statista.com/chart/28878/expected-cost-of-cybercrime-until-2027/
[back to 3]
[4] ITU, The Gender Digital Divide,
https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics/2023/10/10/ff23-the-gender-digital-divide/
[back to 4]
[5] UN, Secretary General, Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security, July 2015, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/799853?ln=en&v=pdf
[back to 5]
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