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BALLOTS INSTEAD OF BULLETS? THE EFFECT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT ON POLITICAL
VIOLENCE
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AUTHOR
Listed:
* Jean Lacroix
Registered:
* Jean Lacroix
ABSTRACT
The extension of voting rights epitomizes the construction of modern
democracies. This paper empirically investigates the effect of such an
enfranchisement on political violence in the context of the US Voting Rights Act
(VRA) of 1965, which forbade discrimination in voting. The formula the VRA used
to determine the counties it applied to generated both geographic and temporal
local discontinuities in enfranchisement. This paper's empirical strategy takes
advantage of these features by comparing the evolution of political violence in
geographically close covered and non covered counties. Difference-indifferences
estimates indicate that VRA coverage halved the incidence and the onset of
political violence. Additional empirical evidence implies that voting became the
new institutionalized way to state political preferences. Indeed, VRA coverage
mostly decreasedelectoral and small-scale strategic violence. This result is not
explained by disaggrievement. Extensions suggest that new strategies of
political action may explain a decrease in violence after enfranchisement.
SUGGESTED CITATION
Jean Lacroix, 2020. "Ballots instead of Bullets? The effect of the Voting Rights
Act on political violence," Working Papers CEB 20-007, ULB -- Universite Libre
de Bruxelles. Handle: RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/304198
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* Jean Lacroix, 2023. "Ballots Instead of Bullets? The Effect of the Voting
Rights Act on Political Violence," Post-Print hal-04210355, HAL.
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MORE ABOUT THIS ITEM
KEYWORDS
Political violence; Enfranchisement; Civil rights movement;
All these keywords.
JEL CLASSIFICATION:
* D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - -
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
* N42 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and
Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
* H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other
NEP FIELDS
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
* NEP-CDM-2020-05-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
* NEP-HIS-2020-05-04 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
* NEP-POL-2020-05-04 (Positive Political Economics)
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