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4. Cybersecurity Advisory
Share:
Cybersecurity Advisory
#STOPRANSOMWARE: ALPHV BLACKCAT
Last Revised
February 27, 2024
Alert Code
AA23-353A
Related topics:
Cyber Threats and Advisories, Malware, Phishing, and Ransomware, Incident
Detection, Response, and Prevention
ACTIONS TO TAKE TODAY TO MITIGATE AGAINST THE THREAT OF RANSOMWARE:
1. Routinely take inventory of assets and data to identify authorized and
unauthorized devices and software.
2. Prioritize remediation of known exploited vulnerabilities.
3. Enable and enforce multifactor authentication with strong passwords.
4. Close unused ports and remove applications not deemed necessary for
day-to-day operations.
SUMMARY
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing
#StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail
various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware
advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations
protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware
advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost
resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known IOCs and TTPs associated with
the ALPHV Blackcat ransomware as a service (RaaS) identified through FBI
investigations as recently as February 2024.
This advisory provides updates to the FBI FLASH BlackCat/ALPHV Ransomware
Indicators of Compromise released April 19, 2022, and to this advisory released
December 19, 2023. ALPHV Blackcat actors have since employed improvised
communication methods by creating victim-specific emails to notify of the
initial compromise. Since mid-December 2023, of the nearly 70 leaked victims,
the healthcare sector has been the most commonly victimized. This is likely in
response to the ALPHV Blackcat administrator’s post encouraging its affiliates
to target hospitals after operational action against the group and its
infrastructure in early December 2023.
FBI, CISA, and HHS encourage critical infrastructure organizations to implement
the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the
likelihood and impact of ALPHV Blackcat ransomware and data extortion incidents.
In February 2023, ALPHV Blackcat administrators announced the ALPHV Blackcat
Ransomware 2.0 Sphynx update, which was rewritten to provide additional features
to affiliates, such as better defense evasion and additional tooling. This ALPHV
Blackcat update has the capability to encrypt both Windows and Linux devices,
and VMWare instances. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates have extensive networks and
experience with ransomware and data extortion operations.
Download the PDF version of this report:
AA23-353A #StopRansomware: ALPHV Blackcat (Update) (PDF, 561.34 KB )
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:
AA23-353A STIX XML (XML, 46.14 KB )
AA23-353A STIX JSON (JSON, 32.93 KB )
TECHNICAL DETAILS
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise(link is external)
framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a
table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and
techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE
ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK
Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool(link is external).
ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use advanced social engineering techniques and open
source research on a company to gain initial access. Actors pose as company IT
and/or helpdesk staff and use phone calls or SMS messages [T1598(link is
external)] to obtain credentials from employees to access the target network
[T1586(link is external)]. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use uniform resource
locators (URLs) to live-chat with victims to convey demands and initiate
processes to restore the victims’ encrypted files.
After gaining access to a victim network, ALPHV Blackcat affiliates deploy
remote access software such as AnyDesk, Mega sync, and Splashtop in preparation
of data exfiltration. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates create a user account, “aadmin,”
and use Kerberos token generation for domain access [T1558(link is external)].
After gaining access to networks, they use legitimate remote access and
tunneling tools, such as Plink and Ngrok [S0508(link is external)]. ALPHV
Blackcat affiliates claim to use Brute Ratel C4 [S1063(link is external)] and
Cobalt Strike [S1054(link is external)] as beacons to command and control
servers. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use the open source adversary-in-the-middle
attack [T1557(link is external)] framework Evilginx2, which allows them to
obtain multifactor authentication (MFA) credentials, login credentials, and
session cookies. The actors also obtain passwords from the domain controller,
local network, and deleted backup servers to move laterally throughout the
network [T1555(link is external)].
To evade detection, affiliates employ allowlisted applications such as
Metasploit. Once installed on the domain controller, the logs are cleared on the
exchange server. Then Mega.nz or Dropbox are used to move, exfiltrate, and/or
download victim data. The ransomware is then deployed, and the ransom note is
embedded as a file.txt. According to public reporting, affiliates have
additionally used POORTRY and STONESTOP to terminate security processes.
Some ALPHV Blackcat affiliates exfiltrate data after gaining access and extort
victims without deploying ransomware. After exfiltrating and/or encrypting data,
ALPHV Blackcat affiliates communicate with victims via TOR [S0183(link is
external)], Tox, email, or encrypted applications. The threat actors then delete
victim data from the victim’s system.
ALPHV Blackcat affiliates offer to provide unsolicited cyber remediation advice
as an incentive for payment, offering to provide victims with “vulnerability
reports” and “security recommendations” detailing how they penetrated the system
and how to prevent future re-victimization upon receipt of ransom payment. The
ALPHV Blackcat encryptor results in a file with the following naming convention:
RECOVER-(seven-digit extension) FILES.txt.
Figure 1: Ransom Note Instruction
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOCS)
Table 1: MD5 Hashes MD5 Description File Name MD5
944153fb9692634d6c70899b83676575
Description
ALPHV Windows Encryptor
File Name
MD5
efc80697aa58ab03a10d02a8b00ee740
c90abb4bbbfe7289de6ab1f374d0bcbe
Description
ALPHV Linux Encryptor
File Name
MD5
341d43d4d5c2e526cadd88ae8da70c1c
Description
Anti Virus Tools Killer
File Name
363.sys
MD5
34aac5719824e5f13b80d6fe23cbfa07
Description
CobaltStrike BEACON
File Name
LMtool.exe
MD5
eea9ab1f36394769d65909f6ae81834b
Description
CobaltStrike BEACON
File Name
Info.exe
MD5
379bf8c60b091974f856f08475a03b04
Description
ALPHV Linux Encryptor
File Name
him
MD5
ebca4398e949286cb7f7f6c68c28e838
Description
SimpleHelp Remote Management tool
File Name
first.exe
MD5
c04c386b945ccc04627d1a885b500edf
Description
Tunneler Tool
File Name
conhost.exe
MD5
824d0e31fd08220a25c06baee1044818
Description
Anti Virus Tools Killer
File Name
ibmModule.dll
Table 2: SHA256 Hashes SHA256 Description
c64300cf8bacc4e42e74715edf3f8c3287a780c9c0a38b0d9675d01e7e231f16
ALPHV Windows Encryptor
1f5e4e2c78451623cfbf32cf517a92253b7abfe0243297c5ddf7dd1448e460d5
Anti Virus Tools Killer
3670dd4663adca40f168f3450fa9e7e84bc1a612d78830004020b73bd40fcd71
CobaltStrike BEACON
af28b78c64a9effe3de0e5ccc778527428953837948d913d64dbd0fa45942021
CobaltStrike BEACON
bbfe7289de6ab1f374d0bcbeecf31cad2333b0928ea883ca13b9e733b58e27b1
ALPHV Linux Encryptor
5d1df950b238825a36fa6204d1a2935a5fbcfe2a5991a7fc69c74f476df67905
SimpleHelp Remote Management tool
bd9edc3bf3d45e3cdf5236e8f8cd57a95ca3b41f61e4cd5c6c0404a83519058e
Tunneler Tool
732e24cb5d7ab558effc6dc88854f756016352c923ff5155dcb2eece35c19bc0
Anti Virus Tools Killer
Table 3: SHA1 Hashes SHA1 Description
3dd0f674526f30729bced4271e6b7eb0bb890c52
ALPHV Windows Encryptor
d6d442e8b3b0aef856ac86391e4a57bcb93c19ad
Anti Virus Tools Killer
6b52543e4097f7c39cc913d55c0044fcf673f6fc
CobaltStrike BEACON
004ba0454feb2c4033ff0bdb2ff67388af0c41b6
CobaltStrike BEACON
430bd437162d4c60227288fa6a82cde8a5f87100
SimpleHelp Remote Management tool
1376ac8b5a126bb163423948bd1c7f861b4bfe32
Tunneler Tool
380f941f8047904607210add4c6da2da8f8cd398
Anti Virus Tools Killer
Table 4: Network Indicators Indicator Type Network Indicator Description
Domain
resources.docusong[.]com
Command and Control Server
Domain
Fisa99.screenconnect[.]com
ScreenConnect Remote Access
IP Address
5.199.168.24
Command and Control Server
IP Address
91.92.254.193
SimpleHelp Remote Access
MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See Table 5 through Table 7 for all referenced threat actor tactics and
techniques in this advisory.
Table 5: ALPHV Blackcat/ALPHV Threat Actors ATT&CK Techniques - Reconnaissance
Technique Title ID Use
Phishing for Information
T1598(link is external)
ALPHV Blackcat affiliates pose as company IT and/or helpdesk staff using phone
calls or SMS messages to obtain credentials from employees to access the target
network.
Table 6: ALPHV Blackcat/ALPHV Threat Actors ATT&CK Techniques – Resource
Development Technique Title ID Use
Compromise Accounts
T1586(link is external)
ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use compromised accounts to gain access to victims’
networks.
Table 7: ALPHV Blackcat/ALPHV Threat Actors ATT&CK Techniques – Credential
Access Technique Title ID Use
Obtain Credentials from Passwords Stores
T1555(link is external)
ALPHV Blackcat affiliates obtain passwords from local networks, deleted servers,
and domain controllers.
Steal or Force Kerberos Tickets T1558(link is external) ALPHV Blackcat/ALPHV
affiliates use Kerberos token generation for domain access.
Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1557(link is external)
ALPHV Blackcat/ALPHV affiliates use the open-source framework Evilginx2 to
obtain MFA credentials, login credentials, and session cookies for targeted
networks.
INCIDENT RESPONSE
If compromise is detected, organizations should:
1. Quarantine or take offline potentially affected hosts.
2. Reimage compromised hosts.
3. Provision new account credentials.
4. Collect and review artifacts such as running processes/services, unusual
authentications, and recent network connections.
5. Report the compromise or phishing incident to CISA via CISA’s 24/7
Operations Center (report@cisa.gov(link sends email) or 888-282-0870).
State, local, tribal, or territorial government entities can also report to
MS-ISAC (SOC@cisecurity.org(link sends email) or 866-787-4722).
6. To report spoofing or phishing attempts (or to report that you’ve been a
victim), file a complaint with the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center
(IC3), or contact your local FBI Field Office to report an incident.
MITIGATIONS
These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network
defenders. FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend that software manufactures incorporate
secure by design principles and tactics into their software development
practices limiting the impact of ransomware techniques, thus, strengthening the
security posture for their customers.
For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage
and joint guide.
FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to
improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture based on threat actor activity
and to reduce the risk of compromise by ALPHV Blackcat threat actors. These
mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs)
developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST
recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing
cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and
impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s
Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs,
including additional recommended baseline protections. Due to the threat ALPHV
Blackcat’s poses in the healthcare sector, healthcare organizations can look to
the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals to
implement cybersecurity protections against the most common threats. tactics,
techniques, and procedures used against this sector.
* Secure remote access tools by:
* Implementing application controls to manage and control execution of
software, including allowlisting remote access programs. Application
controls should prevent installation and execution of portable versions of
unauthorized remote access and other software. A properly configured
application allowlisting solution will block any unlisted application
execution. Allowlisting is important because antivirus solutions may fail
to detect the execution of malicious portable executables when the files
use any combination of compression, encryption, or obfuscation.
* Applying recommendations in CISA's joint Guide to Securing Remote Access
Software.
* Implementing FIDO/WebAuthn authentication or Public key Infrastructure
(PKI)-based MFA [CPG 2.H][HPH CPG – Multifactor Authentication]. These MFA
implementations are resistant to phishing and not susceptible to push bombing
or SIM swap attacks, which are techniques known be used by ALPHV Blackcat
affiliates. See CISA’s Fact Sheet Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA for
more information.
* Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal
of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in
detecting ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network
traffic [CPG 5.1][HPH CPG – Detect and Respond to Relevant Threats and
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures], including lateral movement activity on a
network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are useful for detecting
lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network
connections for each host.
* Implement user training on social engineering and phishing attacks [CPG
2.I][HPH CPG – Basic Cybersecurity Training]. Regularly educate users on
identifying suspicious emails and links, not interacting with those
suspicious items, and the importance of reporting instances of opening
suspicious emails, links, attachments, or other potential lures.
* Implement internal mail and messaging monitoring. Monitoring internal mail
and messaging traffic to identify suspicious activity is essential as users
may be phished from outside the targeted network or without the knowledge of
the organizational security team. Establish a baseline of normal network
traffic and scrutinize any deviations.
* Implement free security tools to prevent cyber threat actors from redirecting
users to malicious websites to steal their credentials. For more information
see, CISA’s Free Cybersecurity Services and Tools webpage.
* Install and maintain antivirus software. Antivirus software recognizes
malware and protects your computer against it. Installing antivirus software
from a reputable vendor is an important step in preventing and detecting
infections. Always visit vendor sites directly rather than clicking on
advertisements or email links. Because attackers are continually creating new
viruses and other forms of malicious code, it is important to keep your
antivirus software up to date.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, CISA recommends exercising, testing, and
validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors
mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA
recommends testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they
perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Tables 1-3).
2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
3. Test your technologies against the technique.
4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of
comprehensive performance data.
6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies,
based on the data generated by this process.
CISA and FBI recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a
production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK
techniques identified in this advisory.
RESOURCES
* Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central
location for ransomware resources and alerts.
* Resource to reduce the risk of a ransomware attack: #StopRansomware Guide.
* No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware
Readiness Assessment(link is external).
* Health and Human Services HPH Cybersecurity Gateway hosts the HPH CPGs and
links to HHS cybersecurity resources.
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational
purposes only. FBI, CISA, and HHS do not endorse any commercial entity, product,
company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within
this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products,
processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise,
does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI,
CISA, and HHS.
VERSION HISTORY
December 19, 2023: Initial version.
February 27, 2024: Update.
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy &
Use policy.
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