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RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 10

May 10, 2022 - Press ISW
Download the PDF

 

Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, and George Barros

May 10, 7:15pm ET

The Ukrainian counteroffensive north of Kharkiv City continued to successfully
push Russian forces toward the Russia-Ukraine border on May 10. Ukrainian forces
liberated several towns north of Kharkiv City and continued pushing north of the
recently liberated Staryi Saltiv to capture several towns northeast of Kharkiv:
a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian troops advanced to within 10km of the
Russian border, though ISW cannot independently confirm these specific
claims.[1] Russian forces from the Izyum area are reportedly redeploying
northwards to attempt to alleviate the pressure of this counteroffensive and
stymie further northward advances toward the Russian border.[2] The Ukrainian
counteroffensive will likely continue to divert Russian troops and resources
from deployment to other axes of advance where fighting has been similarly
stalled out by the successful Ukrainian defense. The counteroffensive will
impede the ability of Russian artillery to target the northeastern suburbs of
Kharkiv City, will potentially enable Ukrainian forces to threaten Russian rear
areas with their own shelling and further attacks, and—if Ukrainian forces are
able to further advance the counteroffensive or Russian forces collapse along
the Kharkiv axis and withdraw further—unhinge Russian offensive operations
around Izyum.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense escalated its false claims of US and NATO
preparations to attack Belarus while announcing the start of a second stage of
ongoing military exercises on May 10. However, Belarus remains unlikely to join
the war in Ukraine. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin announced the
second stage of ongoing rapid response forces exercises on May 10 in response to
what he falsely claimed were NATO escalations.[3] Belarusian First Deputy
Minister of Defense Victor Gulevich accused the US and its allies of building up
a military presence around Belarusian borders and claimed that Poland and the
Baltic states are threatening Belarusian territory through reconnaissance,
sabotage, and special operations.[4] Gulevich announced that Belarusian
battalion tactical groups (BTGs) will subsequently advance to the Western and
Northwestern operational zones as part of a ”whole range of measures aimed at
countering possible threats” in these areas.[5] Gulevich additionally stated
that the presence of 20,000 Ukrainian troops in Belarus’ Southern Operational
District have necessitated a deployment of unspecified Belarusian troops to
three tactical directions near the Ukrainian border, which is consistent with
Ukrainian General Staff reporting that certain Belarusian units have deployed to
the Ukraine-Belarus border area for a combat readiness check.[6]

The rhetoric of threats to Belarus’ borders is not new and was frequently
employed by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in the early stages of the
Russian invasion of Ukraine.[7] The Belarusian exercises, which are concentrated
on Belarus’ borders with Poland and the Baltic States rather than Ukraine, are
likely primarily demonstrative and signal Belarus’ continued political support
for Russia‘s war in Ukraine. The exercises are likely additionally intended to
draw NATO attention and possibly disrupt NATO aid to Ukraine, rather than
threatening an actual military operation—similar to Russian efforts to
destabilize Moldova that are likely intended to distract Romania and NATO rather
than directly threaten Odesa.  Belarus remains unlikely to join the war in
Ukraine. Lukashenko successfully repressed domestic opposition in 2020 and 2021
but remains vulnerable to further domestic unrest if his security apparatus
weakens; he is likely unwilling to risk losing his military in a stalled and
deteriorating Russian war in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

 * The Ukrainian counteroffensive in northern Kharkiv took further ground and
   have possibly closed to within 10km of the Russian border.
 * Belarusian authorities are escalating rhetoric accusing NATO and the US of
   threatening Belarusian borders, but Belarus remains unlikely to join the war.
 * Russian operations around Izyum remain stalled.
 * DNR and Russian forces are advancing efforts to consolidate their control of
   the ruins of Mariupol, including reportedly attempting to reopen steel plants
   to produce military equipment.
 * Russian forces in eastern Ukraine continued attempts to encircle the
   Severodonetsk area and reportedly reached the Donetsk-Luhansk administrative
   border from Popasna.
 * Russian and Ukrainian forces did not conduct any significant attacks on the
   southern axis.



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are
well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations
we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the
effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population
and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these
Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and
humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the five primary efforts Russian forces are
engaged in at this time:

 * Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and four supporting
   efforts);
 * Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron
   between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
 * Supporting effort 1 — Mariupol; 
 * Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
 * Supporting effort 3—Southern axis;
 * Supporting effort 4—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian
objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety
of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in
Donbas)

Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances in any direction from Izyum
on May 10. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces around Izyum
are focusing on regrouping, replenishing equipment, and conducting
reconnaissance to create conditions for renewed offensives east towards Lyman
and Slovyansk.[8]

Russian forces continued ground attacks and shelling along the line of contact
in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and made marginal westward advances on May 10.
The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces moved west from
Popasna and reached the administrative border of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts,
though ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[9] Ukrainian sources
reported intense fighting to the north, west, and south of Severodonetsk in
Vojevodivka, Toshkivke, Rubizhne, Lysychansk, Orikhove, Hirske, and Bilohorivka
as Russian forces attempt to encircle the town.[10] Ukrainian forces notably
destroyed a Russian pontoon bridge across the Siverskyi Donets River in the
vicinity of Bilohorivka, which may allow Ukrainian forces to develop a line west
of Severodonetsk and disrupt the intended Russian encirclement of the
Rubizhne-Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.[11]

Russian troops continued attacks in Donetsk Oblast around Oleksandrivka and
Shandryholove in order to move west to the Donetsk-Kharkiv administrative
border.[12] Russian forces additionally continued unsuccessful frontal assaults
around Donetsk City but did not make any confirmed advances on May
10.[13] Pro-Russian reporter Aleksandr Sladkov, who is operating around Donetsk
City, complained that Russian forces are fighting Ukrainians at a 1:1 assault
force ratio and have not been able to push Ukrainian forces from their positions
in Donetsk.[14]



Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce
the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued to conduct air and artillery strikes and ground
assaults against Ukrainian positions in the Azovstal Steel Plant on May
10.[15] Deputy Ukrainian Prime Minister Iryna Vershchuk reported that there are
1,000 Ukrainian soldiers in the plant and that hundreds are wounded.[16] A
senior US defense official noted that Russian forces are increasingly relying on
“dumb bombs” to assault Mariupol because they have expended precision-guided
munition supplies.[17] Russian authorities are continuing to prepare Mariupol
for economic integration. Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko
claimed that occupation authorities of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) are
trying to call workers back to the captured Ilyich Iron and Steel Work Plant to
launch production of military equipment to supply Russian and proxy forces.[18]



Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Retain positions on the
outskirts of Kharkiv within artillery range of the city and prevent further
Ukrainian counterattacks)

Ukrainian forces reportedly pushed Russian troops further north from Kharkiv
City toward the international border on May 10. The Ukrainian General Staff
confirmed on May 10 that Ukrainian forces recaptured Cherkasy Tyshky and Ruski
Tyshky, both within 10 kilometers of the northeast boundary of Kharkiv City,
after unverified reports on May 7 and 9 that Russian forces withdrew from the
two towns.[19] Ukrainian units reportedly also took control of Pytomnyk, 10
kilometers directly north of Kharkiv City.[20] The Ukrainian 227th Kharkiv
Territorial Defense Battalion claimed that they successfully advanced north of
Staryi Saltiv (about 40 kilometers east of Kharkiv City) and liberated Bairak,
Zamulivka, Verkhnii Saltiv, and Rubizhne (a different Rubizhne than the town of
the same name in Kharkiv Oblast) on May 10.[21] A Russian source claimed that
Ukrainian troops are as far north as Vovchansk, which is less than 10 kilometers
south of the Russian border.[22] ISW cannot independently confirm this claim,
but it is consistent with the overall Ukrainian push toward the Russian border
over the last few days.

The Borivka Village Council reported that Russian forces are withdrawing en
masse from Borova and Bohuslavka, southeast Kharkiv Oblast, and moving north in
the direction of Kupyansk.[23] Russian forces are likely prioritizing
reinforcing their grouping northeast of Kharkiv to prevent further Ukrainian
counteroffensives in the direction of the international border at the expense of
offensive operations to the southeast.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported
that elements of the 138th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 6th Combined Arms
Army withdrew to Belgorod due to losses sustained in Kharkiv Oblast.[25]



Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian
counterattacks)

Russian and Ukrainian troops clashed on the line of contact between Kherson and
Mykolaiv Oblasts but neither side made any confirmed advances on May
10.[26] Russian forces continued to shell Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and
Mykolaiv oblasts.[27]  Russian forces additionally intensified airstrikes
against Odesa.[28] Transnistrian authorities announced that they will extend the
“red level” terrorist threat until May 25.[29]





 

Supporting Effort #4—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw
combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There were no significant events on this axis in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

 * The Belarusian Defense Ministry announced the second stage of rapid response
   force exercises, but Belarus remains unlikely to join the war in Ukraine.
 * Russian forces will likely continue to merge offensive efforts southward of
   Izyum with westward advances from Donetsk in order to encircle Ukrainian
   troops in southern Kharkiv Oblast and western Donetsk.
 * Russia is likely setting conditions to integrate occupied Ukrainian
   territories directly into Russia, as opposed to creating proxy “People’s
   Republics.” Russian forces have apparently decided to seize the Azovstal
   plant through ground assault and will likely continue operations accordingly.
 * Ukrainian counteroffensives around Kharkiv City are pushing back Russian
   positions northeast of the city towards the international border and will
   likely continue to force the Russians to reinforce those positions at the
   cost of reinforcing Russian offensive operations elsewhere.
 * Russian forces may be preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to
   capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...; https://t.me/natsionalKharkiv/5737; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1523918568995401729; https://twitter.com/donikroman/status/1523880239448866816; https://www.facebook.com/227TrO/posts/126772019973301

[2] https://t dot me/stranaua/41184; https://t dot me/borova_gromada/962

[3] https://t  dot
me/stranaua/41338; https://t dotme/modmilby/14146; https://tdotme/modmilby/14147; https://t dot
me/modmilby/14148

[4] https://t dot me/modmilby/14150

[5] https://t dot me/modmilby/14150

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...;
https://t dot me/modmilby/14150

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-1 -7;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-3

[8]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/313588154287603

[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/15591; https://t dot me/epoddubny/10493

[10]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2470; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/313588154287603; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1523975349670924289; https://twitter.com/abdujalil/status/1523933520585969670; https://twitter.com/SESU_UA/status/1523951975141937153; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2462; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2466

[11] https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1523752742820343808; https://twitter.com/InformNapalm/status/1523736045732319232; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2470

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1523991358356307971; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1524052036286824448

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...; https://twitter.com/Garik_Youmar/status/1523925811065147394; https://twitter.com/watchingAnge1/status/1523737863162310656; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/313588154287603; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1523991358356307971; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1524008774138273792

[14] https://twitter.com/mdmitri91/status/1523769171917430784

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/313588154287603; https://t.me/andriyshTime/766; https://t.me/polkazov/4471

[16] https://t dot me/stranaua/41342; https://t.me/polkazov/4472

[17] https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1524065120426541057; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/09/russia-ukraine-war-news-...;
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-entertainment-business-global-...

[18] https://t.me/andriyshTime/779; https://t dot me/stranaua/41371

[19]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...

[20] https://t.me/natsionalKharkiv/5737

[21] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1523918568995401729; https://twitter.com/donikroman/status/1523880239448866816; https://www.facebook.com/227TrO/posts/126772019973301; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...

[22] https://t dot me/readovkanews/33382

[23] https://t dot me/stranaua/41184; https://t dot me/borova_gromada/962

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/314011584245260

[25]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...

[26] https://t dot me/readovkanews/33382; 
https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1524064392026992646

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/313588154287603; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7591; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7594; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/880; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/445

[28] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1523769093551140865; https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1523919281800597504; https://twitter.com/Liveuamap/status/1523766078794522624;
https://t dot
me/stranaua/41252;  https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/videos/2633996746744736/;  https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/11721; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/11725

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...; https://twitter.com/AlexKokcharov/status/1523994342813278209; https://t.me/istorijaoruzija/62512; https://t.me/tsvtiraspol/25311; https://t.me/krepostpmr/34031; https://t.me/krepostpmr/34032  

 

 

 

File Attachments: 
Moldova Battle Map Draft May 10,2022.png
DraftUkraineCoTMay10,2022.png
Mariupol Battle Map Draft May 10,2022.png
Luhansk Battle Map Draft May 10,2022.png
Kharkiv Battle Map Draft May 10,2022.png
Kherson-Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft May 10,2022.png
 






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