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TEXAS’ BIG FREEZE: THE 2021 POWER CRISIS AND THE LESSONS LEARNED ONE YEAR LATER

Jan. 25, 2022
What has changed in the Lone Star State since the lethal Winter Storm Uri
struck? Are recent improvements enough to keep the grid humming through a
similar disaster?
Jeff Postelwait
 * 
 * 
   
 * 
 * 
 * 
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Texas occupies a unique spot in energy. The nation’s largest energy producer,
Texas makes more wind power than any other state and produces more natural gas
and oil than any other state. At the same time, Texans consume more energy than
residents of any other state in the U.S. ­— a nation already among the most
electricity-hungry in the world.

There is a lot of state pride tied up in being a big player on the energy stage
for Texas, so when that system fails, Texas feels the need to save face.

In February 2021, Winter Storm Uri hit North America and nearly 10 million
people lost power. The wintry blast hit particularly hard in Texas, where a
massive power failure led to water, food and heat shortages.



This was an unprecedented storm in many ways, but it echoes the 2011 Groundhog
Day blizzard when rolling blackouts hit three quarters of Texas for several
days. In both cases, freezing temperatures triggered a wide-ranging failure of
the energy system. Power plants shut down in the cold, natural gas wellheads
froze, fuel ran out and the loss of power crippled water and transportation
infrastructure.

How has Texas reacted in the year since?



Photo by Gsphotography, Dreamstime


Austin, Texas was one metro area that saw extended periods of no power following
Winter Storm Uri.
One change was the dismissal of two of the state’s most powerful energy
regulators. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas fired its CEO Bill Magness
and two days before, the head of the Texas Public Utility Commission DeAnn
Walker resigned following a call for change by Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick, who said
ERCOT and the PUCT had “hoped for the best instead of planning for the worst.”



Brad Jones, interim president and CEO at ERCOT since May 2021 said Texas’ unique
regulatory situation and energy ecosystem make rapid change possible.

“As a state, we were able to quickly mobilize, pass two comprehensive laws and a
half-dozen state regulatory proceedings before federal authorities even
completed their analysis (the report was issued in November). If we did not have
our unique regulatory position, we would have lost nearly an entire year to make
much-needed changes,” Jones wrote to T&D World.

For the decades since the Texas grid has been deregulated, Jones said, the
emphasis has always been on providing affordable and clean energy, but not as
much on reliability. The February storm requires Texas to invest in reliability,
Jones said.






Photo by El Paso Electric


Extreme cold hits one of El Paso Electric's power generating units during the
2011 winter storm. The utility says this storm led it to harden its assets
against future freezes.
“We’ve made tremendous progress in a short amount of time. We have already
completed more than 45 of the 60 initiatives on [ERCOT’s Roadmap to Improving
Grid Reliability, presented in July 2021] and we are making great progress on
the remaining items. I’m proud of the work that ERCOT has done. Importantly, I
see that we are working more closely with the Public Utility Commission than at
any time in the past. That sort of coordination and cooperation is vital to
having a healthy grid in the future,” Jones said.



Texas can enter the winter of 2022 confident that its fleet of power plants is
more prepared than at any time in the past 20 years for winter storms and that
all market participants – generators, transmission providers and ERCOT – will
ensure that there will not be a repeat of the February 2021 storm, Jones said.

ENTERGY/FLICKR


A POWER PLANT IN ENTERGY TEXAS SERVICE TERRITORY IS SHOWN WITH ICICLES DUE TO
THE SEVERELY COLD TEMPERATURES IN THE REGION.
PROTECTING THE GRID

Despite past warnings and reminders by FERC and NERC, that generating units
needed to prepare for coming winters, and despite the detailed instructions the
agencies sent about winterization, 49 generating units in Southwest Power Pool
(15 percent, 1,944 MW of nameplate capacity), 26 in ERCOT (7 percent, 3,675 MW),
and three units in Midcontinent Independent System Operator South (four percent,
854 MW), still lacked winterization plans, and 81 percent of the freeze-related
generating unit outages occurred at temperatures above the unit’s stated ambient
design temperature. Generating units that experienced freeze-related outages
above the unit’s stated ambient design temperature represented about 63,000 MW
of nameplate capacity.

The team behind the joint report now recommend mandatory reliability standards
to require, among other things, for power plant owners to protect cold sensitive
equipment; retrofit existing and future units; do annual winterization training;
write action plans for freeze-related outages; and account for the effects of
climate when providing data.



At a press conference Dec. 8, new PUCT Chairman Peter Lake listed out the
changes his commission had made, saying the Texas grid is stronger and more
reliable than ever.





Photo by Getty Images


During the storm, natural gas production was interrupted by wellheads becoming
frozen or having mechanical failures caused by cold weather. Texas generates
nearly 45% of its electricity from natural gas. 
ERCOT’s final seasonal assessment of resource adequacy for the 2021-2022 winter
said there will be sufficient installed generating capacity to serve forecast
peak demand (62,001 MW) assuming “typical winter grid conditions”



Lake said the scenarios run by NERC used to write their report that found that
another extreme event like the one that hit in February 2021 would threaten
power grid reliability did not account for changes Texas has made to its power
grid since Winter Storm Uri.

“It’s hard to understate how much reform we have implemented in such a short
amount of time, but when you look at all of that and you look at the realities
on the ground in front of us, yes, we can say the lights are going to stay on,”
Lake told the press.



Wesley J. Oliphant, Principal and Chief Technical Officer at Exo Group and a
veteran of the Texas transmission and utilities market, said there is a problem
with basing forecasts on what the weather typically does, however.

“Unfortunately, in my view there is a tendency to forecast the future based on
events of the past. All of the wind and ice maps we use are based on historical
weather events – statistical mean recurrence intervals of an event reoccurring
at some point in the future. Rarely is a potentially more severe weather event
taken into consideration,” Oliphant said.

It's a tough sell to ask PUCs and ratepayers to pay to prepare for an event that
is, by definition, statistically unlikely to happen, he said, adding that Winter
Storm Uri was unprecedented in several ways.

“For Texas, it was unprecedented in both duration and how much of the state was
affected at the same time. Temperature wise, several earlier winter storms
actually had lower temps, they just didn’t last as long or affect as much of
Texas,” Oliphant said.



The weather was underestimated, but how interdependent Texas’ various energy
networks, from natural gas infrastructure to power plants to water, were
underestimated too, Oliphant said.





Photo by Getty Images


Texas is an energy producing state but freezing weather has caused problems for
power plants and natural gas infrastructure over the past decade.
“There is little doubt that natural gas issues were a large part of this event
in Texas. However, a bigger problem was that there appears to have been a
significant ‘sloppiness’ in coordinating and identifying (pre-event) critical
natural gas infrastructure that depended on electrical power to operate the
wells,” Oliphant said. “With a vocal political outcry for moving towards zero
carbon emissions and increasing the renewables portfolios, the delicate
interdependency between natural gas and electric power generation is tenuous.”




CHANGES FOR POWER PLANTS

At the Dec. 8 press conference, Lake said the PUCT, ERCOT and the natural gas
and power generation industries are working together as never before.

“Most importantly, for the first time ever we are requiring winterization for
power plants in Texas. This rule was passed over a month ago and it will require
power plants to have been winterized by Dec.1, attest to ERCOT that they are
winterized and above and beyond that, ERCOT will be conducting inspections to
confirm that our power plant fleet is winterized for this winter,” Lake said at
the press conference.



Lake said ERCOT would be starting those inspections soon, and referred to Jones,
to address that process.

“In fact, those weatherization processes have already begun. On December 1 we
received attestations from CEOs of generators and transmission service providers
throughout the industry, throughout Texas that attested to us that they were
prepared for the winter,” Jones said.

Over 300 generating units from more than 21 owners will be inspected. Those
generating units represent about 85% of the lost megawatt hours during Winter
Storm Uri, Jones said. At the time of the press conference, Jones also said two
transmission service providers had also been inspected, and of the roughly 54
transmission companies ERCOT expected to receive attestations from, it received
100% of those.

The PUC increased penalties for violations of winterization standards to up to
$1 million per day, per incident, Lake said. The majority of Texas’ generator
fleet have been “proactive” in winterizing, Lake said, adding that those who
were not will be punished swiftly and heavily.





Photo by Getty Images


A high voltage substation in Texas. Because of the storm knocking power plants
offline, ERCOT reported that the Texas power grid was minutes or seconds away
from collapse before partial shutdowns were ordered.
The same day as the press conference, the PUC filed violation reports against
eight generation companies for failure to file winter weather readiness reports
by the December 1 deadline. Out of the 850 generation resources in the state,
the PUCT identified 13 generation resources (representing 801 MW) owned by eight
companies that missed the deadline. Companies in violation have 20 days to
respond to the notice and can request a hearing.





Texas’ new rules for weatherization are based on a generator best practices
report from Quanta Technology first submitted in 2012, and transmission best
practices recommended in 2011 by FERC and NERC. The latter was prepared
following the Groundhog Day event of February 2011.

“We go into this winter knowing that because of all these efforts, the lights
will stay on,” Lake said at the press conference. “No other power grid has made
as remarkable changes in such a short amount of time as we have, and we will
continue to improve our grid and our market.”





Photo by Getty Images


Texas natural gas combined cycle power plant. The Texas PUC has enacted
penalties for power plants that do not winterize and are inspecting plants to
ensure weatherization upgrades are installed.
Writing to T&D World, Jones said nearly all the generators operating in Texas
realized points of failure due to the February storm.



“They began immediately to have their teams identify the steps they needed to
complete to be better prepared for the next winter. I know that tens of millions
of dollars were invested by just three generators to winterize their equipment
for the winter of 2022. They began this work BEFORE there was any type of
regulatory framework laid out; they did it because they knew there could not be
a repeat of February 2021,” Jones wrote.

Robert Kondziolka, Governing Body Member for the Western Energy Imbalance
Market, former transmission director with the Salt River Project and former
engineer for Tucson Electric Power, said after the 2011 cold weather event that
disrupted the ERCOT, WECC, MISO and SERC regions, WECC led an effort in the
Western Interconnection to address all the recommendations from the FERC-NERC
report.

“WECC tracked the progress by each entity in getting the recommendations
implemented. At the state level, the Arizona Corporation Commission required
improvements by the natural gas supplier to prevent low pressure to residential
users should another similar event occur,” Kondziolka said.

El Paso Electric, which lies outside ERCOT, is an example of how progress was
made well before the 2021 freeze, Kondziolka said. After seeing what cold
weather could do to power plants, El Paso Electric made the recommended
improvements to their local gas fired generation fleet so they would be reliable
during another extreme cold weather event. During the 2021 event their local
generators operated reliably, and they did not need to implement load
curtailments to meet their system demand, Kondziolka said.

“It does appear to me that both the Texas PUC and ERCOT are at least saying the
right things,” Oliphant said, but cautioned that major improvements will not
happen overnight and must address a wide-ranging, complicated set of problems.





Photo by Getty Images


Texas regulators are for the first time ever we are requiring winterization for
power plants. Over 300 generating units from more than 21 owners will be
inspected, according to ERCOT.
A more robust reliability culture, a smarter load shed methodology, and
evaluating what can be gained with more grid interconnectivity between the
Eastern, Western, and the ERCOT grid could each be helpful, Oliphant said.



“The wires side I think has a good embrace of [resiliency culture] already, but
the generation side, at least here in Texas, has lacked market or other
incentives to promote that type of culture. And doing so because it is the right
thing to do just may not work,” Oliphant said.


INTERCONNECTIONS

As the news covered the aftermath of Winter Storm Uri and words like “ERCOT” and
“interconnection” started being used by laypeople around the country, the links
between the Texas power grid and other regional grids got talked about quite a
bit. The map of the North American grid interconnections, to people who have
never seen it and do not know the history, does look a little odd with the
Western Interconnection covering half the continent, the Eastern Interconnection
covering the other half, and then that strange Texas-shaped chunk taken out of
the middle.

ERCOT operates as a functionally separate interconnection, although it has four
asynchronous ties with other interconnections: Two direct current (DC)
transmission tie lines between ERCOT and the Eastern Interconnection through
SPP: the North Tie, and the East Tie. There is also a pair of ties between ERCOT
and Mexico. ERCOT does not have any synchronous connections to the Eastern
Interconnection, Western Interconnection, or Mexican grid.

ERCOT’s counterparts to the north and northeast, the Southwest Power Pool and
the Midcontinent ISO, have strong networks of transmission tie-ins at different
voltage levels.

In FERC and NERC’s recommendations, the agencies write ERCOT “should conduct a
study to evaluate the benefits of additional links between the ERCOT
Interconnection and other interconnections that could provide additional
reliability benefits,” which include increased ability to import power when its
system is stressed during emergencies and improved black start capabilities. The
agencies encouraged ERCOT to perform these studies as soon as possible.

The recommendation suggests the possibility that, in a similar event, ERCOT may
not be able to facilitate a re-start of the grid given the combined
unavailability of black start and natural gas-fired generating units. Having
access to additional imports could be critical, according to FERC and NERC, if
ERCOT experienced a blackout and had multiple black start generating units
outaged, as was the case during the February 2021.

When asked about the reliability benefits of further interconnections, Jones
said the February 2021 storm was so severe and wide-ranging that more
interconnections would not have helped.

“ERCOT would not have benefitted from interconnecting further with other grids
and the facts, as outlined in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
and our own data, back that up. FERC identified that the grids closest to ERCOT
did not have power to send to Texas during the February winter storm. Our own
data, from imports at our DC ties, show that as the storm worsened, imports were
cut. Additional interconnection would not have helped because there was no power
to send,” Jones wrote to T&D World.

Jones added that more interconnections could cost millions if not billions of
dollars, and that money would be better spent on ERCOT’s own infrastructure to
achieve reliability results higher than what could be had from an
interconnection.

In one example, Jones said Texas’ Rio Grande Valley contains several stranded
generation assets that could help serve the rest of the state if transmission
congestion issues were addressed.

“Improving service to the lower Rio Grande Valley has been a key initiative for
ERCOT. At its core, the transmission constraints represent unfair service levels
to the people and businesses in the Rio Grande Valley. At a higher level, those
constraints create grid management challenges that shouldn’t exist for ERCOT.
The PUC last week gave the approval to begin the multi-year process to resolve
those constraints,” Jones said.

Kondziolka said that while he lacks the perspective of ERCOT’s system operators,
FERC and NERC are right to suggest a look at interconnection benefits.

“If ERCOT had better interconnections with adjacent regions they likely never
get to the low point they did,” Kondziolka said. “When they initially started
losing generators, they could have relied on emergency assistance from adjacent
regions (prior to energy being as scarce as it got). This may have provided time
for ERCOT to figure out why they were inadvertently dropping circuits that
provided service to generators and prevented them from operating.”

Doing this would allow more natural gas to stay or get into the system, help
moderate prices and increase gas generation availability outside of Texas. This,
in turn, would provide for more energy assistance across North America.

“It doesn’t necessarily decease load but could provide time to help implement
conservation measures. The only way you would know if increased interconnections
would help is to start the analysis at the beginning or just prior to the event
and model those conditions and work through it step-by-step. A lifeline at the
beginning when needs are small provides much more value than a lifeline when
needs are big,” Kondziolka said.


MORE WINTERS ARE COMING

“The devastating effects of extreme cold on our bulk power system’s ability to
operate in 2011 and now, 2021, must not be allowed to happen again. We have a
duty to protect the bulk power system and public safety and we will do just
that,” Rich Glick, Biden’s chairman of FERC said in his commission’s final
report on the February 2021 freeze.

FERC and NERC’s joint recommendations found that protecting just four types of
power plant components from icing and freezing could have reduced outages by 67%
in the ERCOT region, 47% in the SPP and 55% in the MISO South regions.

The failure of the Texas grid had mostly to do with power plants and the natural
gas infrastructure that feeds plants and heats homes both freezing. 81% of the
generating units that went offline did so at temperatures above the units’
stated temperature limits. Of the power plant outages that happened because of
an interruption in fuel supply, 87% of these were at natural gas-fired power
plants.

According to NERC, this was the largest firm load shed event in U.S. history, at
23,418 MW, and the third largest in quantity of outaged megawatts of load, with
only the August 2003 and August 1996 blackouts being worse.



The two agencies and their partner organizations said Texas is locked in a
“recurring pattern for the last ten years” where extreme weather makes power
plants unable to produce power, leading to a power crisis.






Q&A WITH EL PASO ELECTRIC

El Paso Electric is a public utility company serving 450,000 customers with its
service territory in Southern New Mexico and West Texas. Load centers include
Las Cruces and El Paso. T&D World spoke with Steve Buraczyk, Senior Vice
President of Operations with EPE, on the changes his utility enacted after the
2011 winter storm.

T&D World: In 2021, El Paso Electric fell outside the area of the rolling
blackouts. Is this just luck, or were there some measures taken since 2011?

Buraczyk: EPE is a vertically integrated, regulated utility that is
interconnected to the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) – one of
three major electric grids in the United States. Although EPE is not
interconnected to ERCOT, which was severely hit by both the February 2011 and
2021 cold snaps, the ripple effect felt beyond ERCOT was undeniable. The impact
on fuel resources alone could have impacted EPE’s reliability but the decision
to invest in new generation with dual-fuel capability provided a layer of
protection to our customers that many others in the state do not have.  

T&D World: How would you compare and contrast the 2021 event with the one that
happened ten years ago?

Buraczyk: The cold snap that hit Texas in February 2011 was strikingly similar
to the one that hit this year in February – same timeframe and same freezing
temperatures. The only stark difference was EPE’s preparation for the 2021 cold
snap based on lessons learned ten years ago. The freezing temperatures did not
last as long in 2021 for the West Texas / El Paso area as it did for the rest of
Texas, but the ripple effect was still felt here, especially access to natural
gas to fuel power generation stations.

T&D World: After the 2011 event, what were the findings and recommendations?
What came of those, if anything?

Buraczyk: Multiple lessons were learned from the 2011 event. A foundational
change that came from 2011 was how EPE hardens its infrastructure for extreme
winter weather events, such as changing the generation design threshold to -10
degree-Fahrenheit at its local generation plants. Also, recognizing that the
natural gas supply can be interrupted, regardless of firm commitments, the
importance of having dual-fuel capable units that can be started on and run
using 100% fuel oil. 

T&D World: What are the challenges Texas faces with winterizing?  Is it possible
to prepare for severely hot and severely cold weather?

Buraczyk: our typical extreme occurs during the summer months when triple-digit
weather is common.  However, during the winter season we need to be prepared for
those brief but crucial periods of freezing temperatures.  Recognizing the need
to improve after our 2011 event EPE has:

Invested approximately $4.5 million on winterization upgrades at its local power
plants designed to enable operations of the generation fleet down to -10
degree-Fahrenheit.

 * Diversified EPE’s generation mix since 2011. EPE has added 352 MW of quick
   start combustion turbine generation at its new Montana Power Station (MPS)
   that had a design temperature down to -10 degree-F.
 * Designed MPS with dual-fuel capability to guard against natural gas supply
   disruptions. During the 2021 event EPE relied on the dual-fuel capability at
   MPS due to natural gas curtailments that were seen throughout Texas and New
   Mexico. 
 * Identified critical load customers – they are now documented and tracked so
   that if interruptions are needed to preserve the bulk electric system,
   customers that are needed for the health, safety and welfare of the
   communities we serve are spared when possible.
   

T&D World: Does El Paso Electric plan any further weather hardening measures, or
are some under way at the moment?

Buraczyk: One key point is that the winterization investment made after 2011
need to be maintained. This requires testing and replacement of those systems as
needed. EPE does this every year to ensure the systems are performing as
designed and the insulation at its plants had not degraded. While EPE’s
generation fleet performed well in 2021, there were small challenges that EPE
learned from. As a result, EPE has added additional protection in areas at its
local generation plants that did have minor impacts, real world conditions did
identify where freeze protection could be improved and added to our
winterization checklists.  EPE has also implemented freeze protection specific
training for its power plant employees to ensure that new employees understand
what is needed to maintain generation reliability in freezing conditions. 

Additionally, in December 2021, EPE completed its Blackstart Project at MPS. The
new capability will allow the units at MPS to be started and synced to the grid
through a backup diesel generator. This means EPE will be able to initiate a
restoration plan and restore power to our region in the event of a system-wide
blackout. The Blackstart capability is just another way EPE is making efforts to
provide additional reliability to its customers.









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