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Mike Fong, CEO, Privoro
July 13, 2022
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THE WEAPONIZING OF SMARTPHONE LOCATION DATA ON THE BATTLEFIELD



For soldiers on the battlefield, the act of turning on one’s smartphone has been
described as the digital equivalent of lighting a cigarette, as doing so creates
a signal about one’s location that can be picked up by the enemy. Despite this,
smartphones have played a meaningful role in recent conflicts, including
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, where the devices have been used for communicating
in the event of radio failure, disseminating on-the-ground footage to counter
propaganda and maintaining morale by staying in touch with family and friends.
How each side collects the adversary’s smartphone location data and shields
their own can mean the difference between victory and defeat.




HOW SMARTPHONE LOCATION DATA IS OBTAINED

For a country at war, monitoring the cellular networks in the conflict zone
provides the most comprehensive view of mobile device activity. But before the
conflict even begins, the nation can identify phones of interest, including the
devices belonging to soldiers.

Because mobile app location data is often sold to commercial data brokers and
then repackaged and sold to individual customers, a country can access such a
database and then pick out the phones likely belonging to soldiers. Such devices
will ping regularly in the locations of known bases or other military
facilities. It’s even possible to identify the owner of a device by tracking the
phone to its home address and then referencing publicly available information.

A country can also use information obtained from one or more data breaches to
inform their devices of interest. The T-Mobile breach in 2021 demonstrated how
much customer data is in the hands of a mobile operator, including a phone’s
unique identifier (IMEI) and its SIM card’s identifier (IMSI).

Spies can also physically monitor known military sites and use devices known as
IMSI catchers – essentially fake cell towers – to collect phone data from the
phones in the vicinity. The Kremlin reportedly did this in the UK, with GRU
officers gathering near some of the UK’s most sensitive military sites.

When a phone of interest appears on the monitored mobile network, the country
can keep a close eye on the device’s location and other cellular data. The
presence of two or more such devices in close proximity indicates that a mission
may be taking place.

In addition to monitoring cell networks, a nation at war can utilize IMSI
catchers on the battlefield to gather phone data for the purposes of locating
and identifying devices. Location can be determined by triangulating signal
strengths from nearby cell towers or by pinging a targeted device’s GPS system.
Russia’s Leer-3 electronic warfare system, which consists of two drones
containing IMSI catchers along with a command truck, can locate up to 2,000
phones within a 3.7-mile range.

To counter these location-finding drones, an opposing nation may jam a drone’s
GPS signal, using a radio emitter to block the drone from receiving GPS signals.
The country can also try GPS spoofing, employing a radio transmitter to corrupt
the accuracy of the drone’s reported location. To counter such spoofing, systems
for validating GPS signals have been deployed on the battlefield. In the larger
picture, the corruptibility of GPS data has forced some nations to build their
own geopositioning systems. For the US, M-Code serves as a military-only GPS
signal that is both more accurate and provides anti-jamming and anti-spoofing
capabilities.

Spyware is a more targeted approach to obtaining location data. It can be
delivered over the cell network (via a malicious carrier update) or through an
IMSI catcher. It’s also not uncommon for operators to pose as single women on
social media sites to lure soldiers into downloading a malicious app. Hamas has
reportedly used this tactic many times against Israeli soldiers. Such spyware
can capture a device’s real-time location, among other capabilities.


THE RISKS OF CAPTURED SMARTPHONE LOCATION DATA

Of all the signals given off by smartphones in the normal course of operation,
location data is perhaps the most valuable during battle. Unlike captured
conversations or call metadata, location data is actionable immediately.
Location data can reveal troop movements, supply routes and even daily routines.
A cluster of troops in a given location may signal an important location.
Aggregated location data can also reveal associations between different groups.

The obvious risk to soldiers is that their location data can be used by the
enemy to direct targeted attacks against them. Notably, it has been reported
that a Russian general and his staff were killed in an airstrike in the early
weeks of the invasion after his phone call was intercepted and geolocated by the
Ukrainians.

Short of lethal strikes, location data can be used to inform a country’s
strategy. For example, Russia’s phone data-collecting drone flights over Poland
and the Baltic states in 2017 suggested to military experts that the country was
trying to monitor troop levels at NATO’s new bases to see if there were more
forces present there than the alliance had disclosed publicly.


SMARTPHONE LOCATION DATA COUNTERMEASURES

To counter the capture of location data from soldiers’ smartphones, many
countries have understandably banned the presence of these devices on the
battlefield. In 2019, for instance, Russia’s parliament unanimously voted to ban
smartphones and tablets from being used by on-duty armed forces.

However, banning mobile device usage by soldiers who have never known a world
without smartphones has its limitations. Since the invasion began, there have
been multiple instances of Russian commanders confiscating their subordinates’
personal phones for fear that they would unwittingly give away the locations of
their units.

Short of an outright ban, soldiers may be encouraged to mind their SIM cards.
Ukrainian soldiers have been advised to obtain a SIM card in the conflict zone,
which helps shield a device’s identity. During the war in Afghanistan, some top
Taliban leaders played SIM card roulette, randomly distributing SIM cards at
frequent intervals to elude American trackers.

Soldiers are also advised to shield their true locations when smartphones are
used. Ukrainian soldiers, for example, are instructed to walk at least 1,600
feet away from their squad position in order to make a phone call, ideally to an
area with many civilians. Soldiers can also use a Faraday case to cloak their
direction of travel, first heading in the wrong direction before placing their
phone in the case. Using a Faraday case is a safer option than turning off the
phone, as powering off is a signal in its own right that can invite additional
scrutiny, and as the phone may have been hacked to appear to be off when it’s in
fact still on and transmitting signals to the enemy.


WHAT’S AT STAKE

Smartphones are so ubiquitous that their presence on the battlefield is
inevitable, even when they’ve been prohibited or otherwise discouraged from use
due to lethal consequences. But each location ping gives the enemy another
signal that may ultimately culminate in a targeted missile strike or an improved
defensive posture. The side that can best fight this information battle very
likely has the upper hand in winning the war.




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