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URL: https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wip19-espionage-new-chinese-apt-targets-it-service-providers-and-telcos-with-signed-malware/
Submission: On October 28 via api from DE — Scanned from DE

Form analysis 6 forms found in the DOM

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    your personal data to third parties.</div><input type="hidden" name="formid" class="mktoField mktoFieldDescriptor" value="2673"><input type="hidden" name="munchkinId" class="mktoField mktoFieldDescriptor" value="327-MNM-087">
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Text Content

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 * ABOUT
 * CVE DATABASE
 * CONTACT
 * VISIT SENTINELONE.COM



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 * ABOUT
 * CVE DATABASE
 * CONTACT
 * VISIT SENTINELONE.COM


Advanced Persistent Threat


WIP19 ESPIONAGE | NEW CHINESE APT TARGETS IT SERVICE PROVIDERS AND TELCOS WITH
SIGNED MALWARE

Joey Chen / October 12, 2022

By Joey Chen and Amitai Ben Shushan Ehrlich, with additional insights from
QGroup


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 * A new threat cluster we track as WIP19 has been targeting telecommunications
   and IT service providers in the Middle East and Asia.
 * We assess it is highly likely this activity is espionage-related and that
   WIP19 is a Chinese-speaking threat group.
 * The threat cluster has some overlap with Operation Shadow Force but utilizes
   new malware and techniques.
 * WIP19 utilizes a legitimate, stolen certificate to sign novel malware,
   including SQLMaggie, ScreenCap and a credential dumper.


OVERVIEW

SentinelLabs has been monitoring a threat cluster we track as WIP19, a group
characterized by the usage of a legitimate, stolen digital certificate issued by
a company called “DEEPSoft”. Based on our investigations, WIP19 has been
targeting telecommunications and IT service providers in the Middle East and
Asia.

Throughout this activity, the threat actor abused the certificate to sign
several malicious components. Almost all operations performed by the threat
actor were completed in a “hands-on keyboard” fashion, during an interactive
session with compromised machines. This meant the attacker gave up on a stable
C2 channel in exchange for stealth.

Our analysis of the backdoors utilized, in conjunction with pivoting on the
certificate, suggest portions of the components used by WIP19 were authored by
WinEggDrop, a well-known Chinese-speaking malware author who has created tools
for a variety of groups and has been active since 2014.

The use of WinEggDrop-authored malware, stolen certificates and correlating TTPs
indicate possible links to Operation Shadow Force, as reported by TrendMicro and
AhnLab. As the toolset itself appears to be shared among several actors, it is
unclear whether this is a new iteration of operation “Shadow Force” or simply a
different actor utilizing similar TTPs. The activity we observed, however,
represents a more mature actor, utilizing new malware and techniques.

We linked an implant dubbed “SQLMaggie”, recently described by DCSO CyTec, to
this set of activity. SQLMaggie appears to be actively maintained and provides
insights into the development timeline with hardcoded version names. In
addition, we identified a number of other pieces of malware utilized by this
threat actor.

This report focuses on detailing the set of activity we track as WIP19 and
provides further context around the usage of these new tools.

Relationship between the malware, certificates, and creators


ABUSING VALID DIGITAL CERTIFICATES

WIP19 has been observed signing malware with a valid digital certificate issued
for DEEPSoft Co., Ltd., a Korean company specializing in messaging solutions.
The threat actor used the certificate to sign several malware components, some
of which were tailor-made for specific targets. We assess that it is highly
likely the certificate was stolen, as it was also used to sign legitimate
software used by DEEPSoft in the past.

DEEPSoft digital certificate

Activity involving toolsets authored by WingEggDrop and signed with both
legitimate and fake certificates has been previously reported on by AhnLab. It’s
commonly understood that malware created by WinEggDrop is shared among several
threat clusters, making it possible that these associated toolsets could also be
in use by the WIP19 threat actor.


DUMPER ANALYSIS

Like many components utilized by WIP19, all their credential harvesting tools –
consisting mainly of password dumpers – were signed using the DEEPSoft
certificate. The main dumper used by the threat actor utilized open source
projects to load an SSP to LSASS  and then dump the process.

WIP19’s password dumper consists of two components, one used as a loader, and
the other as a dumper. On many of the instances observed, the dumper was
executed using WMIEXEC.


LOADER ANALYSIS

The dumper loader component is a signed EXE file, internally dubbed
ssp_rpc_loader, as indicated from the PDB path embedded within the file. As the
name suggests, the loader uses RPC to load a malicious DLL file as an SSP
(Security Support Provider), given as an argument. The loader appears to be
taken from an open source project available on GitHub.

D:\source\dump_lsass-main\ssp_rpc_loader\x64\Release\ssp_rpc_loader.pdb



SSP ANALYSIS

The actual SSP loaded is NanoDump, which is loaded into LSASS and creates a
minidump of the process. Loading NanoDump as an SSP is a built-in function
embedded within NanoDump. This is done utilizing the MiniDumpWriteDump API. The
dump will be created in the following path:

C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin


Much like the loader, the threat actor did not bother to remove the PDB path for
the DLL dumper.

D:\source\dump_lsass-main\dll1\x64\release\dll1.pdb


Combining both components, a full execution of the dumper will look like this:

C:\attacker\loader.exe c:\attacker\ssp.dll



KEYLOGGER & SCREEN RECORDING (SCREENCAP)


LOADING MECHANISM

WIP19 has been observed utilizing a less-common (although documented) DLL search
order hijacking of explorer.exe to load a keylogging and screen recording
component internally named ScreenCapDll_x64.

The keylogging and screen recording components

The threat actor dropped the malicious, signed DLL, in the path
c:\windows\linkinfo.dll. Dropping the file in this specific path triggers the
loading of the DLL into explorer.exe the next time it is executed. The threat
actor may manually kill and restart the explorer.exe process to initiate the
screen recording and keylogging functionality.

The ScreenCap malware performs checks involving the victim’s machine name,
indicating it is specially crafted for each deployment. This does not prevent
the actor from re-signing each of the payloads with the DEEPSoft certificate,
proving the actors have direct access to the stolen certificate.

After verifying it is executed on the correct machine, the ScreenCap malware
drops a RAR CLI binary in one of the following paths, according to the target’s
operating system:

C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\dwmgr.exe
C:\Users\Public\AppData\MsTemp\dwmgr.exe


RAR executable drop file path


KEYLOGGING

The keylogging functionality mainly focuses on the user’s browser. The malware
detects the user’s browser and logs all keystrokes to .ax files stored in its
current working directory. By default, it will keylog Internet Explorer
activity, but it also supports keylogging of other popular browsers including
Chrome and Opera.

Keylogger drop file path and the browser it targets


SCREEN RECORDING

A relatively unique TTP observed in this activity is the recording of the user’s
screen. Much like keylogging, this helps the actor harvest credentials and
access sensitive information. The malware will record the screen for 1,296,000
milliseconds at a time, 30 times, and store the output as .avi files in its
current working directory.

Using Windows Multimedia (vfw.h) to record the user’s screen

During our analysis of the ScreenCap malware, we identified a number of samples
that contained hardcoded victim IDs. This indicates that some of the intrusions
are well researched and highly targeted.

Hardcoded victim host identity number “DESKTOP-xxxxxxx”


EXTENDEDPROCEDURE SQL (SQLMAGGIE)

Whilst we did not observe the initial infection vector in this intrusion, the
SQLmaggie malware dropped on victim networks targets Windows systems and has to
be executed in an MSSQL server. This provided us a foundation from which to
investigate further.

We found that SQLMaggie masquerades as a legitimate DLL containing extended
stored procedure functions for an MSSQL Server. The executed methodology uses
the sp_addextendedproc function to register an external DLL in a MSSQL server.
After registering the DLL into the MSSQL server, the threat actor is able to
fully control the server machine and use this backdoor to conduct reconnaissance
in the internal network. For instance:

sp_addextendedproc 'malicious', 'c:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\MSSQL13.0.MSSQLSERVER\MSSQL\Binn\malicious.dll';


Reproduced SQLMaggie backdoor command

Our analysis showed that this backdoor was authored by WinEggDrop.

From the timestamp of the sample, we can confirm the first version of this
backdoor variant was developed in or before 2019. Available commands in each
version vary according to the target environment. Unlike some of the other
components which can be found on public, open-source repositories, neither the
source code nor the executable for SQLMaggie appear to be publicly available.
This suggests that the tool is either sold or used privately, or is in exclusive
use by WinEggDrop.



The author’s purported signature in SQLMaggie
Below we detail SQLMaggie backdoor commands and capabilities. The following
commands appear in all versions of SQLMaggie.



Command Description SysInfo Show system information and detected is it in the VM
or not FileAccess Modify file permissions ls List DIR Exec Create process RShell
Reverse Shell Type Open file and print the strings inside Download Download
files

Additionally, the following commands appear variously in different versions of
SQLMaggie coded for specific targets.

Command Description StopSocks5 Stop Socks5 tunnel stopped StartHook Start
WinSock socket hook StopHook Stop Winsock socket Hook ResetClientData Attacker
input information ViewClientData Show client data, attacker input information TS
Checking regkey about TermService and its port ListIP Get host name, IP
CheckPath Get data path StartSocks5 Create Socks5 tunnel SetClient Set client
data, include hook winsock and allow ip, port InstallTS Install TermService
DelFile Delete file SetFile Set file attributes GetUser Using ROOT\\CIMV2 to get
host account GetModule Print out the execute module file path ScanStatus Scan
the victim’s environment machines StopScan Terminate all scan threads GetAdmin
Get domain admin account SqlCheck Check SQL server is running and list username
& password SqlScan Create a thread to scan for SQL server Exploit Run Use
exploit to execute process Exploit AddUser Use exploit to add user Exploit Clone
Use exploit to clone user Exploit TS Use exploit to install TermService on a
machine StartHook Hook WinSock socket and show client data, attacker input
information Port Check if port is open WriteAll MSSQLServer Write permission
AccessAll MSSQLServer Access permission


ATTRIBUTION ANALYSIS

We assess it is highly likely this activity is espionage-related and that WIP19
is a Chinese-speaking threat group. The Work-In-Progress (WIPxx) designation is
used for unattributed clusters of activity. A WIP may represent activity that
fits under the umbrella of an existing – but thus far unknown – actor or
ultimately represent the activity of a new threat actor.

The intrusions we have observed involved precision targeting and were low in
volume. Specific user machines were hardcoded as identifiers in the malware
deployed, and the malware was not widely proliferated. Further, the targeting of
telecommunications and IT service providers in the Middle East and Asia suggest
the motive behind this activity is espionage-related. Communications providers
are frequent targets of espionage activity due to the kinds and amount of
sensitive data they hold.

The overlap with Operation Shadow Force through a possible common developer in
WinEggDrop, and the fact their tooling has been observed in other Chinese
espionage-related activity, supports the assessment that this activity is likely
being carried out by a thus far unidentified Chinese-speaking threat group. The
hardcoding of machine identifiers and the usage of malware to log keystrokes and
screenshot specific user machines, suggests that WIP19 is after very specific
information.


CONCLUSION

WIP19 is an example of the greater breadth of Chinese espionage activity
experienced in critical infrastructure industries. The existence of reliable
quartermasters and common developers enables a landscape of hard-to-identify
threat groups that are using similar tooling, making threat clusters difficult
to distinguish from the defenders point of view. We hope this report helps move
the needle forward in the effort to continue identifying threat groups engaged
in spying on industries critical to society.

SentinelLabs continues to track this activity to provide further insight into
their evolution and future activity.


INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

SQLMaggie SHA1 Real File Name 4AABB34B447758A2C676D8AD49338C9E0F74A330
sqlmaggieAntivirus_32.dll 5796068CFD79FBA65394114BA0EDC8CC93EAE151
sqlmaggieVS2008new_64.dll 13BA1CFD66197B69A0519686C23BDEF17955C52E
sqlmaggieVS2008new_32.dll CA25FCBA11B3B42D9E637132B5753C9B708BE6F0
sqlmaggieVS2008new_64.dll 26cbd3588b10cabc7c63492c82808104829e9ac0
sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll 5e0291928e29db46386fd0bd85f269e967758897
sqlmaggieVS2008new_64.dll 96099015981559237a52a7d50a07143870728fd0
sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll 7eb6e7d4e5bd5a34c602879cad0a26b35a3ca4fb
sqlmaggieVS2008new_32.dll fe2e7c663913e0744822d1469be0c3655d24178d
sqlmaggieAntivirus_32.dll b15bae6a8379a951582fc7767fa8490722af6762
sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll c81de9a27f7e8890d30bd9f7ec0f705029b74170
sql_epX64_MD.dll 829df7b229220c56eedc5660e8f0e7f366fa271f
sqlmaggieAntivirus_32.dll d02fce5d87ea1fe9fabe7ac52cae2439e8215121
sqlmaggieAntivirus_32.dll 1c6d0e8920af9139a8a9fe3d60b15cf01fb85461
sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll 2cad0328863cb09a6b27414d5158075d69bfb387
sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll 26c0722a1d16641d85b97594deea2a65399daef7
sqlbackupAntiVirus_64.dll 17ff9fc9ee72baaf8d66ef9b3ab6411c47384968
sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll 5be50453f6e941c5c1dd20e0ba53e9abb6d00b68
sqlmaggieVS2008new_32.dll 56d326dfe7dcb1ce7cae2cb4c13819510fc9945c
sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll 253e702ff8201eec6fdf9630a39f5a8c28b132ed
xp_OAreateX64.dll b91ab391a4e26e4ff0717cd989ad5ce7f6af235c xp_OAreateX64.dll
4d2eb6e03be068f364e8e3f3c9645e03e1052e66 xp_OAreate.dll
b91ab391a4e26e4ff0717cd989ad5ce7f6af235c xp_OAreateX64.dll
4d2eb6e03be068f364e8e3f3c9645e03e1052e66 xp_OAreate.dll
8941d889cb199a234d99c90ce78a96411b6dedb6 sqlmaggieAntivirus_32.dll
5aa9a9299865b0cb81fcad5f42424d79c67c403b sqlmaggieVS2008new_64.dll
5182e0a5f075317171ad0e01e52d32937ec2fa01 sqlmaggieVS2008new_64.dll
bfccf57e173b8233d35928956022bae85fc5d722 sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll
18d3ac848955295381f769b923a86871e01bfa1c sqlmaggieVS2008new_64.dll
2bf1b6163af5685824c2d7ecda4f3f65f3ca4723 sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll
9577a2c15494edc2f7f4a59ecfb3ee90dd1df9d7 sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll
32e96ef4754c8f357e2366078387750e7f6add43 sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll
11678237dfccc88f257acca2b66b578713deaca8 sqlmaggieVS2008new_64.dll
327bedce44160ebccc7d465c673d3464e23292b9 sqlmaggieVS2008new_32.dll
7d58e51aee7da91dc93025854712cee47ed03101 sqldoorVS2005_64.dll
4a6cf3d5b005e97ef6f2be09f8ab19c2755cae39 sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll
f37d9ce547894ab5449e5632188a3a3bb9e91fed sqlbackupAntiVirus_64.dll
a347aaf152d8ddcd299d86d7839d4ffa369ef2ef sqlmaggieVS2008new_32.dll
f2c64108cb670e82908e5f41c58f1aab97ee7786 sqlmaggieVS2008new_64.dll
a34bda87bd253eda794462c20074baed19e1c01c sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll
df1a7c13a3ec612a10819353ba0d34348a404bc8 sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll
b3249b6f05eeeb2cf5f74931aa990fbc92027b54 sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll
d3eeb9db89f0b21dc945f5410be9a9532e0c951e sqlmaggieAntiVirus_64.dll

ScreenCap SHA1 Real File Name c6cb7ec82ee55ccb56a4cc8b91c64e9b4f4e14da
ScreenCapDll_x64.dll 19f2a546a76458dda6eab6e2fae07d0942759b84
ScreenCapDll_x64.dll 693e4ed784279bc47a013dc56f87cbd103e1db2e x
ad72aa442ff2c357b48ae8b4f8ba9b04b63c698b ScreenCapDll.dll

Hacking Tool SHA1 Description da876cd6e3528f95aafb158713d3b21db5fc780b Browser
credential stealer 1121324a15e6714e4313dfa18c8b03a6da381ba1 Credential dumper
loader 9bedb5810536879fae95c70a918eb90ac628953e Network scanning tool
539d87139de6d5136b6d45dbc33a1aae69926eee Credential dumper
afe25455804a7afb7639cb4e356cb089105be82d Port relay tool
37cca724227a8e77671ecde3d295f5b98531705b Credential dumper loader
2eeb46d538c486f8591a78a65dde250b0bf62f89 Windows domain tool

apt
Critical Infrastructure


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JOEY CHEN

Joey Chen is working as a Threat Intelligence Researcher at SentinelOne. His
major areas of research include incident response, APT investigation, malware
analysis and cryptography analysis. He has been a speaker at several conferences
and received a 2018 Training Ambassador & Trainer prize from TrendMicro. He now
focuses on the security issues of target attack, emerging threats and IOT
systems.

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VOID BALAUR | THE SPRAWLING INFRASTRUCTURE OF A CARELESS MERCENARY


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RECENT POSTS

 * Void Balaur | The Sprawling Infrastructure of a Careless Mercenary
   September 22, 2022
 * The Mystery of Metador | An Unattributed Threat Hiding in Telcos, ISPs, and
   Universities
   September 22, 2022
 * Crimeware Trends | Ransomware Developers Turn to Intermittent Encryption to
   Evade Detection
   September 8, 2022


LABS CATEGORIES

 * Security & Intelligence
 * Crimeware
 * Security Research
 * Advanced Persistent Threat
 * Adversary


SENTINELLABS

In the era of interconnectivity, when markets, geographies, and jurisdictions
merge in the melting pot of the digital domain, the perils of the threat
ecosystem become unparalleled. Crimeware families achieve an unparalleled level
of technical sophistication, APT groups are competing in fully-fledged cyber
warfare, while once decentralized and scattered threat actors are forming
adamant alliances of operating as elite corporate espionage teams.


LATEST TWEET

 * Let's discuss Windows Apps – packaged into APPX or MSIX packages as a medium
   to deploy malware. Looking for examp… https://t.co/OE385osZIn3 days ago
 * The Mystery of #Metador | An Unattributed Threat Hiding in Telcos, ISPs, and
   Universities - An elusive adversary… https://t.co/A8WzG3nPtg19 hours ago
 * The Void Balaur cyber mercenary group has thrived throughout 2022, attacking
   targets on a global scale with new… https://t.co/gyTnFZCnOTyesterday
 * Precision targeting of critical infrastructure industries indicates
   espionage-related activity by an unattribute… https://t.co/fzdk0qiDA12 days
   ago
 * Let's discuss Windows Apps – packaged into APPX or MSIX packages as a medium
   to deploy malware. Looking for examp… https://t.co/OE385osZIn3 days ago
 * The Mystery of #Metador | An Unattributed Threat Hiding in Telcos, ISPs, and
   Universities - An elusive adversary… https://t.co/A8WzG3nPtg19 hours ago




RECENT POSTS

 * Void Balaur | The Sprawling Infrastructure of a Careless Mercenary
   September 22, 2022
 * The Mystery of Metador | An Unattributed Threat Hiding in Telcos, ISPs, and
   Universities
   September 22, 2022
 * Crimeware Trends | Ransomware Developers Turn to Intermittent Encryption to
   Evade Detection
   September 8, 2022


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