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CHAT CONTROL


THE END OF THE PRIVACY OF DIGITAL CORRESPONDENCE

The EU decided to let providers search all private chats, messages, and emails
automatically for suspicious content – generally and indiscriminately. The
stated aim: To prosecute child pornography. The result: Mass surveillance by
means of fully automated real-time messaging and chat control and the end of
secrecy of digital correspondence. A majority of the Members of the European
Parliament adopted the chatcontrol regulation on 6 July 2021.

Chatcontrol 2.0 will follow soon

But this is not the end of the story: For autumn 2021, European Commission
announced that it will propose a follow-up legislation that will make the use of
chatcontrol mandatory for all e-mail and messenger providers. This legislation
might then also affect securely end-to-end encrypted communications. However, a
public consultation by the Commission on this project showed that the majority
of respondents, both citizens and stakeholders, were opposed to an obligation to
use chat control. Over 80% of respondents opposed its application to end-to-end
encrypted communications. As a result, the Commission postponed the draft
legislation originally announced for July to December 2021 Q1 2022. 

Protest now to the responsible EU commissioners!

Politely tell them your concerns about chat control (arguments below).
Experience shows that a phone call is more effective than e-mails or letters.
Officially, the planned obligation for message and chat control is called
“legislation to effectively tackle child sexual abuse online”. If authorities
try to excuse themselves by saying that the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs
(Directorate-General for Home Affairs) is responsible, point out that all EU
Commissioners can vote on draft legislation and raise concerns at an early
stage.

Here is the contact information:

 * EU Home Affairs Commissioner Johansson (lead responsible): Tel.
   +32-229-50170, E-Mail cab-johansson-contact@ec.europa.eu
 * EU-Kommissionspräsidentin von der Leyen: Tel. +32-229-56070, E-Mail
   ec-president-vdl@ec.europa.eu
 * EU Commission President von der Leyen: Tel. +32-229-56070, E-Mail
   ec-president-vdl@ec.europa.eu
 * Executive Vice President for a Europe for the Digital Age, Vestager: tTel.
   +32-229-55136, E-Mail margrethe-vestager-contact@ec.europa.eu
 * EU Internal Market Commissioner Breton, Tel. +32-229-90200, E-Mail
   cab-breton-contact@ec.europa.eu
 * Vice-President for Values and Transparency, Jourova: Tel. +32-229-55144,
   E-Mail cab-jourova-contact@ec.europa.eu
 * Vice President for Promoting our European Way of Life, Mr. Schinas: Tel.
   +32-229-60524, E-Mail cab-schinas-contact@ec.europa.eu
 * Justice Commissioner Reynders, Tel. +32-229-50900, E-Mail
   cab-reynders-contact@ec.europa.eu








HOW DID WE GET HERE?



In 2020 the European Commission proposed “temporary” legislation aimed at
allowing the search of all private chats, messages, and emails for illegal
depictions of minors and attempted initiation of contacts with minors. This is
to allow the providers of Facebook Messenger, Gmail, et al, to scan every
message for suspicious text and images. This takes place in a fully automated
process and using error-prone “artificial intelligence”. If an algorithm
considers a message suspicious, its content and meta-data are disclosed
automatically and without human verification to a private US-based organization
and from there to national police authorities worldwide. The reported users are
not notified.

Some U.S. providers of services such as Gmail and Outlook.com are already
performing such automated messaging and chat controls. Through a second piece of
legislation, the EU Commission intends to oblige all providers of chat,
messaging and e-mail services to deploy this mass surveillance technology. At
the same time, a representative survey conducted in March 2021 clearly shows
that a majority of Europeans oppose the use of chat control  (Detailed poll
results here).

More videos on Chatcontrol are available in this playlist


HOW DOES THIS AFFECT YOU?

 * All of your chat conversations and emails will be automatically searched for
   suspicious content. Nothing remains confidential or secret. There is no
   requirement of a court order or an initial suspicion for searching your
   messages. It occurs always and automatically.
 * If an algorithms classifies the content of a message as suspicious, your
   private or intimate photos may be viewed by staff and contractors of
   international corporations and police authorities. Also your private nude
   photos may be looked at by people not known to you, in whose hands your
   photos are not safe.
 * Flirts and sexting may be read by staff and contractors of international
   corporations and police authorities, because text recognition filters looking
   for “child grooming” frequently falsely flag intimate chats.
 * You can falsely be reported and investigated for allegedly disseminating
   child sexual exploitation material. Messaging and chat control algorithms are
   known to flag completely legal vacation photos of children on a beach, for
   example. According to Swiss federal police authorities, 86% of all
   machine-generated reports turn out to be without merit. 40% of all criminal
   investigation procedures initiated in Germany for “child pornography” target
   minors.
 * On your next trip overseas, you can expect big problems. Machine-generated
   reports on your communications may have been passed on to other countries,
   such as the USA, where there is no data privacy – with incalculable results.
 * Intelligence services and hackers may be able to spy on your private chats
   and emails. The door will be open for anyone with the technical means to read
   your messages if secure encryption is removed in order to be able to screen
   messages.
 * This is only the beginning. Once the technology for messaging and chat
   control has been established, it becomes very easy to use them for other
   purposes. And who guarantees that these incrimination machines will not be
   used in the future on our smart phones and laptops?

Click here for further arguments against messaging and chat control

Click here to find out what you can do to stop messaging and chat control


TIMELINE

The trilogue negotiations on the draft law, in which representatives of the
European Parliament negotiate with EU governments with the participation of the
EU Commission, were concluded in May. Voluntary chat control is coming! Here is
my press release on the outcome of the negotiations. The final vote in the
European Parliament is scheduled for 6 July.

In autumn 2021 the EU Commission intends to make a second legislative proposal,
which is to force all providers of email, messaging and chat services to
comprehensively search all private messages in the absence of any suspicion.

According to the case-law of the European Court of Justice the permanent and
comprehensive automated analysis of private communications violates fundamental
rights and is prohibited (paragraph 177). For this reason, Member of the
European Parliament Patrick Breyer has filed a complaint against U.S. companies
Facebook and Google with the data protection authorities for violating the
General Data Protection Regulation. Former judge of the European Court of
Justice Prof. Dr. Ninon Colneric has extensively analysed the plans and
concludes in a legal assessment that the EU legislative plans on chat control
are not in line with the case law of the European Court of Justice and violate
the fundamental rights of all EU citizens to respect for privacy, to data
protection and to freedom of expression.


UPCOMING DATES

 * 14 January 2021: Internal technical negotiations of the European Parliament
 * 15 January 2021: Technical negotiations between Council, Commission and
   Parliament (Technical Trilogue)
 * 18 January 2021: Shadow rapporteur meeting of the negotiators of the European
   Parliament
 * 19 January 2021: Internal technical negotiations of the European Parliament
 * 20 January 2021: Technical negotiations between Council, Commission and
   Parliament (Technical Trilogue)
 * 25 January Shadow rapporteur meeting of the negotiators of the European
   Parliament
 * 01 February 2021: Internal technical negotiations of the European Parliament
 * 05 February 2021: Internal technical negotiations of the European Parliament
 * 22 February 2021: Shadow rapporteur meeting of the negotiators of the
   European Parliament
 * 23 February 2021: Second Political Trilogue negotiations between Council,
   Commission and Parliament
 * 26 February 2021: Internal technical negotiations of the European Parliament
 * 1 March 2021: Shadow rapporteur meeting of the negotiators of the European
   Parliament
 * 2 March 2021: Internal technical negotiations of the European Parliament
 * 8 March 2021: Shadow rapporteur meeting of the negotiators of the European
   Parliament
 * 9 March 2021: Third Political Trilogue negotiations between Council,
   Commission and Parliament
 * 23 March 2021: Shadow rapporteur meeting of the negotiators of the European
   Parliament
 * 25 March 2021: Shadow rapporteur meeting of the negotiators of the European
   Parliament
 * 19 April: Internal technical negotiations of the European Parliament,
   Commission and Council
 * 28 April: Shadow rapporteur meeting of the negotiators of the European
   Parliament
 * 29 April: Fifth Political Trilogue negotiations between Council, Commission
   and Parliament
 * 26 May: Committee Vote on  Trilogue Agreement
 * 6 July 2021: Plenary Vote

 * Expected for December 2021 Q1 2022: Commission proposal on mandatory
   messaging and chat controls for online service providers


WHAT YOU CAN DO

Talk about it! Inform others about the dangers of chat control. Here, you can
find tweet templates, share pics and videos. Of course, you can also create your
own images and videos.Generate attention on social media! Use the hashtags
#chatcontrol and #secrecyofcorrespondence Reach out to your representatives in
Parliament! If you want, you can use pre-worded message for this purpose.
However, experience has shown that individually worded messages are more
effective. Generate media attention! So far very few media have covered the
messaging and chat control plans of the EU. Get in touch with newspapers and ask
them to cover the subject – online and offline.Ask your e-mail, messaging and
chat service providers! Avoid Gmail, Facebook Messenger, outlook.com and the
chat function of X-Box, where indiscriminate chat control is already taking
place. Ask your email, messaging and chat providers if they generally monitor
private messages for suspicious content, or if they plan to do so.


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND ARGUMENTS

 * All citizens are placed under suspicion, without cause, of possibly having
   committed a crime. Text and photo filters monitor all messages, without
   exception. No judge is required to order to such monitoring – contrary to the
   analog world which guarantees the privacy of correspondence and the
   confidentiality of written communications. According to a judgment by the
   European Court of Justice, the permanent and general automatic analysis of
   private communications violates fundamental rights (case C-511/18, Paragraph
   192). Nevertheless, the EU now intends to adopt such legislation. For the
   court to annul it can take years. Therefore we need to prevent the adoption
   of the legislation in the first place.
 * The confidentiality of private electronic correspondence is being sacrificed.
   Users of messenger, chat and e-mail services risk having their private
   messages read and analyzed. Sensitive photos and text content could be
   forwarded to unknown entities worldwide and can fall into the wrong hands.
   NSA staff have reportedly circulated nude photos of female and male citizens
   in the past. A Google engineer has been reported to stalk minors.
 * Indiscriminate messaging and chat control wrongfully incriminates hundreds of
   users every day. According the Swiss Federal Police, 90% of machine-reported
   content is not illegal, for example harmless holiday photos showing nude
   children playing at a beach.
 * Securely encrypted communication is at risk. Up to now, encrypted messages
   cannot be searched by the algorithms. To change that back doors would need to
   be built in to messaging software. As soon as that happens, this security
   loophole can be exploited by anyone with the technical means needed, for
   example by foreign intelligence services and criminals. Private
   communications, business secrets and sensitive government information would
   be exposed. Secure encryption is needed to protect minorities, LGBTQI people,
   democratic activists, journalists, etc.
 * Criminal justice is being privatized. In the future the algorithms of
   corporations such as Facebook, Google, and Microsoft will decide which user
   is a suspect and which is not. The proposed legislation contains no
   transparency requirements for the algorithms used. Under the rule of law the
   investigation of criminal offences belongs in the hands of independent judges
   and civil servants under court supervision.
 * Indiscriminate messaging and chat control creates a precedent and opens the
   floodgates. Deploying technology for automatically monitoring all online
   communications is dangerous: It can very easily be used for other purposes in
   the future, for example copyright violations, drug abuse, or “harmful
   content”. In authoritarian states such technology is to identify and arrest
   government opponents and democracy activists. Once the technology is deployed
   comprehensively, there is no going back.
 * The temporary legislation on the table is ineffective. Contrary to its
   intent, it will not allow Facebook et al to continue the mass monitoring of
   private correspondence. It does limit the ePrivacy directive. The chat
   control, however, will continue to violate the General Data Protection
   Regulation (DSGVO) because it lacks a legal basis and violates the principle
   of proportionality. A complaint filed by Patrick Breyer is being examined by
   the Irish Data Protection Agency.


WHY MESSAGING AND CHAT CONTROL HARMS CHILDREN AND ABUSE VICTIMS

Proponents claim indiscriminate messaging and chat control facilitates the
prosecution of child sexual exploitation. However, this argument is
controversial, even among victims of child sexual abuse. In fact messaging and
chat control can hurt victims and potential victims of sexual exploitation:

 1. Safe spaces are destroyed. Victims of sexual violence are especially in need
    of the ability to communicate safely and confidentially to seek counseling
    and support, for example to safely exchange among each other, with their
    therapists or attorneys. The introduction of real-time monitoring takes
    these safe rooms away from them. This can discourage victims from seeking
    help and support.
 2. Self-recorded nude photos of minors (sexting) end up in the hands of company
    employees and police where they do not belong and are not safe.
 3. Minors are being criminalized. Especially young people often share intimate
    recordings with each other (sexting). With messaging and chat control in
    place, their photos and videos may end up in the hands of criminal
    investigators. German crime statistics demonstrate that 40% of all
    investigations for child pornography target minors.
 4. Indiscriminate messaging and chat control does not contain the circulation
    of illegal material but actually makes it more difficult to prosecute child
    sexual exploitation. It encourages offenders to go underground and use
    private encrypted servers which can be impossible to detect and intercept.
    Even on open channels, indiscriminate messaging and chat control does not
    contain the volume of material circulated, as evidenced by the constantly
    rising number of machine reports.


DOCUMENTS ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE

 * Legislative Proposal by the Commission (10 September 2020)
 * Technical solutions to screen end to end encrypted communications (September
   2020)
 * Report of the Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (11
   December 2020)
 * Answers given by the Commission to questions of the Members of Parliament (28
   September 2020)
 * Answers given by the Commission to questions of the Members of Parliament (27
   October 2020)
 * Impact Assessment by the European Parliamentary Research Service (5 February
   2021)
 * Leaked 4 column document reflecting the state of negotiations (englisch) (5
   March 2021)
 * Legal Opinion on the Compatibility of Chatcontrol with the case law of the
   ECJ (March 2021)
 * Answers by Europol on statistics regarding the prosecution of child sexual
   abuse material online (28 April 2021)
 * Consolidated Compromise Text of the Draft Regulation (Trilogue Agreement) (21
   May 2021)
 * Final Regulation


CRITICAL COMMENTARY AND FURTHER READING

 * Prostasia Foundation: “How the War against Child Abuse Material was lost” (19
   August 2020)
 * European Digital Rights (EDRi): “Is surveilling children really protecting
   them? Our concerns on the interim CSAM regulation” (24 September 2020)
 * Civil Society Organizations: “Open Letter: Civil society views on defending
   privacy while preventing criminal acts” (27 Oktober 2020)

> “we suggest that the Commission prioritise this non-technical work, and more
> rapid take-down of offending websites, over client-side filtering […]”

 * European Data Protection Supervisor: “Opinion on the proposal for temporary
   derogations from Directive 2002/58/EC for the purpose of combatting child
   sexual abuse online” (10. November 2020)

> “Due to the absence of an impact assessment accompanying the Proposal, the
> Commission has yet to demonstrate that the measures envisaged by the Proposal
> are strictly necessary, effective and proportionate for achieving their
> intended objective.”

 * Alexander Hanff (victim of child abuse and privacy professional): “Why I
   don’t support privacy invasive measures to tackle child abuse.” (11 November
   2020)

> “As an abuse survivor, I (and millions of other survivors across the world)
> rely on confidential communications to both find support and report the crimes
> against us – to remove our rights to privacy and confidentiality is to subject
> us to further injury and frankly, we have suffered enough. […] it doesn’t
> matter what steps we take to find abusers, it doesn’t matter how many freedoms
> or constitutional rights we destroy in order to meet that agenda – it WILL NOT
> stop children from being abused, it will simply push the abuse further
> underground, make it more and more difficult to detect and ultimately lead to
> more children being abused as the end result.”

 * AccessNow: “The fundamental rights concerns at the heart of new EU online
   content rules” (19 November 2020)

> “In practice this means that they would put private companies in charge of a
> matter that public authorities should handle”

 * Federal Bar Association (BRAK) (in German): “Stellungnahme zur
   Übergangsverordnung gegen Kindesmissbrauch im Internet” (24 November 2020)

> „the assessment of child abuse-related facts is part of the legal profession’s
> area of responsibility. Accordingly, the communication exchanged between
> lawyers and clients will often contain relevant keywords. […] According to the
> Commission’s proposals, it is to be feared that in all of the aforementioned
> constellations there will regularly be a breach of confidentiality due to the
> unavoidable use of relevant terms.”

 * Alexander Hanff (Victim of Child Abuse and Privacy Activist): “EU Parliament
   are about to pass a derogation which will result in the total surveillance of
   over 500M Europeans” (4 Dezember 2020)

> “I didn’t have confidential communications tools when I was raped; all my
> communications were monitored by my abusers – there was nothing I could do,
> there was no confidence. […] I can’t help but wonder how much different my
> life would have been had I had access to these modern technologies. [The
> planned vote on the e-Privacy Derogation] will drive abuse underground making
> it far more difficult to detect; it will inhibit support groups from being
> able to help abuse victims – IT WILL DESTROY LIVES.”

 * German Data Protection Supervisor (in German): „BfDI kritisiert versäumte
   Umsetzung von EU Richtlinie“ (17 Dezember 2020)

> “A blanket and unprovoked monitoring of digital communication channels is
> neither proportionate nor necessary to detect online child abuse. The fight
> against sexualised violence against children must be tackled with targeted and
> specific measures. The investigative work is the task of the law enforcement
> authorities and must not be outsourced to private operators of messenger
> services.”

 * European Digital Rights (EDRi): Wiretapping children’s private
   communications: Four sets of fundamental rights problems for children (and
   everyone else) (10 February 2021)

> “As with other types of content scanning (whether on platforms like YouTube or
> in private communications) scanning everything from everyone all the time
> creates huge risks of leading to mass surveillance by failing the necessity
> and proportionality test. Furthermore, it creates a slippery slope where we
> start scanning for less harmful cases (copyright) and then we move on to
> harder issues (child sexual abuse, terrorism) and before you realise what
> happened scanning everything all the time becomes the new normal.”

 * German Bar Association (DAV): “Indiscriminate communications scanning is
   disproportionate” (9 March 2021)

> “The DAV is explicitly in favour of combating the preparation and commission
> of child sexual abuse and its dissemination via the internet through effective
> measures at EU-level. However, the Interim Regulation proposed by the
> Commission would allow blatantly disproportionate infringements on the
> fundamental rights of users of internet-based communication services.
> Furthermore, the proposed Interim Regulation lacks sufficient procedural
> safeguards for those affected. This is why the legislative proposal should be
> rejected as a whole.”

 * Letter from the President of the German Bar Association (DAV) and the
   President of the Federal Bar Association (BRAK) (in German) (8 March 2021)

> “Positive hits with subsequent disclosure to governmental and non-governmental
> agencies would be feared not only by accused persons but above all by victims
> of child sexual abuse. In this context, the absolute confidentiality of legal
> counselling is indispensable in the interest of the victims, especially in
> these matters which are often fraught with shame. In these cases in
> particular, the client must retain the authority to decide which contents of
> the mandate may be disclosed to whom. Otherwise, it is to be feared that
> victims of child sexual abuse will not seek legal advice.”

 * Strategic autonomy in danger: European Tech companies warn of lowering data
   protection levels in the EU (15 April 2021)

> “In the course of the initiative “Fighting child sexual abuse: detection,
> removal, and reporting of illegal content”, the European Union plans to
> abolish the digital privacy of correspondence. In order to automatically
> detect illegal content, all private chat messages are to be screened in the
> future. This should also apply to content that has so far been protected with
> strong end-to-end encryption. If this initiative is implemented according to
> the current plan it would enormously damage our European ideals and the
> indisputable foundations of our democracy, namely freedom of expression and
> the protection of privacy […]. The initiative would also severely harm
> Europe’s strategic autonomy and thus EU-based companies.

 * Article in “Welt.de: Crime scanners on every smartphone – EU plans major
   surveillance attack“ (in German) (4 November 2021)

> Experts from the police and academia are rather critical of the EU’s plan: on
> the one hand, they fear many false reports by the scanners, and on the other
> hand, an alibi function of the law. Daniel Kretzschmar, spokesman for the
> Federal Board of the Association of German Criminal Investigators, says that
> the fight against child abuse depictions is “enormously important” to his
> association. Nevertheless, he is skeptical: unsuspected persons could easily
> become the focus of investigations. At the same time, he says, privatizing
> these initiative investigations means “making law enforcement dependent on
> these companies, which is actually a state and sovereign task. “
> 
> Thomas-Gabriel Rüdiger, head of the Institute for Cybercriminology at the
> Brandenburg Police University, is also rather critical of the EU project. “In
> the end, it will probably mainly hit minors again,” he told WELT. Rüdiger
> refers to figures from the crime statistics, according to which 43 percent of
> the recorded crimes in the area of child pornographic content would be traced
> back to children and adolescents themselves. This is the case, for example,
> with so-called “sexting” and “schoolyard pornography “, when 13- and
> 14-year-olds send each other lewd pictures.
> 
> Real perpetrators, who you actually want to catch, would probably rather not
> be caught. “They are aware of what they have done and use alternatives.
> Presumably, USB sticks and other data carriers will then be increasingly used
> again,” Rüdiger continues.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


RELATED TOPICS

12. November 2021

EU INTERIOR MINISTERS WELCOME MANDATORY CHAT CONTROL FOR ALL SMARTPHONES

20. October 2021

WORLD ENCRYPTION DAY: LAWMAKERS WARN AGAINST EU ATTACK ON SECURE ENCRYPTION AND
CONFIDENTIAL DIGITAL CORRESPONDENCE

07. July 2021

EU PASSES EMERGENCY LAW ALLOWING TECH COMPANIES TO SCREEN MESSAGES FOR CHILD
ABUSE | FORBES [EXTERNAL]

06. July 2021

CHATCONTROL: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT APPROVES MASS SURVEILLANCE OF PRIVATE
COMMUNICATIONS

01. July 2021

INDISCRIMINATE MESSAGING AND #CHATCONTROL: LAST CHANCE TO PROTEST

11. June 2021

#CHATCONTROL VOTE SCHEDULED: LAST CHANCE TO ACT

27. May 2021

CHAT CONTROL: HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE APPROVES REGULATION ON INDISCRIMINATE
SEARCHING OF PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS

25. May 2021

CHAT CONTROL: CIVIL LIBERTIES COMMITTEE TO VOTE ON SEARCHING ALL PRIVATE
MESSAGES FOR ALLEGEDLY ILLEGAL MATERIAL

29. April 2021

EU-DEAL ON CHATCONTROL: INDISCRIMINATE ANALYSIS OF ALL PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS
CONTENTS BECOMES LAW

28. April 2021

POLL: 72% OF CITIZENS OPPOSE EU PLANS TO SEARCH ALL PRIVATE MESSAGES FOR
ALLEGEDLY ILLEGAL MATERIAL AND REPORT TO THE POLICE

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IN DER PRESSE

 * Piratenpartei Schleswig-Holstein: Piraten-Klage: Landesverfassungsgericht
   soll über Veröffentlichung geheimer Landtags-R... 11. November 2021
 * Piratenpartei Deutschland: Patrick Breyer (Piratenpartei): Protestiert gegen
   die EU-Pläne zur Chatkontrolle! 10. November 2021
 * netzpolitik.org: EU-Kommission: Warum die Chatkontrolle so gefährlich ist 9.
   November 2021
 * Überwachungsangriff durch die EU: Chatverläufe sollen automatisch durchsucht
   werden 9. November 2021
 * Kampf gegen Kindesmissbrauch: Kriminalscanner auf jedem Smartphone – EU plant
   den großen Überwachungsangriff 9. November 2021
 * EU-Chatkontrolle: Uns drohen Methoden wie in China 9. November 2021


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