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Blog Home
CVE-2024-3094 XZ BACKDOOR: ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW
By Shachar Menashe, Senior Director Security Research Jonathan Sar Shalom,
Director of Threat Research Brian Moussalli, Malware Research Team Leader March
31, 2024
12 min read
SHARE:
On March 29th, it was reported that malicious code enabling unauthorized remote
SSH access has been detected within XZ Utils, a widely used package present in
major Linux distributions (The GitHub project originally hosted here is now
suspended). Fortunately, the malicious code was discovered quickly by the OSS
community and managed to infect only two of the most recent versions of the
package, 5.6.0 and 5.6.1, which were released within the past month. Stable
versions of most Linux distributions were not affected.
The sophisticated malicious payload that came with the affected versions of XZ
Utils ran in the same process as the OpenSSH server (SSHD) and modified
decryption routines in the OpenSSH server in order to allow specific remote
attackers (that own a specific private key) to send arbitrary payloads through
SSH which will be executed before the authentication step, effectively hijacking
the entire victim machine.
This supply chain attack came as a shock to the OSS community, as XZ Utils was
considered a trusted and scrutinized project. The attacker built up a credible
reputation as an OSS developer over the span of multiple years and used highly
obfuscated code in order to evade detection by code reviews. Following our
initial research communication, this post will detail its fundamentals and
impact.
* Who is affected by CVE-2024-3094?
* How to detect CVE-2024-3094
* How to remediate CVE-2024-3094
* JFrog OSS tools for detection of CVE-2024-3094
* CVE-2024-3094 technical analysis
* Is the JFrog Platform affected by CVE-2024-3094?
* Is Conan affected by CVE-2024-3094?
* Detecting and resolving CVE-2024-3094 with JFrog Xray
WHO IS AFFECTED BY CVE-2024-3094?
The following distributions were affected by the attack –
Distribution Affected Branches Affected Packages Remediation Comments Fedora 40,
41, Rawhide (active development) xz-5.6.0-*
xz-5.6.1-*
Fedora 40 – Update to latest version (5.4.x).
Fedora 41 & Rawhide – Stop using immediately.
Debian testing, unstable (sid), experimental xz-utils 5.5.1alpha-0.1
(uploaded on 2024-02-01), up to and including 5.6.1-1
Update to latest version (5.6.1+really5.4.5-1) No stable branches are affected
Alpine Edge (active development) xz 5.6.1-r0, 5.6.1-r1 Update to latest version
(5.6.1-r2) No stable branches are affected Kali N/A xz-utils 5.6.0-0.2
(Kali installations updated between March 26th to March 29th)
Update to latest version (5.6.1+really5.4.5-1) OpenSUSE Tumbleweed xz-5.6.0,
xz-5.6.1 Update to latest version (5.6.1.revertto5.4) Arch Linux N/A xz 5.6.0-1
Update to latest version (5.6.1-2)
The following distributions were not affected –
Distribution Affected Branches Affected Packages Remediation Comments Red Hat
Enterprise Linux N/A N/A N/A No versions of Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) are
affected. Ubuntu N/A N/A N/A The affected version of xz-utils was only in
noble-proposed, and
was removed before migrating to noble itself.
Amazon Linux N/A N/A N/A Wolfi N/A N/A N/A The affected version of liblzma was
briefly available (now reverted) but Wolfi’s OpenSSH does not link to liblzma,
making it unaffected. Gentoo N/A xz-utils 5.6.0, xz-utils 5.6.1 Update to latest
version (restores 5.4.2) Although Gentoo pulled the vulnerable version, it isn’t
affected since its OpenSSH isn’t patched to work with systemd-notify, which is a
prerequisite for the backdoor.
HOW TO DETECT CVE-2024-3094
Check if your version of “xz” is one of the affected versions (5.6.0 or 5.6.1,
see table above) by running –
strings `which xz` | grep '5\.6\.[01]'
Example of a vulnerable output –
$ strings `which xz` | grep '5\.6\.[01]'
xz (XZ Utils) 5.6.1
Example of a safe output –
$ strings `which xz` | grep '5\.6\.[01]'
Note that in Alpine Linux (edge branch), the output of xz --version is “5.6.1”
even on the fixed version (5.6.1-r2) –
It is possible to validate the exact version using the Alpine Package Manager –
$ apk list xz
xz-5.6.1-r2 x86_64 {xz} ...
HOW TO REMEDIATE CVE-2024-3094
Immediately downgrade your version of xz to an earlier version (5.4.6 is the
latest unaffected version in most distributions).
After downgrading xz, either reboot your machine or restart the OpenSSH server
in order to remove the patched code from memory –
sudo systemctl restart ssh
If upgrading is not possible, another possible workaround is to take advantage
of the backdoor’s “kill switch”. Adding the following string to /etc/environment
will disable the malicious backdoor functionality (applies after restarting SSH
and Systemd) –
yolAbejyiejuvnup=Evjtgvsh5okmkAvj
JFROG OSS TOOLS FOR DETECTION OF CVE-2024-3094
The JFrog Research team published an open-source detector for CVE-2024-3094.
The tool checks whether the local machine is both vulnerable to CVE-2024-3094
(SSH payload is able to run) and currently affected by CVE-2024-3094 (malicious
version of XZ is currently installed).
CVE-2024-3094 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
WHAT IS THE MALICIOUS PAYLOAD OF CVE-2024-3094?
TL;DR – the end goal of the malicious backdoor introduced by CVE-2024-3094, is
to inject code to the OpenSSH server (SSHD) that runs on the victim machine, and
allow specific remote attackers (that own a specific private key) to send
arbitrary payloads through SSH which will be executed before the authentication
step, effectively hijacking the entire victim machine.
The backdoor payload is still under analysis, but based on preliminary analysis
it seems that the payload is highly sophisticated –
1. The payload gets injected into OpenSSH server (sshd process), since liblzma
(that contains the malicious code) is a dependency of certain builds of
OpenSSH.
2. The payload hooks the RSA_public_decrypt function, a function originally
used for validating RSA signatures.
3. The malicious hook code examines the RSA public modulus (“N” value) passed
inside the RSA struct (4th argument of RSA_public_decrypt). Note that this
modulus is completely controlled by the connecting SSH client (in our case,
the attackers).
4. The malicious hook code decrypts the “N” value with a hardcoded decryption
key (using the ChaCha20 symmetric stream cipher).
5. The decrypted data is checked for validity by using the Ed448 elliptic curve
signing algorithm. Note that since this is an asymmetric signing algorithm,
the backdoor contains only the public (verification) key, ensuring that only
the attackers can generate valid payloads for the backdoor. Furthermore, the
signature is bound to the host’s public key, meaning that a valid signature
for one host cannot be reused on a different host.
6. If the data is valid, the payload is executed as a shell command by passing
it to system()
7. If the data is invalid in any way (malformed payload, invalid signature),
the original implementation of RSA_public_decrypt is resumed in a
transparent manner. This means the detection of vulnerable machines over the
network may be impossible for anyone besides the attackers.
The sophisticated nature of this attack and the use of highly future proof
crypto algorithms (Ed448 vs the more standard Ed25519) led many to believe that
the attack may be a nation-state level cyberattack.
Researchers have published a modified SSH client that allows inputting an
arbitrary RSA public key, in order to further examine the malware.
TIMELINE OF THE ATTACK
The most notable part of this supply chain attack is the extreme levels of
dedication of the attacker, working more than two years to establish themselves
as a legitimate maintainer, offering to pick up work in various OSS projects and
committing code across multiple projects in order to avoid detection.
2021 – GitHub user Jia Tan (JiaT75) account created. Started contributing to
several projects with 546 commits done in 2021, of which the most suspicious one
was made to libarchive. A more detailed account of this commit can be found
below.
2022, February 6th – JiaT75 submits a first (legitimate) commit to the XZ repo.
The commit adds arguments validation to the LZMA and LZMA2 encoders.
Add Parameter Validation to LZMA and LZMA2 encoders
2023, June 27-28th – A series of changes were made to XZ Utils, possibly setting
the ground for the attack. In these changes, support for ifunc implementation to
crc64_fast.c, was added.
Introducing the ifunc implementation to XZ Utils
Interestingly, this patch was introduced by the original maintainer of the
package, Lasse Collin, who credited another contributor for this patch, Hans
Jansen. This ifunc implementation is possibly one of the ways which the backdoor
seems to operate, according to the analysis by Andres Freund.
2023, July 8th – JiaT75 opens a Pull Request in oss-fuzz, a project that
performs fuzz testing on XZ and many other OSS projects. The PR disables ifunc
fuzzing, which effectively prevents oss-fuzz from finding the malicious changes
done in XZ.
2024, February 15th – JiaT75 adds an ignore rule for build-to-host.m4 in the XZ
repository, via its .gitignore file. This script file, soon to be included in
actual release bundles, is executed during the package’s build, and contains the
malicious M4 macros which initializes the backdoor’s installation on the
victim’s machine.
2024, February 23rd – JiaT75 adds the obfuscated binary backdoor in two tests
files in the XZ repository –
* tests/files/bad-3-corrupt_lzma2.xz
* tests/files/good-large_compressed.lzma
2024, February 24th – JiaT75 releases version 5.6.0 with the malicious
build-to-host.m4. At this stage, the malicious payload is fully operational (any
subsequent XZ version is compromised). Malicious xz-utils version 5.6.0 pulled
by Debian, Gentoo and Arch Linux.
2024, February 27th – Malicious xz-utils version 5.6.0 pulled by Fedora.
2024, March 5th – Malicious xz-utils version 5.6.0 pulled by openSUSE.
2024, March 9th – JiaT75 updates the backdoor’s binaries to an improved version,
and releases version 5.6.1. Malicious xz-utils version 5.6.1 pulled by Fedora,
Gentoo and Arch Linux
2024, March 10th – Malicious xz-utils version 5.6.1 pulled by openSUSE.
2024, March 11th – Malicious xz-utils version 5.6.1 pulled by Alpine.
2024, March 26th – Malicious xz-utils version 5.6.1 pulled by Debian.
2024, March 29th – A detailed account of the malicious activity found in XZ
utils was published on the oss-security mailing list by Andres Freund.
2024, March 30th – Lasse Collins, xz-utils original maintainer, made an official
announcement regarding the project’s breach.
WAS ONLY XZ AFFECTED BY THE MALICIOUS ACTOR?
While the malicious code was detected only on the XZ project, other code
contributions of the attacker’s account are currently being investigated. As for
today, some notable suspicious code was added to the following projects:
libarchive:
In 2021, JiaT75 submitted a pull request to the libarchive repository with the
title ‘Added error text to warning when untaring with bsdtar’ which seemed
legitimate at first glance. However, upon closer inspection, it was discovered
that the code in this pull request replaced the safe function safe_fprintf()
with the unsafe version fprintf(), potentially introducing a character escape
vulnerability. The security implications of this change are currently being
investigated, as they are not yet clear. However, since a malicious actor is
involved in this code modification, it is reasonable to assume that more
sophisticated attacks might be at play in this investigation. A PoC for
characters escape was already published:
PoC by mikesiegel
A fix to this vulnerability was introduced to libarchive main branch but has not
yet been released as a version update at the time of writing.
oss-fuzz:
In early 2023, JiaT75 changed the primary email address of the XZ project in
Google’s oss-fuzz tool to his own personal Gmail address. This suggests that
they may have wanted reports of vulnerabilities found in Project XZ to be
reported to them first so that they would know when their malicious actions are
discovered –
Later in 2023, they opened another PR to disable `Indirect function support` in
the fuzzer’s configuration for the XZ project. This looks like preparation for
the backdoor they were going to add later to the XZ project to prevent detection
by the fuzzer –
Currently, both the fuzzers for XZ and liblzma were disabled by the oss-fuzz
maintainers.
IS THE JFROG PLATFORM AFFECTED BY CVE-2024-3094?
JFrog is not affected by CVE-2024-3094 as none of its products use the
vulnerable xz_utils versions.
IS CONAN AFFECTED BY CVE-2024-3094?
As of March 30th, recipes containing the vulnerable xz_utils versions have been
removed from Conan Center.
In addition, recipes that depended on the affected versions of xz_utils (cpython
and libunwind) have been reverted to require the latest safe version of
xz_utils.
DETECTING AND RESOLVING CVE-2024-3094 WITH JFROG XRAY
JFrog Security Essentials (Xray) can be used to identify every vulnerable
occurrence across your entire codebase and compiled artifacts, including Docker
containers, repository packages, and even standalone binaries.
JFrog Xray can be used to scan source code and binary artifacts in order to
detect the affected libraries –
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