academic.oup.com Open in urlscan Pro
52.224.90.245  Public Scan

Form analysis
1 forms found in the DOM

GET /Citation/Download

<form action="/Citation/Download" method="get" id="citationModal">
  <input type="hidden" name="resourceId" value="7903052">
  <input type="hidden" name="resourceType" value="3">
  <label for="selectFormat" class="hide js-citation-format-label">Select Format</label>
  <select required="" name="citationFormat" class="citation-download-format js-citation-format" id="selectFormat">
    <option selected="" disabled="">Select format</option>
    <option value="0">.ris (Mendeley, Papers, Zotero)</option>
    <option value="1">.enw (EndNote)</option>
    <option value="2">.bibtex (BibTex)</option>
    <option value="3">.txt (Medlars, RefWorks)</option>
  </select>
  <button class="btn citation-download-link disabled" type="submit">Download citation</button>
</form>

Text Content

Skip to Main Content
Advertisement
Journals
Books
 * Search Menu
 * 
 * 
 * Menu
 * 
 * 
 * Sign in through your institution


Navbar Search Filter International Studies PerspectivesISA Journals
International RelationsPublic PolicyBooksJournalsOxford Academic Mobile Enter
search term Search
 * Issues
 * Advance articles
 * Submit
   * Author Guidelines
   * Submission Site
   * Open Access
   * Why Submit?
 * Purchase
 * Alerts
 * About
   * About International Studies Perspectives
   * About the International Studies Association
   * Editorial Board
   * Advertising and Corporate Services
   * Journals Career Network
   * Self-Archiving Policy
   * Dispatch Dates
   * ISA Portal
 * Journals on Oxford Academic
 * Books on Oxford Academic

ISA Journals

 * Issues
 * Advance articles
 * Submit
   * Author Guidelines
   * Submission Site
   * Open Access
   * Why Submit?
 * Purchase
 * Alerts
 * About
   * About International Studies Perspectives
   * About the International Studies Association
   * Editorial Board
   * Advertising and Corporate Services
   * Journals Career Network
   * Self-Archiving Policy
   * Dispatch Dates
   * ISA Portal

Close
Navbar Search Filter International Studies PerspectivesISA Journals
International RelationsPublic PolicyBooksJournalsOxford Academic Enter search
term Search
Advanced Search
Search Menu

Article Navigation
Close mobile search navigation
Article Navigation


ARTICLE CONTENTS

 * Abstract
 * Resumen
 * Résumé
 * Introduction
 * The Case for Universalizing UN Development Work
 * The Status Quo of UN Development Work
 * The Future of UN Development Work
 * Conclusion
 * Acknowledgments
 * Footnotes
 * References


Article Navigation
Article Navigation
Journal Article


EMBRACING UNIVERSALITY: TOWARD THE FUTURE OF UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT WORK

Max-Otto Baumann,
Max-Otto Baumann
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
,
Germany
  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4067-1696
Search for other works by this author on:
Oxford Academic
Google Scholar
Sebastian Haug
Sebastian Haug
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
,
Germany
  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5272-046X
Search for other works by this author on:
Oxford Academic
Google Scholar
International Studies Perspectives, ekae021, https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekae021
Published:
18 November 2024
Article history
Received:
21 October 2023
Revision received:
13 August 2024
Published:
18 November 2024

 * PDF
 * Split View
 * Views
     
   * Article contents
 * Cite
   
   
   CITE
   
   Max-Otto Baumann, Sebastian Haug, Embracing Universality: Toward the Future
   of United Nations Development Work, International Studies Perspectives,
   2024;, ekae021, https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekae021
   
   Select Format Select format .ris (Mendeley, Papers, Zotero) .enw (EndNote)
   .bibtex (BibTex) .txt (Medlars, RefWorks) Download citation
   Close
 * Permissions Icon Permissions
 * Share Icon Share
   * Facebook
   * Twitter
   * LinkedIn
   * Email

Navbar Search Filter International Studies PerspectivesISA Journals
International RelationsPublic PolicyBooksJournalsOxford Academic Mobile Enter
search term Search

Close
Navbar Search Filter International Studies PerspectivesISA Journals
International RelationsPublic PolicyBooksJournalsOxford Academic Enter search
term Search
Advanced Search
Search Menu


ABSTRACT

United Nations (UN) development work has long followed the binary logic of
“developed” countries providing funding so that UN entities support “developing”
countries with their national development efforts. This rigid North–South
template, however, is unfit for responding to current sustainability challenges
that cut across borders and implicate both “developed” and “developing” member
states. Against this backdrop, we suggest that the principle of universality
promoted by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development holds untapped potential
for rethinking how the UN development pillar operates. We first make the general
case for universalizing UN development work, i.e., adapt UN support functions to
enable engagement with all member states. We then examine the status quo of UN
development work in more detail. Building on the strong North–South bias and the
limited examples of UN engagement with “developed” countries we identify, we
outline the contours of what a more universal future of UN development work
could look like and discuss the political economy of our proposal. Overall, we
argue that the principle of differentiated universality provides a helpful
heuristic for rethinking the roles and functions of the UN development system in
light of sustainable development concerns and persisting inter-state
inequalities.


RESUMEN

El trabajo en materia de desarrollo por parte de la Organización de las Naciones
Unidas (ONU) ha seguido, durante mucho tiempo, la lógica binaria de los países
«desarrollados», los cuales proporcionan fondos para que las entidades de la ONU
apoyen a los países «en desarrollo» en sus esfuerzos de desarrollo a nivel
nacional. Sin embargo, este rígido modelo Norte-Sur no resulta adecuado para
responder a los actuales desafíos en materia de sostenibilidad que trascienden
las fronteras e implican tanto a los Estados miembros «desarrollados» como a los
Estados miembros «en desarrollo». En este contexto, sugerimos que el principio
de universalidad promovido por la Agenda 2030 para el Desarrollo Sostenible
tiene un potencial no utilizado que nos permitiría repensar cómo opera el pilar
de desarrollo de la ONU. En primer lugar, defendemos la universalización del
trabajo en materia de desarrollo por parte de la ONU, es decir, la adaptación de
las funciones de apoyo que lleva a cabo la ONU con el fin de permitir el
compromiso con todos los Estados miembros. A continuación, estudiamos con más
detalle el statu quo de la labor de desarrollo que realiza la ONU. Partimos de
la base del fuerte sesgo Norte-Sur y de los limitados ejemplos, que hemos podido
identificar, de compromiso por parte de la ONU con los países «desarrollados»
para esbozar los contornos de lo que podría ser un futuro más universal con
respecto al trabajo a nivel de desarrollo por parte de la ONU y analizamos la
economía política de nuestra propuesta. En general, argumentamos que el
principio de universalidad diferenciada proporciona una heurística útil que nos
permite repensar los roles y funciones del sistema de desarrollo de la ONU a la
luz de las preocupaciones existentes en materia de desarrollo sostenible y de
las desigualdades interestatales persistentes.


RÉSUMÉ

Le travail de développement de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) suit
depuis longtemps une logique binaire de pays «développés» qui fournissent des
financements pour que les entités onusiennes soutiennent les pays «en
développement» dans leurs efforts de développement nationaux. Toutefois, ce
schéma rigide Nord/Sud n'est pas en mesure de répondre aux défis actuels de
durabilité qui traversent les frontières et concernent tant les États membres
«développés» que ceux «en développement». Sur cette toile de fond, nous
suggérons que le principe d'universalité promu par l'Agenda 2030 pour le
développement durable est doté d'un potentiel inexploité quand il s'agit de
repenser le fonctionnement des piliers de développement de l'ONU. D'abord, nous
défendons une universalisation du travail de développement onusien, c'est-à-dire
une adaptation des fonctions de soutien de l'ONU pour permettre la collaboration
avec tous les États membres. Ensuite, nous analysons le statu quo du travail de
développement de l'ONU plus en détail. En nous fondant sur l'important biais
Nord/Sud et sur les exemples limités de coopération onusienne avec les pays
«développés» que nous identifions, nous dessinons les contours d'un avenir plus
universel pour le travail de développement de l'ONU et traitons de l’économie
politique de notre proposition. Dans l'ensemble, nous affirmons que le principe
d'universalité différenciée fournit une heuristique utile pour repenser les
rôles et fonctions du système de développement de l'ONU au vu des préoccupations
de développement durable et des inégalités interétatiques persistantes.

policy relevance, sustainable development, universality, United Nations,
development cooperation, development support, North–South divide
relevante para las políticas, desarrollo sostenible, universalidad, ONU,
cooperación para el desarrollo, apoyo al desarrollo, brecha Norte-Sur
pertinent sur le plan politique, développement durable, universalité, Nations
Unies, coopération de développement, soutien au développement, division Nord/Sud
Issue Section:
Original Article


INTRODUCTION

United Nations (UN) development work has long followed the binary logic of
traditional North–South templates: Wealthy countries provide funding so that UN
entities can support poor(er) countries with their national development efforts
(Baumann 2018; Fomerand and Dijkzeul 2018). While the one-sided focus on
“developing countries” reflects the logic of development cooperation supporting
those worse off, it has always been at odds with the foundations of a universal
multilateral organization where sovereign member states meet as equals (Abbott
and Snidal 1998). More importantly, perhaps, it also fails to provide tools for
effectively addressing today’s global sustainability challenges. The emergence
of daunting transnational concerns about planetary boundaries (Butler 2017), an
unprecedented level of global interdependence (Iriye 2014), and increasingly
blurred demarcations between North and South—reflected in complex inequality
patterns that cut across traditional divides (Alonso et al. 2014; see Milanovic
2024)—require a new rationale for the UN’s role in sustainable development.
Current constellations “leave[. . .] untenable any notion of development being
simply about developing countries (the poor South)” (Horner and Hulme 2017, 369)
and make it “increasingly inadequate and inappropriate to stick to a cooperation
architecture that separates countries and actors [along North-South lines]
instead of bringing them together as equals” (Kloke-Lesch 2021, 151).

Over the last decade, the UN has made some institutional adjustments to this new
reality. Adopted in 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has
introduced universality as a key principle of development work (Long 2015; UNGA
2015). In line with a multilateral understanding of universality—meaning that
standards, goals, or responsibilities apply to all member states—the Agenda
states unambiguously that the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) “involve
the entire world, developed and developing countries alike” (UNGA 2015, para 5).
The UN High-Level Political Forum for Sustainable Development, created in 2012,
has been repurposed as a universal intergovernmental mechanism where all
countries—irrespective of their development status—report and exchange on SDG
implementation (Beisheim 2018). However, it remains unclear to what extent the
UN system more generally, and in particular its development entities, has
adapted to the universality aspirations of the 2030 Agenda, and what (the lack
of) institutional adjustment means for the future of UN development work beyond
North–South templates.

This is the gap our paper contributes to address. In light of the UN development
system’s traditional focus on working in “developing” or low- and middle-income
countries (often referred to as “program” countries),1 we examine
the—limited—extent to which UN development entities currently engage with
“Northern” or “developed” high-income countries.2 We also explore how the UN’s
current engagement with high-income settings can inform steps toward making the
UN development system fit for a future beyond the “old geography of
international development” (Horner and Hulme 2017, 349), where the rich and
“developed” North is no longer seen as developmentally superior to, and treated
separately from, the poor and “developing” South (Haug 2021). Informed by a
decade of research on the UN development system, our analysis builds on the
review of policy documents, academic literature, and twenty-five semi-structured
expert interviews with UN staff and observers conducted between September 2021
and May 2024.

In what follows, we first make the case for universalizing UN development work
by highlighting biases in extant approaches and the need to review established
practices. We then examine the status quo of UN development work in more detail
with a focus on three entities: the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the UN entity for gender equality (UN Women). We
analyze whether and how these entities engage with “developed” countries on
development-related questions, and to what extent some of their functions with a
potentially global reach—such as monitoring, data analysis, and advocacy—cover
high-income contexts. Based on the strong North–South bias we identify, we then
build on insights into extant practices to outline the contours of what a more
universal—and more sustainable—future of UN development work could look like and
discuss the political economy of universalizing attempts. Overall, we suggest
that the principle of differentiated universality holds untapped potential for
rethinking the roles and functions of the multilateral development system in
light of sustainable development concerns and persisting inter-state
inequalities.


THE CASE FOR UNIVERSALIZING UN DEVELOPMENT WORK

In a multilateral context, the principle of universality is closely related to
normative and functional concerns about the potential benefits (or drawbacks) of
institutionalized cooperation. Contrary to conceptions of international
organizations as exclusive instruments of the powerful, liberal institutionalist
accounts maintain that “institutions and rules can facilitate mutually
beneficial cooperation” among states (Keohane 2012, 125; Payne and Samhat 2012).
International organizations such as the UN are said to provide a range of
functions that enable and strengthen cooperative practices: They offer joint
monitoring instruments, inter-governmental spaces for debates and mutual
accountability, operational services, and mechanisms that help member states
elaborate and abide by shared norms (Abbott and Snidal 1998). Through the
equitable provision of these functions, international organizations can have an
equalizing effect on member states that contributes to their overall
effectiveness (Keohane and Nye 1977, 35).

At the UN, universality has a long tradition as a normative principle in
international frameworks, notably in the field of human rights (Henkin 1989),
and has also figured in climate policy debates (Luomi 2020). The UN development
pillar, however, has long stood out as a field of multilateral cooperation
centering on a binary North-to-South logic, where affluent member states act as
donors, while poorer countries are recipients of UN support (Baumann 2018;
Fomerand and Dijkzeul 2018). UN development entities have often come to act as
service providers through the implementation of development projects and
programs in “developing” countries that are funded by major donors.3 The
“developing” country alliance at the UN, the Group of 77 (G77), regularly
highlights the need for “developed” countries to step up their financial support
for UN development work, recalling donors’ commitment to providing at least 0.7
percent of their gross national income as official development assistance (ODA;
G77 2024). The UN General Assembly, in turn, reaffirmed in 2020 “that the
fundamental characteristics of the operational activities for development of the
United Nations system should be [. . .] to respond to the development needs of
programme [i.e., “developing”] countries” (UNGA 2020, 4). Traditionally, the
entities that belong to the UN development system—including thirty-seven funds
and programs, specialized agencies, and related organizations—have focused on
operational work in “program” country member states only: while their
development operations support covers 162 “countries and territories” (UNSDG
2023, n.p.) and thus the vast majority of UN member states, it excludes
“developed” high-income countries.

This partial development support setup is the result of attempts to react
to—and/or perpetuate—highly unequal relations between rich(er) and poor(er)
states, at least partly inherited from colonial relations (Escobar 2011). At the
same time, it also epitomizes a general feature across the international system
where an “in-group” of states—notably rich countries in the West that identify
as liberal democracies—design the rules of the game and have the capacity to
provide resources that keep multilateral cooperation going (Johnson and Heiss
2018; see Acharya 2011). In a multilateral context marked by such obvious
inequalities, and despite the continuous flow of development-related funds from
North to South, “developing” countries have often come to see “developed” states
as “the source of their pain” (Johnson and Heiss 2018, n.p.) and as the
addressees of demands to change the underlying structures of international
cooperation (Reus-Smit and Zarakol 2023).

Against this backdrop, the 2030 Agenda’s introduction of the universality
principle into the UN development field has triggered questions about the need
to revise existing development support structures. In light of increasing levels
of transnational interdependence (Iriye 2014) and the collective experience of
planetary boundaries (Butler 2017), the explicit emphasis on universality in the
2030 Agenda offers an opportunity to review how institutional practices can move
beyond biased forms of cooperation, where the potential mutuality of
multilateralism is effaced by a hierarchical binary understanding of donors and
recipients. While the UN system is not the only multilateral development player,
its universal and horizontal features—with a General Assembly where a
close-to-universal membership of states engages on the basis of the
one-country-one-vote principle (Peterson 2005)—set UN processes apart from
multilateral development banks where wealthier states have more decision-making
power by design. The banks’ weighted voting systems (Clark 2017) resonate more
with a status quo-oriented emphasis on “developed” vs. “developing” country
roles, in both functional and normative terms. At the UN, however, the need to
acknowledge the key role of poorer countries in decision-making processes is
well established (Lees 2023) and provides a more obvious reference for
universality-related concerns.

Through the lens of cosmopolitan theory (Appiah 2006; Hayden 2017), the
application of the universality principle to sustainable development centers on
the assumption that concerns shared by all generate demands for all (Long 2015,
206). All states, including “developed” countries, are expected “to reevaluate
domestic agendas in light of the new global goals, and to reshape those agendas
and their domestic priorities in light of their endorsement of the 2030 Agenda”
(O'Connor et al. 2016, 2). Global commons—such as climate, global public health,
and biodiversity—require “actions by all, benefitting all” (Van der Heijden et
al. 2014, 2). National development and global sustainability goals are
understood to be mutually dependent, and none can be achieved without the other
(Messner and Scholz 2018; Horner 2020).

For UN development work, this raises potentially fundamental questions about how
support for SDG implementation can or should unfold across traditional
“developing”–“developed” divides. The logic of the 2030 Agenda challenges
established UN development patterns, where “developed” high-income member states
provide financial resources, while “developing” countries focus on addressing
their domestic development challenges with UN support. As an integral part of
the UN membership that has adopted the 2030 Agenda, “developed” countries have
accepted that all member states are in the same boat and that all—including
themselves—need to step up their efforts to reach global sustainability targets,
from reducing inequality and biodiversity loss at home to addressing the
externalities of transnational supply chains abroad.

Embracing universality thus appears as a necessary dimension of multilateral
reform if the UN system wants to contribute to effectively tackling sustainable
development concerns. As the world’s foremost multilateral organization, the UN
is in a unique position to bring together all member states to solve problems
within and across borders, nationally and globally. To that end, we suggest
moving beyond extant UN structures and practices wedded to entrenched
North–South logics that emerged historically but do not provide a convincing
multilateral response to sustainability challenges. Instead, the future of UN
development work should follow the logic of differentiated universality (Haug et
al. 2022): A general commitment that sustainable development support is provided
to all member states, irrespective of development or income levels (i.e.,
universality), combined with a tailored approach that takes countries’
persisting economic and institutional capacities as well as context-specific
requirements into account (i.e., differentiation).

The emphasis on differentiation is particularly important as, in an
international system marred by persisting inequalities (Milanovic 2024), all
countries “must share in the responsibility for building a sustainable world”
(O'Connor et al. 2016, 1) according to their abilities and their contributions
to causing challenges in the first place. This connection between ability and
responsibility puts a particular focus on high-income countries: While
“developing” countries may require more external support, the externalities of
“developed” countries arguably present a more serious challenge to global
sustainability ambitions (O'Connor et al. 2016). Externalities—or
“spill-overs”—of action in and through “developed” countries can be diffuse,
such as when agricultural subsidies in high-income settings have implications
for sustainable development processes elsewhere (O'Connor et al. 2016, 8; Van
Kooten 2019). But they can also be more specific, such as when the fight against
sex tourism in low- and middle-income settings requires efforts in clients’
(often high-income) countries of origin.4 Such externalities have become the
subject of an expanding debate on “policy coherence for development” (Van der
Heijden et al. 2014, 2) that focuses on cross-border implications of political
decisions across policy fields. While bodies like the World Trade Organization
have tried to limit the externalities of “developed” countries’ trade policies,
the implications of the latter’s production and consumption patterns go well
beyond trade rules and buttress an “imperial mode of living” (Brand and Wissen
2021) where affluent parts of the world directly and indirectly benefit from the
exploitation of others.

In sum, the insertion of the principle of—differentiated—universality into the
UN development pillar is part of attempts to move beyond traditional
“developing–developed” distinctions to address global sustainable development
challenges. A focus on universality resonates with voices at and beyond the UN
arguing for a development paradigm that moves beyond the North–South divide as
structuring element (Jenks and Jones 2013; UNDG 2016; Horner and Hulme 2017;
Kloke-Lesch 2021). It speaks to both normative and functional concerns about the
ability of multilateral cooperation to support all member states, and UN
membership as a whole, in a concerted effort to address sustainability
challenges.


THE STATUS QUO OF UN DEVELOPMENT WORK

UN engagement with “developed” countries should be an integral part of a
universal approach to multilateral cooperation on sustainable development, not
only because of the above-discussed externalities but also due to the so far
rather inconsistent and selective approaches to SDG implementation in
high-income settings (O'Connor et al. 2016; European Parliament 2019). However,
although the 2030 Agenda poses a “radical challenge to the more developed world”
(Osborn et al. 2015, 29; see Pike et al. 2014), we know little about whether and
how UN development entities have engaged with “developed” countries beyond the
latter’s donor functions.

As a first step toward addressing this gap, we therefore turn to UNDP, UNICEF,
and UN Women to examine how and to what extent UN development entities currently
support domestic processes in “developed” countries. All three entities are
members of the “core group” of what has been rebranded as the UN Sustainable
Development Group and cover a substantial range of development-related fields,
including a focus on gender equality (UN Women), children (UNICEF), and broader
social, economic, and environmental questions (UNDP). Taken together, the three
entities represent a substantial share of the UN’s operational development
resources, i.e., 44 percent in 2022 (UN 2024).5

In contrast to the UN’s specialized agencies such as the World Health
Organization or the UN Food and Agriculture Organization that have a separate
membership, the three entities under investigation are organs of the General
Assembly. As they constitute the heart of more traditional UN development work,
they are arguably the most unlikely to follow a universal development support
approach in their operational activities and thus serve as least-likely cases
(Gerring and Cojocaru 2016, 404). If we see meaningful change in how they act
toward ”developed” countries, we have evidence that the core of the UN
development system has actually been evolving in line with the 2030 Agenda’s
universality provisions. Insights from UNDP, UNICEF, and UN Women might also
help us identify mechanisms through which UN development work can engage with
all member states and thus overcome entrenched North–South templates.

When analyzing their relationship with “developed” countries, we examine whether
and to what extent UNDP, UNICEF, and UN Women have direct operational engagement
on the ground, and to what extent their global functions that combine functional
and normative elements—such as monitoring, data analysis, and advocacy—also
cover high-income contexts. We also examine whether and how relevant functions
are embedded in their organizational structures through programming, funding,
and monitoring, and discuss the scope of their engagement with “developed”
countries vis-à-vis their portfolios in program countries.


UNDP

The 1965 founding resolution of UNDP notes that “requests for assistance on the
part of the developing countries are steadily increasing in volume and in scope”
and then highlights that “the United Nations assistance programmes are designed
to support and supplement the national efforts of developing countries” (UNGA
1965, 1, emphases added). Our review of available evidence suggests that UNDP
has largely remained committed to this initial mandate. Like other UN funds and
programs, UNDP’s budgetary rules stipulate that funding for operational
activities from the organization’s core budget is to be exclusively allocated to
program countries, effectively excluding (most) high-income countries (UNDP
2021). UNDP states that it is currently “on the ground in some 170 countries and
territories” (UNDP n.d.), although the number of its country offices is somewhat
smaller. Its five regional hubs are located in low- or middle-income countries,
except for the one in Latin America and the Caribbean based in Panama. Through
policy centers in Oslo and Seoul, liaison offices such as those in Brussels,
Tokyo, and Washington DC, or service offices such as that in Copenhagen, UNDP
only has a limited institutional presence in selected “developed” countries.
More importantly, this presence does not have explicit functions toward domestic
development concerns in host countries but is part of UNDP’s global support
structure for the organization’s role in program countries.

With regard to UNDP’s advocacy function, the overall pattern is similar in as
far as the bulk of advocacy efforts are focused on program countries. In
contrast to operational development work, however, there are a limited number of
instances where UNDP’s global advocacy also includes “developed” countries. The
most visible example is the Human Development Report (HDR), UNDP’s flagship
publication issued by the HDR Office, a unit operating from UNDP headquarters in
New York. Covering all UN member states, the HDR presents the Human Development
Index—as a global public good, so to say—and related analysis on an annual
basis. Since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, the themes covered by the annual
publication have moved toward universal topics, with some saying that the latest
editions—on inequalities, the Anthropocene, uncertainty, and cooperation (UNDP
2024)—even seem to speak more to high-income audiences than to program
countries.6 Covering topics such as gender norms and the implications of the
COVID-19 pandemic, other recent publications by the HDR Office share a similarly
universal approach. In addition to support mechanisms dedicated to “helping
programme countries incorporate human development into programmes and policies”
(UNDP 2021, 16), UNDP usually goes to great lengths to spread the messages of
HDR-related publications in “developed” country capitals among both citizens and
policymakers.7

Beyond the HDR, UNDP’s global advocacy includes initiatives whose exact
functions are more difficult to pin down. What they have in common is that they
operate with a global scope and that UNDP acts as a facilitator or convener,
often alongside other stakeholders. UNDP officials highlight that most of the
organization’s publications with a universal focus are commissioned as input to
initiatives that contribute to global processes beyond UNDP’s organizational
remit.8 Here, UNDP attempts to position itself as global thought leader,
development advocate, or partner for key donors rather than embrace a universal
approach to development support work. An example is “Youth4Climate,” a joint
initiative set up by UNDP and the Italian government in 2021 to “boost youth-led
and youth-inclusive climate action” globally (Youth4Climate 2021). UNDP also has
twelve Goodwill Ambassadors that mostly hail from Northern countries, with some
focusing on global issues, such as climate. It also actively engages with and
supports the operations of global inter-governmental and multi-stakeholder fora.
Together with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
UNDP co-hosts the secretariat of the Global Partnership for Effective
Development Cooperation (Haug and Taggart 2024, 29). It also hosts the G20
secretariat for global sustainable finance mobilization and plays a similar role
in the G7.9 Across these engagement mechanisms, UNDP’s work with “developed”
countries focuses—usually exclusively—on supporting global development policy
and coordination efforts, rather than attempting to shape domestic policies in
Northern settings per se.

Situated within the broader context of UNDP’s global portfolio and its annual
budget of around USD 5 billion, the lines of work discussed above suggest that
the universal function of the organization’s operations remains limited. It is
quite telling that the HDR Office—the only substantive unit counting with a
somewhat universal outlook—operates partially outside of UNDP’s management
structures, similar to the organization’s Independent Evaluation Office (UNDP
2023). Also, while UNDP promotes the HDR across all member state constituencies,
much of the USD 30.7 million allocated to the HDR Office for the 2022–2025
period appears to be dedicated to the Office's policy support for program
countries only (UNDP 2021, 16). A similar pattern can be found with regard to
UNDP’s global publications. As a snapshot: out of UNDP’s eighteen publications
issued in July and August 2022, only four address a universal issue,10 whereas
the coverage of all other publications focuses exclusively on program countries.
What is more, most of these publications adopt a rather narrow perspective
concerned with details of project work and thus suggest that UNDP often succumbs
to mundane “developmentalism” (Pike et al. 2014), despite aspirations of being a
thought leader and global development advocate. And, although UNDP’s annual
reports provide detailed insights into how the organization works with program
countries, systematic reporting on its engagement with “developed” countries is
missing.


UNICEF

The UNICEF founding resolution from 1946 articulates a geographically flexible
focus on countries, “which were victims of aggression” and received “assistance
from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration” (UNGA 1946,
para I.1). In the aftermath of the Second World War, these were European
countries. Today, UNICEF often describes itself as guided by the Convention of
the Rights of the Child, but there is no formal mandate to that effect. In fact,
the Convention only mentions the role of UNICEF “and other United Nations
organs” in supporting member states with implementation efforts “as fall within
the scope of their mandate” (UNGA 1989, Art. 45). In its public messaging,
including its strategic plans, UNICEF has highlighted the organization’s
“universal mandate to secure the rights of all children, everywhere” (UNICEF
2022, 3). Impact indicators in its integrated results framework apply globally,
but a considerably longer section with outcome and output indicators covers only
member states where UNICEF has a field presence, i.e., program countries.

Like UNDP, UNICEF can—by its executive board regulations—only allocate financial
resources to program countries.11 Its operational engagement thus has a strong
focus on “developing” countries where it works through a dense net of country
offices (UNICEF n.d.b).12 Similar to UNDP, UNICEF headquarters are based in New
York and build on a network of support offices across selected “developed”
countries, including a service center in Budapest, a fundraising and
partnerships division in Geneva, as well as other offices in Copenhagen,
Brussels, Tokyo, and Seoul (UNICEF n.d.b). Out of UNICEF’s seven regional
offices, two are based in high-income countries: the one for Europe and Central
Asia in Geneva, and the one for Latin America and the Caribbean in Panama City.
Through its national committees, UNICEF also contains a more substantial (if
indirect) presence focused on domestic dynamics in “developed” countries. There
are currently thirty-three national committees operating almost exclusively in
OECD countries, and, except for Turkey, all member states hosting a national
committee are high-income countries (UNICEF n.d.c). While national committees
are legally independent entities registered as non-governmental bodies under a
member state’s jurisdiction, UNICEF sees them as an extended arm of the
organization that operates under its strategic plan and “collectively raise[s]
around one-third of UNICEF’s annual income” (UNICEF n.d.c, n.p.).

Embedded in UNICEF’s attachment to universal global frameworks, the
organization’s engagement with high-income countries became the subject of an
internal review following the adoption of the SDGs (UNICEF 2021a). According to
that review, UNICEF’s functions in “developed” countries largely resonate with
the organization’s work in program countries and include advocacy, technical
support, capacity building, and monitoring exercises. While these operational
activities are mostly conducted by national committees, some involve
collaboration with UNICEF headquarters. Examples are developing standards for
children in refugee hostels in Germany and advocating for laws punishing the
sexual abuse of minors in Japan (UNICEF 2021a, 7 and 9). A different model is
reflected in UNICEF’s country office in Greece—the only example of that type we
have identified—that opened in 2020 with the intention to help the government
strengthen children’s rights domestically (UNICEF n.d.f).

Mirroring UNDP’s Human Development Report, UNICEF’s annual flagship publication
“State of the World’s Children” provides children-related data and analysis from
across all member states. In a recent edition, Ireland and Spain—two “developed”
countries—figure among eleven country case studies (UNICEF 2021b). Other
examples of publications with universal coverage include a report on internet
access (UNICEF 2020) or UNICEF’s Children Climate Risk Index (UNICEF 2021c),
which, again, covers all member states. Similar to UNDP, UNICEF maintains an
equally detached but significantly larger research office, the “UNICEF
Innocenti,” located in Florence. While the office’s research covers all aspects
of UNICEF’s work and reflects a strong focus on program countries, some
publications explicitly deal with high-income contexts. Compared to UNDP, UNICEF
also has a more systematic global monitoring and advocacy function. UNICEF
databases provide country-level information for all UN member states (UNICEF
n.d.d), although the coverage of indicators for high-income countries is
patchier than that for program countries where county offices report additional
data. While UNICEF seems less engaged in broad global initiatives than UNDP, its
global advocacy is reflected in partnerships and outreach mechanisms such as
UNICEF’s Youth Advocates that bring together representatives from countries
across all income categories (UNICEF 2024).

Despite different examples of UNICEF’s engagement with “developed” countries and
the universal nature of a number of its functions, the overall scope of UNICEF’s
work in high-income settings remains limited. Financially, the amounts directed
to UINCEF’s work there are tiny when compared to UNICEF’s overall budget. Out of
a total income of more than USD 7 billion in 2020, only USD 53 million—i.e.,
less than 1 percent—were invested domestically by UNICEF’s thirty-three national
committees. As by UNICEF regulations, national committees are only allowed to
spend up to 5 percent of domestically raised resources on staff and advocacy at
the national level (UNICEF 2021a, 13). This is arguably to ensure that such
“local resources” do not compete with funds raised for UNICEF work in program
countries, perhaps also to maintain the image of UNICEF as an organization that
is focused on the world’s neediest children. A failed policy initiative
illustrates the influence of established patterns: The idea of “A million
volunteers for UNICEF” had been that private donors—mostly individuals based in
high-income countries that provide approximately one-third of the organization's
financial resources—speak out as citizens to target domestic policies in their
home countries. However, the initiative raised concerns—particularly within the
US government—about the corporate identity of UNICEF as being focused on poor
children in the “developing” world (and arguably also about a UN body meddling
with US domestic politics) and was eventually abandoned.13

It also remains unclear how much UNICEF spends on global advocacy with a
universal outlook. Although UNICEF’s budget includes a “global program” item,
resources under that item also cover UNICEF’s seven regional offices and are
therefore—via regional schemes—likely to primarily fund work in program
countries. UNICEF’s accountability structure also remains focused on program
countries. For the organization’s strategic plan and its results framework,
effectiveness indicators such as “X countries have policies on topic Y” only
apply to program countries (UNICEF 2021d), meaning that UNICEF’s engagement with
“developed” countries—albeit varied—takes place largely outside the
organization’s monitoring and accountability structures.


UN WOMEN

Set up in 2012, the UN entity for gender equality and the empowerment of women
(UN Women) shares certain features with UNICEF, although it is a significantly
smaller UN body with a 2022 budget of roughly USD 600 million (ECOSOC 2024). UN
Women is closely linked to universal UN frameworks on gender equality, such as
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
Its founding resolution includes an explicitly universal mandate: “Based on the
principle of universality, the Entity shall provide, through its normative
support functions and operational activities, guidance and technical support to
all Member States” (UNGA 2010, para 51b). The explicit reference to operational
activities highlights that UN Women’s universal mandate is not restricted to the
entity’s normative work. UN Women’s current strategic plan explicitly highlights
that the entity “will leverage its role as a global thought leader to explore
the possibility of offering advisory services for a fee to help partners beyond
traditional programme contexts and upon their request to apply technical, policy
and programming expertise to their local contexts” (UN-Women 2021, 22).

Despite this universal mandate, however, UN Women’s operational work has a
strong bend toward low- and middle-income countries (UN-Women n.d.a), reflecting
UNDP’s and UNICEF’s engagement patterns. During an interview, a UN Women
official estimated that around 1 percent of the organization’s operational
resources are usually spent on high-income countries.14 This also shows in how
UN Women presents itself publicly: The UN Women annual report for 2019–2020, for
instance, focuses exclusively on program countries (UN-Women 2020). In terms of
organizational presence, UN Women has five regional offices, of which only the
one for Latin America and the Caribbean is located in a high-income country
(Panama, as with UNDP and UNICEF). While UN Women has a network of sixty-six
(multi-)country or sub-regional offices, only a small number of high-income
countries—notably Argentina and Uruguay—currently host country offices. The
organization’s liaison offices in Geneva, Tokyo, Washington DC, Brussels,
Copenhagen, and Abu Dhabi are based in high-income settings, and there is one in
Addis Ababa to ensure proximity with the African Union (UN-Women n.d.b).

Similar to UNICEF, UN Women also has national committees, although significantly
fewer: There are currently thirteen member states—all of them “developed”
high-income countries—that host national committees as “independent non-profit,
non-governmental organizations” (UN-Women n.d.c., n.p.). These national
committees are supposed to “support the mission of UN-Women by conducting
fundraising activities [. . .] to support UN-Women programmes worldwide, raising
public awareness and advocacy initiatives on UN-Women and global women’s issues,
as well as supporting UN-Women’s relations with the Government” (UN-Women n.d.c,
n.p.). This includes a mandate for advocacy and policy advice at the domestic
level, and interviews suggest that national committees are indeed filling that
role, usually by using UN Women’s global advocacy material.15 When consulted for
this study, the German national committee highlighted its advocacy and policy
advice activities, such as on women empowerment in the business context
(UN-Women Nationales Komitee 2021, 11) and with regard to a new federal law on
gender equality.16 While the German national committee works in close
cooperation with and as part of broader civil society networks in the country,
there is no operational coordination with UN Women’s headquarters.

Unlike UNDP and UNICEF, UN Women has an explicit mandate to provide policy
advice to “countries where UN-Women has no programmatic presence” (UN-Women
2012, n.p.) and, on paper, counts with a clear roadmap for how this is to be
implemented:

> regional offices will serve as the primary point of contact for countries in
> their region. For example, requests … from Western Europe will be covered by
> the regional office for Europe and Central Asia and supported by UN-Women
> headquarters as required. Support to non-programme countries will be borne by
> earmarked contributions from the respective country requesting assistance.

So far, however, such requests have been scarce. An exception seems to have been
UN Women’s engagement with the Japanese government on gender issues.17
Similarly, UN Women’s office in Brussels serves to not only partner with the
European Union (EU) on global work but also “contribute to the strengthening of
gender equality in EU policies” (UN Brussels n.d., n.p.), potentially opening
the door for policy engagement in “developed” country settings beyond national
committee work. While UN Women’s operational activities in high-income countries
are minimal compared to its portfolios in program countries, some noteworthy
examples include the “safe cities and safe public spaces programme” with
activities in Dublin, Winnipeg, Sakai, and Brussels (UN-Women 2017, 20) and the
“Unstereotype Alliance” with activities in Australia, Japan, and the United
Kingdom (Unstereotype Alliance n.d.). According to interviews, UN Women has no
intention to specifically include “developed” countries in projects as the
organization is said to be “agnostic”18 about country types when designing and
implementing global initiatives.

While UN Women has (co-)led global campaigns to promote gender equality—such as
“HeForShe” (HeForShe n.d.)—the organization’s global advocacy also mirrors that
of UNDP and UNICEF in centering on a flagship report with universal coverage.
“Progress of the world’s women” presents comprehensive data on all member
states, irrespective of income status, and can therefore also be of use to
(multilateral work with) “developed” countries. UN Women has also published
other reports with a universal outlook, including “Turning promises into action:
Gender equality in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (UN-Women 2018).
In 2022, UN Women and UNDP co-published “Government responses to COVID-19:
Lessons on gender equality for a world in turmoil,” which systematically
analyzed all countries and territories around the world. While interviews
suggest that, according to UN Women’s self-assessment, some of these reports do
have traction in high-income settings,19 UN Women’s standard reports focus more
on program countries. Similar to UNDP and UNICEF, UN Women publications beyond
its flagship report are not flagged as universally relevant and therefore seem
to have little to no resonance with domestic discussions in “developed”
countries.20 In line with its annual reports and overall funding allocation, the
main focus of UN Women’s development support is directed at “developing”
countries.


THE FUTURE OF UN DEVELOPMENT WORK

Despite partly substantial variance across mandates and engagement practices,
the status quo of operational development work at the three UN entities examined
above continues to reflect entrenched North–South templates. From a functional
perspective, this is problematic because their predominant (and sometimes
exclusive) focus on program countries severely limits the ability of these UN
bodies to analyze and effectively address interlinkages and externalities that
are part and parcel of global sustainability challenges. From a normative
perspective, and relatedly, the ways in which UNDP, UNICEF, and UN Women
practice multilateral development work continue to perpetuate binary patterns of
(funding allocations by) rich countries influencing the content and contours of
interventions in poor countries that are perceived as outdated and unfair.

What, then, could—or should—an alternative setup for the UN development pillar
look like that responds to pressing functional needs in the fight against global
sustainability challenges and addresses key normative demands for more equitable
multilateralism? As argued above, we suggest that universalizing UN development
work is a key step toward making sure that the UN delivers on supporting member
states with, and remains a relevant player in, sustainable development
processes. The expansion of UN development work toward “developed” countries
should not follow the logic of simply integrating the latter into existing UN
country office networks. In line with the notion of differentiated universality,
UN entities should rather follow a tailored and context-specific approach. While
certain types of needs—such as poverty alleviation—are set to remain more
prevalent among today’s program countries, “developed” countries would require
types of support that might be less based on the UN’s physical presence through
field offices and the use of financial resources for implementing projects.

Instead, we suggest a leaner model for UN engagement with high-income countries,
requiring an inherently selective and expertise-oriented approach. Mechanisms of
engagement at the country level would center on policy advice, contributions to
public debate, and, in a circumscribed manner, targeted operational support. At
the global level, the UN would have to strengthen its monitoring capacity (in
particular with regard to externalities) and accompany revamped
intergovernmental processes. Irrespective of the concrete organizational
contours such a reformed UN engagement with “developed” countries would take, we
argue that, overall, the UN’s development arm should focus on three functions
that are set to improve the ability of the UN to deliver: providing an inclusive
governance platform, monitoring sustainability challenges, and facilitating
learning across established divides. While the political economy of such an
overhaul of UN development work might seem daunting, we suggest that member
states across the board would benefit from a UN development pillar with a more
universal outlook.


PROVIDING AN INCLUSIVE GOVERNANCE PLATFORM

Developing countries’ structural positions in the UN have long been marked by
inferiority, not just because of obvious material power differentials but also
by way of symbolic hierarchies. It makes for unhealthy multilateralism if one
set of member states is labeled as deficient (“developing”) while others are
framed as accomplished (“developed”), and if one side provides solutions while
the other side occupies the undignified position of “recipient.” Even though
factual differences in development persist, such incomplete convergence (Horner
and Hulme 2017) does not justify unequal multilateral governance conditions. On
the contrary, the UN needs to provide a platform to “put the relationship
between “poor Southern” and “rich Western” countries onto an equal and fair
footing”21 as a condition for effectively dealing with common challenges.
Currently, the one-country-one-vote principle of the UN General Assembly
notwithstanding, rich member states can influence UN country programs in
developing countries, but the reverse option does not exist. Developing
countries can address or co-shape conditions in high-income countries through UN
mechanisms only in indirect ways, if at all, such as General Assembly or Human
Rights Council resolutions that are of a general and non-binding nature. As
constantly being on the receiving end of UN processes can contribute to a
general skepticism about multilateral cooperation (Jenks and Jones 2013), a more
egalitarian approach is needed to increase the legitimacy—and the
effectiveness—of UN sustainable development support over the long run.


MONITORING SUSTAINABILITY CHALLENGES

A key function of multilateral organizations is to provide systematic global
monitoring as a basis for coordination and collective action. While the UN
already engages in universal SDG monitoring, including through the High-Level
Political Forum, it so far lacks a qualitatively deeper analysis of trends and
challenges. The monitoring we have in mind should be oriented toward identifying
both problems and solutions. In line with the distinction between domestic and
international responsibilities under the 2030 Agenda (Knoll et al. 2015), the
UN’s monitoring needs to include data on how countries address, or fail to
address, sustainable development challenges domestically in order to get at the
underlying hurdles of SDG implementation globally. It also needs to focus on
externalities as a basis for initiating action. As described above, “developed”
countries have been at the forefront of producing such externalities, and UN
monitoring functions therefore need to include an explicit focus on where and
how they unfold. Finally, monitoring data need to be translated into narratives
and strategies that speak to wider audiences and guide the way toward practical
and context-specific solutions. Public discourse in wealthy countries tends to
have blind spots with regard to the problematic spill-over effects of production
and consumption patterns, the insufficient action on climate change mitigation
being a prominent example (Carrington 2023). Recently adopted EU measures to
regulate the supply chains of EU-based companies beyond EU borders (Naranjan
2024), for instance, might have seen the light of day earlier with external
impetus. It is not difficult to think of other issues - from labor migration to
the externalities of "green" energy production - where high-income countries
need to be part and parcel of attempts to solve problems elsewhere, or to
address global collective concerns, and where the UN should have a role in
setting agendas and identifying potential solutions.


FACILITATING LEARNING ACROSS ESTABLISHED DIVIDES

While sustainability challenges do not align with national borders and often
ignore North–South divisions, the UN’s thinking about sustainable
development—with exceptions (see above)—remains focused on “developing”
countries. At the same time, bodies like the OECD produce their own analyses
with a focus on their (primarily “developed”) member states, highlighting the
extent to which “such enduringly disconnected approaches are limiting in an
increasingly globalized and inter-dependent world, creating gaps in our
understanding and fragmenting our collective knowledge” (Pike et al. 2014, 22).
As outlined above, reports published by UN funds and programs primarily focus on
projects implemented across the South, thus contributing to reproducing myopic
views—manifested also in the negotiation of the 2030 Agenda (Denk 2021) and the
General Assembly more generally (Baumann 2018)—on what sustainable development
is and how it is to be supported multilaterally. Horner (2020, 422) therefore
demands a “move towards thinking about comparisons, convergences, connections,”
reflecting a more general need “to reconfigure a geo-politics of knowledge based
upon the whole range of experiences used to inform the nature of change and
differentiation” (Jones 2000, 240). In our view, the UN is uniquely positioned
to overcome engrained “epistemic and institutional divides” (McFarlane 2006, 6)
for more effective policy advice and advocacy. This can work both ways. With
their considerable institutional and financial capacities, high-income countries
provide examples of both successful and problematic development trajectories. At
the same time, there is an increasing number of policy areas—from digitalization
and urbanization to pandemic or disaster preparedness—where “developed”
countries can benefit from lessons learned elsewhere (Lewis 2017). A more
universal way of thinking and operating could therefore strengthen the epistemic
authority of the UN in national and global sustainable development processes.


THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNIVERSALIZING UN DEVELOPMENT WORK

The so far marginal role of UN development work with “developed” countries
suggests that there might be a number of potentially serious objections to the
more universal multilateral functions discussed above. In fact, member states on
both sides of what is often still perceived as an entrenched North–South divide
are likely to take issue with transformative proposals, albeit for different
reasons. With regard to questions of responsibility, the G77 continues to
highlight that rich countries—that have disproportionally benefitted from
colonial exploitation and global capitalist structures—have a duty to support
poorer countries financially and provide the bulk of funding for UN development
work (G77 2024). This is not only a dominant theme in the UN General Assembly
(UNGA 2020) but also a key rationale of the ODA regime with its focus on
promoting the “welfare of developing countries” (OECD n.d., n.p.). Attempts to
extend the UN’s operational work more substantially to “developed” countries
would arguably give rise to fears that program countries lose political
attention and financial resources. Similar fears have stifled the debate about
enlarging the role of the UN in global public goods provision, which would imply
resource allocation logics not based on national poverty levels but on a
country’s links with or potential contribution to global concerns (Jenks and
Jones 2013). “Developed” countries themselves, in turn, might use this argument
in an attempt to stick to the status quo that allows them to exercise influence
abroad as donors but limits UN entities’ ability to interfere in their own
domestic spheres.22 Where universal mechanisms already exist, such as in the
UN’s human rights pillar, “developed” countries have often not been amused when
the UN’s focus turns to their domestic challenges.23 UN entities, finally, will
arguably be reluctant to meddle with both the “developing” country majority of
their membership and the “developed” member states they depend on financially.

While politically salient, these objections are rooted in a traditional
North-to-South aid paradigm. As such, they have little to do with UN principles
or, indeed, the role the UN was initially thought to play in supporting its
member states. The UN Charter highlights the UN’s role in promoting “conditions
of economic and social progress and development” (UN 1945, Article 55) but does
not stipulate that this refers exclusively to a subset of member states. As the
most recent authoritative development-related framework, the 2030 Agenda links
the UN’s longstanding development function with more encompassing sustainability
concerns. These concerns underline the extent to which the current setup of the
UN’s operational work—with its heavy focus on program country presence and
project delivery—is a contingent development that has long been criticized as
ineffective (see Browne and Weiss 2013).

Against this backdrop, the current political economy of UN development work is
not set in stone. There are a number of reasons for taking steps toward a more
universal system of multilateral development cooperation that eventually
benefits all. A universal approach—that engages with all member states—would
strengthen the UN’s standing as a set of multilateral entities addressing issues
that matter politically for the entirety of its membership, and not only for a
subset of countries where the UN—through its development work—has been
particularly visible (see Parizek 2024). A significantly expanded portfolio and
a more integrated approach to tackling cross-border challenges would make a
universality rationale attractive to UN leaders and staff who want to not only
secure the expansion or consolidation of the UN development branch but also
strengthen its ability to deliver for all member states. “Developed” countries,
in turn, would receive UN support on how to respond more effectively to global
sustainability challenges that already affect their space of maneuver, from
migration to climate change or energy supply (European Parliament 2022; Damen
2023). Universalizing UN development work would also provide a step toward
recasting the role of Northern member states at the UN that has become
problematic, as Southern counterparts often perceive them as self-righteous and
lacking in commitment to address economic and environmental interdependencies.24
Southern countries, in turn, would gain a new level of equality and voice in the
UN development pillar. They would get a multilateral development system that
provides tools to hold “developed” countries to account in more meaningful ways,
and on issues that matter for their development paths.

It goes without saying that the revamped and universalized UN development
functions outlined above would incur additional costs. However, this does not
necessarily mean that the financial support for program countries would be
reduced. As financial backbone of the status quo, “developed” states already
support the UN not (only) out of charity, or because of historical
responsibilities, but (also) because they see a strategic self-interest in doing
so (Lancaster 2007; Weinlich et al. 2020). More importantly, as the UN’s
engagement with “developed” countries would not emulate the significant levels
of UN operational expenditure in today’s program countries, related costs “would
not make a dent in [the] overall distribution of resources” (Palm 2020, 9).
Extrapolations are difficult, but for the sake of gauging the magnitude of
financial implications, funding for a small UN presence in “developed” countries
would mirror that currently received by Southern high-income countries that host
a UN resident coordinator. Building on the example of Uruguay where the UN’s
presence currently operates with an annual budget of about USD 15 million,25
additional funds required to resource a basic UN presence in the approximately
forty member states that are currently not covered by UN development entities
would collectively amount to USD 600 million. This is slightly more than 1
percent of the UN development system’s total expenses in 2022.

What is more, the overhaul of the UN development system in line with
universality provisions could go hand in hand with a more general reform of how
UN development entities are funded. The excessive use of earmarked voluntary
funding, currently amounting to 84 percent of all resources managed by the UN
development system (UN 2024, 1), has led to significant and often
disproportionate donor influence over UN portfolios (Weinlich et al. 2020).
Instead, a key part of UN development work could be funded in line with the
scale of assessments already used for the UN’s regular budget that has long been
accepted by all member states as a fair burden-sharing formula (Baumann and Haug
2024). According to that scale—which arguably “epitomizes a mechanism that
combines concerns for universality with the logic of differentiation” (Haug et
al. 2022, 8)—all countries contribute in line with their abilities as the
formula used for calculating membership fees takes into account income levels
and debt burden and includes exceptions for particularly dire circumstances.
Receiving contributions from all (which differ according to individual
countries’ economic abilities) to provide support to all (unfolding in line with
individual countries’ needs and challenges) would allow UN development entities
to get ready for a future that is likely to differ significantly from what the
world looked like when the distinction between program countries and donors
first got traction.


CONCLUSION

Against the backdrop of ongoing shifts in the global development landscape and
attempts by the 2030 Agenda to put forward a more universal understanding of
development, this paper has examined the link between the principle of
universality and UN development work. The empirical analysis of the status quo
has focused on UNDP, UNICEF, and UN Women as three entities that stand at the
core of the UN development system. Our findings suggest that all three entities,
despite partly substantial differences in mandates and engagement practices,
continue to have a strong—in the case of UNDP de facto exclusive—operational
focus on program countries, in line with long-standing General Assembly
mandates. Their outlook has not fundamentally changed since the adoption of the
2030 Agenda: They remain committed to supporting “developing” countries and
approach “developed” countries primarily or exclusively as donors. At the same
time, however, all three entities publish annual flagship reports with universal
coverage and engage in some global monitoring, data analysis, and advocacy
activities that also cover “developed” countries. In addition, UNICEF and UN
Women can count on networks of national committees that provide a
semi-independent mechanism for working with “developed” country constituencies,
and they can build on a few concrete examples of contributing to policy
processes in high-income settings.

While member states across the board and the UN itself would probably raise a
number of objections to attempts at universalizing multilateral development
work, we have outlined a political economy of a more universal UN development
system that combines rather limited additional costs with benefits for all
parties involved, particularly over the long run. This revamped approach to how
UN development work is funded, and how it operates, also resonates with ongoing
shifts in the global political landscape. Spurred by crises, including the
COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war against Ukraine, Southern countries have
become increasingly outspoken about their desire for greater voice and
representation. In 2023, the G77 used their majority in the UN General Assembly
to initiate negotiations of a binding international framework on global tax
cooperation, an issue where they feel disadvantaged by existing rules emanating
from the OECD (Hearson 2023). Current discussions among “developed” countries to
reform the ODA regime provide another potential opening (Cutts n.d.), as
established allocation rules in the UN development system largely operate as an
organizational shadow of the ODA regime (Borchmeyer and Mir 2019, 11–4). If
adopted, revamped ODA rules— taking into account global public goods and climate
finance logics—would remove or soften what is currently a major disincentive for
UN development entities to operationally engage with “developed” countries and
provide space for more universal perspectives on (the potential of) UN
development work.

Overall, our analysis suggests that the notion of differentiated
universality—combining a commitment to the universality principle with a focus
on the highly diverse realities of UN member states—should inform a much-needed
reform of how the UN supports sustainable development concerns. Instead of
bowing in front of development or income classifications that are often
unrelated to sustainable development challenges, a universalized UN development
function would be part of a more egalitarian and more effective approach to
multilateral cooperation that focuses on domestic and trans-border challenges no
matter where they occur.


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank colleagues and interviewees for sharing insights into
their take on the (potential) contours of UN development work, as well as Leonie
Christel, Orel Scheinin, and Franziska Schweitzer for their support during the
first steps of this project. We are also grateful to Marianne Beisheim, Anita
Breuer, Niels Keijzer, Stephan Klingebiel, Adolf Kloke-Lesch, Detlef Palm, Silke
Weinlich, and participants at the 2023 conference of the Academic Council on the
United Nations System (ACUNS) for their feedback on earlier iterations of our
thinking about the link between universality and the future of the UN
development pillar.


FOOTNOTES

1

“Program countries” are member states that host a UN resident coordinator. With
some exceptions, they are low- and middle-income countries as defined by the
World Bank.

2

In what follows, we use the terms “developed” countries, “Northern” countries,
and “donors” interchangeably.

3

While some program countries provide their own—so-called local—resources to UN
entities, the major part of UN development funding comes from “developed”
country donors.

4

Interview, independent expert, April 2022.

5

This number is based on the UN development system’s expenses for “development
activities,” which totaled USD 20.13 billion in 2022; it excludes humanitarian
spending, which for UNICEF constituted 57 percent of organizational expenses.

6

Interview, UNDP official, October 2022.

7

Interview, UNDP official, September 2022. The HDR Office does not systematically
track the policy impact of its analyses.

8

Interview, UNDP official, November 2022.

9

Interview, UNDP official, November 2022.

10

All connected to the Global Commission on HIV and the Law, where UNDP acts as
secretariat.

11

UNICEF country offices stop receiving funding after the member state in question
“achieves ‘high income’ status for two years.” If activities continue, they are
funded through domestic resources; see UNICEF (n.d.a).

12

Only a small number of high-income countries—including Romania and Bulgaria—have
a UNICEF country office; see UNICEF (n.d.e).

13

Interview, UN official, November 2022.

14

Interview, UN Women official, November 2022.

15

Interview, UN Women official, November 2022.

16

Interview, UN Women National Committee Germany official, October 2022.

17

Interview, UN Women official, November 2022.

18

Interview, UN Women official, November 2022.

19

Interview, UN Women official, November 2022.

20

Interviews, September 2022 to March 2023.

21

Written comment by Detlef Palm, January 2024.

22

On controversies over UN voices speaking out against poverty in the United
Kingdom, for instance, see BBC (2019).

23

Interview with UN staff, May 2024.

24

Interviews with member state representatives, September 2022 to May 2024.

25

A similar amount is provided through local resources; interview, UN official,
October 2023.


REFERENCES

Abbot
Kenneth
,
Snidal
Duncan
.
1998
. “
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations
.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution
.
42
(
1
):
3
–
32
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Acharya
Amitav
.
2011
.
Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond the
West
.
Millennium
,
39
(
3
),
619
–
637
.
10.1177/0305829811406574
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Alonso
Jose Antonio
,
Glennie
Jonathan
,
Sumner
Andy
.
2014
. “
Recipients and Contributors: Middle Income Countries and the Future of
Development Cooperation
.”
DESA Working Paper 135
.



Appiah Kwame
Anthony
.
2006
.
Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers
.
New York City
:
W.W. Norton & Co.



Baumann
Max-Otto
,
Haug
Sebastian
.
2024
. “
Financing the United Nations: Status Quo, Challenges and Reform Options
.”
FES-IDOS Study
. Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://ny.fes.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Financing_the_UN_online.pdf.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

Baumann
Max-Otto
.
2018
. “
Forever North–South? The Political Challenges of Reforming the UN Development
System
.”
Third World Quarterly
.
39
(
4
):
626
–
41
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation]
.
2019
. “
Poverty in the UK Is ‘Systematic’ and ‘Tragic’, Says UN Special Rapporteur
.”
BBC News
.
May 22
. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-48354692.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

Borchmeyer
Sebastian
,
Mir
Wasim
.
2019
. “
Reevaluating the United Nations Secretariat’s Contribution to Economic
Development
.”
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
. Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://www.kas.de/en/web/newyork/single-title/-/content/reevaluating-the-united-nations-secretariat-s-contribution-to-economic-development.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

Brand
Ulrich
,
Wissen
Markus
.
2021
.
The Imperial Mode of Living: Everyday Life And The Ecological Crisis of
Capitalism
.
London
:
Verso Books
.



Google Scholar

Google Preview

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

COPAC
 

Browne
Stephen
,
Weiss
Thomas
.
2013
. “
Is the UN Development System Becoming Irrelevant?
”
Development Dialogue Paper No. 4
. Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://www.futureun.org/media/archive1/reports/FUNDS-UNDSBecomingIrrelevant.pdf.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

Butler
Colin
.
2017
. “
Limits to Growth, Planetary Boundaries, and Planetary Health
.”
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability
.
25
:
59
–
65
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Carrington
Damian
.
2023
.
Action to protect against climate crisis ‘woefully inadequate’, UN warns. The
Guardian
.
2 November 2023
.
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/nov/02/action-to-protect-against-climate-crisis-woefully-inadequate-un-warns.



Clark
Rob
.
2017
. “
Quotas Operandi: Examining the Distribution of Voting Power at the IMF and World
Bank
.”
The Sociological Quarterly
.
58
(
4
):
595
–
621
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Cutts
Stephen
.
n.d.
  “
ODA Reform: Why this Matters
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024. https://www.odareform.org/why-this-matters.



Denk
Albert
.
2021
.
Nachhaltige Entwicklung und globale Ungleichheit: Eine wissenspolitologische
Studie über die Entwicklungsagenda der Vereinten Nationen
.
Baden-Baden
:
Nomos
.



Damen
Mario
.
2023
. “
Four Challenges of the Energy Crisis for the EU’s Strategic Autonomy
.”
European Parliament Briefing
. Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/747099/EPRS_BRI(2023)747099_EN.pdf.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

ECOSOC [United Nations Economic and Social Council]
.
2024
. “
Statistical Annex on 2022 Funding Data
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://ecosoc.un.org/en/what-we-do/oas-qcpr/quick-links/2024-operational-activities-development-segment.



European Parliament
.
2019
. “
Europe’s Approach to Implementing the Sustainable Development Goals: Good
Practices and the Way Forward
.”
Paper
. Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/160360/DEVE%20study%20on%20EU%20SDG%20implementation%20formatted.pdf.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

Escobar
Arturo
.
2011
.
Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World
.
Princeton
:
Princeton University Press
.



Google Scholar

Google Preview

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

COPAC
 

Escobar
Arturo
.
2022
.
The Future of Climate Migration
.”
Briefing
. Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/729334/EPRS_ATA(2022)729334_EN.pdf.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

Fomerand
Jacques
,
Dennis
Dijkzeul
,
2018
),
'UN Development System'
,
in Thomas G. Weiss, and Sam Daws (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the United
Nations
, 2nd edn(
accessed 23 Oct 2024
.
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803164.013.36
,



Google Scholar

Google Preview

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

COPAC

Crossref

 

G77 [Group of 77]
.
2024
. “
Third South Summit Outcome Document
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024. https://www.g77.org/doc/3southsummit_outcome.htm.



Gerring
John
,
Cojocaru
Lee
.
2016
. “
Selecting Cases for Intensive Analysis: A Diversity of Goals and Methods
.”
Sociological Methods & Research
.
45
(
3
):
392
–
423
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Haug
Sebastian
,
Gulrajani
Nilima
,
Weinlich
Silke
.
2022
. “
International Organizations and Differentiated Universality: Reinvigorating
Assessed Contributions in United Nations Funding
.”
Global Perspectives
.
3
(
1
):
39780
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Haug
Sebastian
,
Taggart
Jack
.
2024
. “
Transnationalisation Light: Non-State Inclusion and North/South Differentials in
Global Development Governance
.” In
Transnational Cooperation: An Explorative Collection
, edited by
Grimm
Sven
,
Klingebiel
Stephan
,
28
–
32
.,
Bonn
:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability
.
IDOS Discussion Paper 04/2024
.



Google Scholar

Google Preview

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

COPAC
 

Haug
Sebastian
.
2021
. “
A Thirdspace Approach to the ‘Global South’: Insights from the Margins of a
Popular Category
.”
Third World Quarterly
.
42
(
9
):
2018
–
38
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Hayden
 
Patrick
.
2005
.
Cosmopolitan Global Politics
. London:
Routledge
.



Google Scholar

Google Preview

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

COPAC
 

Hearson
Martin
.
2023
. “
A New UN Tax Convention—How Will It Change Global Tax Governance?
”
International Center for Tax & Development
. Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://www.ictd.ac/blog/the-new-un-tax-convention-a-critical-juncture-for-global-tax-governance/.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

HeForShe
.
n.d.
  “
The UN Global Solidarity Movement for Gender Equality
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024. https://www.heforshe.org/en.



Henkin
Louis
.
1989
. “
The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights
.”
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
.
506
:
10
–
16
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Horner
Rory
,
Hulme
David
.
2017
. “
From International to Global Development: New Geographies of 21st Century
Development
.”
Development and Change
.
50
(
2
):
347
–
78
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Horner
Rory
.
2020
. “
Towards a New Paradigm of Global Development? Beyond the Limits of International
Development
.”
Progress in Human Geography
.
44
(
3
):
415
–
36
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Iriye
Akira
, ed.
2014
.
Global Interdependence: The World after 1945
.
Cambridge
:
Harvard University Press
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


Google Preview

WorldCat

COPAC
 

Jenks
Bruce
,
Jones
Bruce
.
2013
.
United Nations Development at a Crossroads
.
New York
:
Center on International Cooperation
.



Google Scholar

Google Preview

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

COPAC
 

Johnson
Tana
,
Heiss
Andrew
.
2018
. “
Liberal Institutionalism: Its Threatened Past, Its Threatened Future
.”
Brookings
. Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/liberal-institutionalism-its-threatened-past-its-threatened-future/.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

Jones
Peris
.
2000
. “
Why Is It Alright to Do Development ‘Over There’ But Not ‘Here’? Changing
Vocabularies and Common Strategies of Inclusion across the ‘First’ and ‘Third’
Worlds’
.”
Area
.
32
(
2
):
237
–
41
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Keohane
Robert
.
2012
. “
Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism
.”
International Relations
.
26
(
2
):
125
–
138
.. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0047117812438451.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Keohane
Robert
, and
Joseph
Nye
.
1977
.
Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition
.
New York
:
Little, Brown and Company
.
https://www.amazon.com/Power-Interdependence-World-Politics-Transition/dp/0316489360.



Kloke-Lesch
Adolf
.
2021
. “
The Untapped Functions of International Cooperation in the Age of Sustainable
Development
.” In
The Palgrave Handbook of Development Cooperation for Achieving the 2030 Agenda
,
edited by
Chaturvedi
Sachin
et al. ,
127
–
63
.,
Basingstoke
:
Palgrave Macmillan
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


Google Preview

WorldCat

COPAC
 

Knoll
Anna
,
Grosse-Puppendahl
Sebastian
,
Mackie
James
.
2015
. “
Universality and Differentiation in the Post-2015 Development Agenda
.”
ecdpm Discussion Paper No. 173
.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

Lancaster
Carol
.
2007
.
Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, and Domestic Politics
.
Chicago, IL
:
University of Chicago Press
.



Google Scholar

Google Preview

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

COPAC
 

Lees
Nicholas
.
2023
. “
The Endurance of the G77 in International Relations: South–South Ideology and
Voting at the United Nations 1970–2015
.”
Japanese Journal of Political Science
.
24
(
3
):
310
–
30
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Lewis
Davis
.
2017
. “
Should We Pay More Attention to South–North Learning?
”
Human Service Organizations
.
41
(
4
):
327
–
31
.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

Long
Graham
.
2015
. “
The Idea of Universality in the Sustainable Development Goals
.”
Ethics & International Affairs
.
29
(
2
):
203
–
22
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Luomi
Mari
.
2020
. “
Global Climate Change Governance: The Search for Effectiveness and Universality
.”
IISD Earth Negotiations Bulletin
.
6
:
1
–
11
.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

McFarlane
Colin
.
2006
. “
Crossing Borders: Development, Learning and the North–South Divide
.”
Third World Quarterly
.
27
(
8
):
1413
–
37
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Messner
Dirk
,
Scholz
Imme
.
2018
. “
Globale Gemeinwohlorientierung als Fluchtpunkt internationaler Kooperation für
nachhaltige Entwicklung: Ein Perspektivwechsel
.”
Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik
.
11
:
561
–
72
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Milanovic
Branco
.
2024
. “
The Three Eras of Global Inequality, 1820–2020 with the Focus on the Past Thirty
Years
.”
World Development
.
177
:
106516
.
10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106516
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Naranjan
Ajit
.
2024
. “
EU Approves Watered-Down Human Rights and Supply Chain Law
.”
The Guardian
.
March 15
.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/15/eu-approves-watered-down-human-rights-and-supply-chain-law.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

O'Connor
David
,
Mackie
James
,
van Esveld
Daphne
,
Kim
Hoseok
,
Scholz
Imme
,
Weitz
Nina
.
2016
. “
Universality, Integration, and Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development:
Early SDG Implementation in Selected OECD Countries
.”
World Resource Institute Working Paper
. Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Universality_Integration_and_Policy_Coherence_for_Sustainable_Development_Early_SDG_Implementation_in_Selected_OECD_Countries.pdf.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

OECD [Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development]
.
n.d.
  “
Official Development Assistance
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm.



Osborn
Derek
,
Cutter
Amy
,
Ullah
Farooq
.
2015
. “
Universal Sustainable Development Goals: Understanding the Transformational
Challenge for Developed Countries
.”
Stakeholder Forum Report
. Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1684SF_-_SDG_Universality_Report_-_May_2015.pdf.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

Palm
Detlef
.
2020
. “
The Universal Mandate
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://xunicefnewsandviews.blogspot.com/2020/11/bubble-thoughts-2-universal-mandate.html.



Parizek
Michal
.
2024
. “
Less in the West: The Tangibility of International Organizations and Their Media
Visibility around the World
.”
The Review of International Organizations
 
10.1007/s11558-024-09551-6
.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

Crossref

 

Payne
Rodger
,
Samhat
Nayef
.
2012
. “
International Organizations and Power
.”
International Studies
 
10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.454
.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

Crossref

 

Peterson
M.J.
2005
.
The UN General Assembly
.
London
:
Routledge
.



Google Scholar

Google Preview

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

COPAC
 

Pike
Andy
,
Rodríguez-Pose
Andrés
,
Tomaney
John
.
2014
. “
Local and Regional Development in the Global North and South
.”
Progress in Development Studies
.
14
(
1
):
21
–
30
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

Reus-Smit
Christian
,
Zarakol
Ayse
.
2023
. “
Polymorphic Justice and the Crisis of International Order
.”
International Affairs
.
99
(
1
):
1
–
22
.





Google Scholar

Crossref
Search ADS


WorldCat

 

UN [United Nations]
.
1945
. “
United Nations Charter
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.



UN [United Nations]
.
2024
. “
Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 75/233 on the Quadrennial
Comprehensive Policy Review of Operational Activities for Development of the
United Nations System
.”
A/79/72/Add.1-E/2024/12/Add.1
.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

UN Brussels
.
n.d.
“
UN-Women
.” Accessed 24 May, 2024. https://unric.org/en/unbt-agencies/un-women/.



UN-Women
.
2012
. “
Regional Architecture: Administrative, Budgetary and Financial Implications and
Implementation Plan
.”
UN Document UNW/2012/10
.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

UN-Women
.
2021
. “
Strategic Plan 2022–2025
.”
UN Document UNW/2021/6
.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

UN-Women
.
n.d.a
. “
Frequently Asked Questions
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https//www.unwomen.org/en/partnerships/donor-countries/frequently-asked-questions.



UN-Women
.
n.d.b
. “
Where We Are
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024. https://www.unwomen.org/en/where-we-are.



UN-Women
.
n.d.c
. “
National Committees for UN-Women
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://www.unwomen.org/en/partnerships/national-committees.



UNDP [United Nations Development Programme]
.
2021
. “
UNDP Integrated Resources Plan and Integrated Budget Estimates, 2022–2025
.”
UN Document DP/2021/29
.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

UNDP [United Nations Development Programme]
.
2023
. “
2023 Organizational Chart
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024. https://www.undp.org/organizational-chart.



UNDP [United Nations Development Programme]
.
2024
. “
Human Development Reports: Reports and Publications
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024. https://hdr.undp.org/reports-and-publications.



UNDG (United Nations Development Group)
.
2016
.
Universality and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Discussion Note,
from UNDG Lens)
.
UN Development Group. Accessed June 24, 2024
.
https://www.daghammarskjold.se/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/undg-discussion-note-on-universality-and-2030-agenda.pdf.



UNGA [United Nations General Assembly]
.
1946
. “
57 (1). Establishment of an International Children’s Emergency Fund
.”
UN Document, 11 December 1946, 56th Plenary Meeting
.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

UNGA [United Nations General Assembly]
.
1965
. “
Consolidation of the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical
Assistance in a United Nations Development Programm
.”
UN Document A/Res/2029 (XX)
.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

UNGA [United Nations General Assembly]
.
1989
. “
Convention on the Rights of the Child
.”
UN Document A/Res/44/25
.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

UNGA [United Nations General Assembly]
.
2010
. “
System-Wide Coherence
.”
UN Document A/Res/64/289
.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

UNGA [United Nations General Assembly]
.
2015
. “
Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
.”
UN Document A/Res/70/1
.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

UNGA [United Nations General Assembly]
.
2020
. “
Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review of Operational Activities for
Development of the United Nations System
.”
UN Document A/Res/75/233
.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

UNICEF [United Nations Children’s Fund]
.
2021a
. “
Progress Update on UNICEF Experience in High-Income Countries and in Countries
Transitioning from Upper-Middle-Income to High-Income Status within the
Framework of the UNICEF Universal Agenda for Child Rights
.”
UN Document E/ICEF/2021/26
.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

UNICEF [United Nations Children’s Fund]
.
2021b
.
The State of the World’s Children 2021—On My Mind: Promoting, Protecting and
Caring for Children’s Mental Health
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://www.unicef.org/reports/state-worlds-children-2021.



UNICEF [United Nations Children’s Fund]
.
2021c
. “
Children’s Climate Risk Index
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://data.unicef.org/resources/childrens-climate-risk-index-report/.



UNICEF [United Nations Children’s Fund]
.
2021d
. “
Integrated Results and Resources Framework of the UNICEF Strategic Plan,
2022–2025
.”
UN Document E/ICEF/2021/25/Add.1
.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

UNICEF [United Nations Children’s Fund]
.
2022
. “
UNICEF Strategic Plan 2022–2025. Renewed Ambition Towards 2030
.” Accessed June 24, 2024.
https://www.unicef.org/reports/unicef-strategic-plan-2022-2025.



UNICEF [United Nations Children’s Fund]
.
n.d.a
. “
Funding for Core Resources for Results
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://www.unicef.org/partnerships/funding/core-resources-for-results.



UNICEF [United Nations Children’s Fund]
.
n.d.b
.
Where We Work
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://www.unicef.org/careers/where-we-work#:∼:text=UNICEF%20headquarters%20offices%20include%20the%20following%3A%20Headquarters%2C%20New,Research%20-%20Innocenti%2C%20Florence%2C%20Italy%20Brussels%20Office%2C%20Belgium.



UNICEF [United Nations Children’s Fund]
.
n.d.c
. “
UNICEF National Committees
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024. https://www.unicef.org/unicef-national-committees.



UNICEF [United Nations Children’s Fund]
.
n.d.d
. “
Country Profiles Data
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024. https://data.unicef.org/country/.



UNICEF [United Nations Children’s Fund]
.
n.d.e
. “
Europe and Central Asia: Where We Work
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024. https://www.unicef.org/eca/where-we-work.



UNICEF [United Nations Children’s Fund]
.
n.d.f
. “
UNICEF Greece: What We Do
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024. https://www.unicef.org/greece/en/what-we-do.



UNICEF
.
2020
.
How many children and young people have internet access at home? Estimating
digital connectivity during the COVID-19 pandemic. UNICEF Report. Accessed June
24, 2024
.
https://www.unicef.org/media/88381/file/How-many-children-and-young-people-have-internet-access-at-home-2020.pdf.



UNSDG [United Nations Sustainable Development Group]
.
2023
. “
Who We Are
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024. https://unsdg.un.org/about/who-we-are.



UNICEF
.
2024
.
UNICEF Youth Advocates. Accessed October 24, 2024
. https://www.unicef.org/youth-advocates.



UNDP n.d
.
Frequently Asked Questions
.
Accessed June 24, 2024
. https://www.undp.org/egypt/faqs.



OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

Unstereotype Alliance
.
n.d.
“
About
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024. https://www.unstereotypealliance.org/en/about.



Van der Heijden
Kitty
,
Olsen
Simon Hoiberg
,
Scott
Andrew
.
2014
. “
From Solidarity to Universality. How Global Interdependence Impacts the
Post-2015 Development Agenda
.”
Independent Research Forum Background Paper 1
. Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://www.iied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/migrate/G04355.pdf.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

UN-Women
.
2017
.
Safe cities and safe public spaces. Safe cities and safe public spaces
.
Accessed June 24, 2024
.
https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2017/Safe-Cities-and-Safe-Public-Spaces-Global-results-report-en.pdf.



UN-Women
.
2018
.
Turning promises into action: Gender equality in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development
.
Accessed June 24, 2024
.
https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2018/2/gender-equality-in-the-2030-agenda-for-sustainable-development-2018.



UN-Women
.
2020
.
Annual Report 2019-2020
.
Accessed June 24, 2024
.
https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/06/annual-report-2019-2020.



Van Kooten
Cornelis
.
2019
. “
Policy Instruments for Addressing Externality in Agriculture
.”
CAPI Paper
. Accessed 24 June, 2024.
https://capi-icpa.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/2019-02-22-CAPI-land-use-dialogue-Van-Kooten-Paper_WEB-4.pdf.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

Weinlich
Silke
,
Baumann
Max-Otto
,
Lundsgaarde
Eric
,
Wolff
Peter
.
2020
. “
Earmarking in the Multilateral Development System: Many Shades of Grey
.”
DIE Studies
.
101
.
11
–
328
.



Google Scholar

OpenURL Placeholder Text

WorldCat

 

Youth4Climate
.
2021.
“
About
.” Accessed 24 June, 2024. https://community.youth4climate.info/homepage.




© The Author(s) (2024). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the
International Studies Association.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.



Download all slides


Advertisement


CITATIONS

0
CITATIONS


VIEWS

250


ALTMETRIC


More metrics information
Metrics
Total Views 250
209 Pageviews
41 PDF Downloads
Since 11/1/2024

Month: Total Views: November 2024 250

Citations
0
CITATIONS
0 Total citations
0 Recent citations
n/a Field Citation Ratio
n/a Relative Citation Ratio
Powered by Dimensions
Altmetrics

See more details

Posted by 13 X users
×


EMAIL ALERTS

Article activity alert
Advance article alerts
New issue alert
Receive exclusive offers and updates from Oxford Academic

Recommended
 * The United Nations at Work
   G. L. G., International Affairs, 1953
 * United Nations Work in Africa
   African Affairs, 1955
 * The United Nations Development Programme
   Joel E. Oestreich, Oxford Academic Books, 2017

 * Genome-resolved metagenomics of Venice Lagoon surface sediment bacteria
   reveals high biosynthetic potential and metabolic plasticity as successful
   strategies in...
   Elisa Banchi, Marine Life Science & Technology, 2023
 * A chitosan-based antibacterial hydrogel with injectable and self-healing
   capabilities
   Rui Chen, Marine Life Science & Technology, 2023
 * Correction: Incorporating mesopelagic fish into the evaluation of marine
   protected areas under climate change scenarios
   Shuhao Liu, Marine Life Science & Technology, 2023

Powered by
 * Privacy policy
 * Google Analytics settings




CITING ARTICLES VIA

Google Scholar


 * LATEST


 * MOST READ


 * MOST CITED

Cyber Diplomacy through Official Public Attribution: Paving the Way for Global
Norms

Embracing Universality: Toward the Future of United Nations Development Work

Studying Narratives in International Relations

Methodology Matters: Emplotting Interpretivism in Contemporary Political Science
and International Studies

Democratization and Peace after Civil War—What Difference Can International
Engagement Make? Insights from Liberia



More from Oxford Academic
International Relations
Politics
Public Policy
Social Sciences
Books
Journals
Advertisement

Advertisement
close advertisement
Advertisement
 * About International Studies Perspectives
 * Editorial Board
 * Author Guidelines
 * Facebook
 * X (formerly Twitter)

 * Purchase
 * Recommend to your Library
 * Advertising and Corporate Services
 * Journals Career Network


 * Online ISSN 1528-3585
 * Print ISSN 1528-3577
 * Copyright © 2024 International Studies Association

 * About Oxford Academic
 * Publish journals with us
 * University press partners
 * What we publish
 * New features 

 * Authoring
 * Open access
 * Purchasing
 * Institutional account management
 * Rights and permissions

 * Get help with access
 * Accessibility
 * Contact us
 * Advertising
 * Media enquiries

 * Oxford University Press
 * News
 * Oxford Languages
 * University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide

 * Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
 * Cookie settings
 * Cookie policy
 * Privacy policy
 * Legal notice



Close

Close


THIS FEATURE IS AVAILABLE TO SUBSCRIBERS ONLY

Sign In or Create an Account

Close

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

View Article Abstract & Purchase Options

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an
annual subscription.

Close




Manage Cookies

When you visit web sites, they may store or retrieve data in your web browser.
This storage is often necessary for basic functionality of the web site or the
storage may be used for the purposes of marketing, analytics, and
personalization of the web site such as storing your preferences.



Powered by Privado

Save

Oxford University Press uses cookies to enhance your experience on our website.
By selecting ‘accept all’ you are agreeing to our use of cookies. You can change
your cookie settings at any time. More information can be found in our Cookie
Policy.

Reject and manage Deny all Accept all