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ROMAN MATZUTT

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BIOGRAPHY

I am a junior research group leader for data protection and sovereignty with
Fraunhofer FIT. I joined Fraunhofer FIT in 2023 after concluding my PhD with
COMSYS at RWTH Aachen University.

My main research interests are the scenario-specific application of blockchain
technology as well as the design of privacy-enhancing systems.

Blockchain technology, as introduced by Bitcoin, constitutes a virtually
unchangeable log of events, e.g., financial transactions, and thereby eliminates
attacks such as equivocation. In my research, I am interested in general
properties of blockchains as well as their applications, e.g., to improve the
trustworthiness of existing systems and to discover entirely novel use cases.

Privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) usually comprise basic principles and
technologies that can be utilized to increase user privacy. With respect to
privacy-enhancing systems, I am interested in developing new architectures that
allow to utilize PETs in novel ways and thereby further reduce the trust users
are required to put into the online services they use.


FEATURED PUBLICATIONS


AN INTERDISCIPLINARY SURVEY ON INFORMATION FLOWS IN SUPPLY CHAINS

Jan Pennekamp, Roman Matzutt, Christopher Klinkmüller, Lennart Bader, Martin
Serror, Eric Wagner, Sidra Malik, Maria Spiß, Jessica Rahn, Tan Gürpinar, Eduard
Vlad, Sander J. J. Leemans, Salil S. Kanhere, Volker Stich, Klaus Wehrle
Computing Surveys, 56(2):1-38

We assess the current state of the art regarding security and reliability of
information flows in supply chains. Our systematic literature review covering
over a decade of survey articles reveals an unexpected technological gap: While
technical building blocks for protecting informations flows are theoretically
available, they have not yet found widespread applications in protecting
supply-chain information flows. Thus, we derive a taxonomy for describing
characterstics of supply-chain data flows and propose future research directions
toward closing this gap.

PDF Cite ACM DL Kudos

@article{2023-csur-pennekamp-scsok,
    author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Matzutt, Roman and Klinkm{\"u}ller, Christopher and Bader, Lennart and Serror, Martin and Wagner, Eric and Malik, Sidra and Spi{\ss}, Maria and Rahn, Jessica and G{\"u}rpinar, Tan and Vlad, Eduard and Leemans, Sander J. J. and Kanhere, Salil S. and Stich, Volker and Wehrle, Klaus},
    title = {{An Interdisciplinary Survey on Information Flows in Supply Chains}},
    journal = {Computing Surveys},
    publisher = {ACM},
    year = {2023},
    volume = {56},
    number = {2},
    month = {9},
    pages = {1--38},
    keywords = {information flows, data communication, supply chain management, data security, data sharing, systematic literature review},
    issn = {0360-0300},
    doi = {10.1145/3606693},
}



A MODERATION FRAMEWORK FOR THE SWIFT AND TRANSPARENT REMOVAL OF ILLICIT
BLOCKCHAIN CONTENT

Roman Matzutt, Vincent Ahlrichs, Jan Pennekamp, Roman Karwacik, Klaus Wehrle
Proceedings of the 2022 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain
and Cryptocurrency (ICBC 2022)

In this paper, we propose a moderation framework, RedactChain, that allows small
and periodically replaced juries to redact transactions from a Bitcoin-like
blockchain, e.g., when users report illicit content being engraved on the
blockchain. In contrast to previous schemes, our approach enables the swift and
transparent removal of such content while keeping per-redaction overheads low.
Furthermore, RedactChain defines rules to handle the redaction of manipulated
transactions, whose outputs hold currency and might be spendable, without
affecting the transaction graph. Namely, spendable outputs are obfuscated such
that their content cannot be retrieved anymore, but the output’s associated
coins remain spendable.

PDF Cite Code IEEE Xplore

@inproceedings{2022-icbc-matzutt-redactchain,
    author = {Matzutt, Roman and Ahlrichs, Vincent and Pennekamp, Jan and Karwacik, Roman and Wehrle, Klaus},
    title = {{A Moderation Framework for the Swift and Transparent Removal of Illicit Blockchain Content}},
    booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2022 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC 2022)},
    publisher = {IEEE},
    year = {2022},
    pages = {},
    keywords = {redactable blockchain, illicit content, chameleon hash functions, threshold cryptography},
    isbn = {978-1-6654-9538-7},
    doi = {10.1109/ICBC54727.2022.9805508},
}



COINPRUNE: SHRINKING BITCOIN’S BLOCKCHAIN RETROSPECTIVELY

Roman Matzutt, Benedikt Kalde, Jan Pennekamp, Arthur Drichel, Martin Henze,
Klaus Wehrle
Transactions on Network and Service Management, 18(3):3064-3078

In this paper, we present the full design of CoinPrune, our block-pruning
protocol that is retrofittable to Bitcoin via a velvet fork. This work extends
our initial paper presented at IFIP Networking 2020 by enabling CoinPrune to
obfuscate most objectionable content stored in the UTXO set and introducing an
additional store for application-level data. Furthermore, we extend our security
discussion, our discussion of related work, we updated our performance
evaluation, and we released a prototype implementation of CoinPrune.

PDF Cite Code Dataset IEEE Xplore

@article{2021-ieeetnsm-matzutt-coinprune-v2,
    author = {Matzutt, Roman and Kalde, Benedikt and Pennekamp, Jan and Drichel, Arthur and Henze, Martin and Wehrle, Klaus},
    title = {{CoinPrune: Shrinking Bitcoin's Blockchain Retrospectively}},
    journal = {Transactions on Network and Service Management},
    publisher = {IEEE},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {18},
    number = {3},
    month = {9},
    pages = {3064--3078},
    keywords = {blockchain, block pruning, synchronization, bootstrapping, scalability, velvet fork, Bitcoin},
    issn = {1932-4537},
    doi = {10.1109/TNSM.2021.3073270},
}



UTILIZING PUBLIC BLOCKCHAINS FOR THE SYBIL-RESISTANT BOOTSTRAPPING OF
DISTRIBUTED ANONYMITY SERVICES

Roman Matzutt, Jan Pennekamp, Erik Buchholz, Klaus Wehrle
15th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM
ASIACCS 2020)

We present AnonBoot, an architecture for securely bootstrapping anonymity
services seizing a public blockchain as a trust anchor. Through periodic peer
advertisements, we create a Sybil-resistant repository of privacy peers that can
be directly utilized to establish circuits for onion routing networks, or that
can be elected to establish small distributed anonymity services such as mixnets
or cryptotumblers. Our proof-of-concept implementation shows how AnonBoot can
operate even on simple public blockchains such as Bitcoin.

PDF Cite Code ACM DL arXiv

@inproceedings{2020-asiaccs-matzutt-anonboot,
    author = {Matzutt, Roman and Pennekamp, Jan and Buchholz, Erik and Wehrle, Klaus},
    title = {{Utilizing Public Blockchains for the Sybil-Resistant Bootstrapping of Distributed Anonymity Services}},
    booktitle = {15th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM ASIACCS 2020)},
    publisher = {ACM},
    year = {2020},
    pages = {531--542},
    keywords = {anonymization, bootstrapping, public blockchain, Sybil attack, anonymity network, cryptocurrency tumbler, Bitcoin, Tor},
    isbn = {978-1-4503-6750-9/20/10},
    doi = {10.1145/3320269.3384729},
}



THWARTING UNWANTED BLOCKCHAIN CONTENT INSERTION

Roman Matzutt, Martin Henze, Jan Henrik Ziegeldorf, Jens Hiller, Klaus Wehrle
Proceedings of the First IEEE Workshop on Blockchain Technologies and
Applications, co-located with the IEEE International Conference on Cloud
Engineering 2018 (BTA 2018), Workshop paper

Since the insertion of illicit content into public blockchains can have severe
consequences for users, we explore and discuss the design space for preventing
this insertion. Our findings show that firewall-like scanning of Bitcoin
transactions poses no viable solution to the problem. However, while content
insertion cannot entirely be prevented by technical means, self-verifying
blockchain identifiers make currently simple manipulations hard. Finally, the
introduction of mandatory minimum fees can be used to disincentivize content
insertion additionally.

PDF Cite IEEE Xplore Website

@inproceedings{2018-bta-matzutt-bitcoin-content-countermeasures,
    author = {Matzutt, Roman and Henze, Martin and Ziegeldorf, Jan Henrik and Hiller, Jens and Wehrle, Klaus},
    title = {{Thwarting Unwanted Blockchain Content Insertion}},
    booktitle = {Proceedings of the First IEEE Workshop on Blockchain Technologies and Applications, co-located with the IEEE International Conference on Cloud Engineering 2018 (BTA 2018)},
    publisher = {IEEE},
    year = {2018},
    pages = {364--370},
    keywords = {Bitcoin, blockchain, security, objectionable content, countermeasure},
    isbn = {978-1-5386-5008-0},
    doi = {10.1109/IC2E.2018.00070},
}



SECURE AND ANONYMOUS DECENTRALIZED BITCOIN MIXING

Jan Henrik Ziegeldorf, Roman Matzutt, Martin Henze, Fred Grossmann, Klaus Wehrle
Future Generation Computer Systems, 80:448-466

CoinParty is a fully decentralized and thus secure Bitcoin mixing service. Our
work uses threshold cryptography to combine the adavantages of centralized and
decentralized mixers: high usability and strong security guarantees.

PDF Cite Code

@article{2018-fgcs-ziegeldorf-coinparty-v2,
    author = {Ziegeldorf, Jan Henrik and Matzutt, Roman and Henze, Martin and Grossmann, Fred and Wehrle, Klaus},
    title = {{Secure and anonymous decentralized Bitcoin mixing}},
    journal = {Future Generation Computer Systems},
    publisher = {Elsevier},
    year = {2018},
    volume = {80},
    number = {},
    month = {3},
    pages = {448--466},
    keywords = {Bitcoin, digital cash, privacy-preserving protocols, pseudonymity, anonymity, untraceability},
    issn = {0167-739X},
    doi = {10.1016/j.future.2016.05.018},
}



A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF ARBITRARY BLOCKCHAIN CONTENT ON BITCOIN

Roman Matzutt, Jens Hiller, Martin Henze, Jan Henrik Ziegeldorf, Dirk Müllmann,
Oliver Hohlfeld, Klaus Wehrle
Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2018 (FC ‘18)

We survey methods enabling the insertion of arbitrary content into Bitcoin’s
blockchain, quantitatively analyze their utilization, both directly and via
content insertion services, and assess potential consequences of being forced to
keep potentially illicit content on the users’ hard disks. Our findings show
that arguably objectionable content has already been inserted to Bitcoin’s
blockchain and that it can lead to legal liability for users in jurisdictions
such as Germany.

PDF Cite The Morning Paper Website Springer

@inproceedings{2018-fc-matzutt-bitcoin-contents,
    author = {Matzutt, Roman and Hiller, Jens and Henze, Martin and Ziegeldorf, Jan Henrik and M{\"u}llmann, Dirk and Hohlfeld, Oliver and Wehrle, Klaus},
    title = {{A Quantitative Analysis of the Impact of Arbitrary Blockchain Content on Bitcoin}},
    booktitle = {Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2018 (FC ‘18)},
    publisher = {Springer},
    year = {2018},
    pages = {420--438},
    keywords = {},
    isbn = {},
    doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-58387-6_23},
}


© 2023 by Roman Matzutt · Impressum (Imprint) · Attribution/Licenses