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About Ed Hartin




« Reading the Fire: Flame Indicators
Real Backdraft? »


FIRE BEHAVIOR CASE STUDY
TOWNHOUSE FIRE: WASHINGTON, DC

This series of posts focused on Understanding Flashover has provided a
definition of flashover; examined flashover in the context of fire development
in both fuel and ventilation controlled fires; and looked at the importance of
air track on rapid fire progression through multiple compartments. To review
prior posts see:

 * Myths and Misconceptions
 * Myths and Misconceptions: Part 2
 * The Ventilation Paradox
 * The Importance of Air Track

This post begins study of an incident that resulted in two line-of-duty deaths
as a result of extreme fire behavior in a townhouse style apartment building in
Washington, DC. This case study provides an excellent learning opportunity as it
was one of the first times that the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) and Smokeview were used in
forensic fire scene reconstruction to investigate fire dynamics involved in a
line-of-duty death. Data development of this case study was obtained from Death
in the line of duty, Report 99-21 (NIOSH, 1999), Report from the reconstruction
committee: Fire at 3146 Cherry Road NE, Washington DC, May 30, 1999 (District of
Columbia (DC Fire & EMS, 2000), and Simulation of the Dynamics of the Fire at
3146 Cherry Road NE Washington D.C., May 30, 1999 (Madrzykowski & Vettori,
2000).


THE CASE

In 1999, two firefighters in Washington, DC died and two others were severely
injured as a result of being trapped and injured by rapid fire progress. The
fire occurred in the basement of a two-story, middle of building, townhouse
apartment with a daylight basement (two stories on Side A, three stories on Side
C).

Figure 1. Cross Section of 3146 Cherry Road NE



The first arriving crews entered Floor 1 from Side A to search for the location
of the fire. Another crew approached from the rear and made entry to the
basement through a patio door on Side C. Due to some confusion about the
configuration of the building and Command’s belief that the crews were operating
on the same level, the crew at the rear was directed not to attack the fire.
During fireground operations, the fire in the basement intensified and rapidly
extended to the first floor via the open, interior stairway.


BUILDING INFORMATION

The unit involved in this incident was a middle of row 18′ x 33′ (5.6 m x 10.1
m) two-story townhouse with a daylight basement (see Figures 1 and 3). The
building was of wood frame construction with brick veneer exterior and
non-combustible masonry firewalls separating six individual dwelling units.
Floors were supported by lightweight, parallel chord wood trusses. This type of
engineered floor support system provides substantial strength, but has been
demonstrated to fail quickly under fire conditions (NIOSH, 2005). In addition,
the design of this type of engineered system results in a substantial
interstitial void space between the ceiling and floor as illustrated in Figure
2.

Figure 2. Parallel Chord Truss Construction



Note: This is not an illustration of the floor assembly in the Cherry Road
Townhouse. It is provided to illustrate the characteristics of wood, parallel
chord truss construction.

The trusses ran from the walls on Sides A and C and were supported by steel
beams and columns at the center of the unit (See Figure 3). The basement ceiling
consisted of wood fiber ceiling tiles on wood furring strips which were attached
to the bottom chord of the floor trusses. Basement walls were covered with
gypsum board (sheetrock) and the floor was carpeted. A double glazed sliding
glass door protected by metal security bars was located on Side C of the
basement, providing access from the exterior. Side C of the structure (see
Figure 3) was enclosed by a six-foot wood and masonry fence. The finished
basement was used as a family room and was furnished with a mix of upholstered
and wood furniture.

The first floor of the townhouse was divided into the living room, dining room,
and kitchen. The basement was accessed from the interior via a stairway leading
from the living room to the basement. The door to this stairway was open at the
time of the fire (see Figures 1 and 3). The walls and ceilings on the first
floor were covered with gypsum board (sheetrock) and the floor was carpeted.
Contents of the first floor were typical of a residential living room and
kitchen. A double glazed sliding glass door protected by metal security bars
similar to that in the basement was located on Side C of the first floor. An
entry door and double glazed kitchen window were located on Side A (see Figure
3). A stairway led to the second floor from the front entry. The second floor
contained bedrooms (but was not substantively involved in this incident). There
were double glazed windows on Sides A and C of Floor 2.

Figure 3. Plot and Floor Plan-3146 Cherry Road NE



Note: Adapted from Report from the Reconstruction Committee: Fire at 3146 Cherry
Road NE, Washington DC, May 30, 1999, p. 18 & 20. District of Columbia Fire &
EMS, 2000; Simulation of the Dynamics of the Fire at 3146 Cherry Road NE,
Washington D.C., May 30, 1999, p. 12-13, by Daniel Madrzykowski & Robert
Vettori, 2000. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology,
and NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty Report 99 F-21, 1999, p. 19.

Figure 4. Side A 3146 Cherry Road NE



Note: Adapted from Report from the Reconstruction Committee: Fire at 3146 Cherry
Road NE, Washington DC, May 30, 1999, p. 17. District of Columbia Fire & EMS,
2000 and Simulation of the Dynamics of the Fire at 3146 Cherry Road NE,
Washington D.C., May 30, 1999, p. 5, by Daniel Madrzykowski & Robert Vettori,
2000. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology.

Figure5. Side C 3146 Cherry Road NE



Note: Adapted from Report from the Reconstruction Committee: Fire at 3146 Cherry
Road NE, Washington DC, May 30, 1999, p. 19. District of Columbia Fire & EMS,
2000 and Simulation of the Dynamics of the Fire at 3146 Cherry Road NE,
Washington D.C., May 30, 1999, p. 5, by Daniel Madrzykowski & Robert Vettori,
2000. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology.


THE FIRE

The fire originated in an electrical junction box attached to a fluorescent
light fixture in the basement ceiling (see Figures 1 and 3). The occupants of
the unit were awakened by a smoke detector. The female occupant noticed smoke
coming from the floor vents on Floor 2. She proceeded downstairs and opened the
front door and then proceeded down the first floor hallway towards Side C, but
encountered thick smoke and high temperature. The female and male occupants
exited the structure, leaving the front door open, and made contact with the
occupant of an adjacent unit who notified the DC Fire & EMS Department at 0017
hours.


QUESTIONS

It is important to remember that consideration of how a fire may develop and the
relationship between fire behavior and your strategies and tactical operations
must begin prior to the time of alarm. Assessment of building factors and fire
behavior prediction should be integrated with pre-planning.

 1. Based on the information provided about the fire and building conditions,
    how would you anticipate that this fire would develop?
 2. What concerns would you have if you were the first arriving company at this
    incident?


MORE TO FOLLOW

My next post will examine dispatch information and initial tactical operations
by first alarm companies.



Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO


REFERENCES

District of Columbia (DC) Fire & EMS. (2000). Report from the reconstruction
committee: Fire at 3146 Cherry Road NE, Washington DC, May 30, 1999. Washington,
DC: Author.

Madrzykowski, D. & Vettori, R. (2000). Simulation of the Dynamics of the Fire at
3146 Cherry Road NE Washington D.C., May 30, 1999, NISTR 6510. August 31, 2009
from http://fire.nist.gov/CDPUBS/NISTIR_6510/6510c.pdf

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (1999). Death in
the line of duty, Report 99-21. Retrieved August 31, 2009 from
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9921.html

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2005). NIOSH
Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters Due to Truss System
Failures. Retrieved August 31, 2009 from
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9921.html

Tags: B-SAHF, burning regime, case study, deliberate practice, Extreme Fire
Behavior, fire behavior indicators, firefighter fatality, firefighter injury,
firefighter LODD, flashover, NIOSH, NIST, practical fire dynamics, reading the
fire, vent controlled fire




5 RESPONSES TO “FIRE BEHAVIOR CASE STUDY
TOWNHOUSE FIRE: WASHINGTON, DC”

 1. Blog Archive » Townhouse Fire: Washington, DC What Happened | Compartment
    Fire Behavior Says:
    September 14th, 2009 at 06:08
    
    […] previous post in this series, Fire Behavior Case Study of a Townhouse
    Fire: Washington, DC examined building construction and configuration that
    had a significant impact on the outcome of […]

 2. Blog Archive » Townhouse Fire: Washington, DC Extreme Fire Behavior |
    Compartment Fire Behavior Says:
    September 21st, 2009 at 08:17
    
    […] posts in this series, Fire Behavior Case Study of a Townhouse Fire:
    Washington, DC and Townhouse Fire: Washington, DC-What Happened examined the
    building and initial tactical […]

 3. Blog Archive » Townhouse Fire: Washington, DC:Computer Modeling |
    Compartment Fire Behavior Says:
    September 28th, 2009 at 08:46
    
    […] posts in this series, Fire Behavior Case Study of a Townhouse Fire:
    Washington, DC, Townhouse Fire: Washington, DC-What Happened,and Townhouse
    Fire: Washington, DC-Extreme Fire […]

 4. Blog Archive » Townhouse Fire: Washington, DCComputer Modeling-Part 2 |
    Compartment Fire Behavior Says:
    October 5th, 2009 at 06:03
    
    […] Fire Behavior Case Study Townhouse Fire: Washington, DC […]

 5. Blog Archive » Influence of Ventilation in Residential Structures:Tactical
    Implications Part 7 | Compartment Fire Behavior Says:
    November 9th, 2011 at 06:24
    
    […] Fire Behavior Case Study Townhouse Fire: Washington, DC […]


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