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Justia › U.S. Law › U.S. Case Law › U.S. Supreme Court › Opinions by Volume ›
Volume 477 › Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
MERITOR SAVINGS BANK V. VINSON, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)
* Overview
* Opinions
* Materials
Argued: March 25, 1986
Decided: June 19, 1986
Syllabus
U.S. SUPREME COURT
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
No. 84-1979
Argued March 25, 1986
Decided June 19, 1986
477 U.S. 57
Syllabus
Respondent former employee of petitioner bank brought an action against the bank
and her supervisor at the bank, claiming that, during her employment at the
bank, she had been subjected to sexual harassment by the supervisor in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and seeking injunctive relief and
damages. At the trial, the parties presented conflicting testimony about the
existence of a sexual relationship between respondent and the supervisor. The
District Court denied relief without resolving the conflicting testimony,
holding that, if respondent and the supervisor did have a sexual relationship,
it was voluntary, and had nothing to do with her continued employment at the
bank, and that therefore respondent was not the victim of sexual harassment. The
court then went on to hold that, since the bank was without notice, it could not
be held liable for the supervisor's alleged sexual harassment. The Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded. Noting that a violation of Title VII may be
predicated on either of two types of sexual harassment -- (1) harassment that
involves the conditioning of employment benefits on sexual favors, and (2)
harassment that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a hostile or
offensive working environment -- the Court of Appeals held that, since the
grievance here was of the second type, and the District Court had not considered
whether a violation of this type had occurred, a remand was necessary. The court
further held that the need for a remand was not obviated by the fact that the
District Court had found that any sexual relationship between respondent and the
supervisor was a voluntary one, a finding that might have been based on
testimony about respondent's "dress and personal fantasies" that "had no place
in the litigation." As to the bank's liability, the Court of Appeals held that
an employer is absolutely liable for sexual harassment by supervisory personnel,
whether or not the employer knew or should have known about it.
Held:
1. A claim of "hostile environment" sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination that is actionable under Title VII. Pp. 477 U. S. 63-69.
(a) The language of Title VII is not limited to "economic" or "tangible"
discrimination. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines fully support
the view that sexual harassment leading to non-economic
Page 477 U. S. 58
injury can violate Title VII. Here, respondent's allegations were sufficient to
state a claim for "hostile environment" sexual harassment. Pp. 477 U. S. 63-67.
(b) The District Court's findings were insufficient to dispose of respondent's
"hostile environment" claim. The District Court apparently erroneously believed
that a sexual harassment claim will not lie absent an economic effect on the
complainant's employment, and erroneously focused on the "voluntariness" of
respondent's participation in the claimed sexual episodes. The correct inquiry
is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances
were unwelcome, not whether her participation in them was voluntary. Pp. 477 U.
S. 67-68.
(c) The District Court did not err in admitting evidence of respondent's
sexually provocative speech and dress. While "voluntariness" in the sense of
consent is no defense to a sexual harassment claim, it does not follow that such
evidence is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether the complainant
found particular sexual advances unwelcome. Pp. 477 U. S. 68-69.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that employers are always
automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors. While common
law agency principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title
VII, Congress' decision to define "employer" to include any "agent" of an
employer evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for
which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. In this case,
however, the mere existence of a grievance procedure in the bank and the bank's
policy against discrimination, coupled with respondent's failure to invoke that
procedure, do not necessarily insulate the bank from liability. Pp. 477 U. S.
69-73.
243 U.S.App.D.C. 323, 753 F.2d 141, affirmed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and
WHITE, POWELL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a
concurring opinion, post, p. 477 U. S. 73. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 477 U. S. 74.
Page 477 U. S. 59
Read More
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Opinions
* Opinions & Dissents
U.S. SUPREME COURT
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson
No. 84-1979
Argued March 25, 1986
Decided June 19, 1986
477 U.S. 57
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Syllabus
Respondent former employee of petitioner bank brought an action against the bank
and her supervisor at the bank, claiming that, during her employment at the
bank, she had been subjected to sexual harassment by the supervisor in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and seeking injunctive relief and
damages. At the trial, the parties presented conflicting testimony about the
existence of a sexual relationship between respondent and the supervisor. The
District Court denied relief without resolving the conflicting testimony,
holding that, if respondent and the supervisor did have a sexual relationship,
it was voluntary, and had nothing to do with her continued employment at the
bank, and that therefore respondent was not the victim of sexual harassment. The
court then went on to hold that, since the bank was without notice, it could not
be held liable for the supervisor's alleged sexual harassment. The Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded. Noting that a violation of Title VII may be
predicated on either of two types of sexual harassment -- (1) harassment that
involves the conditioning of employment benefits on sexual favors, and (2)
harassment that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a hostile or
offensive working environment -- the Court of Appeals held that, since the
grievance here was of the second type, and the District Court had not considered
whether a violation of this type had occurred, a remand was necessary. The court
further held that the need for a remand was not obviated by the fact that the
District Court had found that any sexual relationship between respondent and the
supervisor was a voluntary one, a finding that might have been based on
testimony about respondent's "dress and personal fantasies" that "had no place
in the litigation." As to the bank's liability, the Court of Appeals held that
an employer is absolutely liable for sexual harassment by supervisory personnel,
whether or not the employer knew or should have known about it.
Held:
1. A claim of "hostile environment" sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination that is actionable under Title VII. Pp. 477 U. S. 63-69.
(a) The language of Title VII is not limited to "economic" or "tangible"
discrimination. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines fully support
the view that sexual harassment leading to non-economic
Page 477 U. S. 58
injury can violate Title VII. Here, respondent's allegations were sufficient to
state a claim for "hostile environment" sexual harassment. Pp. 477 U. S. 63-67.
(b) The District Court's findings were insufficient to dispose of respondent's
"hostile environment" claim. The District Court apparently erroneously believed
that a sexual harassment claim will not lie absent an economic effect on the
complainant's employment, and erroneously focused on the "voluntariness" of
respondent's participation in the claimed sexual episodes. The correct inquiry
is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances
were unwelcome, not whether her participation in them was voluntary. Pp. 477 U.
S. 67-68.
(c) The District Court did not err in admitting evidence of respondent's
sexually provocative speech and dress. While "voluntariness" in the sense of
consent is no defense to a sexual harassment claim, it does not follow that such
evidence is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether the complainant
found particular sexual advances unwelcome. Pp. 477 U. S. 68-69.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that employers are always
automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors. While common
law agency principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title
VII, Congress' decision to define "employer" to include any "agent" of an
employer evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for
which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. In this case,
however, the mere existence of a grievance procedure in the bank and the bank's
policy against discrimination, coupled with respondent's failure to invoke that
procedure, do not necessarily insulate the bank from liability. Pp. 477 U. S.
69-73.
243 U.S.App.D.C. 323, 753 F.2d 141, affirmed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and
WHITE, POWELL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a
concurring opinion, post, p. 477 U. S. 73. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 477 U. S. 74.
Page 477 U. S. 59
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents important questions concerning claims of workplace "sexual
harassment" brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat.
253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
I In 1974, respondent Mechelle Vinson met Sidney Taylor, a vice-president of
what is now petitioner Meritor Savings Bank (bank) and manager of one of its
branch offices. When respondent asked whether she might obtain employment at the
bank, Taylor gave her an application, which she completed and returned the next
day; later that same day, Taylor called her to say that she had been hired. With
Taylor as her supervisor, respondent started as a teller-trainee, and thereafter
was promoted to teller, head teller, and assistant
Page 477 U. S. 60
branch manager. She worked at the same branch for four years, and it is
undisputed that her advancement there was based on merit alone. In September,
1978, respondent notified Taylor that she was taking sick leave for an
indefinite period. On November 1, 1978, the bank discharged her for excessive
use of that leave.
Respondent brought this action against Taylor and the bank, claiming that,
during her four years at the bank, she had "constantly been subjected to sexual
harassment" by Taylor in violation of Title VII. She sought injunctive relief,
compensatory and punitive damages against Taylor and the bank, and attorney's
fees.
At the 11-day bench trial, the parties presented conflicting testimony about
Taylor's behavior during respondent's employment. * Respondent testified that,
during her probationary period as a teller-trainee, Taylor treated her in a
fatherly way and made no sexual advances. Shortly thereafter, however, he
invited her out to dinner and, during the course of the meal, suggested that
they go to a motel to have sexual relations. At first she refused, but out of
what she described as fear of losing her job, she eventually agreed. According
to respondent, Taylor thereafter made repeated demands upon her for sexual
favors, usually at the branch, both during and after business hours; she
estimated that over the next several years she had intercourse with him some 40
or 50 times. In addition, respondent testified that Taylor fondled her in front
of other employees, followed her into the women's restroom when she went there
alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions.
These activities ceased after 1977, respondent stated, when she started going
with a steady boyfriend.
Respondent also testified that Taylor touched and fondled other women employees
of the bank, and she attempted to
Page 477 U. S. 61
call witnesses to support this charge. But while some supporting testimony
apparently was admitted without objection, the District Court did not allow her
"to present wholesale evidence of a pattern and practice relating to sexual
advances to other female employees in her case in chief, but advised her that
she might well be able to present such evidence in rebuttal to the defendants'
cases."
Vinson v. Taylor, 22 EPD � 30,708, p. 14,693, n. 1, 23 FEP Cases 37, 38-39, n. 1
(DC 1980). Respondent did not offer such evidence in rebuttal. Finally,
respondent testified that, because she was afraid of Taylor, she never reported
his harassment to any of his supervisors and never attempted to use the bank's
complaint procedure.
Taylor denied respondent's allegations of sexual activity, testifying that he
never fondled her, never made suggestive remarks to her, never engaged in sexual
intercourse with her, and never asked her to do so. He contended instead that
respondent made her accusations in response to a business-related dispute. The
bank also denied respondent's allegations, and asserted that any sexual
harassment by Taylor was unknown to the bank and engaged in without its consent
or approval.
The District Court denied relief, but did not resolve the conflicting testimony
about the existence of a sexual relationship between respondent and Taylor. It
found instead that
"[i]f [respondent] and Taylor did engage in an intimate or sexual relationship
during the time of [respondent's] employment with [the bank], that relationship
was a voluntary one having nothing to do with her continued employment at [the
bank] or her advancement or promotions at that institution."
Id. at 14,692, 23 FEP Cases at 42 (footnote omitted). The court ultimately found
that respondent "was not the victim of sexual harassment and was not the victim
of sexual discrimination" while employed at the bank. Ibid., 23 FEP Cases at 43.
Page 477 U. S. 62
Although it concluded that respondent had not proved a violation of Title VII,
the District Court nevertheless went on to address the bank's liability. After
noting the bank's express policy against discrimination, and finding that
neither respondent nor any other employee had ever lodged a complaint about
sexual harassment by Taylor, the court ultimately concluded that "the bank was
without notice, and cannot be held liable for the alleged actions of Taylor."
Id. at 14,691, 23 FEP Cases, at 42.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. 243
U.S.App.D.C. 323, 753 F.2d 141 (1985). Relying on its earlier holding in Bundy
v. Jackson, 205 U.S.App.D.C. 444, 641 F.2d 934 (1981), decided after the trial
in this case, the court stated that a violation of Title VII may be predicated
on either of two types of sexual harassment: harassment that involves the
conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors, and harassment
that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a hostile or offensive
working environment. The court drew additional support for this position from
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985), which set out these two types of
sexual harassment claims. Believing that "Vinson's grievance was clearly of the
[hostile environment] type," 243 U.S.App.D.C. at 327, 753 F.2d at 145, and that
the District Court had not considered whether a violation of this type had
occurred, the court concluded that a remand was necessary.
The court further concluded that the District Court's finding that any sexual
relationship between respondent and Taylor "was a voluntary one" did not obviate
the need for a remand. "[U]ncertain as to precisely what the [district] court
meant" by this finding, the Court of Appeals held that, if the evidence
otherwise showed that "Taylor made Vinson's toleration of sexual harassment a
condition of her employment," her voluntariness "had no materiality whatsoever."
Page 477 U. S. 63
Id. at 328, 753 F.2d at 146. The court then surmised that the District Court's
finding of voluntariness might have been based on "the voluminous testimony
regarding respondent's dress and personal fantasies," testimony that the Court
of Appeals believed "had no place in this litigation." Id. at 328, n. 36, 753
F.2d at 146, n. 36.
As to the bank's liability, the Court of Appeals held that an employer is
absolutely liable for sexual harassment practiced by supervisory personnel,
whether or not the employer knew or should have known about the misconduct. The
court relied chiefly on Title VII's definition of "employer" to include "any
agent of such a person," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), as well as on the EEOC
Guidelines. The court held that a supervisor is an "agent" of his employer for
Title VII purposes, even if he lacks authority to hire, fire, or promote, since
"the mere existence -- or even the appearance -- of a significant degree of
influence in vital job decisions gives any supervisor the opportunity to impose
on employees." 243 U.S.App.D.C. at 332, 753 F.2d at 150.
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the District Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. A subsequent
suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied, with three judges dissenting. 245
U.S.App.D.C. 306, 760 F.2d 1330 (1985). We granted certiorari, 474 U.S. 1047
(1985), and now affirm, but for different reasons.
II Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it
"an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The prohibition against discrimination based on sex
was added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of
Representatives. 110 Cong.Rec. 2577-2584 (1964). The principal argument in
opposition
Page 477 U. S. 64
to the amendment was that "sex discrimination" was sufficiently different from
other types of discrimination that it ought to receive separate legislative
treatment. See id. at 2577 (statement of Rep. Celler quoting letter from United
States Department of Labor); id. at 2584 (statement of Rep. Green). This
argument was defeated, the bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left with
little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition
against discrimination based on "sex."
Respondent argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that unwelcome sexual advances
that create an offensive or hostile working environment violate Title VII.
Without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of
the subordinate's sex, that supervisor "discriminate[s]" on the basis of sex.
Petitioner apparently does not challenge this proposition. It contends instead
that, in prohibiting discrimination with respect to "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges" of employment, Congress was concerned with what
petitioner describes as "tangible loss" of "an economic character," not "purely
psychological aspects of the workplace environment." Brief for Petitioner 30-31,
34. In support of this claim petitioner observes that, in both the legislative
history of Title VII and this Court's Title VII decisions, the focus has been on
tangible, economic barriers erected by discrimination.
We reject petitioner's view. First, the language of Title VII is not limited to
"economic" or "tangible" discrimination. The phrase "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment" evinces a congressional intent "to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women'" in employment. Los
Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 435 U. S. 707, n. 13
(1978), quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (CA7
1971). Petitioner has pointed to nothing in the Act to suggest that Congress
contemplated the limitation urged here.
Page 477 U. S. 65
Second, in 1980 the EEOC issued Guidelines specifying that "sexual harassment,"
as there defined, is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. As an
"administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency," Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 401 U. S. 433-434 (1971), these Guidelines,
"'while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance,'"
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 429 U. S. 141-142 (1976),
quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 323 U. S. 140 (1944). The EEOC
Guidelines fully support the view that harassment leading to noneconomic injury
can violate Title VII.
In defining "sexual harassment," the Guidelines first describe the kinds of
workplace conduct that may be actionable under Title VII. These include
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature." 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985). Relevant to
the charges at issue in this case, the Guidelines provide that such sexual
misconduct constitutes prohibited "sexual harassment," whether or not it is
directly linked to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where
"such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment."
§ 1604.11(a)(3).
In concluding that so-called "hostile environment" (i.e., non quid pro quo)
harassment violates Title VII, the EEOC drew upon a substantial body of judicial
decisions and EEOC precedent holding that Title VII affords employees the right
to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult. See generally 45 Fed.Reg. 74676 (1980). Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234
(CA5 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), was apparently the first case to
recognize a cause of action based upon a discriminatory work environment. In
Rogers, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Page 477 U. S. 66
Circuit held that a Hispanic complainant could establish a Title VII violation
by demonstrating that her employer created an offensive work environment for
employees by giving discriminatory service to its Hispanic clientele. The court
explained that an employee's protections under Title VII extend beyond the
economic aspects of employment:
"[T]he phrase 'terms, conditions or privileges of employment' in [Title VII] is
an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of
creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial
discrimination. . . . One can readily envision working environments so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers. . . ."
454 F.2d at 238. Courts applied this principle to harassment based on race,
e.g., Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506,
514-515 (CA8), cert. denied sub nom. Banta v. United States, 434 U.S. 819
(1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 178 U.S.App.D.C. 91, 98, 545 F.2d 169,
176 (1976), religion, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (SD Ohio
1976), and national origin, e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club,
568 F.2d 87, 88 (CA8 1977). Nothing in Title VII suggests that a hostile
environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment should not be likewise
prohibited. The Guidelines thus appropriately drew from, and were fully
consistent with, the existing case law.
Since the Guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly held, and we agree, that
a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that
discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.
As the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit wrote in Henson v. Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 902 (1982):
Page 477 U. S. 67
"Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members
of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement
that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege
of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting
as the harshest of racial epithets."
Accord, Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-255 (CA4 1983); Bundy v. Jackson, 205
U.S.App.D.C. at 444-454, 641 F.2d at 934-944; Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F.
Supp. 780 (ED Wis.1984).
Of course, as the courts in both Rogers and Henson recognized, not all workplace
conduct that may be described as "harassment" affects a "term, condition, or
privilege" of employment within the meaning of Title VII. See Rogers v. EEOC,
supra, at 238 ("mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders
offensive feelings in an employee" would not affect the conditions of employment
to sufficiently significant degree to violate Title VII); Henson, 682 F.2d at
904 (quoting same). For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment." Ibid. Respondent's
allegations in this case -- which include not only pervasive harassment but also
criminal conduct of the most serious nature -- are plainly sufficient to state a
claim for "hostile environment" sexual harassment.
The question remains, however, whether the District Court's ultimate finding
that respondent "was not the victim of sexual harassment," 22 EPD � 30,708, at
14,692-14,693, 23 FEP Cases, at 43, effectively disposed of respondent's claim.
The Court of Appeals recognized, we think correctly, that this ultimate finding
was likely based on one or both of two erroneous views of the law. First, the
District Court apparently believed that a claim for sexual harassment will not
lie
Page 477 U. S. 68
absent an economic effect on the complainant's employment. See ibid. ("It is
without question that sexual harassment of female employees in which they are
asked or required to submit to sexual demands as a condition to obtain
employment or to maintain employment or to obtain promotions falls within
protection of Title VII") (emphasis added). Since it appears that the District
Court made its findings without ever considering the "hostile environment"
theory of sexual harassment, the Court of Appeals' decision to remand was
correct.
Second, the District Court's conclusion that no actionable harassment occurred
might have rested on its earlier "finding" that "[i]f [respondent] and Taylor
did engage in an intimate or sexual relationship . . . that relationship was a
voluntary one." Id. at 14,692, 23 FEP Cases, at 42. But the fact that
sex-related conduct was "voluntary," in the sense that the complainant was not
forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment
suit brought under Title VII. The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is
that the alleged sexual advances were "unwelcome." 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985).
While the question whether particular conduct was indeed unwelcome presents
difficult problems of proof, and turns largely on credibility determinations
committed to the trier of fact, the District Court in this case erroneously
focused on the "voluntariness" of respondent's participation in the claimed
sexual episodes. The correct inquiry is whether respondent, by her conduct,
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her
actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.
Petitioner contends that even if this case must be remanded to the District
Court, the Court of Appeals erred in one of the terms of its remand.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated that testimony about respondent's
"dress and personal fantasies," 243 U.S.App.D.C. at 328, n. 36, 753 F.2d at 146,
n. 36, which the District Court apparently admitted
Page 477 U. S. 69
into evidence, "had no place in this litigation." Ibid. The apparent ground for
this conclusion was that respondent's voluntariness vel non in submitting to
Taylor's advances was immaterial to her sexual harassment claim. While
"voluntariness" in the sense of consent is not a defense to such a claim, it
does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is
irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular
sexual advances unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant.
The EEOC Guidelines emphasize that the trier of fact must determine the
existence of sexual harassment in light of "the record as a whole" and "the
totality of circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the
context in which the alleged incidents occurred." 29 CFR § 1604.11(b) (1985).
Respondent's claim that any marginal relevance of the evidence in question was
outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice is the sort of argument
properly addressed to the District Court. In this case the District Court
concluded that the evidence should be admitted, and the Court of Appeals'
contrary conclusion was based upon the erroneous, categorical view that
testimony about provocative dress and publicly expressed sexual fantasies "had
no place in this litigation." 243 U.S.App.D.C. at 328, n. 36, 753 F.2d at 146,
n. 36. While the District Court must carefully weigh the applicable
considerations in deciding whether to admit evidence of this kind, there is no
per se rule against its admissibility.
III Although the District Court concluded that respondent had not proved a
violation of Title VII, it nevertheless went on to consider the question of the
bank's liability. Finding that "the bank was without notice" of Taylor's alleged
conduct, and that notice to Taylor was not the equivalent of notice to the bank,
the court concluded that the bank therefore could not be held liable for
Taylor's alleged actions. The Court of Appeals took the opposite view, holding
that an employer is
Page 477 U. S. 70
strictly liable for a hostile environment created by a supervisor's sexual
advances, even though the employer neither knew nor reasonably could have known
of the alleged misconduct. The court held that a supervisor, whether or not he
possesses the authority to hire, fire, or promote, is necessarily an "agent" of
his employer for all Title VII purposes, since "even the appearance" of such
authority may enable him to impose himself on his subordinates.
The parties and amici suggest several different standards for employer
liability. Respondent, not surprisingly, defends the position of the Court of
Appeals. Noting that Title VII's definition of "employer" includes any "agent"
of the employer, she also argues that, "so long as the circumstance is
work-related, the supervisor is the employer and the employer is the
supervisor." Brief for Respondent 27. Notice to Taylor that the advances were
unwelcome, therefore, was notice to the bank.
Petitioner argues that respondent's failure to use its established grievance
procedure, or to otherwise put it on notice of the alleged misconduct, insulates
petitioner from liability for Taylor's wrongdoing. A contrary rule would be
unfair, petitioner argues, since, in a hostile environment harassment case, the
employer often will have no reason to know about, or opportunity to cure, the
alleged wrongdoing.
The EEOC, in its brief as amicus curiae, contends that courts formulating
employer liability rules should draw from traditional agency principles.
Examination of those principles has led the EEOC to the view that, where a
supervisor exercises the authority actually delegated to him by his employer, by
making or threatening to make decisions affecting the employment status of his
subordinates, such actions are properly imputed to the employer whose delegation
of authority empowered the supervisor to undertake them. Brief for United States
and EEOC as Amici Curiae 22. Thus, the courts have consistently held employers
liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory personnel,
Page 477 U. S. 71
whether or not the employer knew, should have known, or approved of the
supervisor's actions. E.g., Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hospital, Inc.,
464 F.2d 723, 725 (CA6 1972).
The EEOC suggests that, when a sexual harassment claim rests exclusively on a
"hostile environment" theory, however, the usual basis for a finding of agency
will often disappear. In that case, the EEOC believes, agency principles lead to
"a rule that asks whether a victim of sexual harassment had reasonably available
an avenue of complaint regarding such harassment, and, if available and
utilized, whether that procedure was reasonably responsive to the employee's
complaint. If the employer has an expressed policy against sexual harassment and
has implemented a procedure specifically designed to resolve sexual harassment
claims, and if the victim does not take advantage of that procedure, the
employer should be shielded from liability absent actual knowledge of the
sexually hostile environment (obtained, e.g., by the filing of a charge with the
EEOC or a comparable state agency). In all other cases, the employer will be
liable if it has actual knowledge of the harassment or if, considering all the
facts of the case, the victim in question had no reasonably available avenue for
making his or her complaint known to appropriate management officials."
Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 26. As respondent points out,
this suggested rule is in some tension with the EEOC Guidelines, which hold an
employer liable for the acts of its agents without regard to notice. 29 CFR §
1604.11(c) (1985). The Guidelines do require, however, an
"examin[ation of] the circumstances of the particular employment relationship
and the job [f]unctions performed by the individual in determining whether an
individual acts in either a supervisory or agency capacity."
Ibid.
Page 477 U. S. 72
This debate over the appropriate standard for employer liability has a rather
abstract quality about it, given the state of the record in this case. We do not
know at this stage whether Taylor made any sexual advances toward respondent at
all, let alone whether those advances were unwelcome, whether they were
sufficiently pervasive to constitute a condition of employment, or whether they
were "so pervasive and so long continuing . . . that the employer must have
become conscious of [them]," Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1197-1199 (CA8
1981) (holding employer liable for racially hostile working environment based on
constructive knowledge).
We therefore decline the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on
employer liability, but we do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to
look to agency principles for guidance in this area. While such common law
principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII,
Congress' decision to define "employer" to include any "agent" of an employer,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts
of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. For
this reason, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
employers are always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their
supervisors. See generally Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 219-237 (1958). For
the same reason, absence of notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate
that employer from liability. Ibid.
Finally, we reject petitioner's view that the mere existence of a grievance
procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled with respondent's failure
to invoke that procedure, must insulate petitioner from liability. While those
facts are plainly relevant, the situation before us demonstrates why they are
not necessarily dispositive. Petitioner's general nondiscrimination policy did
not address sexual harassment in particular, and thus did not alert employees to
their employer's
Page 477 U. S. 73
interest in correcting that form of discrimination. App. 25. Moreover, the
bank's grievance procedure apparently required an employee to complain first to
her supervisor, in this case Taylor. Since Taylor was the alleged perpetrator,
it is not altogether surprising that respondent failed to invoke the procedure
and report her grievance to him. Petitioner's contention that respondent's
failure should insulate it from liability might be substantially stronger if its
procedures were better calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come
forward.
IV In sum, we hold that a claim of "hostile environment" sex discrimination is
actionable under Title VII, that the District Court's findings were insufficient
to dispose of respondent's hostile environment claim, and that the District
Court did not err in admitting testimony about respondent's sexually provocative
speech and dress. As to employer liability, we conclude that the Court of
Appeals was wrong to entirely disregard agency principles and impose absolute
liability on employers for the acts of their supervisors, regardless of the
circumstances of a particular case.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the
District Court is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
* Like the Court of Appeals, this Court was not provided a complete transcript
of the trial. We therefore rely largely on the District Court's opinion for the
summary of the relevant testimony.
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
Because I do not see any inconsistency between the two opinions, and because I
believe the question of statutory construction that JUSTICE MARSHALL has
answered is fairly presented by the record, I join both the Court's opinion and
JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion.
Page 477 U. S. 74
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE
STEVENS join, concurring in the judgment.
I fully agree with the Court's conclusion that workplace sexual harassment is
illegal, and violates Title VII. Part III of the Court's opinion, however,
leaves open the circumstances in which an employer is responsible under Title
VII for such conduct. Because I believe that question to be properly before us,
I write separately.
The issue the Court declines to resolve is addressed in the EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, which are entitled to great deference. See Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 401 U. S. 433-434 (1971) (EEOC Guidelines on
Employment Testing Procedures of 1966); see also ante at 477 U. S. 65. The
Guidelines explain:
"Applying general Title VII principles, an employer . . . is responsible for its
acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual
harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized
or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or
should have known of their occurrence. The Commission will examine the
circumstances of the particular employment relationship and the job [f]unctions
performed by the individual in determining whether an individual acts in either
a supervisory or agency capacity."
"With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible
for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents
or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it
can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action."
29 CFR §§ 1604.11(c),(d) (1985).
The Commission, in issuing the Guidelines, explained that its rule was
"in keeping with the general standard of employer
Page 477 U. S. 75
liability with respect to agents and supervisory employees. . . . [T]he
Commission and the courts have held for years that an employer is liable if a
supervisor or an agent violates the Title VII, regardless of knowledge or any
other mitigating factor."
45 Fed.Reg. 74676 (1980). I would adopt the standard set out by the Commission.
An employer can act only through individual supervisors and employees;
discrimination is rarely carried out pursuant to a formal vote of a
corporation's board of directors. Although an employer may sometimes adopt
company-wide discriminatory policies violative of Title VII, acts that may
constitute Title VII violations are generally effected through the actions of
individuals, and often an individual may take such a step even in defiance of
company policy. Nonetheless, Title VII remedies, such as reinstatement and
backpay, generally run against the employer as an entity. [Footnote 1] The
question thus arises as to the circumstances under which an employer will be
held liable under Title VII for the acts of its employees.
The answer supplied by general Title VII law, like that supplied by federal
labor law, is that the act of a supervisory employee or agent is imputed to the
employer. [Footnote 2] Thus, for example, when a supervisor discriminatorily
fires or refuses to promote a black employee, that act is, without more,
considered the act of the employer. The courts do not stop to consider whether
the employer otherwise had "notice" of the action, or even whether the
supervisor had actual authority to act as he did. E.g., Flowers v. Crouch-Walker
Corp.,
Page 477 U. S. 76
552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (CA7 1977); Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan Assn.,
509 F.2d 140 (CA5 1975); Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hospital, Inc., 464
F.2d 723 (CA6 1972). Following that approach, every Court of Appeals that has
considered the issue has held that sexual harassment by supervisory personnel is
automatically imputed to the employer when the harassment results in tangible
job detriment to the subordinate employee. See Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., Div. of
Windsor Mobile Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 604-606 (CA7 1985); Craig v. Y & Y Snacks,
Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80-81 (CA3 1983); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255, n. 6 (CA4
1983); Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (CA11 1982); Miller v. Bank of
America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (CA9 1979).
The brief filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the United States and the
EEOC in this case suggests that a different rule should apply when a
supervisor's harassment "merely" results in a discriminatory work environment.
The Solicitor General concedes that sexual harassment that affects tangible job
benefits is an exercise of authority delegated to the supervisor by the
employer, and thus gives rise to employer liability. But, departing from the
EEOC Guidelines, he argues that the case of a supervisor merely creating a
discriminatory work environment is different because the supervisor "is not
exercising, or threatening to exercise, actual or apparent authority to make
personnel decisions affecting the victim." Brief for United States and EEOC as
Amici Curiae 24. In the latter situation, he concludes, some further notice
requirement should therefore be necessary.
The Solicitor General's position is untenable. A supervisor's responsibilities
do not begin and end with the power to hire, fire, and discipline employees, or
with the power to recommend such actions. Rather, a supervisor is charged with
the day-to-day supervision of the work environment and with ensuring a safe,
productive workplace. There is no reason why abuse of the latter authority
should have different consequences than abuse of the former. In both cases, it
is the authority
Page 477 U. S. 77
vested in the supervisor by the employer that enables him to commit the wrong:
it is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the
employer's authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on
subordinates. There is therefore no justification for a special rule, to be
applied only in "hostile environment" cases, that sexual harassment does not
create employer liability until the employee suffering the discrimination
notifies other supervisors. No such requirement appears in the statute, and no
such requirement can coherently be drawn from the law of agency.
Agency principles and the goals of Title VII law make appropriate some
limitation on the liability of employers for the acts of supervisors. Where, for
example, a supervisor has no authority over an employee, because the two work in
wholly different parts of the employer's business, it may be improper to find
strict employer liability. See 29 CFR § 1604.11(c) (1985). Those considerations,
however, do not justify the creation of a special "notice" rule in hostile
environment cases.
Further, nothing would be gained by crafting such a rule. In the "pure" hostile
environment case, where an employee files an EEOC complaint alleging sexual
harassment in the workplace, the employee seeks not money damages, but
injunctive relief. See Bundy v. Jackson, 205 U.S.App.D.C. 444, 456, n. 12, 641
F.2d 934, 946, n. 12 (1981). Under Title VII, the EEOC must notify an employer
of charges made against it within 10 days after receipt of the complaint. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If the charges appear to be based on "reasonable cause,"
the EEOC must attempt to eliminate the offending practice through "informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Ibid. An employer whose
internal procedures assertedly would have redressed the discrimination can avoid
injunctive relief by employing these procedures after receiving notice of the
complaint or during the conciliation period. Cf. Brief for United
Page 477 U. S. 78
States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 26. Where a complainant, on the other hand,
seeks backpay on the theory that a hostile work environment effected a
constructive termination, the existence of an internal complaint procedure may
be a factor in determining not the employer's liability, but the remedies
available against it. Where a complainant without good reason bypassed an
internal complaint procedure she knew to be effective, a court may be reluctant
to find constructive termination, and thus to award reinstatement or backpay.
I therefore reject the Solicitor General's position. I would apply in this case
the same rules we apply in all other Title VII cases, and hold that sexual
harassment by a supervisor of an employee under his supervision, leading to a
discriminatory work environment, should be imputed to the employer for Title VII
purposes regardless of whether the employee gave "notice" of the offense.
[Footnote 1]
The remedial provisions of Title VII were largely modeled on those of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S.
405, 422 U. S. 419, and n. 11 (1975); see also Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S. 747, 424 U. S. 768-770 (1976).
[Footnote 2]
For NLRA cases, see, e.g., Graves Trucking, Inc. v. NLRB, 692 F.2d 470 (CA7
1982); NLRB v. Kaiser Agricultural Chemical, Division of Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp., 473 F.2d 374, 384 (CA5 1973); Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America v. NLRB, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 365, 377, 365 F.2d 898, 909 (1966).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)
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