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NOVEMBER 25, 2020 | VISUAL


WHO VOTES WITH RUSSIA AT THE OPCW?



CONTENTS

 * Top Adverse Voters in CSP
 * Top Abstained Voters in CSP
 * Top Adverse Voters in EC
 * Top Abstained Voters in EC
 * Vote Records by Country
 * Download

ANDREA STRICKER

Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program Deputy Director and Research Fellow



NOVEMBER 25, 2020 | VISUAL

WHO VOTES WITH RUSSIA AT THE OPCW?



ANDREA STRICKER

Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program Deputy Director and Research Fellow



The Russian Federation has attempted to prevent the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) from holding Moscow and its client states
accountable for their use of chemical weapons under the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). Thus far, the OPCW’s voting process, which features open
ballots and requires a two-thirds majority to approve decisions, has allowed the
organization to operate more effectively than many other international bodies,
which often allow small minorities or even a single member to block decisions.
To address Russian obstruction, the United States will have to preserve and
broaden the coalition of OPCW member states committed to holding accountable
those who violate the CWC.

The OPCW’s governing bodies are the all-member Conference of the States Parties
(CSP), the organization’s principal and plenary body, and the Executive Council
(EC), an elected organ of 41 member states. FDD has learned that the CSP may
hold a truncated version of its annual gathering from November 30 to December 1,
2020, where it will discuss administrative matters, while delaying votes on
substance until a planned meeting in early 2021. The EC held the last of its
triannual meetings from October 6 to 9, 2020.

Russia’s obstruction seeks to prevent the OPCW from investigating Moscow’s use
of a military-grade chemical nerve agent called Novichok to poison enemies of
the state, as well as the use of chemical weapons against civilians by the
Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria starting in 2013. Russia and its voting bloc
have also attempted to prevent the OPCW from taking care of basic organizational
business, such as passing annual budgets, agendas, and programs of work. These
efforts have sometimes delayed EC decisions until subsequent meetings, since an
abstention by an EC member makes reaching a two-thirds majority more difficult.

The table and list below provide the first publicly available breakdown of
voting patterns of OPCW member states. This analysis identifies two main groups
of non-cooperative states: first, U.S. adversaries and the lesser powers in
their orbit, which actively side with Russia in OPCW voting; and, second, member
states that frequently abstain, thereby making it harder to reach the two-thirds
threshold. Twenty-seven member states are in the former category, and 35 are in
the latter.

The United States has positive relations with many countries that frequently
abstain; Washington should leverage these relationships to broaden the coalition
of member states committed to upholding the integrity of the CWC and the OPCW.

Certain countries that often vote with Russia may also be amenable to
persuasion, such as South Africa and Vietnam. Armenia seeks to maintain U.S.
economic support. The Palestinian Authority will seek to obtain renewed U.S.
economic funding next year. Sudan is part of a U.S.-assisted normalization
process with Israel.

Working through the OPCW, the next administration can show that multilateral
diplomacy is capable of ensuring accountability for regimes that violate binding
treaties with their concealment and use of chemical weapons.


TOP ADVERSE VOTERS IN CSP

7+ ADVERSE VOTES OUT OF 15




TOP ABSTAINED VOTERS IN CSP

4+ ABSTAINED VOTES OUT OF 8




TOP ADVERSE VOTERS IN EC

5+ ADVERSE VOTES OUT OF 11




TOP ABSTAINED VOTERS IN EC

4+ ABSTAINED VOTES OUT OF 9




VOTE RECORDS BY COUNTRY

Country Abstentions in CSP Adverse Votes in CSP Absentions in EC Adverse Votes
in EC Afghanistan5 Algeria*7673 Angola 17 Argentina*4 Armenia8 Azerbaijan52
Bangladesh*521 Belarus14 Benin4 Bhutan4 Bolivia113 Bosnia & Herzegovina6
Botswana1 Brazil*77 Brunei4 Burkina Faso8 Burundi12 Cambodia16 Cameroon*421
Chile*2 China1510 Comoros7 Congo7 Cuba14 DR Congo 3 Ecuador7 El Salvador*71
Eritrea2 Eswatini2 Ethiopia8 Ghana*421 Guatemala*111 India*4581 Indonesia413
Iran 1510 Iraq*77 Japan*1 Jordan8 Kazakhstan14 Kenya*6191 Kyrgyzstan8 Laos113
Lebanon1 Libya4 Malaysia7 Mongolia71 Morocco*13 Mozambique17 Myanmar15 Namibia1
Nepal8 Nicaragua15 Nigeria*431 Pakistan*11082 Palestinian Authority8 Panama1
Peru*1 Philippines*712 Russia1511 Rwanda 1 Saudi Arabia*3 South Africa*11272
South Korea*1 Senegal*421 Sri Lanka8 Sudan*1433 Suriname7 Sweden1 Syria15
Tajikistan14 Thailand 6 Togo1 Tunisia4 UAE*11 Uganda81 Uzbekistan14 Venezuela15
Vietnam 47 Zimbabwe8

Asterisk (*) denotes current EC member states as of October 2020


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MOST PROBLEMATIC VOTERS FOR THE UNITED STATES

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VOTE RECORDS BY COUNTRY

ISSUES:

ISSUES:

International Organizations Nonproliferation

TOPICS:

TOPICS:

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Russia
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