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THREAT ALERT: FILELESS MALWARE EXECUTING IN CONTAINERS

Security Threat

Idan RevivoAssaf Morag
December 2, 2020


Our cyber research team detected a new type of attack that executes and runs
malware straight from memory in containers, thus evading common defenses and
static scanning. This malware is using a rootkit to hide its running processes,
then hijacks resources by executing a crypto miner from memory — leaving a
backdoor that enables attackers to do more damage. We found four container
images in Docker Hub designed to execute fileless malware attacks.



A fileless attack is especially concerning since industry reports indicate that
every year the number of these malware attacks is increasing — by hundreds of
percent. Some reports claim that this type of malware attack is 10 times more
likely to succeed in infecting a machine than a file-based attack. Now that
adversaries are using such highly sophisticated and obfuscated techniques,
security practitioners must up their game accordingly.


WHAT IS A FILELESS MALWARE ATTACK?

Until recently, we’ve most often witnessed two types of attacks in containers,
and neither of them were fileless. Dedicated malicious images are one type of
attack that can be detected by using traditional static security solutions, such
as antivirus scanners, that usually scan to find malicious marks correlated with
a tool’s signature. The second type is a benign image running malicious scripts
at the entry point which is set to download malware from the attacker’s C2
server. This type of attack is more advanced, to detect this form of malware you
need a dynamic scanner that’s capable of scanning files written to disk during
runtime. You can read more about our classifications in our 2020 Cloud Native
Threat Report.

However, in a fileless malware attack, the malware is loaded into memory and
then executed. By executing malicious code directly from memory, attackers can
evade detection by static scanners, and even some dynamic scanners, because they
cannot read the file from memory. Only more sophisticated dynamic analysis that
analyzes a running system’s processes can help.


THE DETECTION METHOD

We at Team Nautilus occasionally scan Docker Hub using our sophisticated Aqua
DTA (Dynamic Threat Analysis) scanner. It is purpose-built to detect hidden,
malicious elements in images by running the image as a container in a secure
sandbox to analyze its behavior.

Using this technique, we detected two Docker Hub accounts (portaienr and
lifengyi1323) containing various malicious images. Our research shows that these
accounts are linked to TeamTNT, a group whose attacks we’ve seen before. We just
reported about the account ‘portaienr’ in a recent blog. In addition to the
findings in the blog, DTA found four images designed to execute fileless malware
attacks. It was at this point we decided to thoroughly investigate these images.






THE ENTRY POINTS

The image lifengyi1323/traband was built with six layers. Two of the layers
contained BusyBox (provides various Unix utilities) and the rest contained
TeamTNT’s malicious binaries and scripts (as detailed below). The container is
initiated with execution of file init.sh which is located on disk (MD5=
2a42cc706d451a64b5d2cbf80e5d61ec).



The shell file Init.sh is a short, straight-forward file designed to prepare the
environment to execute three files. First, the script changes attribute
definitions in several files. It changes /root/sbin (MD5=
f42be0d5a0da02a4d6bfc95b62d1838e) and /root/traband (MD5=
37902136fe513879ee7fee9208cdb40a) mode to execute. Both sbin and traband are
packed files, but they only have a few general detections in VirusTotal, an
online service that analyzes files and URLs to detect malicious content. A lack
of detections within these files implies that this technique is highly effective
against av scanners. After a deeper analysis, traband seems to be packed with
UPX and ezuri packers while sbin is packed with ezuri packer.

Attackers often use packers as a defensive evasion technique since they can
compress a malware file without affecting its code and functionality and appear
to security detectors as a benign file. There is also a 4th file (muser) that is
designed to open a backdoor for the attackers (TeamTNT). The script erases host
Cron jobs and sets to execute the muser file in a Cron that is mounted to the
host.


LOADING AND EXECUTING THE PAYLOAD IN MEMORY

As mentioned above, both files sbin and traband are decrypting and executing the
payload from memory during runtime.

The file ‘traband’

First ‘traband’ is unpacked and the decrypted binary payload is written and
executed from memory. We then see an execve() syscall from memory that is
running a process named kthreadd, this is actually a rootkit using LD Preload to
hide all processes related to kthreadd.

Moreover, the elf binary is also executed from memory. It is classified in
VirusTotal as Tsunami malware (MD5= 48c056a1bf908a424d472f121ccaf44b), something
often used in TeamTNT’s other campaigns. Tsunami malware enables a remote
attacker to download files and execute shell commands in an infected host. In
addition, the attacker can also launch a denial-of-service attack from the
infected host. Lastly, the Tsunami connected through IRC protocol to
164[.]68[.]106[.]96[:]6697 that serves as TeamTNT’s C2 server
(ircbd[.]anondns[.]net / irc[.]teamtnt[.]red).

The file ‘sbin’

The file sbin is executed and the binary payload is written and executed from
memory. Following that, we see indications of an unpacking process and another
execve() syscall with kthreadd as argv. The same name is used in both executed
binaries so that its processes are hidden with the help of the rootkit. The code
is encrypted with base64 and is then decrypted and executed during runtime. The
output of the decrypted base64 is written to disk and archived as a tar file
kube.tar.gz. Once extracted, the outcome is kube file, the Tsunami malware
(MD5=df386df8c8a376686f788ceff1216f11).

We see another execve() syscall that executes a crypto miner from memory.
Lastly, we see a connection with a mining pool (gulf[.]moneroocean[.]stream /
18[.]210[.]126[.]40).


IN SUMMARY

The first attacks in containers involved running a simple mining command or an
unsophisticated attempt to break out of the container to the host. Now, for the
first time, we see a fileless attack in a container, using rootkit to hide
traces, stealthily mining cryptocurrency, and opening a backdoor to the
attackers.

These new and daring attacks emphasize the importance of putting better and
stronger solutions in the defender’s toolbox. Below are a few recommendations,
when practiced together, they can assist you against these kinds of attacks:

 1. Scan all images that you use, make sure you are familiar with them and their
    use, use minimal privileges, such as avoiding root user and privileged mode.
    Use a static vulnerability scanner such as Trivy (open source).
 2. Use Tracee (open source) to detect suspicious or abnormal processes running
    in your environment, and dynamically scan using DTA to safely discover
    malware in images before deploying.
 3. Investigate logs, mostly around user actions, and look for anomalous
    actions.
 4. Form a security strategy to better enforce your policies and consider using
    advanced cloud security tools to improve security coverage.


MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK







INDICATIONS OF COMPROMISE (IOCS)

Container Images lifengyi1323/simple:latest lifengyi1323/speedrun:latest
lifengyi1323/monkey:latest lifengyi1323/bindoc:latest
lifengyi1323/kubeconfig:latest lifengyi1323/traband:latest Binaries The file
‘usr/bin/xmrig’ (MD5= 5888e17810aa1846c0c013804e181624) was detected in
container image ‘lifengyi1323/simple’ The in-memory file (MD5=
e01d8a1656e41ec3b7de722424286ce9) was detected in runtime memory while running
‘lifengyi1323/simple’ The file ‘root/sbin’ (MD5=
f42be0d5a0da02a4d6bfc95b62d1838e) was detected in container image
‘lifengyi1323/bindoc’ The file ‘root/xmrig’ (MD5=
91a915ce774a9103c17e2786fb6d7424) was detected in container image
‘lifengyi1323/kubeconfig’ The in-memory file (MD5=
d180c45a49e3d338c4cd7fb1781453d7) was detected in runtime memory while running
‘lifengyi1323/kubeconfig’ Domains / IP Addresses ircbd[.]anondns[.]net
irc[.]teamtnt[.]red 164[.]68[.]106[.]96

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Published under: SECURITY RESEARCH

Tags: Container Security, Malware Attacks, Security Threats



Idan Revivo
Idan is the Head of Security Research at Aqua Security. He manages a team of
researchers who are focused on threat hunting and vulnerability research in
containers, serverless, and cloud native technologies.


Assaf Morag
Assaf is a Lead Data Analyst at Aqua Nautilus research team, he focuses on
supporting the data needs of the team, obtaining threat intelligence and helping
Aqua and the industry stay at the forefront of new threats and methodologies for
protection. His work has been published in leading info security publications
and journals across the globe, and most recently he contributed to the new MITRE
ATT&CK Container Framework.


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