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UNWANTED GUESTS: MITIGATING REMOTE ACCESS TROJAN INFECTION RISK

Tags: Malware, TelegramRAT, QwixxRAT, Data Extraction, New Malware

UPTYCS THREAT RESEARCH

August 14, 2023
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A new threat has emerged in the realm of cybersecurity, referred to as
QwixxRAT.  Both businesses and individual users are at risk, as this Trojan
silently infiltrates devices, casting a wide net of data extraction. 

 

Ever vigilant for threats like the Remote Access Trojan (RAT), the Uptycs Threat
Research team discovered QwixxRAT (aka Telegram RAT) in early August 2023. The
threat actor is widely distributing this malicious tool through Telegram and
Discord platforms. 

Once installed on the victim’s Windows platform machines, the RAT stealthily
collects sensitive data, which is then sent to the attacker's Telegram bot,
providing them with unauthorized access to the victim's sensitive information.


To avoid detection by antivirus software, the RAT employs command and control
functionality through a Telegram bot. This allows the attacker to remotely
control the RAT and manage its operations. 

 


A FAR-REACHING RAT

QwixxRAT is meticulously designed to harvest an expansive range of information
from browser histories and credit card details to keylogging insights. 


Its presence became notably alarming in recent evaluations of compromised
systems, hinting at its potential rise. While its origin and primary target
zones remain under investigation, the Trojan's reach seems global, leaving no
user truly safe. 


Beyond mere data theft, QwixxRAT wields formidable remote administrative tools,
enabling attackers to control victim devices, launch commands, and even
destabilize systems. In this blog, we aim to comprehensively explore its
features, workings, and the preventative steps that can be taken against it.

 


MARKETING AND DISTRIBUTION TACTICS OF QWIXXRAT

The scheme is orchestrated via a threat actor utilizing both Telegram and
Discord platforms to market the RAT tool. They offer the tool for sale,
specifying its cost, and additionally provide a limited free version.


Price list (Russian currency):
Permanent access - 500 rubles 
Access for a week - 150 rubles 

Upon any threat actor's purchase of the RAT, the team establishes a separate
channel dedicated to accessing the acquired data.

 

Figure 1 – QwixxRAT Telegram channel

 


QWIXXRAT WORKFLOW

Figure 2 depicts the QwixxRAT workflow.

 

Figure 2 – Workflow of QwixxRAT

 


TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

The RAT file is a C# compiled binary, functioning as a 32-bit executable file
designed for CPU operations. The figure shows that the threat actor employed two
distinct names for the same Remote Access Trojan (RAT). One alias used was
"Qwixx Rat," while the other was identified as "TelegramRAT."

 

Figure 3 – QwixxRAT code

 

The main function consists of a total of 19 individual functions, each serving a
unique purpose. We will now examine them one by one.

The RAT is equipped with a configuration function that determines its behavior
on the target machine. This configuration function contains various values,
which can be in the form of booleans, file extensions, or other types of data.
Based on these values, the RAT adapts its actions accordingly.

 


FUNCTION 1: HIDECONSOLEWINDOW

As this is a CPU program, the threat actor conceals the console to remain
covert.

 


FUNCTION 2: CHECKMUTEX

The threat actor employs a mutex value check to prevent duplicate execution.
They generate an MD5 value for the string "995716229" and additionally verify if
the current login user has administrative privileges. If the user is an admin,
the threat actor creates a new mutex using the string
"ADMIN:21de6ebf2e182b19a589c154562979b4." By doing so, the actor ensures that
only one instance of the program runs on the target machine.

 

Figure 4 – Mutex check

 


FUNCTION 3: SECURITYPROTOCOL

This code snippet sets the “ServicePointManager.SecurityProtocol” property to
enable support for multiple secure network protocols. The application ensures
backward compatibility and broader compatibility with various servers and
clients by including SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.2. This configuration
allows the application to securely communicate with servers requiring different
SSL/TLS versions to establish secure connections.

 


FUNCTION 4: ELEVATE PRIVILEGES

The code attempts to elevate the current application's privileges to run with
administrative rights by relaunching itself(Hidden Attribute) with the "runas"
verb. If the user denies the elevation or if the configure AdminRightsRequired
setting prevents it, the while loop will continue, allowing for further attempts
to elevate privileges.

 


FUNCTION 5: SLEEP

To evade AV/EDR/Sandbox detection, the threat actor incorporates the sleep
function to introduce a delay in the execution process.

 


FUNCTION 6: RUNANTIANALYSIS

The threat actor employed three methods for anti-analysis purposes: Sandboxie,
VirtualBox, and Debugger.

 

Figure 5 – Anti analysis check

 

 * Sandbox check:

The code includes a check to determine whether the current application is
operating within a sandbox environment. This check involves looking for specific
DLLs, namely SbieDll.dll, SxIn.dll, Sf2.dll, snxhk.dll, and cmdvrt32.dll, which
are commonly associated with sandboxing software. If any of these DLLs are
detected as loaded within the current process by GetModuleHandle API, the
attacker instantly terminates the code execution, understanding that it is
running in a sandbox environment.

 

 * VirtualBox

To identify if the file is running within a virtual environment, the threat
actor utilized two WMI queries. Firstly, they employed the query "Select * from
Win32_ComputerSystem" to inspect the "Manufacturer" and "Model" fields. If any
of the strings match the keyword "virtual" or "vmware" or "VirtualBox" the
process is promptly terminated. 

 

Secondly, the actor employed the query "SELECT * FROM Win32_VideoController" to
check the "Name" property using GetPropertyValue.If any of the strings match the
keyword "VMware " or "VBox ", the process is terminated as well.

 

 * Debugger

The code implements a method to identify if the current application is being run
under a debugger. It does this by introducing a brief delay and subsequently
checking if the elapsed time during this delay is less than 10 ticks, equivalent
to 1 microsecond. The underlying assumption is that the presence of a debugger
might induce additional delays, resulting in a smaller time difference. The
process is terminated as a security measure if such a scenario is detected.

 


FUNCTION 7: INSTALLSELF

The threat actor attempts to locate the file at "C:\Users\Chrome\rat.exe". If
the file is not found in the specified path, the code retrieves the executable
path and copies itself to "C:\Users\Chrome\rat.exe". Subsequently, the actor
modifies the file attributes to make it hidden in the system.

 


FUNCTION 8: SETAUTORUN

A scheduled task is created for the hidden file located at
"C:\Users\Chrome\rat.exe".

 

Figure 6 – Persistence of RAT

 


FUNCTION 9: MELTFILE

The code contains a self-destruction mechanism designed for a C# program. Under
specific conditions, it generates a temporary batch script that patiently waits
for the current process to terminate. Once the process stops, the executable
file is deleted, and the program is relaunched from the designated InstallPath
("C:\Users\Chrome\rat.exe"). This self-destructive behavior is commonly observed
in malware to conceal its existence or in security-related applications to
remove sensitive components after use.

 

Figure 7 – Bat file creation

 

The batch script checks for the existence of a parent process with a specific
PID (1207) and waits until it is available. Once the parent process is found, it
proceeds to delete the "stealer.exe" file (which is the parent), changes the
current directory to "C:\Users\Chrome," and then runs the "rat.exe" program
(which is a copy of the parent).

The following snapshot represents a batch file.

 

Figure 8 – The bat file

 


FUNCTION 10: ISCONNECTEDTOINTERNET

The code is a simple way to check for an active internet connection by trying to
ping "google.com" and "api.telegram.org". The method keeps retrying the pings
until both hosts are reachable, and it prints status messages to the console
during the process.

 


FUNCTION 11: PROCESSCHECKERTHREAD

The code serves as a process monitoring mechanism, actively scanning the
system's running process list for specific processes such as "taskmgr,"
"processhacker," "netstat," "netmon," "tcpview," "wireshark," "filemon,"
"regmon," and "cain." 

Upon detecting any of these specified processes, it takes action by blocking the
network activity thread, as managed by the variable
"telegram.waitThreadIsBlocked." It remains in this state until the detected
process is no longer active. Once the process is terminated, the network
activity resumes, and the code sends a notification message to a Telegram bot,
alerting it about the detected blocked process.

 


FUNCTION 12: KEYLOGGERTHREAD

The code implements a keyboard hook callback function responsible for capturing
keyboard events and logging them into a file. As the function captures the keys
pressed, it converts special keys into more understandable representations and
categorizes the keystrokes based on the active window title.

Keyboard hooks find utility in various applications, including keylogging, input
monitoring, and hotkey handling. It is essential to recognize that while
keyboard hooks can serve legitimate purposes like enabling accessibility
features, they can also be misused for malicious activities, such as
unauthorized keylogging, without the user's consent.

 


FUNCTION 13: AUTOSTEALERTHREAD

The code is designed to illicitly gather confidential information from a
targeted computer. This includes capturing screenshots of the desktop,
extracting login credentials, credit card details, browsing history, bookmarks,
FTP credentials, messenger data, and data from the Steam platform. Subsequently,
the collected data is surreptitiously shared with the attacker via a Telegram
channel.

 

Figure 9 – Qwixx stealer code

 

 * desktopScreenshot

The code captures a screenshot of the desktop, saves it as a PNG
image(screenshot.png), sends it to a Telegram bot, and then cleans up by
deleting the temporary file. It can be used as part of a program or application
that periodically takes desktop screenshots and sends them to a Telegram bot for
monitoring, logging, or other purposes.

 

The code is designed to specifically target certain web browsers and collect
sensitive data, such as login details, browsing history, cookies, credit card
information, and bookmarks. It achieves this objective by utilizing an existing
GitHub project.

 

 

Targeted Browser List Google\Chrome
Google(x86)\Chrome
Chromium
Opera Software\Opera Stable\
BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser
Epic Privacy Browser
Amigo
Vivaldi
Orbitum
Mail.Ru\Atom
Kometa
Comodo\Dragon Torch
Comodo
Slimjet
360Browser\Browser
Maxthon3
K-Melon
Sputnik\Sputnik
Nichrome
CocCoc\Browser
uCozMedia\Uran
Chromodo

 * Passwords

The password-stealing code is designed to extract saved login credentials
(including the host name, user name, and password) from specific web browser
locations such as \User Data\Default\Login Data on the user's system. It then
stores the collected data in a text file named "passwords.txt." Finally, the
code uploads the generated file to a Telegram bot.

 

 * CreditCards

The credit card-stealing code is designed to retrieve stored credit card
information, including the card number, cardholder name, expiration year, and
expiration month, from specific web browser locations like "\User
Data\Default\Web data" on the victim's system. Subsequently, it stores this data
in a text file named "credit_cards.txt". Finally, the code uploads the generated
file to a Telegram bot.

 

 * History

The browsing history-stealing code is designed to gather information related to
visited URLs, page titles, visit counts, and timestamps from specific web
browser locations such as "\User Data\Default\History" on the user's system. It
then saves this data in a text file named "history.txt". Finally, the code
uploads the created file to a Telegram bot.

 

 * Bookmarks

The bookmark-stealing code is designed to extract bookmark information,
including the URL, name, and date, from specific web browser locations like
"\User Data\Default\Bookmarks" on the user's system. It then stores this
information in a text file named "bookmarks.txt". Finally, the code uploads the
generated file to a Telegram bot.

 

 * Cookies

The cookie-stealing code is designed to gather cookie information, including the
value, host, name, path, expiration, and secure attributes, from different web
browser locations like "\User Data\Default\Cookies" on the user's system. It
then saves this data in a text file named "cookies.txt." Finally, the code
uploads the created file to a Telegram bot.

 

 * FileZilla

The code is designed to retrieve FTP server information, including the URL,
username, and password, from FileZilla's configuration files. It proceeds to
store this extracted data in a text file named "filezilla.txt" and subsequently
uploads the file to a Telegram bot.

 

 * Telegram

The code is specifically created to pilfer Telegram data located in the "\tdata"
directory. It compresses the data into a .ZIP file and then dispatches this file
to a Telegram bot.

 

 * Discord

The code is purposely crafted to illicitly obtain Discord data found in the
"\discord\Local Storage\leveldb" directory. It then sends this data to a
Telegram bot.

 

 * SteamGrabber

The code responsible for searching the user's Steam installation directory. It
specifically targets Steam-related files, such as those starting with "ssfn,"
files in the "config" subdirectory with names beginning with "loginusers.", and
files in the "config" subdirectory with names starting with "conFigure." Once
the Steam process is detected as running, it gathers these identified files and
creates a zip archive named "steam.zip." Subsequently, the code sends this
archive to a specified Telegram bot without obtaining the user's consent.

 

 * GrabDesktop

The code gathers files with specific extensions (.kdbx, .png, .jpg, .bmp, .pdf,
.txt, .rtf, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .odt, .sql, .php, .py, .html,
.xml, .json, .csv) from the desktop location. After collecting these files, it
creates a zip archive named "desktop.zip" and then transmits this archive to a
Telegram bot.

 


FUNCTION 14: CLIPPER

The threat actor may exploit clipboard manager APIs to illicitly access
sensitive information copied to the device's clipboard. The code aims to extract
cryptocurrency wallet information from the following organizations: Monero,
Ethereum, and Bitcoin.

 


FUNCTION 15: PROTECTPROCESS

To set the "SeDebugPrivilege" to a level of 2, it will grant your program a
special privilege called "Debug Privilege." This is usually only required for
specific debugging or system administration tasks.

 

Figure 10 – Protect process

 


FUNCTION 16: PREVENTSLEEP

It's worth mentioning that the value 2147483651U used in this context represents
a combination of flags (ES_CONTINUOUS, ES_SYSTEM_REQUIRED, and
ES_AWAYMODE_REQUIRED) to set the system's execution state. These flags ensure
that the system remains continuously active, preventing sleep or idle mode, even
if the user is away, such as during presentations or video playback.

 

Figure 11 – Prevent sleep

 


FUNCTION 17: SENDCONNECTION

The purpose of this code is to send a text message to a specific chat on
Telegram using a Telegram bot.

 

Figure 12 – Communication request

 


FUNCTION 18: WAITCOMMANDSTHREAD

The code implements a loop to constantly monitor incoming messages and commands
for the Telegram bot. It promptly takes appropriate actions based on the content
of these messages, which may involve downloading files, executing commands, or
notifying the bot owner of unknown message types. By doing so, the code ensures
that the bot remains responsive and handles new updates in a timely manner.

 

Grabbed Data Category
Command
Description

INFORMATION

Computerinfo

The "Computerinfo" command retrieved the following

details from the victim's machine.


 * GetSystemVersion
 * MachineName
 * UserName
 * Current date and time
 * Antivirus check (Select * from AntivirusProduct)
 * Admin login check
 * Process protected,
 * Debugger check
 * Program List
 * CUPname
 * GPU name
 * RAM amount(Select * From Win32_ComputerSystem)
 * HWID (SELECT ProcessorId FROM Win32_Processor)

BatteryInfo

Get Battery percentage status

Location

The command extracted the Latitude, Longitude, Range,

BSSID, and Router details from the URL

https://api[.]mylnikov[.]org/geolocation/wifi?bssid=.

Whois

Get public ip via  http://ip-api.com/json/

GetActiveWindowTitle

Obtain the title of the presently active window on the

computer's desktop.

SPY

Webcam

Get CommandCam tool from

https[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/tedburke/

CommandCam/master/CommandCam[.]exe. 

This user-friendly command-line tool for Windows
acts as a webcam image grabber, allowing the
capture of a single image and saving it as a png file.
It serves as a convenient solution for automating
image capture in batch files and other scenarios
where simplicity and efficiency are essential.

Microphone

Download the audio recording file from

https://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/LimerBoy/hackpy/

master/modules/audio[.]zip.

Extract the zip file to obtain the executable (exe) file.

Proceed to modify the attributes of the executable to be

hidden. Afterward, execute the modified file with specific

arguments and save the resulting audio in .wav format.

 

Desktop

Refer: Function 12: AutoStealerThread

 

Keylogger

Refer: Function 11: keyloggerThread

CLIPBOARD

ClipboardSet

This method is used to set the text (string) content on the

clipboard. It allows you to place a specific text into the

clipboard so that it can be pasted into other applications

using the standard paste command

ClipboardGet

This method is used to retrieve the text (string) content

from the clipboard.

TASK MANAGER

ProcessList

Get process details

ProcessKill

Kill the running process

ProcessStart

Start new process

TaskManagerDisable

The task manager feature is disabled by making

modifications to the registry settings.

Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\

Policies\\System

TaskManagerEnable

The task manager feature is enabled by making

modifications to the registry settings.Software\\

Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System

MinimizeAllWindows

Minimize windows of target machine

MaximizeAllWindows

Maximize Windows of target machine

STILLER

GetPasswords

Refer: Function 12: AutoStealerThread

GetCreditCards

Refer: Function 12: AutoStealerThread

GetHistory

Refer: Function 12: AutoStealerThread

GetBookmarks

Refer: Function 12: AutoStealerThread

GetCookies

Refer: Function 12: AutoStealerThread

GetDesktop

Refer: Function 12: AutoStealerThread

GetFileZilla

Refer: Function 12: AutoStealerThread

GetDiscord

Refer: Function 12: AutoStealerThread

GetTelegram

Refer: Function 12: AutoStealerThread

GetSteam

Refer: Function 12: AutoStealerThread

CD

OpenCD

Open CD disk

CloseCD

Close CD disk

FILES

DownloadFile

Download file from server

UploadFile

Upload file to attacker

RunFile

Start the file

RunFileAdmin

start the file with admin privileges

ListFiles

Get list of files from directory

RemoveFile

Remove File from disk

RemoveDir

Remove Dir from Disk

MoveFile

Transfer the file from one location to another

CopyFile

Copy the file from one location to another

MoveDir

Transfer the Directory from one location to another

CopyDir

Copy the Directory from one location to another

COMMUNICATION

Speak

The "textToSpeak" command.

Shell

Command for shell execution.

MessageBox

Display a message using MessageBox.

OpenURL

Launch new URL

SetWallpaper

Change wallpaper 

SendKeyPress

Sends one or more key press combinations to the system

NetDiscover

Get Host,IP,MAC details

Uninstall

The parent file is removed, and execution commences

from the copied file "rat.exe."

AUDIO

PlayMusic

Play mp3 file via mciSendString API

AudioVolumeSet

Downloaded file and control volume

https://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/LimerBoy/ToxicEye

/master/TelegramRAT/TelegramRAT/core/libs/

AudioSwitcher.AudioApi[].dll

https://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/LimerBoy/ToxicEye/

master/TelegramRAT/TelegramRAT/core/libs/

AudioSwitcher.AudioApi.CoreAudio[.]dll

AudioVolumeGet

Used same Dll file (AudioVolumeSet) get default value

information

PC

BlockInput

Control Keyboard and Mouse

Monitor

Control monitor - off,standby

DisplayRotate

Rotate display

EncryptFileSystem

Encrypted userprofile folder with targeting files .lnk, .png,

 .jpg, .bmp, .psd, .pdf, .txt, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx,

 .odt, .csv, .sql, .mdb, .sln, .php ,py, .asp, .aspx, .html, .xml

DecryptFileSystem

Decrypted userprofile folder with targeting files .lnk, .png, 

.jpg, .bmp, .psd, .pdf, .txt, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, 

.pptx, .odt, .csv, .sql, .mdb, .sln, .php, .py, .asp, .aspx, .html,

.xml

ForkBomb

It is a "harmful" program that rapidly creates an "endless

loop" of new processes, "overloading" the computer and

causing it to "crash" or become unresponsive. 

Attacker targets below program notepad, explorer,

mspaint, calc, cmd

BSoD

Check Blue Screen of Death

OverwriteBootSector

Change Boot file it maybe lead to destroy machine

TRUST

Shutdown

Power off the victim machine.

Reboot

Restart the machine

Hibernate

move to Hibernate mode

Logoff

Initiate a logoff on the victim machine.

OTHER

Help

Shows Commands details

About

Show telegram id for threat actor

 


FUNCTION 19: MAINFORM

This code sets up the main form of the application to be borderless and not
appear in the taskbar. Additionally, the application is granted high priority
during system shutdown, allowing it to complete critical or background tasks
before the system shuts down.

 


UPTYCS XDR COVERAGE

In addition to having YARA built in and being armed with other advanced
detection capabilities, Uptycs XDR users can easily scan for QwixxRAT. XDR
contextual detection provides important details about identified malware. Users
can navigate to the toolkit data section in the detection screen, then click a
detected item to reveal its profile (Fig. 13).

 



 


QWIXXRAT YARA DETECTION RULE

 

Uptycs XDR scans the memory of newly launched processes and detects any presence
of suspicious strings by utilizing YARA rules. The YARA rule for detecting this
malware has already been made available to our customers.

If you are not an Uptycs XDR customer, you can use either the YARA tool or a
third-party tool to scan suspicious processes. We have shared the rule below for
your convenience.

 

rule Uptycs_QwixxRAT

{

    meta:

    malware_name = "QwixxRAT"

    description = "QwixxRAT is a trojan designed to extract browser cookies,
histories, credit card information and capture keylogger activities from
targeted devices"

    author = "Uptycs Inc"

    version = "1"





strings:

    $string_0 = "[CAPSLOCK: ON]" ascii wide

    $string_1 = "[ESC]"  ascii wide

    $string_2 = "webcam.png"  ascii wide

    $string_3 = "SELECT * FROM win32_operatingsystem"  ascii wide

    $string_4 = "\\User Data\\Default\\Login Data"  ascii wide

    $string_5 = "recentservers.xml"  ascii wide

    $string_6 = "credit_cards.txt"  ascii wide

    $string_7 = "Tasklist /fi"  ascii wide

    $string_8 = "Select * from AntivirusProduct"  ascii wide

    $string_9 = "\\keylogs.txt"  ascii wide

    $string_10 = "AutoStealer"  ascii wide

 

condition:

    all of them

}

 


PRECAUTIONS

 

 * Immediately report any theft to appropriate authorities, such as police,
   banks, or credit card companies, to counteract identity theft and monetary
   fraud promptly.
   
   
 * Regularly scrutinize your bank and credit card statements for anomalies.
   Alert authorities about any unrecognized activity.
   
   
 * Periodically renew your passwords using robust, unique combinations to reduce
   the risk of data misuse or phishing attempts.
   
   
 * Introduce an additional security layer against unauthorized breaches by
   employing two-factor authentication (2FA) on vital accounts, including
   cryptocurrency wallets.
   
   
 * Ensure webcam security by covering or disconnecting it when idle.
   
   
 * Be wary of dubious emails, links, or attachments. Avoid revealing personal
   details or engaging with unfamiliar links.
   
   
 * Stay informed about cybersecurity norms and educate those around you about
   potential threats and safety practices.


IOC

 

File name
MD5

QwixxRAT.exe

46d6f885d323df5f00218da715239a7b

 

 

URL

https[:]//raw.githubusercontent[.]com/tedburke[.]commandCam/master[.]commandCam[.]exe

https[:]//raw.githubusercontent[.]com/LimerBoy/hackpy/master/modules/audio[.]zip

https[:]//api.telegram.org/

https[:]//raw.githubusercontent[.]com/LimerBoy/ToxicEye/master/TelegramRAT/TelegramRAT/core/libs/AudioSwitcher.AudioApi[.]dll

https[:]//raw.githubusercontent[.]com/LimerBoy/ToxicEye/master/TelegramRAT/TelegramRAT/core/libs/AudioSwitcher.AudioApi.CoreAudio].]dll

https[:]//api[.]mylnikov[.]org/geolocation/wifi?bssid=

google[.]com

 

 

 

 

 



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