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Work {a} #Work {k} Subject {b} #Subject {l} Book {c} #Book {m} Section {d}
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* Sentences Commentary
* Sentences I, d. 1-21
* Sentences I, d. 22-48
* Sentences II, d. 1-20
* Sentences II, d. 21-44
* Sentences III, d. 1-22
* Sentences III, d. 23-40
* Sentences IV, d. 1-13
* Sentences IV, d. 14-25
* Sentences IV, d. 26-42
* Sentences IV, d. 43-50
* Summa Contra Gentiles
* Summa Contra Gentiles 1
* Summa Contra Gentiles 2
* Summa Contra Gentiles 3
* Summa Contra Gentiles 4
* Summa Theologiae
* Summa Theologiae I, q. 1-49
* Prologue
* Q. 1 - The Nature and Extent of Sacred Doctrine
* A. 1 - Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required?
* A. 2 - Whether sacred doctrine is a science?
* A. 3 - Whether sacred doctrine is one science?
* A. 4 - Whether sacred doctrine is a practical science?
* A. 5 - Whether sacred doctrine is nobler than other sciences?
* A. 6 - Whether this doctrine is the same as wisdom?
* A. 7 - Whether God is the object of this science?
* A. 8 - Whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument?
* A. 9 - Whether Holy Scripture should use metaphors?
* A. 10 - Whether in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses?
* Q. 2 - The Existence of God
* A. 1 - Whether the existence of God is self-evident?
* A. 2 - Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?
* A. 3 - Whether God exists?
* Q. 3 - The Simplicity of God
* A. 1 - Whether God is a body?
* A. 2 - Whether God is composed of matter and form?
* A. 3 - Whether God is the same as his essence or nature?
* A. 4 - Whether essence and existence are the same in God?
* A. 5 - Whether God is contained in a genus?
* A. 6 - Whether in God there are any accidents?
* A. 7 - Whether God is altogether simple?
* A. 8 - Whether God enters into the composition of other things?
* Q. 4 - The Perfection of God
* A. 1 - Whether God is perfect?
* A. 2 - Whether the perfections of all things are in God?
* A. 3 - Whether any creature can be like God?
* Q. 5 - Goodness in General
* A. 1 - Whether goodness differs really from being?
* A. 2 - Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?
* A. 3 - Whether every being is good?
* A. 4 - Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause, or of the
others?
* A. 5 - Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and
order?
* A. 6 - Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous, the
useful and the pleasant?
* Q. 6 - The Goodness of God
* A. 1 - Whether God is good?
* A. 2 - Whether God is the supreme good?
* A. 3 - Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?
* A. 4 - Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
* Q. 7 - The Infinity of God
* A. 1 - Whether God is infinite?
* A. 2 - Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?
* A. 3 - Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?
* A. 4 - Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
* Q. 8 - The Existence of God in Things
* A. 1 - Whether God is in all things?
* A. 2 - Whether God is everywhere?
* A. 3 - Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?
* A. 4 - Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
* Q. 9 - The Immutability of God
* A. 1 - Whether God is altogether immutable?
* A. 2 - Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
* Q. 10 - The Eternity of God
* A. 1 - Whether this is a good definition of eternity: "eternity is the
simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"?
* A. 2 - Whether God is eternal?
* A. 3 - Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
* A. 4 - Whether eternity differs from time?
* A. 5 - Whether aeviternity differs from time?
* A. 6 - Whether there is only one aeviternity?
* Q. 11 - The Unity of God
* A. 1 - Whether one adds anything to being?
* A. 2 - Whether one and many are opposed to each other?
* A. 3 - Whether God is one?
* A. 4 - Whether God is supremely one?
* Q. 12 - How God is Known by Us
* A. 1 - Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
* A. 2 - Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect
through an image?
* A. 3 - Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?
* A. 4 - Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the
divine essence?
* A. 5 - Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order
to see the essence of God?
* A. 6 - Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more
perfectly than another?
* A. 7 - Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend him?
* A. 8 - Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?
* A. 9 - Whether what is seen in God by those who see the divine essence,
is seen through any similitude?
* A. 10 - Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it
at the same time?
* A. 11 - Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?
* A. 12 - Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?
* A. 13 - Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than
by natural reason?
* Q. 13 - The Names of God
* A. 1 - Whether a name can be given to God?
* A. 2 - Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?
* A. 3 - Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?
* A. 4 - Whether names applied to God are synonymous?
* A. 5 - Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally
predicated of them?
* A. 6 - Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of
creatures?
* A. 7 - Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated
of God temporally?
* A. 8 - Whether this name ‘God’ is a name of the nature?
* A. 9 - Whether this name ‘God’ is communicable?
* A. 10 - Whether this name ‘God’ is applied to God univocally by nature,
by participation, and according to opinion?
* A. 11 - Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?
* A. 12 - Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
* Q. 14 - God’s Knowledge
* A. 1 - Whether there is knowledge in God?
* A. 2 - Whether God understands himself?
* A. 3 - Whether God comprehends himself?
* A. 4 - Whether the act of God’s intellect is his substance?
* A. 5 - Whether God knows things other than himself?
* A. 6 - Whether God knows things other than himself by proper knowledge?
* A. 7 - Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?
* A. 8 - Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?
* A. 9 - Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?
* A. 10 - Whether God knows evil things?
* A. 11 - Whether God knows singular things?
* A. 12 - Whether God can know infinite things?
* A. 13 - Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?
* A. 14 - Whether God knows enunciable things?
* A. 15 - Whether the knowledge of God is variable?
* A. 16 - Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?
* Q. 15 - Ideas
* A. 1 - Whether there are ideas?
* A. 2 - Whether ideas are many?
* A. 3 - Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?
* Q. 16 - Truth
* A. 1 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect?
* A. 2 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and
dividing?
* A. 3 - Whether the true and being are convertible terms?
* A. 4 - Whether good is logically prior to the true?
* A. 5 - Whether God is truth?
* A. 6 - Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things
are true?
* A. 7 - Whether created truth is eternal?
* A. 8 - Whether truth is immutable?
* Q. 17 - Falsity
* A. 1 - Whether falsity exists in things?
* A. 2 - Whether there is falsity in the senses?
* A. 3 - Whether falsity is in the intellect?
* A. 4 - Whether true and false are contraries?
* Q. 18 - The Life of God
* A. 1 - Whether to live belongs to all natural things?
* A. 2 - Whether life is an operation?
* A. 3 - Whether life is properly attributed to God?
* A. 4 - Whether all things are life in God?
* Q. 19 - The Will of God
* A. 1 - Whether there is will in God?
* A. 2 - Whether God wills things apart from himself?
* A. 3 - Whether whatever God wills, he wills necessarily?
* A. 4 - Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
* A. 5 - Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
* A. 6 - Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?
* A. 7 - Whether the will of God is changeable?
* A. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
* A. 9 - Whether God wills evils?
* A. 10 - Whether God has free-will?
* A. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?
* A. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the
divine will?
* Q. 20 - God’s Love
* A. 1 - Whether love exists in God?
* A. 2 - Whether God loves all things?
* A. 3 - Whether God loves all things equally?
* A. 4 - Whether God always loves more the better things?
* Q. 21 - The Justice and Mercy of God
* A. 1 - Whether there is justice in God?
* A. 2 - Whether the justice of God is truth?
* A. 3 - Whether mercy can be attributed to God?
* A. 4 - Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?
* Q. 22 - The Providence of God
* A. 1 - Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?
* A. 2 - Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?
* A. 3 - Whether God has immediate providence over everything?
* A. 4 - Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?
* Q. 23 - Predestination
* A. 1 - Whether men are predestined by God?
* A. 2 - Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?
* A. 3 - Whether God reprobates any man?
* A. 4 - Whether the predestined are chosen by God?
* A. 5 - Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of
predestination?
* A. 6 - Whether predestination is certain?
* A. 7 - Whether the number of the predestined is certain?
* A. 8 - Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the
saints?
* Q. 24 - The Book of Life
* A. 1 - Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?
* A. 2 - Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the
predestined?
* A. 3 - Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?
* Q. 25 - The Power of God
* A. 1 - Whether there is power in God?
* A. 2 - Whether the power of God is infinite?
* A. 3 - Whether God is omnipotent?
* A. 4 - Whether God can make the past not to have been?
* A. 5 - Whether God can do what he does not?
* A. 6 - Whether God can do better than what he does?
* Q. 26 - Divine Beatitude
* A. 1 - Whether beatitude belongs to God?
* A. 2 - Whether God is called blessed in respect of his intellect?
* A. 3 - Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?
* A. 4 - Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?
* Q. 27 - The Procession of the Divine Persons
* A. 1 - Whether there is procession in God?
* A. 2 - Whether any procession in God can be called generation?
* A. 3 - Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the
Word?
* A. 4 - Whether the procession of love in God is generation?
* A. 5 - Whether there are more than two processions in God?
* Q. 28 - The Divine Relations
* A. 1 - Whether there are real relations in God?
* A. 2 - Whether relation in God is the same as his essence?
* A. 3 - Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each
other?
* A. 4 - Whether in God there are only four real relations—paternity,
filiation, spiration, and procession?
* Q. 29 - The Divine Persons
* A. 1 - Whether Boethius' definition of a person is unfitting: "a person
is an individual substance of a rational nature"?
* A. 2 - Whether 'person' is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and
essence?
* A. 3 - Whether the word ‘person’ should be said of God?
* A. 4 - Whether this word ‘person’ signifies relation?
* Q. 30 - The Plurality of Persons in God
* A. 1 - Whether there are several persons in God?
* A. 2 - Whether there are more than three persons in God?
* A. 3 - Whether the numeral terms denote anything real in God?
* A. 4 - Whether this term ‘person’ can be common to the three persons?
* Q. 31 - Unity and Plurality in God
* A. 1 - Whether there is trinity in God?
* A. 2 - Whether the Son is other than the Father?
* A. 3 - Whether the exclusive word ‘alone’ should be added to the
essential term in God?
* A. 4 - Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term,
even if the predicate is common?
* Q. 32 - The Knowledge of the Divine Persons
* A. 1 - Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by
natural reason?
* A. 2 - Whether there are notions in God?
* A. 3 - Whether there are five notions?
* A. 4 - Whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of
notions?
* Q. 33 - The Person of the Father
* A. 1 - Whether it belongs to the Father to be the principle of the Son
or of the Holy Spirit?
* A. 2 - Whether this name ‘Father’ is properly the name of a divine
person?
* A. 3 - Whether this name ‘Father’ is applied to God, first as a
personal name?
* A. 4 - Whether it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten?
* Q. 34 - The Person of the Son
* A. 1 - Whether ‘Word’ in God is a personal name?
* A. 2 - Whether ‘Word’ is the Son’s proper name?
* A. 3 - Whether the name ‘Word’ imports relation to creatures?
* Q. 35 - Image
* A. 1 - Whether 'Image' in God is said personally?
* A. 2 - Whether the name of 'Image' is proper to the Son?
* Q. 36 - The Person of the Holy Spirit
* A. 1 - Whether this name 'Holy Spirit' is the proper name of one divine
person?
* A. 2 - Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son?
* A. 3 - Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the
Son?
* A. 4 - Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy
Spirit?
* Q. 37 - The Name ‘Love’
* A. 1 - Whether ‘Love’ is the proper name of the Holy Spirit?
* A. 2 - Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy
Spirit?
* Q. 38 - The Name ‘Gift’
* A. 1 - Whether ‘Gift’ is a personal name?
* A. 2 - Whether ‘Gift’ is the proper name of the Holy Spirit?
* Q. 39 - The Persons in Relation to the Essence
* A. 1 - Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?
* A. 2 - Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one
essence?
* A. 3 - Whether essential names, such as ‘God‘, should be predicated in
the singular of the three persons?
* A. 4 - Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?
* A. 5 - Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?
* A. 6 - Whether the persons can be predicated of the concrete essential
terms?
* A. 7 - Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the
persons?
* A. 8 - Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons
in a fitting manner by the holy doctors?
* Q. 40 - Persons Compared to Relations or Properties
* A. 1 - Whether relation is the same as person?
* A. 2 - Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations?
* A. 3 - Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally
abstracted from the persons?
* A. 4 - Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts?
* Q. 41 - Persons Compared to Notional Acts
* A. 1 - Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?
* A. 2 - Whether the notional acts are voluntary?
* A. 3 - Whether the notional acts proceed from something?
* A. 4 - Whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional acts?
* A. 5 - Whether the power of begetting signifies a relation, and not the
essence?
* A. 6 - Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?
* Q. 42 - Equality and Likeness among the Divine Persons
* A. 1 - Whether equality is becoming to the divine persons?
* A. 2 - Whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with his principle,
as the Son with the Father?
* A. 3 - Whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature?
* A. 4 - Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness?
* A. 5 - Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely?
* A. 6 - Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power?
* Q. 43 - The Mission of the Divine Persons
* A. 1 - Whether a divine person can be properly sent?
* A. 2 - Whether mission can be eternal?
* A. 3 - Whether the invisible mission of the divine person is only
according to the gift of sanctifying grace?
* A. 4 - Whether the Father can also be fittingly sent?
* A. 5 - Whether it is fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly?
* A. 6 - Whether the invisible mission is to all who participate in
grace?
* A. 7 - Whether it is fitting for the Holy Spirit to be sent visibly?
* A. 8 - Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence he
proceeds eternally?
* Q. 44 - The Procession of Creatures from God
* A. 1 - Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?
* A. 2 - Whether primary matter is created by God?
* A. 3 - Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?
* A. 4 - Whether God is the final cause of all things?
* Q. 45 - Creation
* A. 1 - Whether to create is to make something from nothing?
* A. 2 - Whether God can create anything?
* A. 3 - Whether creation is anything in the creature?
* A. 4 - Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting
things?
* A. 5 - Whether it belongs to God alone to create?
* A. 6 - Whether to create is proper to any person?
* A. 7 - Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the
Trinity?
* A. 8 - Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art?
* Q. 46 - The Beginning of the Duration of Creatures
* A. 1 - Whether the universe of creatures always existed?
* A. 2 - Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?
* A. 3 - Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time?
* Q. 47 - The Distinction of Things in General
* A. 1 - Whether the multitude and distinction of things come from God?
* A. 2 - Whether the inequality of things is from God?
* A. 3 - Whether there is only one world, or many?
* Q. 48 - The Distinction of Good and Evil
* A. 1 - Whether evil is a nature?
* A. 2 - Whether evil is found in things?
* A. 3 - Whether evil is in good as in its subject?
* A. 4 - Whether evil corrupts the whole good?
* A. 5 - Whether evil is adequately divided into pain and fault?
* A. 6 - Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has?
* Q. 49 - The Cause of Evil
* A. 1 - Whether good can be the cause of evil?
* A. 2 - Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
* A. 3 - Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every
evil?
* Summa Theologiae I, q. 50-119
* Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 1-70
* Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 71-114
* Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 1-91
* Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 92-189
* Summa Theologiae III, q. 1-59
* Summa Theologiae III, q. 60-90
* Supplementum, q. 1-68
* Supplementum, q. 69-99
* Disputed Questions
* On Truth
* On the Power of God
* On the Soul
* On Spiritual Creatures
* On the Virtues
* On the Union of the Incarnate Word
* On Evil
* Quodlibet I
* Quodlibet II
* Quodlibet III
* Quodlibet IV
* Quodlibet V
* Quodlibet VI
* Quodlibet VII
* Quodlibet VIII
* Quodlibet IX
* Quodlibet X
* Quodlibet XI
* Quodlibet XII
* Old Testament Commentaries
* Rigans Montes
* Hic est Liber
* Psalms
* Jeremiah
* Lamentations
* Isaiah
* Job
* Gospel Commentaries
* Matthew 1-12
* Matthew 13-28
* John 1-8
* John 9-21
* Pauline Commentaries
* Romans
* 1 Corinthians
* 2 Corinthians
* Galatians
* Ephesians
* Philippians
* Colossians
* 1 Thessalonians
* 2 Thessalonians
* 1 Timothy
* 2 Timothy
* Titus
* Philemon
* Hebrews
* Catena Aurea
* Catena Aurea on Matthew
* Catena Aurea on Mark
* Catena Aurea on Luke
* Catena Aurea on John
* Aristotle Commentaries
* On Interpretation
* Posterior Analytics
* Physics
* On the Heavens
* On Generation and Corruption
* Meteorology
* On the Soul
* On Sense and What is Sensed
* On Memory and Recollection
* Metaphysics
* Ethics
* Table of the Ethics
* Politics
* Other Commentaries
* Boethius's De Trinitate
* Boethius's De Hebdomadibus
* Dionysius's On the Divine Names
* The Book of Causes
* Opuscula I - Treatises
* Compendium Theologiae
* On the Principles of Nature
* On Being and Essence
* On Separate Substances
* On Kingship
* Opuscula II - Polemical Writings
* An Apology for the Religious Orders
* On the Perfection of the Spiritual Life
* Refutation of Teaching that Deters from Religious Life
* On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists
* On the Eternity of the World
* Opuscula III - Collations, Letters
* On Reasons for the Faith
* On the First and Second Decretals
* On the Articles of Faith and the Sacraments of the Church
* On the Catholic Faith of the Greek Fathers
* On the Form of Absolution
* Letter to John of Vercelli on the 108 Articles
* Letter to Bassiano of Lodi on the 30 Articles
* Letter to John of Vercelii on the 43 Articles
* Letter to Bassiano of Lodi on the 36 Articles
* Letter to Brother Gerard of Besançon on the 6 Articles
* A Letter on Credit Sales and Usury
* On Secret Faults
* On Lots
* On Astrology
* Letter to Abbot Bernard
* Letter to Margaret of Flanders
* On the Blend of the Elements
* On the Motion of the Heart
* On the Hidden Activities of Nature
* Opuscula IV - Sermons, Liturgical Works
* Devotional Prayers
* Hymns and Songs
* Office of Corpus Christi - Sacerdos in aeternum
* Office of Corpus Christi - Sapientia aedificavit sibi
* Sermon from the Office - The Boundless Favors of Divine Generosity
* Sermon - He Who is Desired
* Sermon - Sing Praise and Be Glad
* Sermon - Let Us Throw Off the Works of Darkness
* Sermon - Hosanna to the Son of David
* Sermon - Behold Your King
* Sermon - Heaven and Earth
* Sermon - Behold I Send My Angel before Your Face
* Sermon - The Boy Jesus
* Sermon - A Sower Went Out
* Sermon - Ask, and You Will Receive
* Sermon - Send Out Your Spirit
* Sermon - Upon It Stood the Seraphim
* Sermon - Someone Made a Great Dinner
* Sermon - Beware of the False Prophets
* Sermon - There Was a Certain Rich Man
* Sermon - I Have Found David
* Sermon - A Light Has Gone Up for the Just
* Sermon - Let the Earth Bring Forth
* Sermon - Happy Those Who Live in Your House
* Sermon - Happy the Nation whose Lord is its God
* Sermon - Happy the Man Whose Help is from You
* Sermon Fragment, “Wisdom will Strengthen the Wise”
* Sermon Fragment, “Arise”
* Sermons on the Apostles' Creed
* Sermons on the Lord's Prayer
* Sermons on the Commandments
* Sermons on the Hail Mary
Reply Obj. 1: The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be
known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the
articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes
nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless,
there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a
matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically
known and demonstrated.Reply Obj. 1: The existence of God and other like truths
about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but
are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as
grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be
perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a
proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of
being scientifically known and demonstrated.Reply Obj. 2: When the existence of
a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the
definition of the cause in proof of the cause’s existence. This is especially
the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything,
it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its
essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its
existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects;
consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may
take for the middle term the meaning of the word God.Reply Obj. 2: When the
existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place
of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause’s existence. This is
especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence
of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word,
and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of
its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects;
consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may
take for the middle term the meaning of the word God.Reply Obj. 3: From effects
not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be
obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly
demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects;
though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.Reply Obj.
3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that
cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be
clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His
effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His
essence.Article 3Article 3Whether God exists?Whether God exists?Objection 1: It
seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the
other would be altogether destroyed. But the word God means that He is infinite
goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but
there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.Objection 1: It seems
that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other
would be altogether destroyed. But the word God means that He is infinite
goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but
there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.Obj. 2: Further, it is
superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has
been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be
accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural
things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things
can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there
is no need to suppose God’s existence.Obj. 2: Further, it is superfluous to
suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by
many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by
other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be
reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be
reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no
need to suppose God’s existence.On the contrary, It is said in the person of
God: I am Who am. (Ex 3:14)On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: I
am Who am. (Ex 3:14)I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five
ways.I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.The first
and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to
our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in
motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except as it is
in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves
inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of
something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from
potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus
that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be
actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the
same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect,
but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously
be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore
impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both
mover and moved, i.e., that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in
motion must be put in motion by another.The first and more manifest way is the
argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the
world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by
another, for nothing can be in motion except as it is in potentiality to that
towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to
actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by
something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire,
makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and
changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in
actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects.
For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is
simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same
respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e., that
it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by
another.If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this
also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this
cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and,
consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch
as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it
is put in motion by the hand.If that by which it is put in motion be itself put
in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by
another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no
first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers
move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff
moves only because it is put in motion by the hand.Therefore it is necessary to
arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone
understands to be God.Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put
in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.The second way is
from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is
an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed,
possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so
it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.The second way is from the
nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order
of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in
which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be
prior to itself, which is impossible.Now in efficient causes it is not possible
to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the
first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause
of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one.
Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no
first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any
intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to
infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an
ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly
false.Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because
in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the
intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause,
whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the
cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among
efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if
in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first
efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate
efficient causes; all of which is plainly false.Therefore it is necessary to
admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.Therefore
it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the
name of God.The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs
thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they
are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible
to be and not to be.The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and
runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since
they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are
possible to be and not to be.But it is impossible for these always to exist, for
that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything
is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in
existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence,
because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already
existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been
impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would
be in existence—which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible,
but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary.But it is
impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at
some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one
time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now
there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only
begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing
was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to
exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd.
Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something
the existence of which is necessary.But every necessary thing either has its
necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity
in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been
already proved in regard to efficient causes.But every necessary thing either
has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to
infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as
has been already proved in regard to efficient causes.Therefore we cannot but
postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and
not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity.
This all men speak of as God.Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of
some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from
another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as
God.The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among
beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But
more and less are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in
their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be
hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that
there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and,
consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are
greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii.The
fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there
are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But more and less
are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their
different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter
according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is
something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,
something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth
are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii.Now the maximum in any
genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is
the cause of all hot things.Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in
that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot
things.Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause
of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call
God.Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of
their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.The
fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which
lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident
from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the
best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they
achieve their end.The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We
see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end,
and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way,
so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but
designedly, do they achieve their end.Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot
move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge
and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer.Now whatever
lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some
being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark
by the archer.Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things
are directed to their end; and this being we call God.Therefore some intelligent
being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this
being we call God.Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): Since God is
the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His
omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil. This is
part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and
out of it produce good.Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): Since
God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works,
unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.
This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to
exist, and out of it produce good.Reply Obj. 2: Since nature works for a
determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by
nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever
is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than
human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are
changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and
self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.Reply
Obj. 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher
agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its
first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to
some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or
fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced
back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the
body of the Article.
Question 3Question 3The Simplicity of GodThe Simplicity of GodWhen the existence
of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner
of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot
know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering
how God is, but rather how He is not. Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is
not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.When the existence of a
thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of
its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot
know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering
how God is, but rather how He is not. Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is
not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.Now it can be shown how God
is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition,
motion, and the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we
deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple in material things is
imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3)
His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.Now it can be shown how God is
not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition,
motion, and the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we
deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple in material things is
imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3)
His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.Concerning His simplicity,
there are eight points of inquiry:Concerning His simplicity, there are eight
points of inquiry:(1) Whether God is a body?(1) Whether God is a body?(2)
Whether He is composed of matter and form?(2) Whether He is composed of matter
and form?(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature,
and subject?(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or
nature, and subject?(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?(4)
Whether He is composed of essence and existence?(5) Whether He is composed of
genus and difference?(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?(6)
Whether He is composed of subject and accident?(6) Whether He is composed of
subject and accident?(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly
simple?(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?(8) Whether He
enters into composition with other things?(8) Whether He enters into composition
with other things?Article 1Article 1Whether God is a body?Whether God is a
body?Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the
three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to God, for
it is written: He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper
than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth
and broader than the sea (Job 11:8, 9). Therefore God is a body.Objection 1: It
seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But
Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written: He is
higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt
thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea
(Job 11:8, 9). Therefore God is a body.Obj. 2: Further, everything that has
figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have
figure, for it is written: Let us make man to our image and likeness (Gen 1:26).
Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: Who being the brightness
of His glory and the figure, i.e., the image, of His substance (Heb 1:3).
Therefore God is a body.Obj. 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body,
since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it is
written: Let us make man to our image and likeness (Gen 1:26). Now a figure is
called an image, according to the text: Who being the brightness of His glory
and the figure, i.e., the image, of His substance (Heb 1:3). Therefore God is a
body.Obj. 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture
attributes corporeal parts to God. Hast thou an arm like God? (Job 40:4); and
The eyes of the Lord are upon the just (Ps 33:16); and The right hand of the
Lord hath wrought strength (Ps 117:16). Therefore God is a body.Obj. 3: Further,
whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts
to God. Hast thou an arm like God? (Job 40:4); and The eyes of the Lord are upon
the just (Ps 33:16); and The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength (Ps
117:16). Therefore God is a body.Obj. 4: Further, posture belongs only to
bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: I
saw the Lord sitting (Isa 6:1), and He standeth up to judge (Isa 3:13).
Therefore God is a body.Obj. 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But
something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: I saw the
Lord sitting (Isa 6:1), and He standeth up to judge (Isa 3:13). Therefore God is
a body.Obj. 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term
wherefrom or whereto. But in the Scriptures God is spoken of as a local term
whereto, according to the words, Come ye to Him and be enlightened (Ps 33:6),
and as a term wherefrom: All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the
earth (Jer 17:13). Therefore God is a body.Obj. 5: Further, only bodies or
things corporeal can be a local term wherefrom or whereto. But in the Scriptures
God is spoken of as a local term whereto, according to the words, Come ye to Him
and be enlightened (Ps 33:6), and as a term wherefrom: All they that depart from
Thee shall be written in the earth (Jer 17:13). Therefore God is a body.On the
contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John (John 4:24): God is a
spirit.On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John (John 4:24): God
is a spirit.I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and
this can be shown in three ways.I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is
not a body; and this can be shown in three ways.First, because no body is in
motion unless it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been
already proved (Q. 2, A. 3) that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved.
Therefore it is clear that God is not a body.First, because no body is in motion
unless it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been
already proved (Q. 2, A. 3) that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved.
Therefore it is clear that God is not a body.Second, because the first being
must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any
single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is
prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is
prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into
actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that
God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be
any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as
such, is divisible to infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a
body.Second, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way
in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality
to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless,
absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in
potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality. Now
it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore
impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in
potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is
therefore impossible that God should be a body.Third, because God is the most
noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings;
for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body is
manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate
precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its
animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation
on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the
body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.Third, because God is
the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble
of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body
is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate
precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its
animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation
on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the
body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.Reply Obj. 1: As we
have said above (Q. 1, A. 9), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine
things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to
God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies
His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden
things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the
duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all.Reply Obj. 1: As
we have said above (Q. 1, A. 9), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine
things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to
God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies
His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden
things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the
duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all.Or, as says
Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility
of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by
breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His
protection.Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant
the incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of His
all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all
things lie under His protection.Reply Obj. 2: Man is said to be after the image
of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other
animals. Hence, when it is said, Let us make man to our image and likeness, it
is added, And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea (Gen 1:26). Now
man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to
his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be
according to the image of God.Reply Obj. 2: Man is said to be after the image of
God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other
animals. Hence, when it is said, Let us make man to our image and likeness, it
is added, And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea (Gen 1:26). Now
man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to
his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be
according to the image of God.Reply Obj. 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to
God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain
parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to
God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on with
the other parts.Reply Obj. 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture
on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For instance
the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His
power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on with the other
parts.Reply Obj. 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to
God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account of His
unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of
overcoming whatever withstands Him.Reply Obj. 4: Whatever pertains to posture,
also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as
sitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on
account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.Reply Obj. 5: We draw
near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections
of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus,
to draw near to or to withdraw from signifies merely spiritual actions based on
the metaphor of local motion.Reply Obj. 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal
steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the
actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to
withdraw from signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local
motion.Article 2Article 2Whether God is composed of matter and form?Whether God
is composed of matter and form?Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of
matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since
the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it
is mentioned in Hebrews (Heb 10:38), where God says: But My just man liveth by
faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul. Therefore God is
composed of matter and form.Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter
and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul
is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is
mentioned in Hebrews (Heb 10:38), where God says: But My just man liveth by
faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul. Therefore God is
composed of matter and form.Obj. 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are
passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: The
Lord was exceedingly angry with His people (Ps 105:40). Therefore God is
composed of matter and form.Obj. 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are
passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: The
Lord was exceedingly angry with His people (Ps 105:40). Therefore God is
composed of matter and form.Obj. 3: Further, matter is the principle of
individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated
of many. Therefore He is composed of matter and form.Obj. 3: Further, matter is
the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He
cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed of matter and form.On the
contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive
quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a body as proved in the
preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.On the
contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive
quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a body as proved in the
preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.I answer
that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God.I answer that, It is
impossible that matter should exist in God.First, because matter is in
potentiality. But we have shown (Q. 2, A. 3) that God is pure act, without any
potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and
form.First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (Q. 2, A. 3)
that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God
should be composed of matter and form.Second, because everything composed of
matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its
goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the
first good and the best—viz. God—is not a participated good, because the
essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that
God should be composed of matter and form.Second, because everything composed of
matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its
goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the
first good and the best—viz. God—is not a participated good, because the
essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that
God should be composed of matter and form.Third, because every agent acts by its
form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an
agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be
primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the
first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed
of matter and form.Third, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner
in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore
whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially
form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is
therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.Reply Obj.
1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul;
for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His
will is said to be pleasing to His soul.Reply Obj. 1: A soul is attributed to
God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is
due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to
His soul.Reply Obj. 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a
similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry
man, God’s punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.Reply Obj. 2:
Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect.
Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, God’s punishment is
metaphorically spoken of as His anger.Reply Obj. 3: Forms which can be received
in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a
subject since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself,
unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which
cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized
precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is God.
Hence it does not follow that matter exists in God.Reply Obj. 3: Forms which can
be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another
as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject; although form of
itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that
form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is
individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a
form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in God.Article 3Article
3Whether God is the same as his essence or nature?Whether God is the same as his
essence or nature?Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence
or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of
God—i.e., the Godhead—is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not
the same as His essence or nature.Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same
as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or
nature of God—i.e., the Godhead—is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that
God is not the same as His essence or nature.Obj. 2: Further, the effect is
assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created
things the suppositum is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the
same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.Obj. 2:
Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its
like. But in created things the suppositum is not identical with its nature; for
a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His
Godhead.On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only
that He is a living thing: I am the way, the truth, and the life (John 14:6).
Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between
life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very Godhead.On the contrary, It
is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: I
am the way, the truth, and the life (John 14:6). Now the relation between
Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing.
Therefore God is His very Godhead.I answer that, God is the same as His essence
or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of
matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the suppositum, because
the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the
species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man,
for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that,
namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individualizing
accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular
flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the
definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental
qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity;
and yet they are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a
man has something more in it than has humanity. Consequently humanity and a man
are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a
man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the
formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter.I answer that, God is
the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in
things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the
suppositum, because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the
definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the
definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that
humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter,
with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the
species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness,
etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these
bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are
not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is man.
Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity.
Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken
to mean the formal part of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is
defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing
matter.On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which
individualization is not due to individual matter—that is to say, to this
matter—the very forms being individualized of themselves—it is necessary the
forms themselves should be subsisting supposita. Therefore suppositum and nature
in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He
must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of
Him.On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which
individualization is not due to individual matter—that is to say, to this
matter—the very forms being individualized of themselves—it is necessary the
forms themselves should be subsisting supposita. Therefore suppositum and nature
in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He
must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of
Him.Reply Obj. 1: We can speak of simple things only as though they were like
the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking
of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only
those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify
His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in
God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not
that there is any composition in God.Reply Obj. 1: We can speak of simple things
only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our
knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His
subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and
we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that
Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which
our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in God.Reply
Obj. 2: The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they
are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely because what is simple
and one, can only be represented by diverse things; consequently, composition is
accidental to them, and therefore, in them suppositum is not the same as
nature.Reply Obj. 2: The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only
as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely because
what is simple and one, can only be represented by diverse things; consequently,
composition is accidental to them, and therefore, in them suppositum is not the
same as nature.Article 4Article 4Whether essence and existence are the same in
God?Whether essence and existence are the same in God?Objection 1: It seems that
essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine
being has nothing added to it. Now being to which no addition is made is
universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God
is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false:
For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood (Wis 14:21). Therefore
God’s existence is not His essence.Objection 1: It seems that essence and
existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has
nothing added to it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being
which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in
general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: For men gave
the incommunicable name to stones and wood (Wis 14:21). Therefore God’s
existence is not His essence.Obj. 2: Further, we can know whether God exists as
said above (Q. 2, A. 2); but we cannot know what He is. Therefore God’s
existence is not the same as His essence—that is, as His quiddity or nature.Obj.
2: Further, we can know whether God exists as said above (Q. 2, A. 2); but we
cannot know what He is. Therefore God’s existence is not the same as His
essence—that is, as His quiddity or nature.On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin.
vii): In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth.
Therefore what subsists in God is His existence.On the contrary, Hilary says
(Trin. vii): In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting
truth. Therefore what subsists in God is His existence.I answer that, God is not
only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own
existence. This may be shown in several ways.I answer that, God is not only His
own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This
may be shown in several ways.First, whatever a thing has besides its essence
must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a
property that necessarily accompanies the species—as the faculty of laughing is
proper to a man—and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or
by some exterior agent—as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the
existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused
either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is
impossible for a thing’s existence to be caused by its essential constituent
principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its
existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its
essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of
God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible
that in God His existence should differ from His essence.First, whatever a thing
has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of
that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species—as the
faculty of laughing is proper to a man—and is caused by the constituent
principles of the species), or by some exterior agent—as heat is caused in water
by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this
existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential
principles. Now it is impossible for a thing’s existence to be caused by its
essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its
own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence
differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this
cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore
it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His
essence.Second, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for
goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of
as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a
distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is
no potentiality, as shown above (A. 1), it follows that in Him essence does not
differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence.Second, existence
is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are
spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore
existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as
actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as
shown above (A. 1), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from
existence. Therefore His essence is His existence.Third, because, just as that
which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that
which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But God
is His own essence, as shown above (A. 3); if, therefore, He is not His own
existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not
therefore be the first being—which is absurd. Therefore God is His own
existence, and not merely His own essence.Third, because, just as that which has
fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has
existence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own
essence, as shown above (A. 3); if, therefore, He is not His own existence He
will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be the
first being—which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely
His own essence.Reply Obj. 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two
kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it is of
the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a
thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence does not require that
anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because
it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it
to lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first
sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense.Reply
Obj. 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its
essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it is of the essence of an
irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have
nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything
should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is
not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to
lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense;
whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense.
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