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Browse Search Dictionary Quizzes One Good Fact Subscribe Login Russian Empire Table of Contents Russian Empire * Introduction * The reign of Peter the Great * Economy * Military, finance, and administration * Church and education * Relations with the West * Internal disturbances * Peter’s immediate successors * Catherine the Great * Paul * Alexander * Initial liberalism * Nationalism and reaction * The revolutionary movement * Nicholas I * Slavophiles and Westernizers * The Crimean War * Alexander II * Emancipation of the serfs * Administrative reforms * The revolutionary movements * Populism * Terrorism * Loris-Melikov * Foreign policy * Industrial progress * Alexander III * Administration and economy * Foreign policy * Nicholas II * Reassertion of autocratic principles * Administration and economy * Russification policy * Resurgence of revolutionary activity * Other political movements * Foreign policy and the Russo-Japanese War * Revolution of 1905 and the First and Second Dumas * Stolypin’s regime * Agricultural reform * Russian nationalism * World War I * The end of the Romanov dynasty Fast Facts * Facts & Related Content Media * Videos * Images More * More Articles On This Topic * Contributors * Article History NICHOLAS I Nicholas I Nicholas was quite unlike Alexander. With a rough nature and incurious intellect, he was conscious of his inferiority and sincerely disliked the idea of becoming emperor. Once on the throne, he was sure that he would be enlightened from above for the accomplishment of his divine mission, and he conceived an exalted idea of his personal dignity and infallibility. He was, however, no mystic. Cold and reserved, he inspired fear and hatred, and he consciously made use of these feelings as the instrument of his power. His aim was to freeze every germ of free thought and independent moral feeling, as disturbing agents of the order of things entrusted by God to his personal care. Nicholas’s reign is divided into three periods by two European sets of revolutions: those of 1830 and those of 1848. During the first five years he did not feel quite sure of himself, and he appealed for help to advisers of Alexander’s liberal period, such as Kochubey, Speransky, and Egor Frantsevich, Count Kankrin. In December 1826 he even instructed a special committee to collect for him all useful hints about necessary reforms. While punishing severely the Decembrists (five of them were hanged, others sent to Siberia), he wished to make use of all their good ideas. He reserved for himself the control over public opinion and confided to Aleksandr Khristoforovich, Count Benckendorff, the organization of a new secret police of gendarmes controlled by the “third section” of the personal and imperial chancery. Nicholas adopted Alexander’s policy of protecting the kings from their peoples, but he made an exception for Christian Turkish subjects. He thus carried on a war against Turkey (1828–29). By the Treaty of Adrianople, Greece was liberated; the hospodars (princes) of the Danubian principalities were to be appointed for life and free from Turkish interference in internal affairs. The Straits (the Dardanelles and the Bosporus) and the Black Sea were to be open. Nicholas I Nicholas especially attended to education; he wished to clear it of everything politically dangerous and confine it to the upper class. He abolished the liberal university statutes of Alexander (1804). By the new statutes of 1835 he detached the primary education intended for the lower classes from the gymnasiums and universities, where only children of gentry and of officials were to be admitted. The expulsion of Charles X from France and the November Insurrection (1830–31) in Poland determined the legitimist tendency of Nicholas’s foreign policy. He wished to become a real “policeman” of Europe, and at Münchengrätz (Mnichovo Hradiště), in September 1833, he renewed relations with Metternich. His excessive interest in the “sick man” (Ottoman Empire) in Constantinople finished by rousing Europe against him. In 1833 Nicholas saved the sultan from the Egyptian rebel Muḥammad ʿAlī, and by the Treaty of Hünkâr Iskelesi (July 8, 1833) appeared to receive for that service free passage for Russian ships to the Mediterranean. To all other powers, the Dardanelles were to be closed during wartime. This concession drew the attention of the European powers, and in 1841 all the five great powers (France, Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria) agreed that the Dardanelles should be closed to warships of all nations. SLAVOPHILES AND WESTERNIZERS Mikhail Bakunin In sharp contrast with Nicholas’s educational policy, a new generation grew up which was bred by Russian universities, especially Moscow State University, between 1830 and 1848. They were not politicians or liberals of a Franco-English type. They were idealists and students of the philosophy of Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel. In Moscow literary salons, they did not discuss the form of the government but dug deep into the very foundations of Russian history and the Russian national mind. Most of them declared that Russia was unlike Europe and that its type of civilization was potentially far higher than the European. They execrated Peter the Great’s Europeanization of Russia as a fatal deviation from the genuine course of Russian history, and they wanted Russia to come back to the forsaken principles of the Eastern Church and state—to orthodoxy and autocracy. Nevertheless, the majority of public opinion, led by Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen, Vissarion Grigoryevich Belinsky, Mikhail Bakunin, Timofey Granovsky, and others, revolted against this Slavophile doctrine. They opposed it with their own doctrine of the Western origin of Russian civilization. Herzen and Bakunin emigrated from Russia on the approach of the Revolutions of 1848. They became the originators of Russian socialism, and Herzen saw socialist elements in the Russian peasants’ commune (mir). Nicholas was not insensible to the chief social question in Russia—that of serfdom. How could he be when peasant uprisings were steadily growing in frequency? They numbered about 41 in the first four years of his reign, and there were 378 between 1830 and 1849, along with 137 during the last five years. Nicholas formed a series of secret committees which, after many failures, prepared the law of 1842 on voluntary accords, which abolished personal serfdom and fixed the amount of peasant lots and payments. Through Pavel Dmitriyevich Kiselyov’s energy, the same changes were introduced in Poland (1846) and the Russian provinces (1847). A real persecution of intellectuals began after the Revolutions of 1848. A secret committee, presided over by Dmitry Buturlin, was founded to punish press offenses. Minister of Education Sergey Semyonovich, Count Uvarov, was himself found too liberal, and he resigned. His successor, Prince Platon Shirinsky-Shikhmatov, wished to “base all teaching on religious truth.” The university chairs of philosophy were closed, and the number of students limited; many writers were arrested, exiled, or otherwise punished. The private circle of followers of Mikhail Petrashevsky, a young utopian socialist, was sent to forced labour in Siberia for having read and discussed prohibited literature. The group included a young Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and the psychological torment that he suffered while in prison would inform much of his later writing. THE CRIMEAN WAR Crimean War Nicholas also wished to dictate his will to Europe. “Submit yourselves, ye peoples, for God is with us”: thus ended his manifesto published on April 8 (March 27, Old Style), 1848. He sent a Russian army to subdue Hungary when it revolted against the Habsburgs. A few years later he inadvertently provoked a conflict with Turkey, because of a special question on the distribution of holy places in Jerusalem between Catholic and Orthodox priests, which he involved with the question of the general protectorate of Russia over Christian subjects of the sultan. European powers would not admit this protectorate, and Nicholas found himself confronting not only Napoleon III and Britain but also “thankless Austria.” Siege of Sevastopol On October 23, 1853, Turkish forces attacked the advanced Russian troops in the Danubian principalities; on November 1, Russia declared war on Turkey. France and Britain declared war on Russia on March 27, 1854. The courage displayed in the defense of Sevastopol proved useless, as the whole fabric of Russian bureaucratic and autocratic government appeared incapable of competing with European technique. Corruption and lack of communication, feeble development of industry, and financial deficiency deprived the valiant soldiers of the most necessary means of defense. Nicholas died in St. Petersburg on March 2 (February 18, Old Style), 1855, feeling that all his system was doomed to destruction. A wholesale change of regime was indicated to his son and successor, Alexander II. ALEXANDER II Alexander II The emperor Alexander II was a man of weak character who possessed no steadfast views on politics. During the reign of his father he had sometimes surpassed Nicholas in reactionary intentions. The Crimean War proved too clearly the danger of Nicholas’s martinet system, however, and public opinion was too impetuous for Alexander to resist. He swam with the current, and this period coincides with the great reforms which made his reign a turning point in Russian history. Alexander was always conscious of his power as unlimited monarch, and his liberalism ended as soon as his reforms brought with them a revival of political or autonomous tendencies. He then began to waver; the reforms were left unachieved or curtailed. Public opinion grew impatient, extremist tendencies won the ground, and the gap between the government and advanced opinion finally became insuperable. As a consequence, the original impulse for reform was exhausted as early as 1865. There followed a period of faltering which turned into a sheer reaction as the revolutionary movement grew. EMANCIPATION OF THE SERFS The greatest achievement of the era was the liberation of peasants. It paved the way for all other reforms and made them necessary. It also determined the line of future development of Russia. Alexander’s chief motive is clearly expressed in his words to the Moscow gentry: “The present position cannot last, and it is better to abolish serfdom from above than to wait till it begins to be abolished from below.” Alexander knew, of course, of the mounting dissatisfaction of the peasants and of support of their grievances by the progressive intelligentsia. However, he met with passive opposition from the majority of the gentry, whose very existence as a class was menaced. The preparatory discussion lasted from 1857 to March 1859, when the drafting commissions of the main committee were formed. These young officials were enthusiastically devoted to the work of liberation. Iakov Ivanovich Rostovtsev, an honest but unskilled negotiator enjoying the full confidence of the emperor, was mediator. The program of emancipation was very moderate at the beginning, but was gradually extended, partly under the influence of the radical press and especially Aleksandr Herzen’s Kolokol (“The Bell”). Alexander wanted the initiative to belong to the gentry. He exerted his personal influence to persuade reluctant landowners to open committees in all the provinces, while promising to admit their delegates to discussion of the draft law in St. Petersburg. No fewer than 46 provincial committees comprising 1,366 representatives of noble proprietors were at work during 18 months preparing their own drafts for emancipation. They held to the initial program, which was in contradiction with the more developed one. The delegates from the provincial committees were only permitted—each separately—to offer their opinions before the drafting committees. By the Emancipation Manifesto of March 3 (February 19, Old Style), 1861, the peasants became personally but formally free, and their landlords were obliged to grant them their plot for a fixed rent with the possibility of redeeming it at a price to be mutually agreed upon. The peasants remained “temporarily bonded” until they redeemed their allotments. The redemption price was calculated on the basis of all payments received by the landlord from the peasants before the reform. If the peasant desired to redeem a plot, the government paid at once to the landowner the whole price (in 5 percent bonds), which the peasant had to repay to the exchequer in 49 years. Although the government bonds fell to 77 percent and purchase was made voluntary, the great majority of landowners—often in debt—preferred to get the money at once and to end relations which had become insupportable. By 1880, 15 percent of the peasants had not made use of the redemption scheme, and in 1881 it was declared obligatory. The landowners tried, but in vain, to keep their power in local administration. The liberated peasants were organized in village communities that held comprehensive powers over their members. Nominally governed by elected elders, they were actually administered by crown administrative and police officials. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS Alexander II After the emancipation of the peasants, the complete reform of local government was necessary. It was accomplished by the law of January 13 (January 1, Old Style), 1864, which introduced the district and provincial zemstvos (county councils). Land proprietors held a relative majority in these assemblies. The gentry and officials were given (in all Russia) 42 percent of the seats, merchants and others 20 percent, while the peasants had the remaining 38 percent. The competence of zemstvos included roads, hospitals, food, education, medical and veterinary service, and public welfare in general. Before the end of the century services in provinces with zemstvo government were far ahead of those in provinces without. A third capital reform touched the law courts. The law of December 2 (November 20, Old Style), 1864, put an end to secret procedure, venality, and dependence on the government. Russia received an independent court and trial by jury. The judges were irremovable; trials were held in public with oral procedure and trained advocates. Appeals to the senate could take place only in case of irregularities in procedure. Later came the reforms of municipal self-government (1870) and of the army (1874). Gen. Dmitry Alekseyevich, Count Milyutin (the brother of Emancipation Manifesto framer Nikolay Alekseyevich Milyutin) reduced the years of active service from 25, first to 15 and then, by the law of 1874, to 6 years, and made military service obligatory for all classes. The term of service was further shortened for holders of school diplomas. Military courts and military schools were humanized. Load Next Page Ask us a question Update Privacy Preferences