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JUNE 30, 2021 | INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MONOGRAPH


INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION



CONTENTS

 * Introduction
 * Problems
 * Recommendations
 * View Full Monograph

NATHAN PICARSIC

Senior Fellow

EMILY DE LA BRUYÈRE

Senior Fellow



JUNE 30, 2021 | INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MONOGRAPH

INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION



NATHAN PICARSIC

Senior Fellow

EMILY DE LA BRUYÈRE

Senior Fellow




INTRODUCTION

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is responsible for all
international matters related to communications and technology. As technology
advances, the organization will play a vital role in guaranteeing
interoperability in international communications networks.

In 1949, following the adoption of the International Telecommunication
Convention, the ITU became a UN specialized agency. The ITU is divided into
three sectors: Radiocommunication (ITU-R), Telecommunication Development
(ITU-D), and Telecommunication Standardization (ITU-T). ITU-R manages global
radio spectrum and satellite orbit resources. ITU-D supports developing
countries with telecommunications construction, and ITU-T coordinates standards
for telecommunications and information and communications technology. The ITU’s
decisions are binding for member states. However, ITU-R’s standards are issued
as recommendations. While most member states comply, they are not obligated to
do so.

The Plenipotentiary Conference, the ITU’s supreme decision-making organ,
incorporating all 193 member states, convenes every four years. In the interval
between meetings, the ITU Council, composed of 48 members, serves as the
organization’s governing body. The ITU’s General Secretariat, led by the
organization’s secretary-general, manages the union and its sectors’ day-to-day
work, administration, and budgetary planning.


PROBLEMS

Beijing recognizes the ITU’s influence over the global system. The Chinese
Communist Party orients its national strategy around asymmetrically influencing
international standards. Beijing’s National Standardization Work for 2020 report
calls for China’s “in-depth participation in the governance of international
standards organizations.”1 Beijing has determined that the ITU, along with the
International Standardization Organization (ISO) and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), is one of the three most important
international standards-setting organizations.

By contrast, the United States and its allies and partners approach the ITU in a
trustful, fragmented, and ad hoc way. If China is able to cement a leadership
position within the ITU, Chinese commercial players, technical standards, and
geopolitical ambitions are poised to benefit disproportionately at the expense
of free-market ideals, privacy, and security. The American-led world order would
pay the price.

In 2018, China launched a two-year research project called “China Standards
2035,” designed to establish an informational foundation for Beijing’s National
Standardization Strategy Outline. The project is currently under development. At
the project’s launch, Dai Hong of China’s National Standardization Management
Committee declared that “global technical standards are still in the process of
being formed. This gives China’s industry and standards the opportunity to
surpass the world.”2 A 2015 article in the Zhejiang Daily by the then-deputy
director of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee’s Policy Research Office
explains that “under the conditions of economic globalization and modern market
economy … standards are the commanding heights, discourse power, and the power
to control. Therefore, the one who obtains the standards gains the world.”3 That
is why Chinese leadership of the ITU should raise concerns.

Houlin Zhao, a graduate of China’s Nanjing University of Posts and
Telecommunications, is in the middle of his second four-year term as the ITU’s
secretary-general. Chinese media and academic discussions have trumpeted his
post’s significance for China’s global influence.4 Zhao’s milestone
accomplishment at the ITU was the development of coordination mechanisms for the
ITU to work with the ISO and the IEC. He has been a loud defender of Huawei: In
response to U.S. and global pressure in 2019, he declared that the ITU had “not
come across any evidence pointing at security concerns of [Huawei’s]
equipment.”5 Zhao has also overseen Huawei-sponsored ITU events.6

Chinese control of the ITU is a threat to U.S. interests. Beijing’s “state-led,
enterprise-driven” model leverages China’s centralization and scale to exploit
the open global rule-making system. The United States has twice as many
registered ITU sector members as China, enabling them to contribute to working
groups and policy discussions, thereby influencing outcomes.7 However, the
American entities do not all follow a single directive or government tasking.
Rather, they compete and negotiate amongst themselves and others.

Chinese players also possess global market positions – and leverage – that grant
them influence beyond their direct member count.8 For example, Huawei
subsidiaries in Germany (Huawei Technologies Düsseldorf GmbH), Switzerland
(Huawei Technologies Switzerland AG), and Sweden (Huawei Technologies Sweden AB)
are all registered as ITU sector members. The U.S. Department of Commerce has
designated Huawei as a risk to U.S. national security and foreign policy
interests.9 But the company – and its affiliates – freely engage in
standards-setting at the ITU.10


RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States would benefit from efforts that coordinate the influence of
the United States and its principal allies and partners. Specifically, the U.S.
government should:

 * Develop an election strategy to ensure that individuals elected to ITU
   leadership posts – ITU secretary-general, deputy secretary-general, the three
   key director posts, and additional working-group leadership roles – do not
   serve Beijing’s interests. The moment for this is now. ITU elected officials
   may serve a maximum of two four-year terms in any elected post, meaning Zhao
   will not be eligible for re-election in 2023. U.S. support for the candidacy
   of Doreen Bogdan-Martin stands as a timely example of a deliberate election
   approach that could be coordinated and replicated by the State Department
   moving forward.
 * Work with relevant U.S. industries to share information and coordinate in
   advance of ITU deliberations and working-group functions. Coordination among
   U.S. private-sector contributors can help protect against Chinese pressure
   and influence campaigns that may trade preferential policy treatment in the
   Chinese market for cooperation in policymaking debates at the ITU and related
   international organizations.
 * Encourage additional private-sector organizations to apply for sector member
   status at the ITU and bodies that feed into the ITU’s standard-setting
   process, such as the Third Generation Partnership Project. Sector members and
   contributors at linked industry associations provide a critical, undervalued
   voice in the complex bargaining processes of technical standard setting.
   China enjoys an asymmetry in terms of the centralization and non-market
   support provided to its private sector, whose representation in ITU sector
   membership is growing. 

 * Work with allies and partners – and their private sectors – to share
   information about the long-term risks of adopting Chinese-backed standards.
   For example, the emerging standards that define 5G telecommunications not
   only bear security implications, but also promise significant economic
   returns to those who shape them: U.S. leadership in 4G generated some $125
   billion in revenue for American companies.11



ISSUES:

ISSUES:

China Cyber International Organizations

TOPICS:

TOPICS:

International Telecommunication Union
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