marketinsights.natwest.com Open in urlscan Pro
35.158.127.53  Public Scan

Form analysis
0 forms found in the DOM

Text Content

Loading
×Sorry to interrupt
CSS Error

Refresh
 * Home
 * 


MARKET INSIGHTS

HomeArticlesView article


EMU-10 SPREADS: YEAR-END HEALTH CHECK




European Rates Strategy
8 Nov 2024
Europe   Rates   

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A soft landing should support risk assets – EGB spread compression continues in
2025. But that’s not all – we think there is a fundamental change in how markets
view Germany. Lots has changed in the last few years, lowering Germany’s status
as a safe haven with stagnating German growth, declining EU break-up risks,
lower relative political stability in Germany and sovereign spread stability via
PEPP and now TPI. Germany’s debt metrics still look good, but perhaps to the
detriment of German growth. We think a further compression in spreads can come
via an underperformance of Germany versus EMU-peers, political idiosyncratic
risk (read: France) aside.

French political risk keeps us cautious into next year, with another year of
heavy supply to come. We remain optimistic on periphery and think that
BTPs/SPGBs can continue to compress against Germany and France. Belgium has
flown under the radar but faces a lack of fiscal consolidation. Ireland
continues to benefit from corporate taxes and along with Portugal has a budget
surplus. Dutch long-ends may start to feel the pain from pension fund
transition. We like 10s20s NL steepeners.


Risk has performed over this year with equities rising, credit compressing and
EGB spreads tightening over 2024. But what is in store for 2025?

Risk has performed this year, 120 day standardised

Source: NatWest, Bloomberg
For equities, high number indicates equities performing. For spreads lower
number indicates tightening.

  

EUR 1Y1Y  and 10y BTP-bund spreads (since 2023)

Source:  NatWest, Bloomberg



  




The macro supports further compression in EGB spreads. Major central banks have
started to ease policy, with a soft landing looking increasingly plausible. The
ECB has cut rates by 75bp so far this year, inflation is normalising and growth
is set to pick-up over 2025. Periphery has driven European growth over this
year, with the German economy stagnating and cracks in French politics.
Idiosyncratic political risks aside, we expect another year of spread
compression.

There are bearish pressures for outright rates stemming from supply. 2024 supply
has been well received but the front-end has been in the driving seat for most
of this year. As market conviction around terminal rate increases, there should
be renewed focus on supply and rebuilding of term premia. Terminal rates priced
into the market is skewed slightly lower than our base case of 2%. But current
levels align well with our thinking that risks are skewed towards the downside
versus the upside for terminal rate expectations. A realization of our central
scenario however, would bring bearish risks to rates stemming from another year
of heavy supply (see our full piece here). A chart of front-end rates versus
BTP-Bund shows that there is some positive correlation between spread widening
and higher rates.

But 2025 might see a change in this dynamic; we think spread compression can
continue regardless of bearish pressures on rates. The NatWest fundamental
factor scorecard considers the impact of ratings, the economy, fiscal policy,
external trade, financial and political risks and markets, and interestingly
highlights that Germany is an outlier versus peers. German rates are fairly low
relative to peers with similar economic fundamentals i.e. the Netherlands and
Ireland, and relative to other EGBs. This suggests that there could be some room
for Germany to underperform as the strength of euro area peers continues.

NatWest Scorecard

Source: NatWest, Bloomberg

  

NatWest score versus 10-year yields

Source:  NatWest, Bloomberg



  






  

Germany: No longer the golden child

  

Trade idea: Front-ends pinned by terminal rates and the end of the cutting
cycle, long-end grapples with supply. 2s10s steepeners.

What to watch in 2025: The snap election (currently expected in late March) is a
key event, we will be interested in what formation the new government takes.
Either way we expect a fairly disciplined approach to fiscal policy with a bias
towards some limited easing.

Supply in 2025: Net new borrowing in Germany was estimated at €43.8bn over the
summer, but may be slightly higher at €57bn. A new conservative government may
also be more willing to spend so could bring upside to bund supply for next
year. Net supply for 2025 will be slightly higher versus 2024 given another leg
higher in ECB QT.

Germany has been in the news for the wrong reasons recently. The economy has
been stagnant and German manufacturing continues to show signs of weakness.
Volkswagen is planning to shut factories, lay off workers and is even planning
to give employees a 10% pay cut adding to pessimism around the German economy.
While we expect some improvement in the outlook over next year, Germany’s
problems are structural. Debt metrics are gold standard, but German consumers
and government could probably benefit from a bit more government spending.

A risk supportive environment has meant that spreads to Germany have continued
to compress through the year. And swap spreads versus €STR are now trading
negative. There is a key question now – is this move temporary or has there also
been a fundamental shift in how markets view Germany? Germany used to be an A*
student, but things are different now:

 1. Growth. Before covid, German growth surpassed the euro area average for a
    decade, with a bustling economy, resilient domestic demand and strong
    manufacturing and automotive sectors which were key pillars of economic
    strength. More recently, growth in German has been sluggish facing
    competition from China and headwinds from high energy prices. Periphery has
    acted to support euro area growth over this year, and Europe can no longer
    rely on Germany to drive growth forward.
 2. Robust fiscal metrics. The Germans have a strong history of saving and
    constitutional debt rules limit excessive spending. Deficits and debt to GDP
    have remained low.
 3. Relative political stability. A high degree of consensus on economic and
    fiscal policy across parties has kept German politics fairly stable. But an
    increase in support for far-right parties in Germany has reduced its
    relative political stability, particularly compared to how it has improved
    in countries like Italy.
 4. Fragmentation risks. Panic leading to wider periphery spreads is now much
    less likely thanks to ECB tools, first PEPP and now TPI. Risks of
    fragmentation and thus the premia attached to holding safe haven bunds
    should recede. EU fiscal rules should also keep periphery deficits in check.
 5. Break up risk. Break up would be messy but risks of a euro area blow up have
    been more muted recently.  European solidarity, joint debt instruments and
    perhaps Brexit have helped reduce risks here.
    
    

Politics continues to be in focus in Germany, a no-confidence vote has been
called for in January followed by a snap election likely to come in March. While
this may give readers flashbacks to the recent turbulence in French politics,
things are different in Germany. Coalition governments are the norm, and the
conservatives (CDU/CSU) are leading the polls and likely to come on top in an
election. While political turmoil and uncertainty will persist in the short-run
we don’t think the election should be a market moving event. The key risk is
clearly the rise in support for the far-right (AfD) but we don’t think
mainstream parties are likely to cooperate with them. The most likely scenario
by far is some kind of grand coalition, with the SPD and/or the Greens as junior
members.

Real GDP forecasts, an improvement in outlook is coming

Source: NatWest, IMF WEO October 2024

  

Opinion polling for the 2025 German election

Source:  NatWest, Wikipedia  



  



Italy: Positive momentum   

Trade idea: Target 10-year BTPs at 110bp. BTP-OAT compression continues.

What to watch in 2025: Upside momentum in rating reviews.

Supply in 2025: Italian gross supply for 2025 is expected to moderate slightly
versus 2024. Gross issuance is elevated versus EMU-10 peers but redemptions and
“other tools” such as NGEU and retail supply mean that net supply pressures can
be lowered. We pencil in €20bn in retail specific issuance over 2025 and €20bn
in NGEU loan funding.

High beta BTP-bund has compressed this year as rate cuts and soft landing played
positively for risk assets. With European growth expected to recover next year,
and with outperformance in periphery expected to continue, we think that risks
are skewed towards further tightening at this stage. We target 110bp in 10y
BTP-bund spreads.

We are positive on the outlook in Italy. Politically, Italy has seemed like a
beacon of light relative to the political volatility in France, and Meloni’s
government has been more market friendly than expected. Italy has been through a
variety of possible political iterations in recent years and has always come out
with a sufficiently responsible set of policies in the end (excluding the
short-lived 'glitch' of 2018). The European dimension continues to be supportive
with Italy hopefully making good use of NGEU funds eventually, which can offer a
boost to the growth outlook.

While Italy’s debt/GDP ratio remains elevated, there are glimmers of positivity.
Italy's external position has become structurally positive (in current account
terms and in its international investment position), which is an important
factor for any analysis on long-run debt sustainability. And the government
seems committed to EU fiscal guidelines with the deficit for 2024 revised lower
to 3.8%, and 3.3% targeted for 2025. Ratings seem to be on a positive trajectory
with Fitch revising the outlook for Italy to positive from stable this year,
which could support an upgrade in 2025.

While we’re fairly bullish BTPs, one risk stems from the end of PEPP. The market
is clearly less focused on PEPP unwind at this stage and TPI has added in a
safety net to support spreads. But Italy has been a significant beneficiary of
PEPP purchases, unwind here could put some pressure on the spread.

Net supply across country (€bn), France in the hot seat

Source: NatWest, Various DMOs, ECB. Bloomberg  

  

Buyers of Italian debt, retail demand has benefited BTPs

Source:  NatWest, Banca D’italia



  



  

France: Stay cautious

Trade: 10y OAT range bound in Q1. Stay cautious and favour Bonos/BTP.

What to watch in 2025: A snap parliamentary election from June cannot be ruled
out. President Macron’s resignation is a tail risk. Moody’s still rates France a
notch higher than other rating agencies and a credit rating downgrade looks
credible. Plenty of supply to be absorbed by markets. A more aggressive than
expected rate cutting cycle and less restrictive fiscal stance from Germany
would benefit OATs.

Supply in 2025: Elevated issuance, amidst deteriorating debt metrics. Net supply
net of QT will be ~€11bn higher vs 2024.

We don’t see an immediate risk of spread widening in France: a budget is likely
to be adopted before the end of the year, despite the lack of parliamentary
majority, and new legislative elections cannot be held before June (the
Constitution allows for dissolution only once a year). Supply dynamics also
become more favourable into year-end. With 10y OAT at 75bp above bunds, the
scope for further underperformance appears limited for now.

But we see reasons to stay cautious on France next year. Politics will remain in
focus and an escalation, likely in the form of a new legislative election,
cannot be ruled out. Whilst (heavy) French supply was relatively well absorbed
in 2024, the story may be different in 2025, with risks including potential
credit downgrades, further deficit slippages and ongoing political deadlock.
This limits the extent of positive OAT performance. We expect OATs to trade
within a 75-70bp range in Q1 and underperform relative to peripheral countries.

The French economy performed relatively well in the post-covid period, supported
by fiscal measures designed to protect household purchasing power and business
competitiveness. However, France’s fiscal trajectory remains concerning.
Deficits have been consistently higher than in other countries, targets have
been missed, and the debt-to-GDP ratio has reached record levels, creating a
sense of fiscal fragility. The deficit is expected to reach 6.1% of GDP in 2024,
a significant deviation from the 4.4% originally forecast. The government
anticipates a deficit of 5% in 2025. This is one of the key reasons behind the
current political and policy impasse. Whilst economic prospects for 2025 are
cautiously optimistic, political instability remains a challenge.

French deficits higher than most…

Source:  NatWest, Haver, IMF WEO, French and Italian government

  

…with debts rising to unprecedented levels…

Source:  NatWest, Haver, IMF WEO, French and Italian government



  



  

There is some likelihood of a snap legislative election next year, but even
without one, political instability will persist until a majority is formed in
Parliament. At present, the government relies on abstention from the far-right
to pass legislation, as well as the use of the controversial Article 49.3 of the
Constitution. This is unlikely to result in effective policymaking, and support
from the Rassemblement National (RN) may dissipate when the potential timing for
new elections approaches again. In the June 2024 parliamentary elections, the
‘Republican front’ united to prevent the RN from gaining too much ground in the
National Assembly. Whilst this old strategy has been used in the recent past to
prevent Le Pen (father and daughter) from being elected and get too many seats
in the lower house, it’s unclear if the moderate parties from the right and the
left would be willing to form a coalition government.

Spain: Semi-core convergence

Trade: Convergence to semi-core. Target 60bp in 10y spreads versus bunds. 10s30s
Spain flatteners versus steepeners in France.  

What to watch in 2025: The government is fragmented and has found it difficult
to approve the 2025 Budget. We think the likelihood of a snap election is low,
but there are clearly risks. Despite this, rating upgrades could be on the
horizon with a positive outlook from Moody’s.

Supply in 2025: A planned reduction in the fiscal deficit means a decline in
gross issuance in 2025 relative to 2024. Net of redemptions and QT there is an
increase in Spain’s supply versus 2024 but not significantly so.

Spain’s semi-core consolidation has been gaining traction. Spain has compressed
by ~20bp versus bunds through this year and now trades below France. This hasn’t
been surprising to us; we’ve been positive Spain through this year given strong
economic fundamentals. Growth in Spain has outpaced EMU-4 peers over 2024 and
this strong performance is set to continue into 2025. Spain has also continued
to take advantage of NGEU grants and has received 60% of grants allocated to it.
S&P notes that implementation is starting to gain momentum, and expects the real
economic impact of NGEU investments to become more pronounced between 2025 and
2027. Spain’s labour market, which has historically been a point of weakness, is
showing stealthy progress; unemployment is currently 11% - well below highs of
27% over the last decade.

Unemployment rate, IMF estimates

Source: Natwest,  IMF WEO October 2024

  

Spain ratings

Source: NatWest, Various rating agencies 



  



  

Spain’s government is struggling to push a budget through, but deficits are
expected to decline in 2025. Fiscal consolidation is likely to be slow with a
fragmented government, but Spain was left out of the EU’s naughty list (EDP)
this year signaling positive traction ahead. Debt metrics continue to look more
‘semi-core’ than periphery with Debt/GDP expected to moderate in the coming
years (the IMF forecasts general government gross debt as a percentage of GDP at
100.7 in 2025 relative to 115.2 in France and 107.1 in Belgium) partly driven by
strong growth. The volatility in French politics should increase demand for
Spanish paper, particularly in the long-end where curves are steep and buyers
are limited. We think 10s30s Spain can flatten vs France.

The minority government relies on a slim majority made up of seven political
parties. While the political landscape is clearly fragmented, we’re not too
worried about another snap election in the near-term. From a ratings
perspective, Spain ratings are fairly mixed. We expect some convergence -
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch rate Spain differently across the upper to lower medium
grade space. An upgrade by Moody’s is likely given the positive outlook and the
positive economic trajectory. Moody’s also rates Spain lower than S&P and Fitch.
Overall, we remain constructive on Spain and expect the semi-core convergence
theme to continue into 2025.


Netherlands: 10s20s Steepeners

Trade idea: Buy NETHER 34s vs NETHER 47s at 16bp, target 25bp.

What to watch for in 2025: new bond in the long-end, Pension interest shifting
shorter

Supply in 2025: Issuance will be fairly similar to 2024.The impact of net change
in bills next year will be set-off by lower redemptions (€20bn in 2025 vs €33bn
in 2024). Our forecast for capital markets borrowing from Netherlands in 2025
stands at €38bn. We expect two new lines via DDA, a 10y and a longer-dated line,
likely a 20y (or a 30y).

Dutch government debt levels are set to deteriorate but remain low, institutions
are strong and economic growth should be supported by private consumption and an
expansive fiscal stance. We see steepening risks in 10s30s NETHER, given 1) our
expectations for a new bond in the long-end, on top of the usual new 10y, and 2)
as Dutch pension funds demand is expected to slow and move shorter dated, with
the move from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution pensions. The impact is
more likely to be felt in the 30y+ bucket, where pension funds activity is
usually directed. Dutch pension transition is due to begin next year, although
the largest pension funds are expected to only transition in 2026/27.

Upside risks to the deficit, but still healthy debt levels. A deficit of 2.8%
has been cited by the government for 2025. On that basis, we would expect
issuance to be fairly similar to 2024. Debt levels are still well below its EMU
peers, including Germany. Public debt was around 45% of GDP last year, well
below the Maastricht ratio (60%).

A new Dutch government was sworn into office in July, following the snap general
elections held in November 2023. The heterogenous coalition is less pro-European
than the previous one - it notably includes Geert Wilders’ far right Freedom
party (PVV). Thus far the government has been behaving responsibly, with VVD
party keeping the other parties in check. The coalition has a parliamentary
majority but lacks one in the Senate, which complicates the policy making
process. The next general election isn’t scheduled before March 2028, however.


Belgium: Sell 15y OLO against France

Trade idea: Buy FRTR 2038 against BGB 2039 at 15bp. Target flat.

What to watch for in 2025: Elevated debt metrics, but lack of coordination to
achieve fiscal efforts. Risk of reallocation to OATs.

Supply in 2025: We expect gross issuance for 2025 to be moderately higher than
in 2024, at €45bn. Redemptions will be €21bn versus €29bn in 2024.

Belgium has flown under the radar this year with all eyes on France, but fiscal
consolidation might be difficult to achieve. Belgium’s structural deficit
increased significantly in 2024 as the previous seven-party coalition failed to
agree on the policy changes needed to reverse the deteriorating fiscal trend.
Belgium has the third largest deficit in the EU after Italy and France and was
placed under an EDP last year. Fiscal efforts are needed at the federal,
regional and community level but Belgium lacks coordination to achieve it. With
responsibilities shared by three layers of government and a lack of hierarchy
between them, implementing reforms can be challenging.

Net issuance, moderately higher and longer in 2025. The deficit could ~4.7% of
GDP (4.9% assuming unchanged policies). Gross supply should be around €45bn in
2025. We expect three new BGBs, via syndications, a 2035 (the current 35s is old
and at full size), a 2044 (perhaps a Green line) and a 2056. Bill issuance had
been substantial over 2024 given large redemptions from their 1-year retail
note. It could be used to compensate for upside risks to funding plans.

Following the June election, Belgium is yet to have a government in place. The
situation isn’t unusual in Belgium but represents an additional challenge in a
context of a degraded fiscal situation. There could be some form of reallocation
from BGBs to OATs, if sentiment in OATs doesn’t deteriorate. BGB will probably
continue to trade relatively rich but they can underperform OATs, notably in the
15y sector, where we could see demand from French domestics on ASW. We target
15y BGB-OAT spreads at flat, the BGB market is a lower liquidity market so this
compression should only be gradual.

Ireland: 10s30s steepeners


Trade idea: 10s30s IRISH steepeners. Enter at 28bp. Target 40bp.

What to watch for in 2025: Political stability. A budget surplus, again. New 30y

Supply in 2025: Redemptions for Ireland will total €11bn, gross bond supply at
€6bn

We are positive on Ireland. The budget will show a surplus again in 2025, growth
prospects are healthy and opinions polls suggest political stability.

Ireland will be running a budget surplus in 2025. Ireland’s economic situation
is unique amongst EMU-10 countries: it is expected to post an €8.5bn budget
surplus this year, for the third year in a row. Without the corporation tax
receipts, its deficit would stand at €6.3bn in 2024 and €5.7bn in 2025. GDP is
forecast to grow by 1.2% in 2024 and 3.6% in 2025, and whilst these numbers are
distorted by flows from multinationals that are volatile and temporary by
nature, the €14bn windfall in back taxes from Apple is expected to further
improve public finances in coming years. Modified domestic demand, the
government’s preferred measure of growth that strips out the effect of the
multinational sector, should increase by a healthy 1.7% in 2024 and by 2.4% in
2025.

Irish fiscal balance in euro billion

* and the one-off transfer to the State arising from the Court of Justice of the
EU ruling in September

Source:  Ireland fiscal council (June 2024)



Political continuity: Opinion polls favour the current coalition. We don’t
expect any fireworks. Fine Gael party’s leader Harris must call an election by
March 2025. Opinion polls show voters favour maintaining its party and centrist
Fianna Fáil in place. 

Issuance will stay low. Redemptions for Ireland total €11bn for next year which
forms the basis of our funding expectation. Ireland is likely to transfer some
of its budget surplus into its long-term savings fund (the Future Ireland Fund
and the Infrastructure, Climate and Nature Fund) which aims to reduce risks from
relying on corporate tax.

10y spreads compression is limited, favour 10s30s steepeners. Ireland has
tightened aggressively against Germany in past months, so the room for further
compression at 32bp against 10y bund is limited, but we could still see a
further 4-5bp tightening. Supply will be scarce again next year, but a new 30y
maturity is expected, with the current benchmark close to full size. Ireland
usually syndicates a new bond in January. In 2025, we expect steepening
pressures on the Irish curve, which currently looks flat versus Germany.

Portugal: Sell 10y against IRISH  

Trade idea: Sell 10y PGB against IRISH at 18bp, target 30bp

What to watch for in 2025: moderate political risks, small budget surplus

Supply in 2025: Supply is expected to be €14bn, with €15bn redemptions, net
supply will be significantly lower versus 2024

Moderate political risks. A hung parliament might limit policy legislation and
implementation. Another snap election in 2025 is a risk. No clear majority came
out of the early parliamentary elections organised in March 2024. Although risks
seem contained in the short-term (the main opposition party stated it will
abstain from voting on the budget end of November), a minority government puts
Portugal at risk of snap elections in 2025, which would be the third election
since 2022.

Economic prospects are encouraging, and the budget is expected to show a small
surplus in 2025. The Portuguese economy is expected to expand by 2.1% in 2025
according to the IMF and the Bank of Portugal’s projections, placing it as one
the fastest growing EMU-10 economy next year. Portugal’s public debt to GDP
ratio remains elevated at ~100% but there are encouraging signs including a
surplus budget of 0.2-3% in 2025. The debt to GDP ratio should fall to 93.3% of
GDP in 2025, its lowest levels since 2009.

Supportive supply dynamics. Supply from Portugal next year is expected to be
€14bn. With €15bn redemptions, net supply will be significantly lower versus
2024. We expect two news lines (a 10y and a 15/20y bond) via syndication in
January and in Q2, in line with past years’ issuance. Portugal is also likely to
make some use of NGEU loans over 2025 – we pencil in €1bn.

PGBs look rich against IRISH. Like in Ireland, we expect supply dynamics to be
supportive in 2025, but a hung parliament could lead to political gridlock, and
eventually new elections. Whilst Portugal has weathered political instability in
the past, we think this isn’t reflected in the spread against Ireland. 20y PGB
look very rich, but the bond is squeezed. A new line in the sector might not
suffice to cheapen it. The new 30y bond syndicated in 2024 hardly made a
difference to the squeeze in the 42/45/52 PGBs. We thus favour shorting PGBs
against IRISH in the 10y sector, where liquidity is better.

Finland

What to watch for in 2025: risks of an Excessive deficit procedure

Supply in 2025: Finland’s deficit for 2025 is set to decrease but higher
redemptions will increase the gross funding requirement for next year.

Finland spreads have widened significantly against Germany, by over 30bp in the
past three years, reflecting rising debt levels and the fact that ECB’s QT
matters more for less liquid markets.

Finland is on the radar of the European Commission for an EDP. The EC decided
not to put Finland under an EDP this year as it projects the deficit will fall
below 3% in 2025. However, the Finnish Ministry of Finance recently increased
its budget deficit projections to 3.7% of GDP in 2024 and 3.2% for 2025, in its
Autumn Economic Survey. The general government debt ratio is set to increase
further to 81.7% of GDP in 2024 and 84% in 2025. Finland thus remains at risk of
being put under an EDP by the EC in the near term. Finland is expected to beat
recession in 2025 but economic growth remains sluggish compared to its European
peers; it is expected to gradually recover next year from a contraction of 0.2%
in 2024, at 1.7% of GDP.

Low political risk. Following the 2023 legislative elections, Petteri Orpo leads
a pro-business, centre-right National coalition party. The next Parliamentary
elections will be held in 2027.

Austria

What to watch for in 2025: Stable supply, sluggish growth.

Supply in 2025: Similar borrowing requirements as 2024. We pencil in gross
issuance of bonds at €44bn, €33bn net of redemption and QT. We expect a new 5y,
a 10y and a new 20y to be launched in 2025.

Sluggish growth, large fiscal deficit. GDP growth is expected at 1% in 2025 from
-0.6% of GDP in 2024, below the Euro Area average. The deficit is forecast to be
2.8% of GDP next year, from 3.3% this year.

Far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) won the highest share of the vote
(close to 30%) in the September parliamentary election, whilst the ruling
coalition of ÖVP/the Greens recorded a clear defeat. SPÖ and ÖVP have both ruled
out being part of a coalition with FPÖ as the stronger partner, so government
formation is likely to be arduous. However, continuity on fiscal matters can be
expected despite a change in the ruling coalition.

  


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

All of NatWest Markets’ Strategy and Sales commentary/ideas can now be accessed
via our new Market Insights website. To access, please look out for an email
from support@market.insights.natwest.com.

  


You can also find out more about our electronic offering and credentials for
Rates here and for FX here.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This is Non-Independent Research, as defined by the Financial Conduct Authority.
Not intended for Retail Client distribution. This material should be regarded as
a marketing communication and may have been produced in conjunction with the
NatWest Markets Plc trading desks that trade as principal in the instruments
mentioned herein. All data is accurate as of the report date, unless otherwise
specified.


This communication has been prepared by NatWest Markets Plc, and should be
regarded as a Marketing Communication, for which the relevant competent
authority is the UK Financial Conduct Authority.


Please follow the link for the following
information https://www.natwest.com/corporates/support/regulatory-information/market-abuse-regulation-mar-disclosures.html:

 * MAR Disclaimer
 * Conflicts of Interest statement
 * Glossary of definitions
 * Historic Trade ideas log

Note the text above is subject to the following disclaimer(s)  Show disclaimer  

European Rates Strategy

8 Nov 2024
EuropeRates







Share
Print
Save
Read

European Rates Strategy

8 Nov 2024
EuropeRates


Note the text above is subject to the following disclaimer(s)  Show disclaimer  


SEE FULL NOTE HERE

Rates European Rates Special_8 November 2024.pdf

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------




If you wish to discuss the content of this article further, please contact your
usual sales person. Remember, clients of Natwest Markets NV should reach out to
their relevant NV sales person.

×-

 * Disclaimer
 * Terms & Conditions
 * Your Privacy
 * Cookies Policy
 * Complaints
 * Accessibility





Loading



WE CARE ABOUT YOUR PRIVACY

We use cookies to ensure our website works properly. To help us improve our
service, we collect data to understand how people use our site. By allowing all
cookies, we can enhance your experience even further. This means helping you
find information more quickly and tailoring content or marketing to your needs.
Select “Allow All Cookies” to agree or “Manage Preferences” to manage cookie
settings. You can find out more by viewing our Cookies Policy
Allow All Cookies
Manage Preferences



PRIVACY PREFERENCE CENTER

When you visit any website, it may store or retrieve information on your
browser, mostly in the form of cookies. This information might be about you,
your preferences or your device and is mostly used to make the site work as you
expect it to. The information does not usually directly identify you, but it can
give you a more personalized web experience. Because we respect your right to
privacy, you can choose not to allow some types of cookies. Click on the
different category headings to find out more and change our default settings.
However, blocking some types of cookies may impact your experience of the site
and the services we are able to offer.
Cookies Policy
Allow All Cookies


MANAGE CONSENT PREFERENCES

STRICTLY NECESSARY COOKIES

Always Active

These cookies are necessary for the website to function and cannot be switched
off in our systems. They are usually only set in response to actions made by you
which amount to a request for services, such as setting your privacy
preferences, logging in or filling in forms. You can set your browser to block
or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not then work.
These cookies do not store any personally identifiable information.

Cookies Details‎

FUNCTIONAL COOKIES

Functional Cookies

These cookies enable the website to provide enhanced functionality and
personalisation. They may be set by us or by third party providers whose
services we have added to our pages. If you do not allow these cookies then some
or all of these services may not function properly.

Cookies Details‎

TARGETING COOKIES

Targeting Cookies

These cookies may be set through our site by our advertising partners. They may
be used by those companies to build a profile of your interests and show you
relevant adverts on other sites. They do not store directly personal
information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet
device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted
advertising.

Cookies Details‎
Back Button


COOKIE LIST



Search Icon
Filter Icon

Clear
checkbox label label
Apply Cancel
Consent Leg.Interest
checkbox label label
checkbox label label
checkbox label label

Confirm My Choices