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Year: 2023
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HOW TO MEASURE ORGANIZED CRIME?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during
the development of the Index.
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Iran
x
* Continent/Region
* Africa
* Central Africa
* East Africa
* North Africa
* Southern Africa
* West Africa
* Americas
* Caribbean
* Central America
* North America
* South America
* Asia
* Central Asia and the Caucasus
* Eastern Asia
* South-Eastern Asia
* Southern Asia
* Western Asia
* Europe
* Central & Eastern Europe
* Northern Europe
* Southern Europe
* Western Europe
* Oceania
* Australia and New Zealand
* Melanesia
* Micronesia
* Polynesia
* Countries
* Afghanistan
* Albania
* Algeria
* Andorra
* Angola
* Antigua and Barbuda
* Argentina
* Armenia
* Australia
* Austria
* Azerbaijan
* Bahamas
* Bahrain
* Bangladesh
* Barbados
* Belarus
* Belgium
* Belize
* Benin
* Bhutan
* Bolivia
* Bosnia and Herzegovina
* Botswana
* Brazil
* Brunei
* Bulgaria
* Burkina Faso
* Burundi
* Cabo Verde
* Cambodia
* Cameroon
* Canada
* Central African Republic
* Chad
* Chile
* China
* Colombia
* Comoros
* Congo, Dem. Rep.
* Congo, Rep.
* Costa Rica
* Côte d'Ivoire
* Croatia
* Cuba
* Cyprus
* Czech Republic
* Denmark
* Djibouti
* Dominica
* Dominican Republic
* Ecuador
* Egypt
* El Salvador
* Equatorial Guinea
* Eritrea
* Estonia
* Eswatini
* Ethiopia
* Fiji
* Finland
* France
* Gabon
* Gambia
* Georgia
* Germany
* Ghana
* Greece
* Grenada
* Guatemala
* Guinea
* Guinea-Bissau
* Guyana
* Haiti
* Honduras
* Hungary
* Iceland
* India
* Indonesia
* Iran
* Iraq
* Ireland
* Israel
* Italy
* Jamaica
* Japan
* Jordan
* Kazakhstan
* Kenya
* Kiribati
* Korea, DPR
* Korea, Rep.
* Kuwait
* Kyrgyzstan
* Laos
* Latvia
* Lebanon
* Lesotho
* Liberia
* Libya
* Liechtenstein
* Lithuania
* Luxembourg
* Madagascar
* Malawi
* Malaysia
* Maldives
* Mali
* Malta
* Marshall Islands
* Mauritania
* Mauritius
* Mexico
* Micronesia (Federated States of)
* Moldova
* Monaco
* Mongolia
* Montenegro
* Morocco
* Mozambique
* Myanmar
* Namibia
* Nauru
* Nepal
* Netherlands
* New Zealand
* Nicaragua
* Niger
* Nigeria
* North Macedonia
* Norway
* Oman
* Pakistan
* Palau
* Panama
* Papua New Guinea
* Paraguay
* Peru
* Philippines
* Poland
* Portugal
* Qatar
* Romania
* Russia
* Rwanda
* Samoa
* San Marino
* Sao Tome and Principe
* Saudi Arabia
* Senegal
* Serbia
* Seychelles
* Sierra Leone
* Singapore
* Slovakia
* Slovenia
* Solomon Islands
* Somalia
* South Africa
* South Sudan
* Spain
* Sri Lanka
* St. Kitts and Nevis
* St. Lucia
* St. Vincent and the Grenadines
* Sudan
* Suriname
* Sweden
* Switzerland
* Syria
* Tajikistan
* Tanzania
* Thailand
* Timor-Leste
* Togo
* Tonga
* Trinidad and Tobago
* Tunisia
* Turkey
* Turkmenistan
* Tuvalu
* Uganda
* Ukraine
* United Arab Emirates
* United Kingdom
* United States
* Uruguay
* Uzbekistan
* Vanuatu
* Venezuela
* Vietnam
* Yemen
* Zambia
* Zimbabwe
PROFILE
IRAN
CAPITAL
TEHRAN
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP)
USD 359,713.00 MILLION
INCOME GROUP
LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
POPULATION
87,923,432
AREA
1,745,150 KM²
GEOGRAPHY TYPE
COASTAL
GINI INDEX
40.9
7.03-0.07
CRIMINALITY SCORE
2021202305107.107.03
14TH OF 193 COUNTRIES 8
6TH OF 46 COUNTRIES IN ASIA4
4TH OF 14 COUNTRIES IN WESTERN ASIA3
Criminal markets
7.370.42
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific
crime type.
2021202305106.957.37
Human trafficking
8.000.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the
purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
2021202305107.508.00
Human smuggling
8.500.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or
residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
2021202305108.008.50
Extortion & protection racketeering
4.50 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a
mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Arms trafficking
9.001.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and
ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
2021202305108.009.00
Trade in counterfeit goods
7.50 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently
mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Illicit trade in excisable goods
8.00 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban
or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Flora crimes
4.500.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and
other species protected under national law.
2021202305104.504.50
Fauna crimes
4.000.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and
other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
2021202305104.004.00
Non-renewable resource crimes
9.501.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural
resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
2021202305108.509.50
Heroin trade
9.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is
considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
2021202305109.009.00
Cocaine trade
5.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives.
Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
2021202305105.505.50
Cannabis trade
6.000.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or
leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
2021202305106.006.00
Synthetic drug trade
9.501.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is
considered in determining the reach of the market.
2021202305108.509.50
Cyber-dependent crimes
8.00 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology
with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Financial crimes
9.00 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud,
embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Criminal actors
6.70-0.55
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on
society.
2021202305107.256.70
Mafia-style groups
5.00-2.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined
leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
2021202305107.005.00
Criminal networks
7.500.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail
to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
2021202305107.507.50
State-embedded actors
9.500.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s
apparatus.
2021202305109.509.50
Foreign actors
6.001.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country.
Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
2021202305105.006.00
Private sector actors
5.50 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy
free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
3.13-0.38
RESILIENCE SCORE
2021202305103.503.13
166TH OF 193 COUNTRIES 13
39TH OF 46 COUNTRIES IN ASIA1
12TH OF 14 COUNTRIES IN WESTERN ASIA0
Political leadership & governance
2.50-0.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong
political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
2021202305103.002.50
Government transparency and accountability
2.00-0.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure
against state collusion in illicit activities.
2021202305102.502.00
International cooperation
4.00-0.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making
and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
2021202305104.504.00
National policies and laws
4.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized
crime.
2021202305104.004.00
Judicial system and detention
3.00-0.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce
judgments on organized crime-related cases.
2021202305103.503.00
Law enforcement
3.00-0.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce
adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
2021202305103.503.00
Territorial integrity
5.00-0.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber
territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
2021202305105.505.00
Anti-money laundering
2.500.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other
related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
2021202305102.502.50
Economic regulatory capacity
2.50-0.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national
and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
2021202305103.002.50
Victim and witness support
3.50-0.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including
initiatives such as witness protection programs.
2021202305104.003.50
Prevention
3.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes
and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
2021202305103.003.00
Non-state actors
2.50-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their
roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
2021202305103.002.50
3.13 6.70 7.37 3.13 6.70 7.37
3.13-0.38
RESILIENCE SCORE
2021202305103.503.13
166TH OF 193 COUNTRIES 13
39TH OF 46 COUNTRIES IN ASIA1
12TH OF 14 COUNTRIES IN WESTERN ASIA0
Political leadership & governance
2.50-0.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong
political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
2021202305103.002.50
Government transparency and accountability
2.00-0.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure
against state collusion in illicit activities.
2021202305102.502.00
International cooperation
4.00-0.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making
and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
2021202305104.504.00
National policies and laws
4.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized
crime.
2021202305104.004.00
Judicial system and detention
3.00-0.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce
judgments on organized crime-related cases.
2021202305103.503.00
Law enforcement
3.00-0.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce
adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
2021202305103.503.00
Territorial integrity
5.00-0.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber
territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
2021202305105.505.00
Anti-money laundering
2.500.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other
related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
2021202305102.502.50
Economic regulatory capacity
2.50-0.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national
and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
2021202305103.002.50
Victim and witness support
3.50-0.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including
initiatives such as witness protection programs.
2021202305104.003.50
Prevention
3.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes
and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
2021202305103.003.00
Non-state actors
2.50-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their
roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
2021202305103.002.50
ANALYSIS
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PEOPLE
Human trafficking is a widespread issue in Iran, primarily involving sex
trafficking, forced labour and the recruitment of child soldiers. The country is
situated along one of the main human trafficking routes in the region, with
young women being trafficked from Asia into Europe and the Gulf. Iranians are
also trafficked to countries in the Gulf and Caucasus, as well as to Iraqi
Kurdistan. The government and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have
been accused of coercing migrants, especially Afghans, to fight alongside
Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias in Syria and Iraq. Domestic trafficking is
mainly an issue in larger cities such as Tehran, Shiraz and Tabriz, where organ
and blood trafficking contribute to the pervasiveness and profitability of this
criminal market. Millions of child labourers are estimated to be working in
Iran, but due to the country's lack of transparency on the issue, especially on
trafficked women and girls, accurate statistics are hard to find. Since the
onset of the pandemic, the Iranian population has significantly increased its
use and reliance on technology and social media platforms, thereby providing
criminal groups with more opportunities to exploit vulnerable people through
online channels.
The human smuggling market is also pervasive in Iran. Irregular migration is
primarily concentrated along the country’s borders with Afghanistan and Turkey,
with local economies in Sistan and Urumiyeh largely dependent on revenue from
the human smuggling market. The crisis in neighbouring Afghanistan has further
driven the demand for irregular migration, increasing fees and boosting
financial incentives for smuggling groups. Persistent economic hardship and a
lack of employment opportunities across the country are likely to continue to
exacerbate Iran’s human smuggling market. Anecdotal observations suggest that
the country’s continuing economic decline has led to several instances of
protection racketeering by criminal groups in larger cities.
TRADE
Arms trafficking is a key element of Iran's regional geopolitical strategy. The
country is a major supplier of conventional weapons to countries in Western
Asia, as well as North Africa and Russia. Many non-state actors in the region
also use Iranian arms, ammunition and drones, and Tehran's support contributes
to military capacities in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, the Palestinian
territories and Somalia. There have also been allegations that military
equipment and drones are being transferred to Russia to be used in the war in
Ukraine. While Iranian involvement in the arms trafficking market is propelling
the proliferation of illicit arms sales across Western Asia, the country's
domestic illicit arms market is relatively small, largely due to strict gun
control laws and low firearms possession rates. A relatively minor market is
found in the Baluchistan and Sistan provinces and western Iran.
Iran has sizable markets for counterfeit and excisable goods. During the global
pandemic, the country saw an increase in fake medicines and medical supplies
and, as a result, Iran has become one of the primary transit points for
counterfeit pharmaceutical products entering the EU. Most illicit trade into and
out of the country occurs through official ports and border crossings, many of
which are controlled by the IRGC, leading to accusations of its complicity in
smuggling operations.
ENVIRONMENT
While flora and fauna crimes are present in Iran, they are comparably smaller
than other illicit markets in the country. Iran's natural geography includes a
diverse range of ecosystems, making it vulnerable to a wide variety of flora
crimes. Deforestation in the country is mainly caused by illegal logging and
wood smuggling, encroachment on forests, exploitation of natural resources and
coal mining. The critically endangered Iranian maple tree is only found in
Iran's Hyrcanian forest and is threatened by illicit logging, agriculture and
climate change. The pandemic has boosted the traditional medicine industry in
Iran, leading to an increased demand for plant species used in alternative
treatments. Orchid tubers are illegally collected and exported to neighbouring
countries or to South Asia for use in traditional drinks and medicines. Home to
several rare species, Iran also offers an attractive market for wildlife crime.
In particular, sheep and ram subspecies are poached for meat or to be used as
trophies, especially in the Masjed mountain range in Yazd province.
Afghan-sourced species also transit Iran before onward travel to the Caucasus,
Syria and Iraq.
Iran has one of the world's largest oil reserves, and the country's oil exports
have increased in recent years despite Western sanctions. Iranian oil supplies
are reportedly shipped in large quantities through international waters using
Dubai-based tankers, and are primarily destined for Oman, Yemen, Somalia and
China. Illicit oil flows also occur on a small scale, leading to some
socio-economic and environmental challenges in the country, including the
destruction of wildlife and biodiversity, water pollution, degradation of
critical farmland, public health concerns and the prolongation of armed
conflicts. Fuel smuggling occurs largely in the border regions, especially in
Baluchistan and Kurdistan, where smugglers transport Iranian oil and subsidized
fuel to neighbouring countries and reap high profit margins. It is estimated
that millions of litres of fuel are smuggled out of the country each day. This
is allegedly facilitated by corruption among border personnel, including the
IRGC.
DRUGS
Iran’s market for illicit drugs – primarily heroin and methamphetamine – is
pervasive and a prominent feature of its organized crime landscape. Iran
accounts for a large share of heroin seizures worldwide, much of which is
sourced from Afghanistan and destined for Turkey, the EU, the Gulf region and
beyond. Iran is among the cheapest places in the world to buy heroin,
contributing to the country having one the highest addiction rates worldwide.
The heroin trade is associated with violence and has resulted in multiple
clashes between Iranian border guards and traffickers over the past years.
Sanctions have been placed on high ranking IRGC commanders for their alleged
involvement in the heroin trade in Sistan-e-Baluchistan.
The country’s cocaine trade is marginal and eclipsed by the markets for heroin,
cannabis and methamphetamine. There have been allegations of IRGC involvement in
Iran’s methamphetamine and cocaine trade, although these claims have not been
substantiated.
As the second most consumed drug in the country, cannabis is widespread in Iran,
and there is relative tolerance towards the drug compared to other narcotics.
The cannabis trade has significantly grown over the past decade, resulting in
large-scale domestic cultivation fields throughout the country, while
small-scale production is believed take place in Tehran. Cannabis resin is also
imported from Afghanistan. Most cannabis seized in Iran is destined for the
country’s domestic market, as well as the Caucasus, Turkey and the EU. Cannabis
is primarily consumed by Iran’s middle class, and its use is increasing
especially among male youth and female university students.
Iran continues to be a source, transit and destination country for
methamphetamine. The country is among the world’s top methamphetamine producers,
and a large share of the drug is trafficked out of Iran to other countries in
Western Asia, Europe and Southeast Asia. In recent years, increased
methamphetamine production in neighbouring Afghanistan has affected Iran, with
low-cost competition leading to an influx of cheaper Afghan methamphetamine into
the country. These developments have contributed to the surge in methamphetamine
use in Iran over the past few years. Moreover, while the synthetic drug Captagon
is spreading across the region, the role of this drug within Iran remains
unclear.
CYBER CRIMES
Iran is known for its strong offensive cyber capabilities, with state-embedded
criminal actors believed to be particularly active in conducting cyber-dependent
crimes. The increasing reliance on digital platforms in Iran and other countries
during the COVID-19 pandemic has created a conducive environment for
cybercriminals to exploit. These crimes target both national and foreign private
and public sectors, including political dissent, activists, journalists,
entities, critical infrastructure and organizations. In recent years, Iranian
actors have been increasingly targeting government entities in countries like
the US and Israel, as well as in the EU and the Gulf. Iranian actors reportedly
collaborate with criminal groups in Russia and North Korea, learning new
cyber-attack techniques from one another and constantly adapting their tactics.
There has been a particular increase in ransomware attacks by Iranian-backed
actors. State-sponsored ransomware operations, such as ‘Project Signal’ and
‘SpoofedScholar’, have targeted well-known academic institutions, think tanks
and journals in Western Asia and beyond.
FINANCIAL CRIMES
Financial crime is a pervasive issue in Iran, with economic fraud, misuse of
funds, embezzlement and large-scale tax evasion being the most common types of
financial crimes in the country. The number of corruption and embezzlement cases
in the country has tripled in recent years. The majority of these cases involve
either government employees or people appointed to managerial positions at
state-run economic entities, exemplified by the presence of bonyads - untaxable
and opaque organizations. These bonyads have reportedly diverted trillions of
dollars in public funds into the bank accounts of political elites, leading
clerics and other prominent Iranians. In addition, phishing has emerged as a
growing issue in Iran, with fake text messages impersonating government services
and entities being used to scam unsuspecting victims. Tens of thousands of
Iranians have fallen prey to these scams, costing them up to thousands of
dollars each. The rise in phishing attacks has been linked to the increasing use
of mobile phones and the internet, as well as a lack of awareness among the
population about how to protect themselves from financial crime.
CRIMINAL ACTORS
Criminal activities in Iran are mainly carried out by state-embedded actors and
criminal networks. There are long-standing accusations of the Iranian state's
involvement in the country’s illicit economy, although this remains disputed. In
particular, the IRGC allegedly has enduring ties with criminal and terrorist
organizations both within and outside the country. State-embedded actors in Iran
are believed to be involved in the trafficking of people and drugs, including
cocaine, heroin and synthetic drugs, as well as oil smuggling and other
non-renewable resource crimes. It is unclear whether state actors are involved
in human smuggling or cannabis trafficking, and there is little evidence to
suggest that they control flora or fauna crimes. The line between the sale of
arms by the state and arms trafficking has also been blurred in recent years.
The criminal networks that operate within the country are primarily based in
Tehran, as well as in the eastern and western provinces. These networks usually
specialize in one or two illicit markets. Some small criminal networks
collaborate with similar networks outside Iran to smuggle and traffic people and
goods. Loose criminal networks involved in areas such as human trafficking or
drugs may have connections to foreign networks. The level of violence
perpetrated by these networks varies depending on the illegal activity they are
involved in, with heroin trafficking being the most violent.
Even though there is less evidence of significant-sized mafia-style groups
operating in the country, mafia-like syndicates do exist in Iran and are mostly
engaged in money laundering and financial crimes, among others. Iran's lack of a
strong private sector and the dominance of state institutions, including the
IRGC, is a major factor in driving the private sector towards illicit means of
competition. These practices include tax evasion, involvement in the black
market and bribery, among others. Ongoing Western sanctions against the country
have further strengthened the private sector's illicit activities. The influence
of foreign actors in Iran is generally kept to a minimum due to the country's
opposition to foreign intervention. However, there are some examples of
cross-border cooperation in the drug trade, with joint ventures between Iranian
and Afghan partners, as well as smuggling activities in the Kurdish region.
LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE
Iran has a governance system that is a mix of democratic and religious elements.
However, the religious supreme leader has minimal checks and balances, and
elected officials struggle to exercise leadership, which makes it difficult for
the government to tackle issues such as corruption and organized crime.
Anti-corruption efforts tend to be politicized and target opponents rather than
addressing the root causes. The IRGC is thought to actively obstruct Tehran's
attempts to combat organized crime, as it is reportedly complicit in certain
criminal activities. In recent years, there has been growing support for
moderate and reformist candidates, and uprisings and protests have emerged from
traditionally pro-government communities, underscoring the regime's
vulnerability. There are also regular clashes between the IRGC and
Kurdish-affiliated and Baluch nationalist groups. In 2022, the government
violently cracked down on protests, blocking internet access, pressuring media
not to cover the protests, and arresting protesters and activists. Iran's
cybercrime laws give the government full control over the internet, enabling it
to enforce widespread censorship and surveillance, and systematically violating
the Iranian people's rights to freely access information and freedom of
expression. The government's ongoing efforts to implement strict online
surveillance undermine transparency and accountability. Moreover, there have
been increasing reports of nepotism, cronyism, corruption and embezzlement among
members of parliament and councils throughout Iran.
Iran's track record of engaging in international cooperation is limited, with
few exceptions. One such exception is its 2021 security agreement with
Kazakhstan to combat drug trafficking by sea, in addition to collaborations with
INTERPOL and UNODC to combat human trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime.
Although Iran has signed and ratified a few select treaties related to organized
crime, it has yet to sign the Arms Trade Treaty or ratify the UNTOC. While the
country expressed its intention to increase international cooperation on
extradition matters, concerns about persecution in the country have hampered
such agreements. Furthermore, the government introduced a controversial
so-called cyber protection bill in recent years, which is considered draconian
and oppressive by human rights organizations. Additionally, Iran has strict drug
laws that include the death penalty and prison sentences for people who use
drugs in public. The country's laws to combat human trafficking have been widely
criticized for being inadequate.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SECURITY
The Iranian judicial system is characterized by duality, comprising the ordinary
criminal courts and the Revolutionary Courts. However, there is a significant
disparity between these two entities. While ordinary criminal court defendants
have access to a lawyer and can appeal their cases, Revolutionary Court
defendants do not have due process, are not entitled to legal counsel and are
often executed without public notice. Most people become involved in the Iranian
criminal justice system due to drug trafficking; over a third of all prisoners
are incarcerated for drug-related offences. Prison standards in Iran are
typically poor, with overcrowding a common issue. Prison officials have denied
food and medical care to prisoners, and both physical and psychological torture
is prevalent. Thousands of people convicted of drug-related crimes are on death
row, and over the past year, Iran has had the highest execution rate in the
world, including of children. Recent trials and subsequent sentences, including
executions, handed down by the Iranian courts against protestors, demonstrate a
concerning disregard for due process. These incidents further highlight the
politicized nature of the judicial system in the country.
The country’s law enforcement comprises various branches, including the police,
Basij and various intelligence units under the IRGC. While these entities engage
in law enforcement activities, their focus tends to be on counterinsurgency. The
country's law enforcement forces were leading players in the suppression of the
widespread 2022 protests, and their ineffectiveness has been criticized.
Corruption is widespread within law enforcement, and security services are often
poorly equipped and trained. The lack of functioning equipment in law
enforcement agencies has contributed to considerable setbacks in stemming the
flow of drugs and tracking criminals throughout the country.
Iran's borders are difficult to monitor due to their length and varied terrain.
The country’s peripheries, located along some of the world's busiest trafficking
routes, are the most vulnerable parts of the country. They are also home to
armed opposition groups. Heroin and methamphetamine are smuggled into
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Iraq by drug traffickers. Despite attempts to
monitor these borders, there are widespread concerns about corruption among
local guards, particularly along the country’s border with Iraqi Kurdistan. The
recent Taliban takeover of Afghanistan has raised concerns about the influx of
irregular migrants, as well as fears of a potential resurgence of the Islamic
State or a civil war in Afghanistan. Despite these challenges, Iran's
territorial integrity remains relatively strong, and it is unlikely to change
soon absent significant conflict.
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT
The country's deficiencies in fighting money laundering and terrorist financing
have landed it on the FATF blacklist. Even though the country made efforts to
address strategic deficiencies in its money laundering and terrorist financing
systems by introducing new legislation, major strategic deficiencies persist.
Iran's economy is heavily dependent on the Basij and the IRGC, which have
significant control over the national economy. This can make it challenging for
independent businesses to operate. The situation is compounded by corruption and
criminal activity at the state level, as well as Western sanctions, which
contribute to Iran's ongoing economic decline. The impact of the global pandemic
has only worsened this situation, with the country being hit harder than any
other country on the continent. As a result, over one-third of the population
now lives below the poverty line. Although the government typically releases
five-year economic planning documents, it has not made these public since the
imposition of sanctions.
CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION
The Iranian government does not have a cohesive or strategic approach to crime
prevention. Socio-economic interventions to prevent drug trafficking, human
trafficking and human smuggling in the borderlands are insufficient, and Iran’s
main method of deterrence is through imposition of harsh punishments. However,
in recent years, the government has shifted its approach to treating drug
addiction from punitive measures to a more pragmatic, health-based approach.
Drop-in centres and clinics now offer harm reduction services and medical
treatment to drug users, including women. The country also has a witness
protection programme, but it lacks a policy and practice to protect victims and
crime witnesses; international NGOs are not allowed to provide assistance in
such instances. The government offers little protection to victims of human
trafficking, meeting less than 10%of the mechanisms identified to support
victims in escaping modern slavery. Arbitrary arrests of tribunal witnesses and
their families based on undefined national security threats have occurred,
leading to witnesses concealing their identities during public hearings by
wearing masks, sunglasses and headscarves. There are a number of social
activities aimed at reducing the incidence of crime, though their effectiveness
is questionable. The main form of crime prevention in Iran remains deterrence
through rather harsh punishments.
The state heavily censors Iran's media, bans social media and undertakes efforts
to curb the flow of information from outside the country. Although the space for
civil society and media is heavily restricted, civil society organizations have
been very active, particularly in drug policy and carrying out prevention
programmes. There is no meaningful freedom of assembly in Iran, and authorities
have been heavy-handed in their crackdown on protests criticizing the government
or other sensitive subjects. Non-state actors also played a role in the protests
that began in September 2022.
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GLOBAL ORGANIZED CRIME INDEX
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