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Analysis: China’s Taiwan Invasion Plans May Get Faster and Deadlier China’s
Taiwan Invasion Plans May Get Fast... | View Comments (3)

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ANALYSIS


CHINA’S TAIWAN INVASION PLANS MAY GET FASTER AND DEADLIER


RUSSIAN MISTAKES OFFER SOME WARNINGS FOR BEIJING’S AMBITIONS.

By Bonny Lin, the director of the China Power Project and senior fellow for
Asian security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and
John Culver, a retired senior intelligence officer who was national intelligence
officer for East Asia from 2015-2018.
A man holds a Chinese flag on a Chinese navy boat
A man stands on board a Chinese navy boat during an open day in Hong Kong on
June 30, 2019. Isaac Lawrence/AFP via Getty Images
April 19, 2022, 2:00 PM

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has fueled concern over China’s plans for
Taiwan, which it has repeatedly threatened to invade. Some speculate that the
odds of invasion have increased, while others argue that Western unity and
Russian military failures should counsel Chinese caution regarding the island.

This discussion conflates two different questions: Has the Ukraine conflict
changed Beijing’s willingness to use force against Taiwan? And has the Ukraine
conflict altered Beijing’s and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA)
assessments of its ability to conduct a successful amphibious invasion of
Taiwan?

China’s willingness to use force is a political decision that is shaped by more
than just assessments of military capabilities. Even if China is not confident
it can successfully execute an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, Beijing could
believe that the geopolitical and internal costs of not using force outweigh the
risk of military failure. Beijing could instruct the PLA to engage in a
significant military operation short of an invasion, such as a seizure of key
islands in the Taiwan Strait, or to adjust its invasion plans to increase
China’s chance of political success.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has fueled concern over China’s plans for
Taiwan, which it has repeatedly threatened to invade. Some speculate that the
odds of invasion have increased, while others argue that Western unity and
Russian military failures should counsel Chinese caution regarding the island.

This discussion conflates two different questions: Has the Ukraine conflict
changed Beijing’s willingness to use force against Taiwan? And has the Ukraine
conflict altered Beijing’s and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA)
assessments of its ability to conduct a successful amphibious invasion of
Taiwan?

China’s willingness to use force is a political decision that is shaped by more
than just assessments of military capabilities. Even if China is not confident
it can successfully execute an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, Beijing could
believe that the geopolitical and internal costs of not using force outweigh the
risk of military failure. Beijing could instruct the PLA to engage in a
significant military operation short of an invasion, such as a seizure of key
islands in the Taiwan Strait, or to adjust its invasion plans to increase
China’s chance of political success.

To date, there is no clear evidence that the Ukraine conflict has altered
China’s willingness to use force against Taiwan. Beijing remains ready to use
force if Taipei crosses Beijing’s redlines. The Ukraine crisis has not caused
China to revise or add additional redlines. The power differential between China
and Taiwan continues to grow to Beijing’s advantage—this allows the Chinese
leadership to argue that time is on Beijing’s side and China does not need to
take immediate action against Taiwan.

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It is possible that the conflict may introduce some near-term uncertainty and
doubts into the PLA’s assessments of its military capabilities. However, in the
long term, the PLA can learn from the Ukraine conflict and could adjust its
military plans for Taiwan to be more lethal, faster, and more escalatory.



The swift and sweeping Western sanctions on Russia suggest that the economic and
stability costs to China for using military force against Taiwan could be far
higher—and come far faster—than Beijing had assumed. However, China’s economic
and financial heft significantly surpasses that of Russia, and Beijing may
believe that economic sanctions could be more difficult to implement against
China without significant collateral damage to global trade, supply chains, and
financial institutions. Nevertheless, Beijing will likely deepen its investment
in self-reliance measures and alternative systems to blunt such potential future
costs. A heavier emphasis on nationalism, rather than economic growth, as the
basis of the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy might also give Beijing some
political breathing room.

The conflict in Europe has also increased international support for Taiwan and
heightened public awareness within Taiwan of the need to take the island’s
defense more seriously. This is a worrisome trend for China, but it is partially
mitigated by the potential that Ukraine will require significant U.S. and NATO
attention for some time and the United States may not be able to focus its full
attention on Taiwan.

On the other hand, Beijing sees an opportunity to play up a cautionary tale:
Russia’s invasion showcases how devastating a war with China could be and why
the Taiwanese public should not support actions that provoke China. China is
amplifying such messages and arguing that Taiwan should not be a “pawn” for U.S.
efforts to counter China.

The high costs of conflict are resonating within Taiwan: Some Taiwanese
political leaders are advocating that Taipei avoid war and seek dialogue with
Beijing, while others note that both China and Taiwan would pay a heavy price in
the event of a conflict. The United States’ and NATO’s reluctance to send
conventional forces into Ukraine have also decreased the Taiwanese public’s
confidence in U.S. and Japanese military support, which China is likely to
exploit.

Many hope that Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine will encourage
China to think twice about using force against Taiwan. It is possible that the
conflict could introduce some near-term uncertainty and doubts regarding the
PLA’s capabilities. This effect will be limited, however, because China does not
have a single political or military plan for Taiwan, but a set of options to
deal with a range of contingencies.

Read More

Protesters against Russia's invasion of Ukraine in Taipei, Taiwan.


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Less confidence in the PLA’s ability to invade Taiwan could, for example,
encourage Beijing to consider other military options such as a blockade of
Taiwan. In addition, China’s plans for a rapid amphibious invasion of Taiwan
differ significantly from how Russia invaded Ukraine. Chinese political and
military leaders are unlikely to view Russian failures as fully translatable to
how China may perform in a Taiwan invasion scenario.

Yet given Ukraine’s strong resistance, the PLA may need to reconsider its prior
assessments of Taiwan’s will and capacity to resist. Before the Ukraine
conflict, some Chinese military leaders and experts assumed that China could
achieve a rapid victory over Taiwan owing to China’s military superiority, the
island’s perceived lack of will to fight, and China’s repeated espionage
penetrations of Taiwan’s military, government, financial institutions, and
critical infrastructure.

This view that China would meet limited resistance resembles incorrect U.S.,
NATO, and Russian assessments prior to the invasion that Russia would be able to
successfully take over Ukraine in a matter of days. Beijing recognizes that
Taipei—and Washington—are drawing lessons from Ukraine’s surprising resilience,
and China could face a more formidable Taiwan. Chinese commentators have
observed the Ukrainian military’s urban warfare operations and have criticized
Ukraine for what they view as Kyiv’s attempt to use civilian causalities to win
international support.



As Taiwan learns from Ukraine, key questions the PLA may face are: Is it
possible for China to limit deaths and atrocities committed against civilians in
an invasion of the island? Even if the PLA can gain control of Taipei quickly,
would China face a long war of resistance in other parts of Taiwan? Does the
Russian Army’s poor performance demonstrate even greater risks for the PLA,
which last fought a war in 1979?

These questions will likely reinforce China’s prioritization of information
dominance. Information dominance involves: seizing the battlefield initiative
and using political warfare to shape the operating environment; using faster and
more complete flow of information to enable rapid decision-making and efficient
military operations, including improved command, control, communications,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and networked precision strikes;
and dominating the cybersecurity, space, and electromagnetic domains. Chinese
analysts emphasize that information dominance enables weaker militaries (like
Ukraine’s) to fight stronger opponents.

Chinese commentators note that a major failure in Russian operations is its lack
of political warfare efforts and Russia’s inability to undermine Ukrainian
morale and will to fight. Russia has not disabled Ukrainian communication
networks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky maintains a visible public
presence and continues to rally his troops and lobby the international community
for support. Ukrainian and Western media and social media censored information
advantageous to Russia and spread Russian battlefield losses and Ukrainian
victories.

The PLA may well seek to destroy and cut off Taipei’s ability to maintain
internal and external communications to instill panic and fear across the
island. This could be paired with efforts on the ground in Taiwan—such as
Beijing-controlled Taiwanese media outlets sharing stories of Beijing’s
victories and PLA special operations forces infiltration to sabotage Taiwan’s
infrastructure and kill its leaders—to hammer home the message of either
devastating Taiwanese military losses or Taipei’s incompetence.

Chinese analysts have also identified how Russia did not sufficiently adapt to
informatized warfare. This includes the lack of a Russian informatized command
and control system that could effectively process and transmit intelligence to
Russian troops on the ground; Russia’s limited number of precision-guided
munitions and their underperformance, which degraded Russian targeting and
ability to achieve air dominance; and Russia’s need to improve its defenses from
attacks by Ukrainian drones. These are areas that the PLA is likely to improve
on.

In addition to information dominance, the Ukraine conflict could also reinforce
China’s desire to move faster and embrace the element of surprise in its
military operations. China observed Russia’s slow accumulation of military
forces near Ukraine. This visible buildup spanning several months gave the
United States and NATO time to prepare their responses and to provide Ukraine
with more weapons.

Chinese outlets, for example, reprinted Russian assessments that Ukraine was
“stuffed” full of NATO weapons and Western military advisors prior to the
invasion. Russia’s setbacks could encourage China to consider ways to further
conceal its preparations to use force or confuse the United States and
international community. However, the ability of the U.S. intelligence community
to accurately assess Russian military intentions may weaken China’s confidence
in its ability to do so.

The safer bet may be for the PLA to move faster and shorten its timelines for
mobilization and initial key operations. A rapid invasion would allow China to
minimize the possibility of U.S. and foreign intervention. This could lead to
what Chinese media report some Taiwan experts fear: a concentration of PLA
forces against Taipei to engage in “decapitation” and control of the capital.



This rapid invasion could be accompanied by demonstrations of China’s nuclear
capabilities. The Ukraine crisis likely strengthened Beijing’s belief that
nuclear deterrence could enable conventional conflict, limit escalation, and
deter foreign intervention. Chinese scholars watched Russian President Vladimir
Putin exercise and place his nuclear forces on high alert, which deterred U.S.
and NATO conventional intervention in Ukraine.

China, however, recognizes that Taiwan is not Ukraine, and the United States is
more willing to use force to defend Taiwan. It is uncertain how much China
believes nuclear deterrence will prevent the United States from intervening in
Taiwan and China will need to be prepared to counter U.S. military operations to
assist the island. What is relatively more certain is that China is likely to
continue to shift away from a “minimal nuclear deterrent” and “no first use”
policy. China will also continue its massive expansion of its nuclear arsenal.
Beijing may be more willing to use (or threaten the use of) nuclear weapons in a
conflict with Taiwan.

The PLA is also learning how to operate better on the battlefield. The losses
that Russia suffered by engaging in military operations during the daytime, for
example, underscore the PLA’s determination to improve nighttime operations.

The PLA has already invested significantly in logistics reform as part of its
massive 2015-2016 military restructuring that led to the creation of the Joint
Logistic Support Force. As Chinese commentators watch Western sanctions shut
down Russia’s ability to purchase military spare parts abroad, Beijing may push
the PLA to be more self-reliant, focusing on domestic production of its military
equipment.

The PLA is a remarkably opaque organization even by Chinese standards. Chinese
leaders, including President Xi Jinping, may also not have confidence in the
PLA’s self-assessments or may not believe that the PLA candidly reports its
weaknesses up the chain of command. Russian military overconfidence—especially
the failures of supposedly elite groups such as the Russian Airborne Troops—may
reinforce these fears. If that is the case, Beijing is likely to require more
PLA training and investments, and the leadership may be more cautious of asking
the PLA to engage in large-scale military operations in the near term.

Historically, it has taken PLA military strategists a year or two after a major
conflict to digest and conclude its major lessons learned. It will take an even
longer time for China to translate those lessons into new or improved PLA
investments or operational changes. As China is doing so, the United States,
Taiwan, and like-minded allies and partners should monitor PLA changes and
invest in their ability to deter and defeat a potentially more dangerous and
lethal Chinese military.




Bonny Lin is the director of the China Power Project and senior fellow for Asian
security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

John Culver is a retired senior intelligence officer with 35 years of experience
as a leading CIA analyst of East Asian affairs. He was  national intelligence
officer for East Asia from 2015-2018.


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