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TLP:WHITE
TLP:WHITE
1. National Cyber Awareness System >
2. Alerts >
3. Conti Ransomware
More Alerts
ALERT (AA21-265A)
CONTI RANSOMWARE
Original release date: September 22, 2021 | Last revised: March 09, 2022
SUMMARY
Immediate Actions You Can Take Now to Protect Against Conti Ransomware
• Use multifactor authentication.
• Segment and segregate networks and functions.
• Update your operating system and software.
March 9, 2022: this joint CSA was updated to include indicators of compromise
(see below) and the United States Secret Service as a co-author.
Updated February 28, 2022:
Conti cyber threat actors remain active and reported Conti ransomware attacks
against U.S. and international organizations have risen to more than 1,000.
Notable attack vectors include Trickbot and Cobalt Strike (see below for
details).
While there are no specific or credible cyber threats to the U.S. homeland at
this time, CISA, FBI, and NSA encourage organizations to review this advisory
and apply the recommended mitigations.
(end of update)
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have observed the increased use of Conti
ransomware in more than 400 attacks on U.S. and international organizations.
(See FBI Flash: Conti Ransomware Attacks Impact Healthcare and First Responder
Networks.) In typical Conti ransomware attacks, malicious cyber actors steal
files, encrypt servers and workstations, and demand a ransom payment.
To secure systems against Conti ransomware, CISA, FBI, and the National Security
Agency (NSA) recommend implementing the mitigation measures described in this
Advisory, which include requiring multifactor authentication (MFA), implementing
network segmentation, and keeping operating systems and software up to date.
Click here for a PDF version of this report.
Click here for indicators of compromise (IOCs) in STIX format.
Note: This Alert uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common
Knowledge (ATT&CK®) framework, version 9. See the ATT&CK for Enterprise for all
referenced threat actor tactics and techniques.
TECHNICAL DETAILS
While Conti is considered a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model ransomware
variant, there is variation in its structure that differentiates it from a
typical affiliate model. It is likely that Conti developers pay the deployers of
the ransomware a wage rather than a percentage of the proceeds used by affiliate
cyber actors and receives a share of the proceeds from a successful attack.
Conti actors often gain initial access [TA0001] to networks through:
* Spearphishing campaigns using tailored emails that contain malicious
attachments [T1566.001] or malicious links [T1566.002];
* Malicious Word attachments often contain embedded scripts that can be used
to download or drop other malware—such as TrickBot and IcedID, and/or
Cobalt Strike—to assist with lateral movement and later stages of the
attack life cycle with the eventual goal of deploying Conti
ransomware. [1],[2],[3]
* Stolen or weak Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials [T1078].[4]
* Phone calls;
* Fake software promoted via search engine optimization;
* Other malware distribution networks (e.g., ZLoader); and
* Common vulnerabilities in external assets.
In the execution phase [TA0002], actors run a getuid payload before using a more
aggressive payload to reduce the risk of triggering antivirus engines. CISA and
FBI have observed Conti actors using Router Scan, a penetration testing tool, to
maliciously scan for and brute force [T1110] routers, cameras, and
network-attached storage devices with web interfaces. Additionally, actors use
Kerberos attacks [T1558.003] to attempt to get the Admin hash to conduct brute
force attacks.
Conti actors are known to exploit legitimate remote monitoring and management
software and remote desktop software as backdoors to maintain persistence
[TA0003] on victim networks.[5(link is external)] The actors use tools already
available on the victim network—and, as needed, add additional tools, such as
Windows Sysinternals and Mimikatz—to obtain users’ hashes and clear-text
credentials, which enable the actors to escalate privileges [TA0004] within a
domain and perform other post-exploitation and lateral movement tasks [TA0008].
In some cases, the actors also use TrickBot malware to carry out
post-exploitation tasks.
According to a recently leaked threat actor “playbook,” [6(link is external)]
Conti actors also exploit vulnerabilities in unpatched assets, such as the
following, to escalate privileges [TA0004] and move laterally [TA0008] across a
victim’s network:
* 2017 Microsoft Windows Server Message Block 1.0 server vulnerabilities;
[7(link is external)]
* "PrintNightmare" vulnerability (CVE-2021-34527) in Windows Print spooler
[8(link is external)] service; and
* "Zerologon" vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) in Microsoft Active Directory
Domain Controller systems.[9(link is external)]
Artifacts leaked with the playbook identify four Cobalt Strike server Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses Conti actors previously used to communicate with their
command and control (C2) server.
* 162.244.80[.]235
* 85.93.88[.]165
* 185.141.63[.]120
* 82.118.21[.]1
CISA and FBI have observed Conti actors using different Cobalt Strike server IP
addresses unique to different victims.
Conti actors often use the open-source Rclone command line program for data
exfiltration [TA0010]. After the actors steal and encrypt the victim's sensitive
data [T1486], they employ a double extortion technique in which they demand the
victim pay a ransom for the release of the encrypted data and threaten the
victim with public release of the data if the ransom is not paid.
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
Updated March 9, 2022:
The following domains have registration and naming characteristics similar to
domains used by groups that have distributed Conti ransomware. Many of these
domains have been used in malicious operations; however, some may be abandoned
or may share similar characteristics coincidentally.
Domains
badiwaw[.]com
balacif[.]com
barovur[.]com
basisem[.]com
bimafu[.]com
bujoke[.]com
buloxo[.]com
bumoyez[.]com
bupula[.]com
cajeti[.]com
cilomum[.]com
codasal[.]com
comecal[.]com
dawasab[.]com
derotin[.]com
dihata[.]com
dirupun[.]com
dohigu[.]com
dubacaj[.]com
fecotis[.]com
fipoleb[.]com
fofudir[.]com
fulujam[.]com
ganobaz[.]com
gerepa[.]com
gucunug[.]com guvafe[.]com
hakakor[.]com
hejalij[.]com
hepide[.]com
hesovaw[.]com
hewecas[.]com
hidusi[.]com
hireja[.]com
hoguyum[.]com
jecubat[.]com
jegufe[.]com
joxinu[.]com
kelowuh[.]com
kidukes[.]com
kipitep[.]com
kirute[.]com
kogasiv[.]com
kozoheh[.]com
kuxizi[.]com
kuyeguh[.]com
lipozi[.]com
lujecuk[.]com
masaxoc[.]com
mebonux[.]com
mihojip[.]com
modasum[.]com
moduwoj[.]com
movufa[.]com
nagahox[.]com
nawusem[.]com
nerapo[.]com
newiro[.]com
paxobuy[.]com
pazovet[.]com
pihafi[.]com
pilagop[.]com
pipipub[.]com
pofifa[.]com
radezig[.]com
raferif[.]com
ragojel[.]com
rexagi[.]com
rimurik[.]com
rinutov[.]com
rusoti[.]com
sazoya[.]com
sidevot[.]com
solobiv[.]com
sufebul[.]com
suhuhow[.]com
sujaxa[.]com
tafobi[.]com tepiwo[.]com
tifiru[.]com
tiyuzub[.]com
tubaho[.]com
vafici[.]com
vegubu[.]com
vigave[.]com
vipeced[.]com
vizosi[.]com
vojefe[.]com
vonavu[.]com
wezeriw[.]com
wideri[.]com
wudepen[.]com
wuluxo[.]com
wuvehus[.]com
wuvici[.]com
wuvidi[.]com
xegogiv[.]com
xekezix[.]com
(End of update)
MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES
Conti ransomware uses the ATT&CK techniques listed in table 1.
TABLE 1: CONTI ATT&CK TECHNIQUES FOR ENTERPRISE
Initial Access
Technique Title ID Use Valid Accounts T1078 Conti actors have been observed
gaining unauthorized access to victim networks through stolen Remote Desktop
Protocol (RDP) credentials. Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001 Conti
ransomware can be delivered using TrickBot malware, which is known to use an
email with an Excel sheet containing a malicious macro to deploy the malware.
Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 Conti ransomware can be delivered using
TrickBot, which has been delivered via malicious links in phishing emails.
Execution
Technique Title ID Use Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
T1059.003 Conti ransomware can utilize command line options to allow an attacker
control over how it scans and encrypts files. Native Application Programming
Interface (API) T1106 Conti ransomware has used API calls during execution.
Persistence
Technique Title ID Use Valid Accounts T1078 Conti actors have been observed
gaining unauthorized access to victim networks through stolen RDP credentials.
External Remote Services T1133 Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote
services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services
such as virtual private networks (VPNs), Citrix, and other access mechanisms
allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external
locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and
credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote
Management can also be used externally.
Privilege Escalation
Technique Title ID Use Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection
T1055.001 Conti ransomware has loaded an encrypted dynamic-link library (DLL)
into memory and then executes it.
Defense Evasion
Technique Title ID Use Obfuscated Files or Information T1027 Conti ransomware
has encrypted DLLs and used obfuscation to hide Windows API calls. Process
Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection T1055.001 Conti ransomware has loaded
an encrypted DLL into memory and then executes it. Deobfuscate/Decode Files or
Information T1140 Conti ransomware has decrypted its payload using a hardcoded
AES-256 key.
Credential Access
Technique Title ID Use Brute Force T1110 Conti actors use legitimate tools to
maliciously scan for and brute force routers, cameras, and network-attached
storage devices with web interfaces. Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets:
Kerberoasting T1558.003 Conti actors use Kerberos attacks to attempt to get the
Admin hash. System Network Configuration Discovery T1016 Conti ransomware can
retrieve the ARP cache from the local system by using the GetIpNetTable() API
call and check to ensure IP addresses it connects to are for local, non-internet
systems. System Network Connections Discovery T1049 Conti ransomware can
enumerate routine network connections from a compromised host. Process Discovery
T1057 Conti ransomware can enumerate through all open processes to search for
any that have the string sql in their process name. File and Directory
Discovery T1083 Conti ransomware can discover files on a local system. Network
Share Discovery T1135 Conti ransomware can enumerate remote open server message
block (SMB) network shares using NetShareEnum().
Lateral Movement
Technique Title ID Use Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares T1021.002
Conti ransomware can spread via SMB and encrypts files on different hosts,
potentially compromising an entire network. Taint Shared Content T1080 Conti
ransomware can spread itself by infecting other remote machines via network
shared drives.
Impact
Technique Title ID Use Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 Conti ransomware can use
CreateIoCompletionPort(), PostQueuedCompletionStatus(), and
GetQueuedCompletionPort() to rapidly encrypt files, excluding those with the
extensions of .exe, .dll, and .lnk. It has used a different AES-256 encryption
key per file with a bundled RAS-4096 public encryption key that is unique for
each victim. Conti ransomware can use "Windows Restart Manager" to ensure files
are unlocked and open for encryption. Service Stop T1489 Conti ransomware can
stop up to 146 Windows services related to security, backup, database, and email
solutions through the use of net stop. Inhibit System Recovery T1490 Conti
ransomware can delete Windows Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin.
MITIGATIONS
CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend that network defenders apply the following
mitigations to reduce the risk of compromise by Conti ransomware attacks.
USE MULTIFACTOR AUTHENTICATION.
* Require multifactor authentication to remotely access networks from external
sources.
IMPLEMENT NETWORK SEGMENTATION AND FILTER TRAFFIC.
* Implement and ensure robust network segmentation between networks and
functions to reduce the spread of the ransomware. Define a demilitarized zone
that eliminates unregulated communication between networks.
* Filter network traffic to prohibit ingress and egress communications with
known malicious IP addresses.
* Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching end
users. Implement a user training program to discourage users from visiting
malicious websites or opening malicious attachments. Filter emails containing
executable files to prevent them from reaching end users.
* Implement a URL blocklist and/or allowlist to prevent users from accessing
malicious websites.
SCAN FOR VULNERABILITIES AND KEEP SOFTWARE UPDATED.
* Set antivirus/antimalware programs to conduct regular scans of network assets
using up-to-date signatures.
* Upgrade software and operating systems, applications, and firmware on network
assets in a timely manner. Consider using a centralized patch management
system.
REMOVE UNNECESSARY APPLICATIONS AND APPLY CONTROLS.
* Remove any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations. Conti
threat actors leverage legitimate applications—such as remote monitoring and
management software and remote desktop software applications—to aid in the
malicious exploitation of an organization’s enterprise.
* Investigate any unauthorized software, particularly remote desktop or remote
monitoring and management software.
* Implement application allowlisting, which only allows systems to execute
programs known and permitted by the organization's security policy. Implement
software restriction policies (SRPs) or other controls to prevent programs
from executing from common ransomware locations, such as temporary folders
supporting popular internet browsers or compression/decompression programs.
* Implement execution prevention by disabling macro scripts from Microsoft
Office files transmitted via email. Consider using Office Viewer software to
open Microsoft Office files transmitted via email instead of full Microsoft
Office suite applications.
* See the joint Alert, Publicly Available Tools Seen in Cyber Incidents
Worldwide—developed by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—for guidance on detection and
protection against malicious use of publicly available tools.
IMPLEMENT ENDPOINT AND DETECTION RESPONSE TOOLS.
* Endpoint and detection response tools allow a high degree of visibility into
the security status of endpoints and can help effectively protect against
malicious cyber actors.
LIMIT ACCESS TO RESOURCES OVER THE NETWORK, ESPECIALLY BY RESTRICTING RDP.
* After assessing risks, if RDP is deemed operationally necessary, restrict the
originating sources and require multifactor authentication.
SECURE USER ACCOUNTS.
* Regularly audit administrative user accounts and configure access controls
under the principles of least privilege and separation of duties.
* Regularly audit logs to ensure new accounts are legitimate users.
Review CISA’s APTs Targeting IT Service Provider Customers guidance for
additional mitigations specific to IT Service Providers and their customers.
USE THE RANSOMWARE RESPONSE CHECKLIST IN CASE OF INFECTION.
If a ransomware incident occurs at your organization, CISA, FBI, and NSA
recommend the following actions:
* Follow the Ransomware Response Checklist on p. 11 of the CISA-Multi-State
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide.
* Scan your backups. If possible, scan your backup data with an antivirus
program to check that it is free of malware.
* Report incidents immediately to CISA at https://us-cert.cisa.gov/report, a
local FBI Field Office, or U.S. Secret Service Field Office.
* Apply incident response best practices found in the joint Advisory, Technical
Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity, developed by
CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and
the United Kingdom.
CISA, FBI, and NSA strongly discourage paying a ransom to criminal actors.
Paying a ransom may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations,
encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware,
and/or may fund illicit activities. Paying the ransom also does not guarantee
that a victim’s files will be recovered.
ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
* The Digital Forensics, Incident Response (DFIR) Report: BazarLoader to Conti
Ransomware in 32 Hours (September 2021):
https://thedfirreport.com/2021/09/13/bazarloader-to-conti-ransomware-in-32-hours/(link
is external)
* NSA Cybersecurity Information Sheet: Transition to Multi-Factor
Authentication (August 2019):
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180346/-1/-1/0/Transition%20to%20Multi-factor%20Authentication%20-%20Copy.pdf
* NSA Cybersecurity Information Sheet: Segment Networks and Deploy
Application-Aware Defenses (September 2019):
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180325/-1/-1/0/Segment%20Networks%20and%20Deploy%20Application%20Aware%20Defenses%20-%20Copy.pdf
* NSA Cybersecurity Information Sheet: Hardening Network Devices (August
2020):
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Aug/18/2002479461/-1/-1/0/HARDENING_NETWORK_DEVICES.PDF
FREE CYBER HYGIENE SERVICES
CISA offers a range of no-cost cyber hygiene services to help organizations
assess, identify, and reduce their exposure to threats, including ransomware. By
requesting these services, organizations of any size could find ways to reduce
their risk and mitigate attack vectors.
STOPRANSOMWARE.GOV
The StopRansomware.gov webpage is an interagency resource that provides guidance
on ransomware protection, detection, and response. This includes ransomware
alerts, reports, and resources from CISA and other federal partners, including:
* CISA and MS-ISAC: Joint Ransomware Guide
* CISA Insights: Ransomware Outbreak
* CISA Webinar: Combating Ransomware(link is external)
REWARDS FOR JUSTICE REPORTING
The U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offers a reward
of up to $10 million for reports of foreign government malicious activity
against U.S. critical infrastructure. See the RFJ website(link is external) for
more information and how to report information securely.
CONTACT INFORMATION
To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this
Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at
www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices, or the FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch)
at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi.gov(link sends email). When
available, please include the following information regarding the incident:
date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people
affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting
company or organization; and a designated point of contact. If you have any
further questions related to this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, or to request
incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats,
contact CISA at CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov(link sends email). For NSA client
requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact the NSA Cybersecurity
Requirements Center at 410-854-4200 or Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov(link sends
email).
REFERENCES
[1] MITRE ATT&CK: Conti
[2] MITRE ATT&CK: TrickBot
[3] MITRE ATT&CK: IcedID
[4] FBI FLASH: Conti Ransomware Attacks Impact Healthcare and First Responder N…
[5] Ransomware Daily: Conti Ransomware Gang Playbook Mentions MSP Software –
Ch…(link is external)
[6] Cisco Talos blog: Translated: Talos' insights from the recently leaked
Cont…(link is external)
[7] Microsoft Security Bulletin MS17-010 – Critical: Security Update for
Micros…(link is external)
[8] Microsoft Security Update: Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution
Vuln…(link is external)
[9] Microsoft Security Update: Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability –
…(link is external)
REVISIONS
September 22, 2021: Initial Version
September 23, 2021: Updated PDF with FBI Flash link in Summary
February 28, 2022: Updated observed attack number
March 9, 2022: Added Indicators of Compromise STIX file and Section
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