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Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht

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Over TPRRedactieledenVoor AuteursBoekenWisselleerstoelTPR PrijsVVSR-BNKronieken

Geachte Lezer,

Welkom op de website van het Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht. Het TPR is het meest
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Via de navigatiebalk aan de linkerzijde vindt u een archief van alle
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Daarnaast bevat deze website ook informatie over de rijke geschiedenis van het
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Co-Directeuren ivzw TPR

Disclaimer

De redactie heeft geprobeerd om van alle auteurs die gepubliceerd hebben in
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bijdrage op deze webstek. Niet alle rechthebbenden werden bereikt. Mocht een
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TPR, Coupure 5, 9000 Gent
redactie@tpr


Geneviève Schamps

Geneviève Schamps is gewoon hoogleraar aan de Faculteit Recht en Criminologie,
de Faculteit Geneeskunde en Tandheelkunde en de Faculteit Volksgezondheid van de
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. Zij geeft leiding aan het Centrum voor Medisch
en Biomedisch Recht dat zij in 2005 heeft opgericht en is verantwoordelijk voor
de optie Gezondheidsrecht, als onderdeel van de Masters I en II in Recht
(U.C.L.). Ze is ook gastprofessor aan de Universiteit van Bordeaux en het
Collège Belgique (Koninklijke Academie van België). Ze is wetenschappelijk
medewerker aan de Universiteit van Montreal. Ze was een aantal jaren
gastprofessor aan de Paris Descartes Universiteit en werkte als beëdigd,
onafhankelijk vertaler in de Nederlandse taal.



Ze is lid van de Koninklijke Academie van Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone
Kunsten van België (Klasse Technologie en Maatschappij). Ze is voorzitter van de
Federale Commissie voor Patiëntenrechten en vice-voorzitter van de Belgische
Adviescommissie Bio-ethiek. Gedurende het studiejaar 2016-2017 zal zij deze
commissie voorzitten. Ze is tevens voorzitter van het Management Committee van
het Medical Accident Fund en is als gekwalificeerd persoon lid van de Raad van
Bestuur van het National Medical Accident Compensation Office in Parijs. Ze is
voorzitter van de Institutional Reference Group on Bioethics (U.C.L) en is
vice-voorzitter van de Hospital-Faculty Ethics Commission van de St Luc
University Clinics/U.C.L. Geneviève Schamps is ook lid van de Wetenschappelijke
Raad van het Zwitserse Instituut voor Rechtsvergelijking (Lausanne) en van de
Onderzoeksraad van de U.C.L. Ze is medeoprichter van verschillende
internationale wetenschappelijke netwerken, waaronder het International
University Network of Bioethics, waarvan ze vice-president is.

Ze treedt op als deskundige of als voorzitter of lid van scriptiejury’s in
verschillende instanties in binnen- en buitenland. Ze wordt ook ingeschakeld om
universitaire onderzoekscentra in het buitenland te evalueren en is promotor van
verschillende doctoraatsthesissen. Ze maakt ook deel uit van de redactieraad van
binnen- en buitenlandse wetenschappelijke tijdschriften, met leescommissie. Zij
is lid van de Commissie “Wetenschappen van Recht en Criminologie” van het Fonds
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek.

Zijn onderzoeks- en onderwijsgebieden zijn medisch en biomedisch recht,
strafrecht, civiel aansprakelijkheidsrecht, rechtsvergelijking en bio-ethiek.
Zij geeft leiding aan de Wetenschappelijke Collectie van het Centrum voor
Medisch en Biomedisch Recht. Zijn proefschrift, verdedigd in 1997, stelt,
gebaseerd op een analyse van de rechtssystemen van zeven landen, de vaststelling
voor van een algemeen beginsel van burgerlijke aansprakelijkheid zonder schuld
voor slachtoffers van gevaar. Ze won twee prijzen (de vijfjaarlijkse prijs Baron
E. van Dievoet – 1999 – en de vijfjaarlijkse Prijs van de Revue Critique de
Jurisprudence Belge – 2001). Naast haar publicaties heeft zij tal van
presentaties gegeven op nationale of internationale wetenschappelijke
conferenties of congressen op bovengenoemde terreinen.

CLOSE
Mieken Puelinckx-Coene

Doctor juris en lic. notariaat K.U.Leuven; Master in Comparative Law,
(University of Chicago)

Echtgenote van A. Puelinckx, moeder van drie kinderen en oma van zeven
kleinkinderen



Emeritus-hoogleraar van de rechtsfaculteit van de Universiteit Antwerpen;
Gasthoogleraar K.U.L. voor het basisvak familiaal vermogensrecht, academiejaar
1996-97; Docent in de postgraduaat opleiding Planning van de Nalatenschap van de
UAMS tot 2007; Docent in de Postgraduate Estateplanning van de VUB tot 2012;
Gastcolleges aan de Universiteiten van Nijmegen, Johannesburg en Stellenbosch

48 jaar wetenschappelijk actief in familiaal vermogensrecht zowel nationaal als
internationaal, auteur van een 200tal publicaties in dat domein, verschenen o.m.
ook in Nederland, Frankrijk en Zuid- Afrika; Winnaar van de Driejaarlijkse prijs
van het Antwerps Notariaat (1989) met haar boek “Erfrecht”, dat in zijn derde
editie opgenomen werd in de reeks Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht

Herhaald voorzitter, rapporteur of spreker op congressen en studiedagen over
familiaal vermogensrecht, o.m. ook in Nederland, Frankrijk en Zuid- Afrika;
bijv. Algemeen rapporteur van de Conferentie over “La protection de la famille
dans le domaine des successions”, Raad van Europa, Straatsburg 2002; Adviseur
van de rapporteur voor de Senaat tijdens de hervorming van het erfrecht van de
langstlevende echtgenoot (1981) en van het afstammingsrecht (1987) en adviseur
van de Nederlandse Regeringscommissaris tijdens de hervorming van Boek 4, nieuw
B.W. (erfrecht); Ook nadien herhaald adviseur bij het opstellen van
wetsontwerpen en wetsvoorstellen inzake erfrecht, ook tijdens de grote
hervorming gepland onder de vorige legislatuur

Regeringsafgevaardigde van België (1975-1977) in de U.N. Commission on the
Status of Women, toen deze het ontwerp opstelde voor het Internationaal Verdrag
tot uitbanning van elke vorm van discriminatie t.a.v. vrouwen; Voorzitter van de
Commissie van de Status van de Vrouw (1975-1977) , adviescommissie bij het
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken ter voorbereidng van de standpunten in te
nemen in die CSW; Lid van de in 2003 door de Raad van Europa opgerichte
werkgroep” Erfrecht”; Lid van de “Study group for a European Civil Code”,
afdeling Gratuitous contracts (2004-2007)

Herhaald lid van de examenjury van het Vast Wervingssecretariaat voor de werving
van bestuursecretarissen-juristen(1984-1986) en van jury’s van wetenschappelijke
prijzen; Plaatsvervangend lid van het Wervingscollege der Magistraten
(1991-1995)

Medestichter en redactielid van de door Kluwer uitgegeven losbladige reeks
Erfenissen schenkingen en testamenten, Commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak
en rechtsleer; Lid van de adviesraad van het Tijdschrift voor Notarissen en van
Patrimonium Familiare; Lid van het Comité van Studie-en Wetgeving van de
Koninklijke Federatie van Belgische Notarissen; (Ere) lid van de Verenigingvoor
de vergelijkende studie van het recht van België en Nederland (afdeling
privaatrecht) en preadviseur in 1994; Bestuurslid van het Centrum voor
Beroepsvervolmaking in de Rechten (U. Antwerpen) tot juli 2006; Arbiter in
scheidsrechtelijke colleges

CLOSE
Frederik Swennen

Frederik Swennen is gewoon hoogleraar aan de Universiteit Antwerpen, met een
onderzoeks- en onderwijsopdracht in het (internationaal en vergelijkend)
personen- en familierecht en in verwantschapsstudies. Zijn onderzoek is
sociaal-theoretisch gefundeerd en emprisch geïnformeerd en betreft in hoofdzaak
de grensgebieden van de concepten persoon en familie. Hij is met name auteur van
handboek Het personen- en familierecht. Een benadering in context (Antwerpen,
Intersentia, 7de editie, 2021). Hij is promotor van de FWO-Wetenschappelijke
Onderzoeksgemeenschap (2015-2019 en 2020-2024) RETHINKIN_, die de academische
familierechtsbeoefening in Vlaanderen en Nederland omvat. Frederik Swennen is
decaan van de Antwerpse rechtenfaculteit (2018-2021 en 2021-2024).



Hij studeerde aan de Universiteit Antwerpen (1991-1996) en de University of Cape
Town (1996). Van 1996 tot 2000 bereidde hij als aspirant van het FWO-Vlaanderen
een proefschrift voor over “Geestesgestoorden in het burgerlijk recht”
(promotor: T. Vansweevelt, Antwerpen, Intersentia), bekroond met de eerste André
Primsprijs voor Gezondheidsrecht. In 2000 werd hij referendaris bij het Hof van
Cassatie, toegevoegd aan de procureur-generaal. Hij bleef deeltijds verbonden
aan de Universiteit Antwerpen als doctor-assistent personen- en familierecht bij
Alfons Heyvaert, die hij in 2002 opvolgde. Frederik Swennen hield in 2003 zijn
oratie onder de titel “Het huwelijk afschaffen?” (Antwerpen, Intersentia).

Frederik Swennen bekleedde tijdens het academiejaar 2012-2013 de
TPR-Wisselleerstoel aan de Universiteit Utrecht, waar hij zijn oratie als
gasthoogleraar hield onder de titel “Er is leven na de dood.
Persoonlijkheidsrechten na overlijden” (TPR 2013, 1489-1553). Hij was als
gastprofessor of fellow ook verbonden aan verscheidene andere instellingen,
recentelijk aan Birkbeck, University of London en aan het Netherlands Institute
of Advanced Study. Hij is lid van het uitvoerend comité van de International
Society of Family Law en van Family Law in Europe: Academic Network, is Belgisch
rapporteur voor de Commission of European Family Law en is geassocieerd lid van
de Association Internationale de Droit Comparé.

Hij is als of counsel advocaat verbonden aan het Greenille Private Client Team
van Deloitte Legal Lawyers (balie Antwerpen).

www.frederikswennen.be

CLOSE
Reinhard Steennot

Reinhard Steennot studeerde in 1998 af als Licentiaat in de Rechten aan de
UGent. Daarna startte hij als voltijds doctoraatsstudent aan het Instituut
Financieel Recht van de UGent, gesponsord door het Fonds Wetenschappelijk
Onderzoek Vlaanderen (FWO). In 2002 verdedigde hij met succes zijn
doctoraatsproefschrift over de juridische aspecten van elektronische
betaalsystemen. De commerciële editie van het proefschrift, getiteld
“Elektronisch betalingsverkeer: een toepassing van de klassieke principes” werd
bekroond met de prijs voor financieel recht, uitgereikt door de Belgische sectie
van de Europese Vereniging voor Bank- en Financieel Recht.



Reinhard Steennot bleef na het behalen van zijn doctoraat nog een jaar werkzaam
bij het FWO als post-doctoraal onderzoeker. In 2003 werd hij aangesteld als
professor in het economisch en financieel recht. Momenteel doceert hij aan de
rechtsfaculteit de vakken handels- en economisch recht, financieel recht,
consumentenbescherming en privaat bankrecht.

Het onderzoek van Reinhard Steennot spitst zich vooral toe op het privaat
bankrecht (kredieten, betalingen, beleggingsdiensten), consumentenbescherming en
contractuele aspecten van de elektronische handel. Hij is de auteur van
verschillende boeken en van tal van artikels in nationale en internationale
tijdschriften. Voor het Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht staat hij in voor het
Overzicht van Rechtspraak “Consumentenbescherming”. Een volledige
publicatielijst van Reinhard Steennot kan geraadpleegd worden op:
https://biblio.ugent.be/person/801001239940.

Daarnaast is Reinhard Steennot sinds 2011 lid van de Raad van Toezicht van de
Autoriteit voor Financiële Diensten en Markten (FSMA). Hij is tevens voorzitter
van de brc Verbruik en lid van het expertenpanel bij Ombudsfin.

CLOSE
Wilfried Rauws

Na voltooiing van zijn rechtenstudie aan de Universiteit Antwerpen (1979), werd
Wilfried Rauws (Antwerpen, 27 juni 1956) assistent aan de Universitaire
Instelling Antwerpen. Hij behaalde de titel van doctor in de rechten op
proefschrift, getiteld ‘Civielrechtelijke beëindigingswijzen van de
arbeidsovereenkomst’ (grootste onderscheiding, Universitaire Instelling
Antwerpen, 1986) nadat hij een bijzonder licentiaat sociaal recht verwierf
(grote onderscheiding, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1981).



Nadat hij aan diverse hogere onderwijsinstellingen doceerde, is hij thans
voltijds als hoogleraar aan de Faculteit Recht & criminologie van de Vrije
Universiteit Brussel en als deeltijds hoofddocent aan de Faculteit der
rechtsgeleerdheid van de Universiteit Maastricht verbonden waar hij belast is
met onderwijs en onderzoek in het sociaal recht, met een klemtoon op het
arbeidsrecht. In juni 2014 werd hij verkozen tot decaan van de Faculteit Recht
en Criminologie van de VUB.Hij is zestien jaar advocaat geweest te Antwerpen op
het kantoor van wijlen mr. J. Van Goethem. Hij is thans ere-advocaat, en is nog
rechter plaatsvervanger in de Arbeidsrechtbank te Antwerpen. Hij geeft les aan
de advocaten-stagiairs van het rechtsgebied Antwerpen.

Hij publiceerde over diverse sociaalrechtelijke onderwerpen, met inbegrip van de
arbeidsverhoudingen in de onderwijssector. Zijn publicaties raken ook aan andere
domeinen zoals het burgerlijk recht, het strafrecht en het publiekrecht. Naast
het lidmaatschap van de redactie van het Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht maakt
Rauws deel uit van de redactie van het Tijdschrift voor Sociaal Recht, het
Tijdschrift voor Onderwijsrecht en Onderwijsbeleid, het Rechtskundig Weekblad en
van Tegenspraak.

Hij is de vertegenwoordiger van België in het Europese netwerk van
universiteiten ‘the European Labour Law Network’ opgericht door de professoren
B. Waas (Goethe Universiteit Frankfurt) en G. Heerma van Voss (Universiteit
Leiden). Hij is tevens lid van een aantal verenigingen zoals de Belgische
Vereniging Voor Arbeidsverhoudingen, waarvan hij thans voorzitter is.

Hij is sedert 2014 plaatsvervangend lid van het college van beroep inzake tucht
voor de publiekrechtelijke hogescholen.

CLOSE
Joke Baeck

Na de voltooiing van haar rechtenstudies aan de Universiteit Gent (2002), de
Université de Paris X (2002) en het International Law Institute in Washington DC
(2002), startte Joke Baeck haar loopbaan als advocaat-stagiair op het kantoor
van meester Marcel Storme te Gent (2002-2005). Tegelijk werd zij
praktijkassistent bij professor Hubert Bocken aan de Universiteit Gent, in de
vakgebieden verbintenissenrecht en buitencontractueel aansprakelijkheidsrecht
(2002-2004).Van 2005 tot 2011 werkte ze aan een doctoraatsonderzoek over de
restitutieverplichtingen na vernietiging of ontbinding van overeenkomsten, eerst
als assistent (2005-2006) en vervolgens als Aspirant bij het Fonds voor
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Vlaanderen (2006-2011). Promotoren van dit onderzoek
waren de professoren Hubert Bocken en Annelies Wylleman.



Na de succesvolle verdediging van haar doctoraat in 2011, was ze gedurende twee
jaar doctor-assistent aan de Universiteit Gent. In die periode verlegde zij haar
wetenschappelijke focus van het verbintenissenrecht naar het zekerheidsrecht. In
2013 werd zij benoemd als voltijds docent aan de Universiteit Gent, waar zij
momenteel actief is in de vakgebieden zekerheidsrecht en rechtsmethodologie.
Daarnaast is zij ook coördinator van het vaardighedenonderwijs in de
rechtenopleiding van de Universiteit Gent.

Daarnaast is ze auteur van tal van wetenschappelijke bijdragen in het domein van
het verbintenissen- en zekerheidsrecht. Sinds 2014 is zij lid van de
redactieraad van het Rechtskundig Weekblad en sinds 2020 ook van het TPR.

CLOSE
Marcel Storme

OV

Marcel Storme (Gent, 3 augustus 1930 – Gent, 30 maart 2018) is emeritus
hoogleraar van de UGent.



Hij studeerde onder meer rechten aan de Rijksuniversiteit Gent alsook te Parijs
en Londen en promoveerde aan de Rijksuniversiteit Gent tot geaggregeerde in de
rechten met een proefschrift over “De bewijslast in het Belgisch privaatrecht”
(1961). Hij doceerde aan de Rijksuniversiteit Gent (later Universiteit Gent)
alsook aan de UFSIA en het RUCA. Te Gent was hij gewoon hoogleraar en doceerde
hij voornamelijk procesrecht en kritische studie van rechtspraak.

Hij was senator voor de CVP (gecoöpteerd) van 1977 tot 1981.

Hij was voorzitter van de Vlaamse Juristenvereniging van 1983 tot 1996. Hij is
lid en was voorzitter van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor
Wetenschappen en Kunsten.

Hij is voorzitter van de International Association of Procedural Law (in
opvolging van Mauro Cappelletti) en van het Interuniversitair Centrum voor
gerechtelijk recht. Hij richtte een studiegroep op, de Commission for the
Approximation of Procedural Law in Europe, ook Storme-Commissie genoemd, die een
rapport publiceerde over de harmonisatie van het procesrecht.

Hij is dr. jur. h. c. van Lublin University en ereprofessor van de Universiteit
van Peking. In 1989 werd hij opgenomen als lid in de Academia Europaea.

CLOSE
Alain Laurent Verbeke

Gewoon Hoogleraar KU Leuven, Visiting Professor of Law Harvard Law School,
Professor of Law & Negotiation UCP Lisbon Global School of Law en Tilburg Law
School. Advocaat balies Brussel en West-Vlaanderen.



KU Leuven Faculteit Rechten:
Directeur Rector Roger Dillemans Instituut Familiaal Vermogensrecht.
Co-directeur Instituut Contractenrecht. Co-directeur LCN, Leuvens Centrum voor
Notariaat. Co-voorzitter ICBO (Interuniversitair en Interdisciplinair Centrum
voor Bouwrecht en Onroerend Goed Leuven-Antwerpen). Ere-directeur Instituut
Goederenrecht.

KU Leuven Faculteit Psychologie:
Co-voorzitter LCM, Leuven Center for Collaborative Management.

In Harvard verbonden aan PON, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School.
Gommaar van Oosterwijck Leerstoel 2003 (VUB); Francqui Leerstoel 2010-2011
(VUB); KBC Chair Family Wealth 2014-2015 (AMS).

CLOSE
Beatrix Vanlerberghe

Beatrix Vanlerberghe studeerde rechten aan de KU Leuven (1990) en Essex (LL.M.
in International Human Rights Law, 1991). In 1993 behaalde ze het ‘Diplôme de
Droit International et de Droit Comparé des Droits de l’Homme’ aan het ‘Institut
des droits de l’homme’ in Straatsburg.



Ze werd in 1991 toegelaten tot de balie van Brussel en nadien benoemd bij de
balie van het Hof van Cassatie van België (2012). Zij vervoegde in 1991 eerst
het advocatenkantoor Allen & Overy (voorheen Loeff, Claeys, Verbeke) en
vervolgens het advocatenkantoor Linklaters (voorheen De Bandt, Van Hecke &
Lagae), waar zij zich als ‘counsel’ in cassatiewerk specialiseerde. Ze verliet
dit kantoor in 2013 om het advocatenkantoor Verbist & Vanlerberghe Omega Law op
te richten.

Daarnaast was ze van 1991 tot 1999 assistente aan de KU Leuven in de vakgebieden
Gerechtelijk recht en Mensenrechten. Zij promoveerde tot doctor in de rechten in
1999 met een proefschrift over het recht op een eerlijk proces en openbaarheid
en openheid in het gerecht. Sinds 2006 doceert zij aan de Universiteit Antwerpen
de vakken “Grondige Studie van het Gerechtelijk Recht”, “Bijzondere Studie van
het Bewijsrecht” en de “Bijzondere Studie Pleitoefeningen”.

Zij is auteur, coauteur, editor en co-editor van tal van boeken en bijdragen in
tijdschriften over verschillende onderwerpen. Sinds 2020 is zij lid van de
redactieraad van het TPR.

CLOSE
Matthias E. Storme

Matthias Edward Storme (Gent, 8 juli 1959) is als gewoon hoogleraar verbonden
aan de KU Leuven waar hij het Instituut voor Handels- en Insolventierecht leidt.
Na Grieks-Latijnse humaniora aan het Sint-Barbaracollege s.J. te Gent en studies
rechten en wijsbegeerte te Antwerpen en Leuven (1976-1981) behaalde hij een M.A.
in Philosophy aan Yale University (1982) en het doctoraat in de rechten aan de
KU Leuven (1989) na studieverblijven aan de Università degli studi di Bologna
(1983-1984) en het Max Planck Institut für internationales und ausländisches
Privaatrecht te Hamburg (1984-85).



Hij heeft leeropdrachten in internationaal handelsrecht, zekerheden- en
insolventierecht, notarieel burgerlijk en procesrecht, verbintenissenrecht,
rechtsfilosofie en vroeger onder meer ook Europees procesrecht, vergelijkende
levensbeschouwing en rechtsvergelijking.

Hij doceerde eerder aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam, de Universiteit Antwerpen
en de China University of Politics and Law te Peking en gaf gastcolleges aan
vele andere universiteiten. Sedert 1992 maakt hij deel uit van
expertencommissies die een Europees burgerlijk wetboek voorbereiden (1992-2002
de Commission on European Contract Law, de zgn. Lando-commissie; sedert 1999 de
Study group on a European Civil Code en daarnaast sedert 2003 de Acquis
communautaire Group.

In het kader van het project van een ontwerp Gemeenschappelijk referentiekader
voor Europees Contractenrecht (Draft common frame of reference for european
contract law, DCFR) was hij lid van de 10-koppige groep die de eindredactie
verzorgde van dit ontwerp voor een Europees burgerlijk wetboek (december 2008)
dat intussen de basis is geworden voor het gemeenschappelijk europees kooprecht
CESL, Common European Sales law). Hij is stichtend lid van het European Law
Institute (opgericht 2011) en lid van de Raad van het ELI en betrokkene bij
meerdere ELI-projecten (common european sales law; european civil procedure;
business rescue).

Hij is medestichter en mede-hoofdredacteur (met Ewoud Hondius) van het European
review of private law / Europäische Zeitschrift für Privatrecht / Revue
Européenne de droit privé, kernredacteur van het Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht
en sedert 2014 co-directeur van het tijdschrift.

Daarnaast is hij advocaat te Gent (tot 2013 Brussel, aldaar oud-voorzitter van
het Vlaams Pleitgenootschap bij de balie te Brussel, en oud-lid van de Raad van
de Orde van de Nederlandse Orde van advocaten te Brussel).

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Jeroen Delvoie

Jeroen Delvoie is (deeltijds) docent aan de Vrije Universiteit Brussel en
vennoot bij het advocatenkantoor Eubelius.

Jeroen Delvoie werd in 1999 licentiaat in de rechten aan de Vrije Universiteit
Brussel en behaalde in 2000 een Master of Laws diploma aan de University of
Chicago (Chicago, USA).

Hij startte in 2000 zijn professionele loopbaan als advocaat aan de Brusselse
balie bij het kantoor Eubelius.



Van 2004 tot 2009 was hij onderzoeker (FWO-aspirant en doctoraatsbursaal) aan de
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, waar hij in 2010 onder het promotorschap van prof.
dr. Ludo Cornelis promoveerde tot doctor in de rechten met een proefschrift over
de orgaantheorie in het privaatrecht (gepubliceerd bij Intersentia in 2010). Hij
werd voor dit werk bekroond met de driejaarlijkse Prix Pierre Coppens van de UCL
en de Revue Pratique des Sociétés.

Jeroen Delvoie is sinds 2012 deeltijds docent aan de Vrije Universiteit Brussel,
waar hij thans de vakken Selected Topics of European company and association law
en Fusies en overnames doceert.

Daarnaast is hij advocaat aan de balie te Brussel (vennoot bij Eubelius).

Jeroen Delvoie is wetenschappelijk voornamelijk actief in het vennootschapsrecht
en het verbintenissenrecht. Zijn praktijk als advocaat spitst zich toe op het
vennootschapsrecht en het publiek economisch recht, in het bijzonder het publiek
ondernemingsrecht.

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Hubert Bocken

Hubert Bocken werd in 1967 doctor in de rechten aan de Rijksuniversiteit Gent
1967 waar hij als student ook voorzitter was van het Kultureel Konvent en van
het Vlaams Rechtsgenootschap. In 1968 behaalde hij het LLM diploma aan de
Harvard Law School; in 1978 promoveerde hij te Gent tot Geaggregeerde voor het
hoger onderwijs in het burgerlijk recht met een proefschrift over “Het
aansprakelijkheidsrecht als sanctie tegen de verstoring van het leefmilieu” .



Na een paar jaar medewerker te zijn geweest bij het advocatenkantoor Cleary
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton was hij vanaf 1971 voltijds verbonden aan de
Faculteit Rechtsgeleerdheid van de Universiteit Gent. Hij was er belast met
cursussen in het privaatrecht, in het bijzonder het verbintenissenrecht, de
rechtsvergelijking en het milieurecht en vervulde er ook meerdere
bestuursfuncties. Hij was onder meer voorzitter van de Vakgroep burgerlijk recht
en van het Centrum voor milieurecht en lid van de raad van de bestuur van de
UGent en vier jaar decaan. Sinds 2009 is hij emeritus gewoon hoogleraar.

Hij publiceerde over meerdere aspecten verbintenissenrecht, milieurecht en
rechtsvergelijking. Hij was een van de eersten in België om onderzoek te
verrichten over het milieurecht en het milieuaansprakelijkheidsrecht. Meer
recent ligt de nadruk in zijn wetenschappelijk werk op het buitencontractuele
aansprakelijkheidsrecht, in het bijzonder de causaliteitsproblematiek en op
schadevergoeding buiten het aansprakelijkheidsrecht.

Hij adviseerde bij de voorbereiding van wetgeving op het gebied van
overheidsaansprakelijkheid en milieurecht en was lid van EU en UNEP
expertengroepen voor milieurecht.

Hij was voorzitter van de Vlaamse Raad voor het Leefmilieu, oprichter en
voorzitter van de Belgische Vereniging voor Milieurecht, initiatiefnemer en
voorzitter van de Interuniversitaire Commissie tot Herziening van het
Milieurecht in het Vlaamse Gewest, voorzitter van de Working Party on Liability
and Insurance for Pollution, Products and New Technologies van de Association
Internationale du Droit des Assurances. Hij is lid en sinds 2009 voorzitter van
de Vereniging voor de Vergelijkende studie van het Recht in België en Nederland
en sinds 2010 voorzitter van de jury van de F. Collin-prijs voor recht. Hij is
lid van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten van België
en sinds 2013 Bestuurder van de Klasse van Menswetenschappen.

Hij behaalde de Frank Boas Scholarship in International Legal Studies (1967), de
Prijs van de Stichting Leefmilieu (1978), was laureaat van de
Reisbeurzenwedstrijd (1982) en de internationale Elisabeth Haub-Prijs voor
Milieurecht (1992) en is honorary professor aan de Bond University Law School
(Qld, Aus).

Hij maakt sinds 1981 deel uit van de redactie van het Tijdschrift voor
Privaatrecht.

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Vincent Sagaert

Vincent Sagaert studeerde Rechten aan de Campus Kortrijk en de KU Leuven. Als
Aspirant van het FWO-Vlaanderen maakte hij een proefschrift, onder promotorschap
van Prof. dr. Eric Dirix (Insolventierecht, KU Leuven), met als titel “Zakelijke
subrogatie” (Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2003, 792 p.).



Sinds 1 oktober 2004 is hij voltijds benoemd aan de KU Leuven en de Kulak, waar
hij instaat voor Verbintenissenrecht en Goederenrecht. Hij doceert tevens
Goederenrecht (bachelor en master) en notarieel vastgoedrecht aan de KU Leuven,
waar hij Directeur is van het Instituut voor Goederenrecht. Sinds 2009 is hij
Vice-Decaan aan de Rechtsfaculteit. Sinds 1 oktober 2002 vervult hij ook een
deeltijdse leeropdracht aan de Universiteit Antwerpen.

Vincent Sagaert is co-Directeur van het Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht,
redactielid van het Rechtskundig Weekblad, van de Bibliotheek Burgerlijk recht,
van het Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgerlijk Recht, van het Tijdschrift voor
Vrederechters, van het Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht en van de
European Property Law Journal. Hij is co-editor van de International
Encyclopedia of Property and Trust law. Sinds 2013 is hij lid van de
expertencommissie van de Fonds Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique.

In het kader van zijn doctoraatsonderzoek was hij gastonderzoeker aan de
Universiteit van Oxford, College Lady Margareth Hall. Hij was herhaalde malen
gastprofessor aan de Université du Burundi (2003-2004-2005-2009), waarmee hij
ook een universitair onderzoeksproject coördineert. In 2006 was hij
gastprofessor aan de Universiteit van Utrecht en sinds 2010 is hij Fellow van de
South African Research Chair for Property Law (University of Stellenbosch).

Met diverse bijdragen won hij de A.P.R.-prijs (1997-98), tweemaal de
T.P.R.-prijs (2000 en 2001) en de Ius commune Prize (2001). Hij was houder van
de TPR-Wisselleerstoel in 2006.

Sinds 2003 is hij ook als advocaat werkzaam aan de balie van Brussel. Hij maakt
deel uit van het advocatenkantoor Eubelius, waar hij zich toelegt op het
vastgoedrecht. Hij was openingsredenaar van het gerechtelijk jaar aan de Balie
van Brussel (2008) en aan de Balie van Ieper (2010).

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Yves-Henri Leleu

Yves-Henri Leleu is gewoon hoogleraar aan de Université de Liège en deeltijds
hoogleraar aan de Université Libre de Bruxelles, met als onderwijsopdracht het
personen- en familierecht, het relatievermogensrecht, en de juridische
terminologie in het Nederlands.



Hij is gasthoogleraar geweest aan de universiteiten van Nijmegen
(T.P.R.-leerstoel) en van Paris Panthéon-Assas. Hij is directeur van het
Interuniversitair centrum voor rechtsvergelijking, en lid van het redactiecomité
van verschillende wetenschappelijke Belgische en buitenlandse tijdschriften. Hij
is lid van het Comité voor studie en wetgeving van de Federatie van het
Belgische notariaat, en van de Federale controlecomissie euthanasie.

Van zijn hand verschenen twee handboeken (Droit des personnes et des familles,
Larcier, 2005, 2010; Droit patrimonial des couples, Larcier, 2014),
verschillende boeken en publicaties in zijn onderzoeksdomeinen, en een
fotografische album (Photogénies, Cefal, 2005).

Hij is actief in de rechtspraktijk sinds 1996 als consultant, sinds 2006 als
advocaat, thans aan de Balie van Liège.

Hij is geboren te Libramont op 2 augustus 1967, gehuwd en vader van een dochter.

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Annelies Wylleman

Annelies Wylleman studeerde rechten (1986), criminologie (1986) en notariaat
(1993) aan de Universiteit te Gent. Zij promoveerde in 1998 tot doctor in de
rechten aan zelfde universiteit met een proefschrift over “Onvolwaardige
wilsvorming en onbekwaamheid in het materieel en het formeel privaatrecht”. Dit
proefschrift werd bekroond met de Fernand-Collin-prijs (2000) en met de
Driejaarlijkse Prijs van het Antwerps Notariaat (2001).



Sinds 1999 tot vandaag doceert ze het vak Notarieel Burgerlijk Recht in de
Master in het Notariaat te Gent. Sinds 1999 tot 2006 doceerde ze aan de
Rechtsfaculteit te Gent tevens het vak ‘Inleiding tot het privaat recht’,
vervolgens van 2006 tot 2011 de ‘Grondige Studie Vastgoedrecht’ en sinds 2011
tot heden het vak ‘Zakenrecht en zakelijke zekerheidsrechten’. Sinds 2003 is ze
voorzitter van de Opleidingscommissie van de Master in het Notariaat.

Ze is lid van de vereniging voor de Vergelijkende Studie van het Recht in België
en Nederland, lid van de redactie van het Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht, van de
Algemene Praktische Rechtsverzameling en van de Larcier Wetboeken. Ze is
corresponderend lid van het Comité voor Studie en Wetgeving van de Koninklijke
Federatie van het Belgisch Notariaat.

Haar wetenschappelijke interesse gaat vooral uit naar de sanctieregelingen in
het privaatrecht, het vraagstuk van de vertegenwoordiging, vermogensrechtelijke
regelingen in hersamengestelde gezinnen, het appartementsrecht en het
vruchtgebruik.

Annelies Wylleman combineerde steeds haar wetenschappelijke activiteit met de
juridische praktijk: ze was advocaat aan de balie te Gent (1986-1993) en is
sinds 1999 notaris te Sleidinge.

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The Cour de Cassation on the crossroads between public and private interests: a
plea for confirmation of the court’s case law

The Cour de Cassation, being the Belgian supreme court, has two functions. On
the one hand, it supervises and fuels the development of the law by the courts
and ensures consistent application of the law; on the other hand it secures
legal protection. Especially as regards the first-named function, the Court has
a unique role in the Belgian legal system. The Cour de Cassation is also unique
in that, in contrast to the other courts, it is guided by the public interest in
its application of the law. In order to fulfill its task, the Court is dependent
on the private initiative taken by the parties involved in the dispute to bring
an appeal before it. Whereas the divergence between the public and the private
interests may have caused fewer problems in earlier times, when fewer appeals
were lodged with the Court, currently it is generally accepted that the Court is
increasingly less able to fulfill its public interest mission. The increase in
its workload and in the length of time for processing cases highlight a need for
reform.

To that effect, I would propose the adoption of a new case selection mechanism,
as a first step towards a major reform of the Cour. Article 1105bis of the
Belgian Judicial Code allows the Court to differentiate as regards the human
resources allocated to cases, depending on the potential they have for
fulfilling the Court’s public interest mission. This would enhance the ability
which the Court already has to handle straightforward cases with three, rather
than the standard five, judges. Following the example provided by the Court’s
French and Dutch counterparts, I would also advocate the introduction of a
system which allows the Court to respond to statements of appeal with a standard
ground of judgment, where such statements are incapable of causing the appealed
decision to be reviewed and do not involve an important point of law. This
system could reduce the judges’ workload and highlight the importance of the
Court’s public interest mission, without intruding in any significant way on
deep-seated considerations of legal protection and access to justice. Together
with the introduction of a preliminary jurisdiction to rule on new and important
questions of law raised before lower courts, and a renewed interest in the
existing cassation procedure in the general interest of the law, the Court’s
role in protecting the public interest could be enhanced, without detracting its
duty to ensure legal protection in individual cases.

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The utility requirement for servitudes. One of a kind?

Servitudes must benefit the dominant estate. If there is no benefit, there can
be no servitude. This rule applies under Belgian law, but also under French,
German and Dutch law. In other words, all these legal systems make the existence
of servitudes subject to a utitlity requirement. This, however, is not a purely
European phenomenon, since the US law of easements lays down a similar
requirement, to wit the “touch and concern” requirement. That requirement does
not only display interesting similarities with the European utility requirement
in terms of its content and functional application, but has also evolved along
surprisingly similar lines. It is these similarities, as well as the
differences, between these two requirements that this paper examines in some
depth.

Prior to this, however, the author pauses to examine the exact content and
meaning of both these requirements. What exactly amounts to a benefit for the
dominant estate? And at what point does a covenant “touch and concern” an
estate? As regards the benefit requirement, the author considers not only the
Belgian law, but also French, German and Dutch law. From this analysis, it
emerges that the benefit requirement is interpreted sufficiently flexibly, and
that it has even been – at least formally– abolished in the Netherlands.

The author then proceeds to consider extensively the similarities between the
utility requirement and the “touch and concern” requirement, examining
successively (a) the important part played by both requirements where the
relevant covenants are enhanced by means of a droit de suite; (b) their role in
protecting the potential acquirers of the estate in question, the actual
acquirers of such an estate and society in general, (c) the interaction with the
intention requirement displayed by both requirements, and (d) the similarity
with which the two requirements have evolved over the years. As regards (d),
both the benefit and the “touch and concern” requirements have clearly evolved
towards a more flexible interpretation, a phenomenon which the author
illustrates by reference to the non-competition clause.

In addition to the similarities, there are also a number of differences between
the utility requirement and the “touch and concern” requirement. In the first
instance, the requirements in question do not relate to exactly the same types
of right, since European servitudes are not identical to American real
covenants. Other differences relate to (a) one of the requirements being
one-dimensional as to its contents, the other two-dimensional; (b) the precise
consequences of the requirements being no longer fulfilled, and (c) the point at
which the fulfilment of the requirements is to be assessed.

Having applied both requirements to a number of “problematic” obligations, i.e.
the non-competition clause, the developer transfer fee covenant and the covenant
not to sue, the author ends this contribution by reflecting on the impact which
the abolition of the requirements in question would have on the law of property,
and more particularly on the numerus clausus principle. His conclusion is that
such abolition would result in the erosion of the numerus clausus principle.

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Some pithy thoughts on credit default swaps

Apart from the economic consequences of the 2008 credit crisis, the prevailing
viewpoints regarding the way in which some financial instruments (that might
have contributed to the crisis) were traded in unregulated markets have come to
realise that greater control, regulation and transparency in trading instruments
such as credit default swaps may benefit the market. Some of these elements are
referred to in this article, but this is not its main focus, seeking as it does
to analyse the nature of credit default swaps against existing and proven legal
constructs, as well as their rules and requirements.

A credit default swap, in its simplest form, can be explained as follows. A is
the holder of a government bond to the value of €10,000 issued by the Republic
of Transylvania and maturing in five years’ time. Until the bond matures, A has
to hope and pray that Transylvania will be able to repay the main debt and the
relevant interest. As the creditor, A would like to secure his debt and minimise
his risks. A credit default swap allows the creditor to do just that – the
latter approaches a security provider (normally a financial institution) to
provide security against the possible default on the debtor’s part when the debt
matures. If the debtor defaults, the risk against which the creditor took out
the security has materialised and he is entitled to payment.

The credit default swap thus clearly has similarities with insurance, as well as
with aleatory agreements (contracts of chance such as gambling and wagering).
This particular aspect is also examined in the light of so-called “contracts of
difference”, and even though credit default swaps and other similar financial
instruments are now treated as lawful as a result of legislative change, the
author finds substantive similarities between contracts of chance, insurance and
credit default swaps.

Credit default swaps can also be bought where there is no connection between the
purchaser of the swap and the obligation secured by the swap. The credit default
swap is thus totally independent of the relevant agreement. This is similar to
the position as regards guarantees and standby letters of credit, both being
legal constructs meeting the same (or similar) economic objective as a credit
default swap.

The use of personal security is characteristic of numerous international
transactions. The issuing of a guarantee, standby letter of credit, indemnity,
and performance bond are all examples of personal security used to secure
performance of a particular transaction – indeed, the same purpose as met by a
credit default swap in its classic format.

As regards naked credit default swaps, the object here is not the creation of
security, but merely speculation. They have become lawful following changes in
legislation, and it is only in such cases that the use of personal security
would not have sufficed. When faced with a classic credit default swap, on the
other hand, one is for all practical purposes dealing with personal security.
The author also draws a comparison between suretyship and a credit default swap,
and establishes that even the classic terms of a suretyship agreement, i.e. the
beneficium excussionis and the beneficium cedendarum actionum, can in some or
other form be found in the credit default swap – the only difference being that
the surety is not paid a single penny for undertaking the risk.

The different perspective used in this contribution has highlighted that the
purpose for which the credit default swap was initially created could easily
have been met using the existing legal notions covering the provision of credit
security – personal security in particular would have provided legal certainty.
The new legal notion that has been created and is primarily used for the purpose
of speculation (credit default swap), is nothing but an aleatory agreement, and
the fact that it is now accepted as a valid agreement is merely an attempt by
the authorities to bring some order to this notion and is not necessarily
consistent with public policy, which has been a shifting concept down the years.

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Qualifying catastrophe bonds: one whole, three parts

Companies and financial institutions are constantly searching for alternatives
to traditional (re)insurance in order to mitigate risks that are very hard or
even impossible to insure, such as extreme weather, natural disasters or
terrorism. One of those alternatives is the transfer of this risk to capital
markets through the creation of securities linked to those risks, such as CAT
bonds (CATs).

These CATs are modelled on asset-backed securities – here, risks are pooled in a
special purpose vehicle (SPV) by the party who wishes to cover the risk (the
sponsor). This SPV finances itself through the issuing of bonds. Normally, an
interest rate is agreed upon, and at maturity, investors may redeem their
investment. Where, however, a certain event (i.e. the ‘trigger’) occurs,
investors will be repaid either not at all or only in part, and the SPV will be
used to finance the consequences of the disaster. Such triggers can be linked to
the magnitude of the actual loss of the sponsor (indemnity triggers) or to an
index related to the loss incurred by the sponsor (index triggers). There are
also hybrid forms whereby multiple triggers are combined in one bond (hybrid
triggers). Because the bonds are sold, the non-redeemable funds are immediately
available to the sponsor.

However, the question arises as to the extent to which those CATs are financial
products or insurance transactions. This question is highly relevant – for
various reasons the party in question may, or may not, want his/her transaction
to be qualified as one of either of these products. However, before formulating
any rules on this, analyse the nature of CAT-transactions as a financial
product, or insurance product, should be analysed.

Up to this point, this debate has been mainly conducted on the basis of a
holistic approach, characterized by a transparent SPV, rather than by regarding
the SPV as a separate entity – viewing the transaction as a whole. Under such an
approach, the main characteristics that are considered to distinguish insurance
products from financial products (such as the insurable interest principle, the
indemnity principle, the mutualisation of risks, the valuation of the instrument
and the risk allocation) are used as criteria. In most cases, such an analysis
seems to exclude qualification as an insurance product. However, in most cases
there are several counter-arguments possible, and the arguments in favour are,
to say the least, far from solid. In some cases the arguments in favour give
themselves rise to other problems.

A basic CAT is structured in a triangular relationship, in which the sponsor and
the investors have no direct obligations towards each other because of the SPV
that ‘separates’ them. The three parties are the person transferring the risk
(sponsor), the SPV (issuer) and the investors. By controlling the shares in the
SPV through a trust, they are protected in the event of the sponsor’s
insolvency, which guarantees a strict separation between the sponsor and issuer.
For this reason it is impossible to have a transparent insight into the SPV, and
to regard the issuance of CAT-bonds as a single transaction. If, however, there
were a desire to do so by regulation, the SPV articles would need to be taken
strongly into consideration in so doing.

In contrast to this holistic analysis, an analysis of the triangular
relationship does yield a clear result. In the sponsor/SPV relationship, we have
an insurance transaction in the legal, but not in the financial/functional,
sense. However, if instead of an SPV one were to use an MPV, this would
constitute an insurance transaction in the financial sense. Under the
SPV/investors relationship, the object of the agreement would seem to be a
financial operation – qualification as a financial instrument appears to be
recommended here. Between the sponsor and the investors, there is – from a legal
point of view – no contact whatsoever.

This, however, is a very general answer to a question that is highly ad-hoc,
given that most CATs are designed on an ad hoc basis as a function of the
sponsor’s and the investors’ requirements. This analysis must, therefore be used
with care.

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Compensation for loss resulting from disasters – the position in Belgium and in
the Netherlands

1. The central question underlying this contribution is the manner in which
compensation for loss resulting from disasters is regulated in Belgium and in
The Netherlands. A distinction is drawn between so-called technological
disasters, i.e. those marked by human involvement, on the one hand, and natural
disasters on the other hand. From a theoretical perspective, the author asks the
question as to how any loss resulting from disasters should be compensated in an
ideal world. In so doing, he considers not only what should be the optimal level
of compensation awarded to victims, but also the question as to how the various
compensation mechanisms could provide potential victims with the best possible
incentives for preventing such loss. As far as technological disasters are
concerned, the author gives pride of place to solutions provided under the law
of torts, for the simple reason that such disasters will frequently produce a
perpetrator who can also be held liable. As for natural disasters, on the other
hand, appropriate solutions should clearly be sought outside the law of torts,
precisely because the chances of holding the only possible perpetrator, i.e. the
public authorities, liable will frequently be much thinner.

2. As regards technological disasters, the author highlights three aspects which
will be crucial in order to guarantee optimal levels of compensation and
prevention. Firstly, technological disasters constitute a type of accident for
which strict liability appears to be the most appropriate legal remedy. Both for
the purpose of guaranteeing compensation for the victims and in order to create
incentives for prevention, such strict liability should be combined with a
system that guarantees solvency in such a way that the victim will also be able
to claim from the perpetrator’s liability insurer. The problem here is that
where the claim is brought using the ordinary civil proceedings, it can
frequently take a very long time – years in some cases – before the tortfeasor
can be definitively found to be liable for compensation. This mere circumstance
can cause the loss to increase. This is why a strong case can be made,
particularly when it comes to disasters, for introducing accelerated proceedings
which will attend to the most urgent needs in order to prevent increasing the
loss incurred.

3. As for natural disasters, a solution should be sought which is centred around
the victim, more particularly through the mechanism of the so-called first-party
disaster insurance – such as the insurance which house owners take out against
the risk of flooding. Although this type of insurance presents many advantages,
being capable of yielding both compensation and incentives for prevention, it
nevertheless presents some problems. On the demand side, the problem is that
demand for insurance is frequently too low, so that where serious disasters
occur, it transpires that only a restricted number of victims had actually taken
out insurance. One possible solution could be the introduction of compulsory
insurance. On the supply side, the problem is that the losses resulting from
disasters can be quite sizeable. This can result in disasters causing losses
which are no longer insurable on the ordinary commercial insurance market, and
cannot be covered by re-insurance either. This would appear to make out a case
for intervention by the public thorities, the latter presenting themselves as
the re-insurer of last resort. This type of public intervention is strongly to
be preferred to ex-post compensation, under which certain victims are awarded
compensation from public funds. Such an approach is inadequate in terms of
generating incentives for prevention and serves to restrict demand for
insurance. Against this theoretical background, the author considers, first,
compensation of loss caused by technological disasters in Belgium and The
Netherlands, and, subsequently, compensation of loss caused by natural disasters
in Belgium and in the Netherlands.

4. In relation to technological disasters, the author notes that, in Belgium,
the required strict liability mechanisms are available in principle. However,
the problem here is that they frequently present an ad hoc character, and that
they cannot in truth be described as a systematically considered introduction of
a strict liability régime. One positive aspect of the Belgian system, however,
is that in many cases it imposes an obligation to take out solvency cover –
which invariably involves compulsory liability insurance. In addition, the
Belgian Law of 13/11/2011 has created a specific set of rules aimed at providing
compensation for the victims of technological accidents. Although some details
of this law are open to criticism, it presents the all-important characteristics
of having in essence created a mechanism which enables compensation to be
awarded rapidly on the basis of the law of torts.

5. The law of The Netherlands also provides a number of strict liability
systems. However, the “Enschede” and “Volendam” cases show that, where the
disasters assume this kind of dimension, it is not so much the liable party who
caused the loss who is required to pay the lion’s share of the compensation, but
that the largest part of the damages awarded to the victims will be paid from
public funds. Even the legislation which was specifically created in order to
deal with disasters occurring in The Netherlands, to wit the Law on
accommodating Losses resulting from Disasters and Serious Accidents (WTS), has
proved unequal to the challenge of generating adequate levels of compensation
for major disasters such as Enschede and Volendam. What these cases show in
particular is that, in the absence of a system of compulsory insurance, only a
very low amount of money was available for compensation from the contracted
insurance. It was precisely for this reason that the public authorities provided
the lion’s share of the compensation awarded to the victims. In fact, this
situation, which shields the private sector from the cost and risk created by
its activity, is regarded as undesirable in the Netherlands also, as can be seen
from the reports emanating from various committees. Although a number of
interesting options have been ventilated by way of solutions, this has yet to
result in actual changes in the relevant law.

6. Until 2003, compensation of the loss caused by natural disasters in Belgium
was characterised by a patchwork of rules, in which the Disaster Fund
(Rampenfonds) played the leading part. In 2003, Belgium introduced compulsory
cover for damage caused by flooding which was combined with fire insurance for
low-level risks. However, this cover was only intended to apply to properties
located in specifically designated flooding areas – and no such designation ever
took place. Instead, a new Law of 17/9/2005 was adopted under which, following
the French example, additional cover for loss from disasters was made available
on (voluntary) fire insurance. This means that Belgium has to a large extent
conformed to the system which appears to be the most appropriate from a
theoretical viewpoint also, which is to create a system of first party disaster
insurance. Thus it is that the part played by the public authorities, via the
Disaster Fund, has become extremely marginal.

7. In the Netherlands, no insurance against earthquakes and flooding was, until
recently, possible as a result of two binding decisions made by the insurers,
and which had come into being in the 1950s. Under this arrangement, the insurers
had agreed no longer to cover flooding or earthquakes. Following the floods
which occurred in 1992 and 1993, these agreements between the insurers were
withdrawn, under pressure from the politicians and from the competition
authorities. Since then, a lengthy process of negotiation has taken place
between the insurers and the public authorities in the Netherlands, with a view
to putting into place a structured set or rules. In so doing, the parties
involved have considered both the Belgian and French systems. In spite of the
various reports, studies and discussions on the subject, no general flooding
insurance has as yet been made available in the Netherlands. Accordingly,
whenever the Netherlands suffer flooding, either the WTS will be held to be
applicable, or, as is often the case with technological disasters, the public
authorities may make available compensation on an ad hoc basis.

8. When comparing the relevant systems in both countries, one notices
particularly that, to a certain extent, the Belgian legislation comes closer to
the theoretical model than is the case with the Dutch model. Obviously this does
not mean that the Belgian lawmakers have systematically sought to achieve a
properly structured set of rules on the subject. As far as technological
disasters are concerned, the Belgian model, although obviously capable of
improvement at all times, presents the advantage of (a) making available a large
number of strict liability systems, even though the latter have frequently been
introduced on an ad hoc basis, and (b) being combined with compulsory solvency
guarantees. The 2011 Law has also added an interesting novel element to the
Belgian compensation model by creating a specific accelerated procedure.
Obviously it remains to be seen whether this legislation is also capable of
living up to its promise in practical terms.

9. In the Netherlands, the victims of technological disasters are – at the risk
of exaggeration – dependent on their finding a solvent perpetrator and, in the
absence thereof, on any ad hoc funds made available by the public authorities.
The Enschede and Volendam disasters have demonstrated that the Dutch model
presents the problem that those causing the loss are only exposed to tort
liability to a very limited extent, and that the public authorities (and
therefore the taxpayer) pay the lion’s share of the bill. In the light of the
notion, inspired by legal economics, that those causing loss should be exposed
to the social costs caused by their activity, this is not a desirable outcome.

10. As regards the compensation payable for loss caused by natural disasters,
the Belgian model also comes closer to the theoretical model than does its Dutch
counterpart. In Belgium, the relevant legislation has conformed to the
theoretical model by reducing the call on public intervention by phasing out the
role of the Disaster Fund and introducing compulsory disaster cover as an
addition to the fire insurance policy. It is true that in the Netherlands there
is legislation available in the shape of the WTS; however, the latter is seldom
applied, which is related to the circumstance that losses which are insurable
under normal circumstances are not eligible for compensation under the WTS. The
Netherlands still have no proper system of flooding insurance. This is why the
victims of major natural disasters continue to be dependent on the (political)
willingness on the part of the public authorities to contribute from public
funds. Although there are certain aspects of the Belgian system which are open
to criticism, the Belgian model is, all in all, that which comes closest to the
theoretical model as regards compensation for both technological and natural
disasters.

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The “European company law market”- reassessing the company law harmonisation
programme

This contribution examines the future direction which the European harmonisation
programme should take in the field of company law. The reason for this is that
this programme is due for reassessment in the light of recent case law of the
Court of Justice, which is giving the member states less and less scope for
imposing their company law on foreign companies. Taking into account the
competitive dynamics to which this case law is giving rise (the “European
company law market”), the author essentially formulates two proposals.

Firstly, he advocates the adoption of the Fourteenth Company Law Directive,
under which the registered office is the exclusive basis for determining which
company law regime would apply, and which provides companies with the
opportunity to convert to a type of company as regulated by another member
state, without loss of legal personality. When issuing this directive, it is
essential that the EU lawmakers should have adequate regard for the legal
position of the various interested parties who could be affected by such a
conversion. This could involve providing dissenting minority shareholders with a
right to leave the company, and introducing a right to require security on the
part of the creditors.

The second proposal is to abandon the Centre of Main Interest (COMI) principle
in the European Insolvency Regulation. Combined with the Fourteenth Company Law
Directive, as advocated in this paper, this would ensure that the applicable
company law (lex societatis) and the applicable insolvency law (lex concursus)
be at all times that of one and the same member state, i.e. that in which the
company has its registered office.

These two proposals should remedy various shortcomings in the current system,
and create the conditions in which the member states could compete effectively
with each other in the field of company law. Thus a way could be found of
overcoming the absence of political consensus between the EU member states in
relation to the company law harmonisation programme, without harming the legal
position of the various company stakeholders.

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The future of private law

Private law is not lacking any challenges. The accelerating pace of
Europeanisation and globalisation, advances in technology, and a growing
awareness that the law should increasingly set its sights on the long term, all
raise the question as to what will be the face of the private law of the future.
This paper, being the printed version of an address given on the occasion of the
author’s acceptance of the 2014 TPR Visiting Chair, attempts to anticipate what
the future might bring in this regard. It examines the way in which the part
played by the various actors involved in creating the law (legislators, judges,
legal scholars and private actors) could change as a result of the
internationalisation process. The author also asks the question as to whether
the position occupied by the private law itself is being influenced by this
internationalisation process and will cause other mechanisms will take over from
the law as a regulatory force.

When it comes to the changing role played by the legal actors, the part played
by legislators will probably be subject to even greater change as a result of
internationalisation. Affected as they have been by the ever-decreasing
enthusiasm for the Europeanisation process, EU lawmakers will probably have less
and less scope for issuing internal market legislation, whereas at the national
level the legislators’ role will be usurped to an even greater extent by the
courts. The foregoing does not diminish the case for a fundamental debate on
what represents the best possible level of regulation. The question as to “who
does what” can only become a more pressing one during the years to come.

The role played by the private law as a regulatory instrument is also bound to
change in years to come. The growing gap between the demands of globally-trading
business people and the ability – or perhaps inability – on the part of
politicians to lay down satisfactory legal rules, has driven traders to resort
to alternative means of establishing trust. As a result, there are clear
indications that the internationalisation of trade drives traders no longer to
place a posteriori reliance on the law should matters go wrong, but are
attempting ex ante to avoid the necessity of going to law in the first place.
This they do through a process of “self-enforcement” and by acting on the basis
of the future partner’s reputation, which has become increasingly available from
online sources of information. All this justifies the conclusion that the role
of the law in regulating private relations is bound to decrease.

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All the circumstances of the case A comparative study of the circumstances that
influence the effect of the (Dutch) good faith and fair dealing and the
(Belgian) objective notion of bona fides

The (Dutch) rule of good faith and fair dealing (redelijkheid en billijkheid)
and the (Belgian) objective notion of bona fides are “open” or “vague”
standards. There are certain differences between these two notions – yet they
largely succeed in achieving their objective. They are capable of supplementing,
restricting and interpreting legal transactions. The effect of both these
notions depends on the concrete circumstances of the case. The influence exerted
by these circumstances enables a just solution to be achieved in concrete
situations where the strict application of the generally applicable law would
fail to produce satisfactory results. However, the influence of these
circumstances also presents a disadvantage, in that it causes legal uncertainty.

Legal certainty can be enhanced by achieving clarity as to the circumstances
that influence the effect of the open standards. As a result, an adequate
comparison between these open standards requires more than merely comparing
their possible legal implications –they require a comparison between the
circumstances that influence these open notions. This paper is focused on the
circumstances affecting the effects of good faith and fair dealing. The author
examines whether these circumstances are also a factor in the relevant Belgian
statutes. He also examines the extent to which this factor can be compared to
the effect produced by the circumstances of the case under Dutch law.

The author shows that every factor that influences the effects of the good faith
and fair dealing also plays a part in at least one of the effects of the Belgian
bona fides rule or any other legal area in the Netherlands which is governed by
the rule of reason and fair dealing. The Belgian statures, legal literature and
case law provide examples of the influence exerted by every factor that informs
the effects of good faith and fair dealing.

The circumstances of the case have a similar part to play in both legal systems.
These circumstances can be approached in various ways. Accordingly, there are
cases in which the law, legal literature and case law of the Netherlands and
Belgium adopt different approaches. However, when we take a closer look at these
factors we can see that in many cases their influence is more or less the same.
In both legal systems the circumstances of the case tend to produce similar or
comparable effects. This should not give rise to any surprise – both the
Netherlands and Belgium are two developed Western nations united by a common
legal culture, and there are many points of convergence between the two
countries Thus it is reasonable to assume that the legal systems in both
countries will be largely in agreement on the notions of justice and fairness.
The divergences between the Dutch and Belgian systems of law have – even in this
area of “open standards” – increased with the introduction of the new
Netherlands Civil Code in 1992. However, this paper purports to show that there
exists a great deal of consensus as regards the circumstances that influence
these standards.

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The fate of the post-contractual obligations after termination for
non-performance

Post-contractual obligations are contractual obligations which become or remain
effective after the end of the economic operation of the contract. The
principles of termination seem to imply that these post-contractual obligations
disappear after termination of the contract from which they originate. Their
disappearance, however, would mostly result in a suboptimal situation. In this
contribution, we have searched for a foundation for the survival of
post-contractual obligations after termination.

Firstly, the survival (as well as the disappearance) of post-contractual
obligations can result from a statutory provision.

If the fate of the post-contractual obligation after termination is not dealt
with in statutory law, it is possible to base its survival on the material
partial termination (and not on the temporal partial termination). An analysis
of the material scope of termination shows that it only affects the obligation
which has been poorly performed, the obligation to provide the counterpart for
the obligation which has been poorly performed and all other obligations which,
as a result, lose their economic usefulness. The application of this criterion
of economic usefulness requires to first determine whether the parties have
expressed their view on the economic usefulness of an obligation after
termination (subjective application). If not, one should look at what a normal
and reasonable party would consider to be economically useful (objective
application). The objective application causes the disappearance of all
obligations which contribute to the economic operation of the contract, as well
as the disappearance of all obligations which lose their economic usefulness
because of restitution caused by termination.

Thus, post-contractual obligations can survive after termination if they remain
economically useful after termination and restitution caused by termination. The
parties can express their view on that matter, for example by inserting express
clauses about the fate of their post-contractual obligations after termination,
by inserting (in)divisibility clauses, by inserting clauses about partial
termination, … If the actual view of the parties cannot be determined, one
should assume that postcontractual obligations remain economically useful after
termination, since, by definition, they do not contribute to the economic
operation of the contract. Some post-contractual obligations, however, lose
their economic usefulness because of restitution caused by termination. This is
the case for obligations which aim at the return or the destruction of goods
which already return to the other party by way of restitution caused by
termination. In principle, such post-contractual obligations do not survive
after termination. By contrast, post-contractual obligations which aim at the
return of goods which do not return to the other party by way of restitution
caused by termination, as well as post-contractual obligations which have
nothing to do with the return of goods whatsoever, remain economically useful
and should survive.

Belgian and French law thus allow for a material partial termination. The
expression is, however, deceptive, since it seems to imply that material partial
termination is an exception to the normal application of termination. In
reality, the survival of post-contractual obligations is precisely due to the
normal material scope of termination.

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Retention of title and immobilisation by incorporation according to the new Law
on Pledges: What new under the sun?

In this paper, the authors conduct a thorough examination of the changes which
the new Law on Pledges will, as from its entry into effect, bring about in the
rules on retention of title.

The new Law provides a general set of rules in this field by transferring the
provision governing retention of title from the Law on Bankruptcy to the Civil
Code. Henceforth the security provided can be relied upon in all cases of
concurrence. In addition, the new Law expressly stipulates that retention of
title can be exercised regardless of the nature of the agreement, which means
that also be included in building contracts. In functional terms, the new Law
has equated the exercising of retention of title with that of a pledge. One
exception to this is that retention of title has not yet been made compulsorily
subject to disclosure.

This general examination of the law on retention of title is followed by a
comparative analysis of the legal relationship between retention of title and
immobilisation by incorporation. The first issue dealt with is the implications
of immobilisation for retention of title. The new Law on Pledges stipulates
that, in such cases, retention of title continues to apply, but fails to clarify
how this continued applicability is to be interpreted. The authors examine the
position of the retention of title holder, and reach the conclusion that the
most desirable interpretation is that actual reliance on retention of title is
allowed where possible. Under this interpretation, Belgian law provides the
party that stipulated the retention of title with greater protection than does
the law of the Netherlands. This interpretation is also close to the position
under French law, a minor difference being that in France, the risk inherent in
immobilisation is smaller because the criteria for immobilisation are stricter.
The second issue concerns the implications of a retention of title for the
immobilisation of an item. Having drawn attention to the position of the South
African courts, under which retention of title can prevent the immobilisation of
an item, the author points out that this is not possible in either Belgium, the
Netherlands or France, in spite of the fact that, in recent years, broader and
more subjective criteria for immobilisation have been applied in Belgium and the
Netherlands. This confirms that the provision in the Law on Pledges under which
retention of title continues to apply after the incorporation of the pledged
object is a rational one. What is important here is that there should be
disclosure of the ownership of that object. Since the entry into effect of the
new Law on Pledges, retention of title remains free from a general duty to
disclose – there is, however, an opportunity to have the retention of title
registered in the new Register of Pledges. This opportunity is keenly
recommended if the adverse effects of incorporation are to be avoided.

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The diversity of special liability régimes and the equality principle

The law of torts and human rights have traditionally belonged to two different
spheres of the law, the former being traditionally part of the private law and
the latter belonging to the public law. In view of the deep divide between the
public and the private law which prevailed in the past, these two legal areas
interacted not at all or very seldom with each other. However, this has changed.
Over the past few decades, it has become increasingly clear that the decisions
of the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights have
influenced the private law, and therefore also the law of torts. It is in this
context, that this contribution examines how the equality principle as enshrined
in Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution, Article 14 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 1 of the twelfth protocol to the ECHR affects
the distinctness of special liability regimes. The author also examines the
influence produced by the right of access to justice as enshrined in article 6
ECHR, and analyses the case law of the French Conseil Constitutionnel with
regard to Article 4 of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme.

The basic assumption of this article is that liability regimes can currently be
assessed by the principle of equality as to their distinctness and their
relationship with the general law of civil liability. Indeed, where two
different liability regimes apply to similar situations, that amounts to a
potential infringement of the equality principle. It might be interesting in
this context to consider a situation whereby someone can only receive partial
compensation for his loss, whereas another person can receive full compensation
in a similar situation because two different liability regimes were applied to
their situations. Those who believe that they have suffered discrimination for
this reason could consider invoking the equality principle. By so doing, they
are in a position to challenge the existence of and the boundaries between the
different liability regimes. The author accordingly examines the criteria that
apply in this context.

In the first section, the contribution examines the case law of the French
Conseil Constitutionnel according to which Article 4 of the Déclaration des
droits de l’homme is violated where the possibility to receive compensation for
a loss, whether general or specific, is excluded.

The second section examines the case law of the Constitutional Court in which it
applies the principle of equality to special liability regimes. In so doing, the
author discusses the various aspects of the equality test: comparability of the
situations in question, legitimate purpose and the proportionality test. As
regards the comparability aspect, it is argued that the Constitutional Court
takes into account the similarity of the risks under these situations. To assess
whether a different treatment seeks to serve a legitimate aim, the
Constitutional Court establishes whether there is a special risk involved. In
the majority of cases, the Court finds that there is a special risk that the
lawmaker could legitimately try to address by applying a special liability
regime. Ultimately, the Constitutional Court will check whether the unequal
treatment is proportionate to the legitimate purpose pursued. The author argues
that there are four criteria that are decisive when applying the proportionality
test. These are: the impossibility of receiving compensation for loss, whether
general or specific; the presence of a serious or intentional fault, the
opportunity to choose freely the use of a specific statute; and the
socio-economic position of the parties involved. Apart from these criteria, the
article investigates whether a special liability regime can be validated by
applying the lex specialis derogat lex generalis rule at a constitutional level.

The third and last section examines the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights. Here, the article examines not only the case law relating to the
principle of equality, but also that on the right of access to justice. In this
section, the author demonstrates that this right can be used in a way that is
very similar to the approach taken by the case law of the French Conseil
Constitutionnel, but that the scope of Article 6 ECHR is more limited than the
case law of the Conseil Constitutionnel. With regard to the equality principle,
the author argues that there are reasons to believe that, like the
Constitutional Court, the European Court of Human Rights applies the test that
it is impossible to receive compensation for loss incurred, whether general or
specific, and the criterion that a serious or intentional fault was involved.

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Loss assessment and the passage of time. Loss as a variable phenomenon, and what
this means for the law on compensation

Loss is a variable phenomenon – the adverse consequences of an event are capable
of extending over periods which can be longer or shorter. When assessing loss,
it is necessary to compare two positions, i.e. the situation following the
tortious event and the situation as it would have been without it – and this
seems not possible without having a reference point in time from which to make
the assessment. Therefore, to a certain extent, the outcome of the loss
assessment can be regarded as a “snapshot”. If the reference point is fixed at a
time before adjudication by the court, the question will arise as to what can
be, or can still be, the relevance of developments which occur, and information
that transpires, subsequently. Under the Dutch law of torts, it is generally
accepted that the point in time at which the court adjudicates is that which
will be conclusive as far as the loss assessment is concerned. However, there
are a number of scenarios under the law of torts which indicate that exceptions
to this principle are possible.

Where an ex ante approach is adopted, the loss is assessed as being that which
arose at the time of the “initial” loss, i.e. that which was caused at the point
in time when the victim’s property is deemed to have been affected by the
tortious event. This approach entails that the outcome of the loss assessment
will not in itself be influenced by the point in time at which the assessment
takes place (i.e. ‘outcome fixation’). The decisive element will be what was to
be expected at the point in time at which the loss occurred. The risks and
opportunities that existed at that point in time will be factored into the
assessment of the loss – as a result, no account is taken of any subsequent
events or developments. Thus the size of the loss (and of the compensation for
it) will not vary along with any information which transpires subsequently.

The ex ante approach can be recognised when looking at the way in which, in the
case of damage caused to property, the resulting reduction of the property’s
value is assessed in abstracto, the assumption being that the owner has suffered
loss equivalent to the reduction in value of the property involved, prior to and
independently of any repairs. This is what is sometimes referred to as
“instantaneous loss” – by taking the point in time at which the loss actually
occurred as the reference point for measuring the loss of value, any subsequent
developments become irrelevant. However, there are circumstances in which that
precise point in time at which the damage was actually caused cannot be
determined – as is the case where a house is reduced in value as a result of
subsidence caused by the extraction of natural gas, which is revealed gradually
over time. Where we are dealing with the dissolution of a contract of sale, or
with the compensation resulting from the failure to perform a specific
contractual obligation – here again, one discerns a method of loss assessment in
abstracto which can be regarded as a type of time-based fixation. Under the law
of expropriation, all losses are assessed by using an ex ante approach,
referring to the point in time at which the expropriation occurred, regardless
of the point in time at which the loss was determined by the court, and of any
developments which may have taken place in the meantime. Therefore, when
assessing loss, it is necessary to take a step back in time and to disregard any
events and circumstances which may have occurred in the meantime.

The ex post approach, on the other hand, is based on the loss history to the
extent that this has become known at the time at which the loss is assessed, and
regardless of whether the developments in question were foreseeable or not at
the point in time at which the tortious event took place. It is this approach
that, more than any other, complies with the full compensation principle, as
well as with the assumption that loss should be assessed in concreto – here, the
“permanent insight” principle is applied in order to be able to assess the loss
actually incurred as accurately as possible. That is not to deny that, even
where this approach is adopted, it is necessary to make an assessment of the
situation which would have occurred had the tortious event not taken place –
i.e. the situation which, by definition, did not take place. Where an ex post
approach has been adopted, the initially expected loss can be whittled down or,
instead, increase; accordingly, the timing of the loss assessment can be crucial
in this respect.

An ex post approach can be identified where there is an assessment of loss which
extends over a certain period and is incurred in successive stages, as is the
case not only with loss of income resulting from injury and other forms of
forfeiture of earnings, but also with the costs (recurring or not) which are
incurred. Where the loss has already been incurred at the time of assessment,
that loss can be determined more precisely ex post; any future loss can, by
definition, only be assessed ex ante. When assessing continuous loss from an ex
post perspective, there may occur not only events that ‘break the chain’ of
causation, but also events and developments on the basis of which the factors
which were taken as a basis for the frame of reference need to be adjusted
accordingly. During a sufficiently long period between the tortious event and
the (definitive) loss assessment, certain facts and circumstances may come to
light which could not have been anticipated at an earlier point of assessment.
Thus time can be both friend and foe for the parties involved. Moreover, the
question that needs to be asked at all times is this: what absolute certainty
can there be about gradually arising events and circumstances in relation to the
hypothetical scenario under which the tortious event never happened?

Where continuous loss is assessed and compensated by a single amount of money
paid immediately, the period of loss is to a certain extent ‘converted’ into one
point in time at which the whole loss is considered to be suffered. Where such
capitalisation occurs, the time-related factors by definition play an important
part. (The term “capitalisation” in this context should be understood in the
sense of the payment of damages for periodic losses being converted into a fixed
sum.) Under Dutch law, it is allowed to use a reference date for capitalisation
which falls some considerable time before the court decision – which then gives
rise to the question as to how intermediate events and developments should be
handled during the period between the reference date and the later point in time
at which the damages are being awarded. According to the Hoge Raad (Dutch
Supreme Court), the basic principle that the loss must be assessed as much as
possible in concreto entails that, when using a reference date for
capitalisation in the past, an ex ante approach towards loss assessment should
not be adopted.

When assessing non-economic damages, the court is compelled to take all
circumstances into account, and more particularly the effects of the tortious
event on the victim. Therefore, an ex post approach clearly suggests itself for
such loss – given that non-economic loss can generally be expected to continue
over a period of time. In the Netherlands, non-economic losses are generally
being paid by a single amount of money. However, it is not usual to divide this
type of continuous loss into several – future – periods in order to calculate
it’s value by using the capitalization method. This “arithmetic” method of
assessment seems difficult to reconcile with the “rough” manner in which
non-economic loss is being assessed in the first place (‘in fairness’).

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Compensation and the time factor

Loss assessment gives rise to a host of questions which relate to the time
elapsing between the tortious event and the compensation awarded for the loss
incurred. Between these two points in time lies the moment when the court has to
assess the loss. This passage of time affects the court’s assessment of the
existence and size of the loss incurred. The relevant legislation provides no
firm guidance. Time-related issues are solved by reference to the case law of
the Hof van Cassatie (Supreme Court). It is especially this case law which forms
the basis for this contribution, which takes as its starting point a study of
the notion of “loss”, as well as a number of fundamental principles underlying
the law on compensation, more particularly the full compensation requirement and
the actual loss assessment principle.

The effect of the passage of time that follows the tortious event gives rise, in
the first instance, to the question of the point in time on which the court must
focus in order to assess the loss. Under Belgian law, loss assessment is
performed at the point in time which is as close as possible to the date on
which the loss is effectively rectified. This is normally the time at which the
court makes its decision. The date of this decision therefore plays a crucial
part.

In addition, various events which occur simultaneously with, or subsequently to,
the tortious event are capable of increasing or reducing the loss suffered. The
relevant legislation does not specify what are the events which the court needs
to take into account. Events are capable of aggravating the loss both before and
after the court has made its assessment. In the former case, the extent to which
the increased loss is capable of giving rise to compensation is governed by the
rules on causation. In the latter case, it is the content and authority of the
court’s decision which will be conclusive. As regards the events which occurred
after the tortious event, the Supreme Court will apply the rule that these
should not be taken into account where they are unrelated to the fault and/or
the loss. However, this rule does not invariably provide an acceptable solution,
and is consequently not always applied in a consistent way. This is, inter alia,
the case in relation to such benefits as are derived from a new relationship
engaged in by the partner of a deceased victim, or the benefits accruing to the
victim because of the contributions made by third parties, such as material
assistance or payments. In the latter case, any pensions awarded to a deceased
victim’s partner and not debited to the compensation allocated are a particular
source of contention.

The court must determine the compensation that is due both for the loss which
had already occurred at the time of the assessment, and for any loss which could
still arise in the future. The distinction between past loss and future loss has
given rise to different methods of loss assessment. Where it has been
ascertained that the victim will continue to incur loss in the future, it is
impossible to determine with absolute certainty how such loss will develop. This
is why the court will, to a greater or less extent, be compelled to disregard
this element of uncertainty. The courts are seeking ways to reconcile this
uncertainty with a concrete and precise determination of the amount of
compensation to be awarded. The instrument which is most frequently used to this
effect is capitalisation. Thus the material loss incurred because of permanent
unfitness for work on account of the reduction in the victim’s economic capacity
is capitalised on the basis of his/her earnings, even though he/she has not
incurred any loss of income and his ability to exercise his profession in the
future remains uncertain. Capitalisation is also increasingly used in relation
to loss which, until recently, was ineligible for capitalisation, such as
non-material loss. The courts have hitherto displayed no consistency in this
regard.

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Donations over several generations: are napoleonic misgivings outdated ? A
critical comparison between the Belgian erfstelling over de hand bij schenking,
the French donation graduelle and the South African fideicommissary donation

In this contribution, the author seeks to establish whether the prohibition of
fideicommissa, as featured in the 1804 Code Napoléon, can still be maintained
two centuries later. More particularly the author concentrates on
fideicommissary donations, which come under the general heading of
“transgenerational donations”. The latter are donations whereby the donor
requires the beneficiary to retain the donated assets during his lifetime, and
to transfer them to a second beneficiary when he dies. Thus the grantor
determines the succession of the donated assets over several generations. This
retention of control can be very attractive from the point of view of estate
planning.

Not every legal system, however, allows transgenerational donations. Thus the
Code Napoléon subjected transgenerational donations to an unconditional
prohibition as a matter of public policy. This prohibition continues to apply to
this day under Belgian law. French legislators, by contrast, decided in 2006 to
abolish this prohibition as featured in the Code Napoléon, on the grounds that,
inter alia, they wished to give more scope for the donor to exercise his freedom
of action. Moreover, there are a number of legal systems under which
transgenerational donations have at all times been lawful, as is, for example,
the case in South Africa.

This contrast in the treatment of transgenerational donations in the various
legal systems casts new light on the question whether a prohibition of
transgenerational donations remains tenable in this day and age. The traditional
arguments raised in justification of such a prohibition have lost a great deal
of their plausibility. Moreover, alternative legal transactions such as the
donation of usufruct and of bare ownership, or the fideïcommis de residuo, are
incapable of producing the same result. The author therefore concludes that
there is no longer any compelling reason for maintaining the prohibition of
transgenerational donations, so that the latter should, in this day and age, be
fully lawful.

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Comparing and contrasting revocatory actions and actions in annulment of company
decisions with external effect to court without

The action in annulment of a company decision with external effect is, for the
shareholder, the functional equivalent of that which the revocatory action
(actio pauliana) means for the creditor. Both types of action have the same
purpose, i.e. to police the manner in which powers held over property in which
the creditor has a financial interest are used. Moreover, both actions have a
similar effect, in that any transaction which adversely affects the financial
interests concerned will be neutralised. The difference resides in the
conditions under which the action can be brought. The revocatory action is one
which can be brought directly against the fraudulent transaction concerned. It
is precisely because shareholders are prevented from bringing such direct
actions that the action in annulment makes it possible to challenge the disputed
transaction by challenging the decision on which that transaction was based (and
which, by definition, has external effect).

However, there remain some significant differences between the revocatory action
and the action in annulment, both as regards the sanction attached to them and
the conditions in which they can be exercised. Most of these differences can be
explained by comparing and contrasting the claim vested in a creditor (fixed
claim) with that which is vested in the shareholder (variable claim). However,
this does not explain why evidence of complicity on the part of the third party
involved is required for a successful revocatory action – at least when dealing
with a transaction for valuable consideration. The rationale behind this
requirement is to protect third parties who can be credited with a legitimate
belief in the appearance created by the debtor.

By describing the consequences of the annulment of a decision with external
effect for third parties as an issue concerning the broader question as to the
which legal acts are attributable to the company, the author makes it clear that
the third party will also be protected against the annulment of the underlying
company decision. As is the case with revocatory actions, this protection will
only cease to apply where complicity in the disputed act can be attributed to
the third party. This parallel between the revocatory action and the action in
annulment of decisions with external effect has enabled us to conclude that a
decision which had already been carried out in relation to a third party while
being taken with power of representation, may only be annulled after evidence of
bad faith has been supplied. The fact that the revocatory action requires no
evidence of bad faith in relation to transactions without consideration does not
contradict this. Merely having infringed the restriction to acts for profit can
be invoked against third parties regardless of whether this was done in good or
bad faith, given that we are dealing here with a statutory restriction of the
power of representation (although this does not mean that the ‘but de lucre’ is
still required to have this function). The essential point is that the
revocatory action and the action in annulment of decisions with external effect
are both functionally equivalent processes. In that case, the degree of
protection enjoyed by the defendant third party should also be equivalent in
both cases. Just as the revocatory action is a powerful tool in the creditor’s
hands against collusion between his debtor and any third party, the action in
annulment of decisions with external effect represents for the shareholder in
cases of bad faith of a third party an effective action against decisions
(carried out) of his debtor.

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Going to court without a lawyer in civil cases. Is doing it yourself better?

In spite of the absence of empirical data, the general context tells us that an
increasing number of litigants are going to court without a lawyer (i.e. acting
pro se). There are two explanations for this phenomenon. On the one hand, going
to law has in recent years become considerably more expensive as a result of,
inter alia, lawyers having been made subject to VAT and the new system of court
registration fees. On the other hand, the legal aid sector has been coming under
heavy financial pressure, and access to lawyers operating free of charge has
become increasingly restricted. This means that an increasing number of people
are in danger of falling between two stools, in that they are too wealthy to be
able to claim free legal assistance, but not wealthy enough to afford a lawyer.

This paper examines the way in which the Belgian law of civil procedure treats
lawyerless litigants, and the extent to which such treatment meets the standard
set by Article 6(1) of the ECHR. Does the law in question provide pro se
litigants with sufficient support, or are the latter faced with needless
obstacles in their quest for legal equality?

In Part One, the author locates the problem in the context of the right to a
fair trial as contained in Article 6(1) ECHR. Here, two aspects of this right
come to the fore – the right to access to justice, and the right to equality of
arms. The member states are free to decide the way in which effective access to
the courts is to be achieved. To this extent, maintaining an adequate legal aid
system and facilitating pro se litigation are communicating vessels in that, as
legal aid is reduced, so the member states need to increase their concern for
the position of the lawyerless litigant.

Part Two deals with certain aspects of the Belgian law of civil procedure which
have a direct impact on pro se litigants. The author deals successively with the
rule prohibiting the judiciary from giving legal advice; possible legal
representation by non-lawyers; the court’s power to prevent oral pleadings; the
formalities required of court submissions, and the proactive role the judge is
allowed to play.

In Part Three, the author casts his eyes abroad. He examines the way in which
lawyerless litigants are treated in the Netherlands and in England & Wales.
There is also inspiration to be found in the European law of civil procedure.
This applies in particular to the European Payment and Small Claims Regulations,
given that these were expressly adopted with the pro se litigant in mind.

The general picture painted by the analysis featured above allows the conclusion
that the position of the lawyerless litigant in Belgium is not that
unsatisfactory after all. Its law of civil procedure contains a number of
support structures which, with due pragmatic flexibility, are applied to the
lawyerless litigant’s benefit. Before the lower courts, the pro se litigant
receives even greater levels of support. However, this does not mean we can
afford to be complacent here. At a time when the rules on court procedure are
constantly being adjusted, with efficiency being the key word, care must be
taken that the pro se litigant does not silently disappear between the cogwheels
of the judicial system.

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All-sums retention of title

All-sums retention of title entails extending the effect of retention of title
in order to guarantee claims other than those which are inherent in the delivery
of the item sold, i.e. the claim for payment of the sale price and its attendant
charges. Such all-sums retention of title is not valid under current Belgian or
French law, the latter systems requiring a specific link between the item
supplied and the guaranteed claim. However, both English and German law accept
that such an extension of retention of title can be valid. In the Netherlands,
the applicable legislation has already extended the scope of guaranteed claims
beyond payment of the sale price – claims arising from work performed or from
defective performance of the agreement also fall within their ambit. A number of
Dutch authors are of the opinion that all-sums retention of title is accepted as
a general rule, but this view is not without challenge.

General recognition of all-sums retention of title would give suppliers the
additional opportunity to guarantee future claims arising under a long-term
trading relationship. The same degree of priority as that provided by ordinary
retention of title would apply by extension to other claims. In this
contribution, the author examines the possibility of creating an all-sums
retention of title under Belgian law in the light of the new Law on Pledges, and
highlights the policy choices which would be needed for this purpose. In so
doing, the extended retention of title would be confined to claims which remain
linked to the creditor in his capacity of supplier. Thus the overriding priority
provided by retention of title would not be available to any claim whatsoever.
In addition, the author advocates that the ability to plead allsums retention of
title be made dependent on its entry in the Register of Pledges. Finally, a
limit would be imposed on the continued reliance on retention of title by the
supplier – as from the moment when no further claims were extant against the
buyer, the latter would become the definite owner of the item sold, and the
all-sums retention of title would no longer apply. It is not desirable that the
seller of an item should, at a later stage, once again be able to rely on his
retention of title for a new claim. Provided that these conditions are met,
all-sums retention of title should be capable of legal recognition.

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E-Commerce and damage in the course of delivery

Transport is both the lifeblood of e-commerce and its Achilles heel. Whilst
being able to have goods ordered online delivered to one’s home represents a
major competitive advantage for e-commerce, it nevertheless carries many risks.
In the course of delivery, packages are sometimes damaged, lost or arrive late.
By Directive 2011/83/EU, the EU has made it compulsory for the webshop to bear
the risk of any damage or loss. The risk only passes to the consumer at the
moment when physical possession is acquired by him/her. In addition, the
consumer has the right to terminate the agreement in the event of late delivery.
In this article, the author seeks to establish to what extent this Directive
exposes the webshop to liability. In principle, the webshop will not perform the
carriage of the goods itself, but will avail itself of a parcel delivery
service. Assuming that the webshop is able to recover the cost of the damage
from the carrier, the impact of the Directive on liability imposed by it on the
webshop will remain limited. The laws relating to transport and to consumer
protection are to a large extent mandatory, which only provides the webshop with
limited scope for contractual variation of the statutory rules on liability.

These statutory rules do not in many respects appear to be capable of
neutralizing the risk imposed on the webshop, so that the latter will to a
significant extent itself bear the risk of damage incurred in the course of
carriage. This is more particularly the result of the relevant procedural rules,
the rules which govern the liability of the carrier, and those that relate to
the extent of the compensation which the webshop is capable of claiming from the
carrier. Moreover, the complex logistics involved in parcel delivery will ensure
that, because of the specific structure of transport law, there could arise some
uncertainty as to which rules are applicable.

The first cause of a liability exposure for the webshops lies in the different
notification periods. Whereas the webshop is obliged to notify the carrier of
any damage immediately (in the event of visible damage) or within a week (in the
event of invisible damage) in order to enjoy the benefit of the presumption of
liability vested in the carrier, the consumer/buyer has two months as from the
time at which the fault is discovered. Moreover, any damage which arose during
the first six months is deemed to have been present at the time of purchase.
Accordingly, the burden of proof will be on the webshop under both these
agreements where the damage has not been notified immediately by the consumer.

Moreover, the rules governing the carrier’s liability are also capable of
exposing the webshop to liability on several counts. Thus the consumer shall,
where no time limits for delivery had been expressly agreed, be able to
terminate the agreement even before the webshop had the opportunity to claim
compensation against the carrier on account of late delivery. In addition, the
consumer may enforce his/her right of withdrawal in the event of late delivery.
Since the consumer is not obliged to give reasons for his/her withdrawal, it
will be virtually impossible for the webshop to provide evidence that the
withdrawal was caused by the late delivery, and that the latter must therefore
be regarded as loss caused by late delivery. Where the goods are unloaded on the
access area, especially that of third parties, may under certain conditions
cause the compulsory period during which the carrier is held liable to end, even
where the goods have not been physically delivered to the consumer. As a result,
the webshop will continue to bear the risk under the contract of sale, what
could cause a liability exposure to the webshop if damage occurs before the
moment the consumer takes the physical possession of the goods. Finally, the
rule in relation to all the three causes of damage is that, whilst the carrier
may rely on the grounds for exemption, this option is not open to the webshop in
relation to the consumer. The importance of the last-named difference must,
however, be put into perspective, given the fact that a force majeure defence is
seldom accepted by courts.

The restrictions on the recoverable damage by the webshop represent the third
major factor causing its exposure to liability. In the event of loss and late
delivery, compensation shall be restricted to physical damage, which means that
any other type of damage incurred by the webshop will not be considered. Even
more important, and more particularly in relation to electronic consumer goods,
are the limits to the compensation. Under CMR, compensation is limited to +/-
€10.5 per kilogramme, which frequently amounts to a de facto exemption. In the
event of late delivery, the situation is even more problematic, given that in
such cases compensation is limited to the freight. Although full compensation
remains possible in cause of (a fault equivalent to) wilful misconduct, the
prospects of success for such claim are very limited, at least in Belgium and
The Netherlands.

Finally, it would appear that the precise extent to which webshops are being
exposed to liability is difficult to predict with precision, given that
different transport regimes are potentially applicable. Parcel delivery
frequently involves agreements combining several different means of transport or
leaving the method of transport unspecified. As different regimes exist per mode
of transportation, in such circumstances it will not be certain which rules
shall apply. In addition, the relevant international treaties are subject to
divergent interpretations, which can also have a significant impact on
compensation levels. Since the various treaties governing transport do not allow
the parties to stipulate which law shall apply exclusively, this means that here
too, the parties in question will, when concluding the agreement, not be able to
anticipate which interpretation shall prevail.

Accordingly, the risk incurred for any damage caused during parcel delivery is
to a very considerable extent incumbent on the webshop. Although the various
international transport agreements provide a number of mechanisms which enable
this exposure to liability to be restricted by contract, the limited awareness
of any risk by the webshop, or even a large measure of indifference towards risk
on the part of the latter, will ensure that such mechanisms will hardly ever be
used. Self-insurance may not pose a problem for a major webshop, but could have
a considerable impact on the smaller operators. It is therefore recommended that
appropriate legislation be adopted in this area. Moreover, if the webshop is
able to pass the relevant compensation or costs onto the carrier, this increases
the chances that he/she will adopt a more accommodating attitude in response to
any claim by the consumer based on damage incurred in the course of carriage.

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Contracts with public authorities under Belgian law ‒ Governance on the
intersection between public and private law

Action by the public authorities is traditionally associated with unilateral
decisionmaking of an individual or regulatory nature. However, this view of
intervention by the public authorities is essentially divorced from reality. In
addition to exercising such power, the public authorities are, with increasing
frequency, using private law instruments in order to serve the public interest.
This paper will not concern itself with the various reasons for this
development, but concentrates on the legal issues it raises. This is because
such practices confront the lawmakers and the courts with a considerable
challenge. What are the limits within which the authorities may make use of the
private law, and what are the rules which govern these private transactions –
should they be governed by the private law, or should rules of public law apply?
The authors revisit the old dividing line between public and private law, and
examine the way in which the rules and principles that apply on both sides serve
the public interest.

The question whether the public authorities are allowed to use private law
instruments in order to achieve their objectives to serve the general public or
to organise a public service has traditionally been answered in Belgium by
reference to the “two track” doctrine (tweewegenleer). According to this
approach, the public authorities are in principle free to serve the public
interest by resorting to private law rather than using their special
prerogatives. However, they are only allowed to take the private law route
whilst observing the limits set by essential public law principles, such as the
principles of speciality, legality and good administration, as well as the
legislation governing the public services. It is clear that, under Belgian law,
this issue cannot be dissociated from the question as to which law shall apply.

Where the public authorities make use of contractual instruments, these
contracts shall in principle be governed by private law. However, this
assumption is not carried to its ultimate conclusion. The undiluted theory that
the agreements concluded by the public authorities are governed exclusively by
private law is at odds with reality. Even in the absence of legislation that
causes the agreement to depart from private law, the specific nature of the
legal relationship in question will regularly cause the courts to treat it – at
least in part – as regulatory action, more particularly where it concerns the
performance of a public service. The willingness to do so contrasts sharply with
the inadequate legal framework which is available to the courts for this
purpose.

Nevertheless, in many cases public law corrections will not be necessary in
order to serve the public and other interests. The same result can often be
achieved by adopting a private law approach and by relying on general principles
of private law. Highly instructive in this regard is the De Leener and Ballon
decision, in which the Council of State (the Belgian Supreme Administrative
Court) indicated its inclination not to exclude the thesis that the provisions
of the Civil Code governing the performance of contracts are the expression of
the overarching reasonableness principle that is common to public and private
law.

Accordingly, rather than focusing blindly on the contrast between private and
public law, it seems more constructive to concentrate on their similarities and
the manner in which they complement each other. As the public authorities become
increasingly conscious in applying private law in order to serve the public
interest, so the need for corrective mitigation based on the public law
diminishes. Instead, public and private law interact as communicating vessels in
this regard, as the yin and yang of our legal system.

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Powers as a category of subjective rights: Their scope, characteristics and
legal context

Subjective rights can be divided into two major categories, i.e. claim rights
(proprietary rights, intellectual rights, rights to performance from a debtor
and personality rights) on the one hand, and powers on the other hand. Powers
(Dutch literature uses the term “wilsrechten” as well as “bevoegdheden”) give
their holder the authority to change, discontinue or create a certain legal
situation unilaterally (by performing a unilateral legal act). Exercising such a
power automatically causes the relevant legal consequences to take effect,
without reliance on any action on the part of the party whose legal position
could be influenced by it. In other words, the third party in question will be
subjected to the legal consequences of the powers exercised as a matter of
course. Or, to put it yet another way, the holder of a power is entitled to
impose the relevant legal consequences – i.e. changing a legal position – on
third parties. This is where powers differ from the traditional category of
claim rights (proprietary or creditors’ rights). This is because claim rights
assume the existence of a legal obligation on the part of a debtor or of a third
party, which means that non-compliance of such a legal obligation will at all
times frustrate the rights of the holder of the claim right.

From the author’s analysis, it emerges that the number of subjective rights
capable of being described as powers is particularly large. One need only
consider, for example, the right of option, the right of first refusal, a
contracting party’s right to decide, powers of attorney, the right unilaterally
to terminate or dissolve an agreement, the ius agendi, shareholders’ voting
rights, the right to accept or reject an inheritance, the right to enforce,
confirm or waive a subjective right, etc. In many cases these rights do not
arise independently, but are combined with other subjective rights/claim rights.

Powers may arise on the basis of substantive legislation, of an agreement, or of
a court decision. They are exercised through a unilateral legal act, which may
be subject to communication or receipt. The holder of a power is, moreover, free
to exercise, or to refrain from exercising, the power in question – he/she
cannot be compelled to do so. Because the legal consequences of a power take
effect automatically and without any intervention from the party made subject to
that power, considerations of legal certainty dictate that the exercising of a
power be unconditional, irrevocable and indivisible. As is the case with claim
rights, the exercising of powers is subject to the rule prohibiting the misuse
of rights – the holder of a power may not exercise it in a way which clearly
exceeds the normal way of exercising it. Powers may be forfeited by transfer,
waiver or through the extinction of a time limit.

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Measured nullities – proportionality and favor negotii in the event of partial
nullity, reduction and conversion

Prompted by two Supreme Court (Hof van Cassatie) decisions concerning the
nullity of excessive competition clauses in ordinary contracts (Cass. 23/1/2015
and Cass. 25/6/2015), this paper examines the scope of contractual nullity in
this context. In particular, the key question is the following – what are the
factors and rules which determine whether, and if so to what extent, a legal act
which is vitiated by a ground of nullity remains capable of producing certain
legal consequences? In his endeavour to answer this question, the author
compares the current Belgian solution with those which are normally applied in
present-day German, Dutch, Spanish and Italian law.

In the second chapter, the author discusses the applicable Belgian law in this
field. Because the issue under review is constantly analysed on the basis of the
notions of “partial nullity”, “conversion” and “reduction”, these three concepts
play a central part in assessing this current state of the law. As regards these
three notions, the author clarifies (a) whether they are accepted under Belgian
law, (b) what is their legal basis, (c) what are the criteria which determine
the conditions in which they may be applied, and (d) what are the consequences
of the appropriate use of these concepts.

The current state of the law as described in the previous paragraph is subjected
to critical assessment in the next chapter. The author argues that partial
nullity, reduction and conversion must all be accepted by the relevant Belgian
law and that they have their basis in the favor negotii principle, i.e. the
principle which aims to maintain the contractual relationship. The criteria
applied can, according to the author, be refined further by making use of, inter
alia, a number of subtle distinctions which can be found in the German law.
These German positions, moreover, show that the Belgian literature on the
subject wrongly fails to give any attention to the burden of proof question,
which – as is indeed the case in other legal areas – is of crucial importance.

This analysis of the current state of the law indicates that the current Belgian
approach is insufficiently precise in substantive terms, and is deficient in
structural clarity. This is why, in Chapter Four, the author proposes an
alternative approach. To this end, he takes as his starting point two leading
principles in this field, to wit proportionality and favour negotii. He takes
the view that the former provides an answer to the question whether legal act is
null and void at all because of a rule infringement. If the conclusion is that
this is indeed the case, the supplementary question arises whether the legal act
can still have legal consequences in spite of its nullity – a question which is
answered by reference to the favour negotii principle. Having provided a brief
overview and made a legislative proposal, the author explains the reasoning to
be followed on a step-by-step basis and illustrated by examples.

The author concludes this paper by applying the proposed approach to the two
Supreme Court decisions which prompted this contribution, and examines whether
the disputed competition clauses could still remain operational.

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Nullity and the ‘Most Favourable Interpretation’: the Remedies for Unfair Terms
in Consumer Contracts in the light of the Court of Justice Case Law

The law on unfair terms provides two individual and curative remedies on which
the consumer can rely in order to extricate him/herself from unfair terms in
contracts with a business undertaking. On the one hand, there is the individual,
court-imposed sanction in the strict sense, i.e. nullity/voidance (in Belgium);
on the other hand, there is the rule which stipulates that, where there is doubt
about the meaning of a term in a consumer contract, the interpretation most
favourable to the consumer shall prevail.

The introduction of the individual, court-imposed sanction has produced a major
impact on the Belgian legal order. Although the implementing provisions make
reference to nullity (voidance), there currently appears to be general
acceptance that the EU law-based sanction cannot simply be classified under the
traditional, national categories. This is a consequence of the sizeable amount
of case law produced by the Court of Justice on this subject. The Court is
defining the scope and substance of this sanction with increasing levels of
precision. It would appear that this sanction is being attributed a certain
functional and social side aim, a dissuasive effect. In pursuing that effect,
the Court seemingly uses the image of an uninformed consumer as a benchmark.
Therefore perhaps it is desirable to abandon the national approaches and to work
towards a unitory EU sanction (‘erasure’) for unfair terms?

Many aspects of this remedy have already been examined by the Court. However, a
number of significant issues remain unsolved, including first and foremost the
role of the domestic law that applies between parties where no other
arrangements have been concluded.

In addition, the terms contained in consumer contracts must be drafted in plain,
intelligible language, and where any doubt arises as to their meaning, the
interpretation which is the most favourable to the consumer should prevail. For
many years, the European dimension of the transparency requirement was mired in
total obscurity. However, a number of surprising Court of Justice judgments now
seem to indicate a trend towards an extremely broad interpretation. At all
events, contract terms should be drafted transparently, in such a way as to
enable ‘the average consumer’ to foresee the economic consequences which derive
from them, and thus to have more information at his/her disposal in order to
decide whether he/ she wishes to be bound by the contract. In spite of this,
there remains a great deal of uncertainty on the subject. Thus, for example, it
remains unclear how a lack of transparency in the contract should be sanctioned
– even though it has been argued that a deficiency in transparency should
automatically be regarded as being unfair.

Finally, the interpretatio consumptori plurimum favorens principle appears to be
a rarely used ‘remedy’ (intended in a broad sense) that may apply to unfair
contract terms. Unlike the individual, curative court-imposed sanction, i.e.
nullity/voidance, this interpretation rule has no functional aim. It therefore
remains to be seen to what extent the European case law on the former sanction
will be applicable by analogy. As regards the question as to which consumer is
to be seen as the benchmark for the most favourable interpretation, it would
appear that this should be the concrete consumer who is actually a party to the
dispute, having been thoroughly informed by the court as to his/her legal
position.

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What is parenthood?

The notion of “parenthood” as it applies in the civil law of Belgium is not
defined as such. On the basis of the role played by this institution in society,
it is defined in Chapter 1 of this paper as “the acquisition, exercise and loss
of all such rights and obligations as are held over children by certain persons,
in particular their relatives”.

Belgian family law organises parenthood by dividing it into two distinct
container categories, i.e. filiation and adoption. Within these categories, all
the functions associated with parenthood are awarded to two parents on an
indivisible and exclusive basis. However, both filiation and adoption are
experiencing heavy pressure from the decisions of the Constitutional Court,
which are thoroughly analysed in this contribution, more particularly in
Chapters II and III. Clearly, the Constitutional Court is seeking to abandon the
straitjacket in which the current legislation imprisons parenthood, and to move
towards a system based on the weighing up of the concrete interests involved.
This approach goes hand in hand with the way in which parenthood has evolved
from a solid status relationship towards a more fluid set of personal ties.

In this contribution, the author defends the proposition that this represents a
positive development, and that the law needs to adjust accordingly. Thus the
courts will be in a better position to give prophylactic and positive support to
the vulnerable entity that is the family, with the interest of the child being
the main consideration.

On this basis, the author proposes that a new chapter, entitled Parenthood, be
inserted in the Civil Code. Parenthood would be acquired as a package deal based
on a parenthood project, acquired through natural procreation, medically
supervised reproduction (including commercial surrogacy) or adoption. This could
serve to avoid the problematic process of balancing the biological issues and
social reality, and at the same time to mitigate the mater semper certa est
rule.

In addition to advancing this proposal based on parenthood as a package deal,
the author also highlights the fragmented regulation by law of other important
relationships between child and adult, which only covers some of the functions
of parenthood. In the first instance, paternity could be made transparent
through the creation of a paternity register in addition to a parenthood
register. The law could also give some recognition to those parties who bring up
or educate the child, by conferring parental authority on persons other than
those involved in the parenthood project. Such persons could also have certain
financial responsibilities imposed on them.

The necessarily pluralistic approach towards parenthood outlined above will
result in parenthood being fully dissociated from the partner relationship
between the parents – even in relation to the pater is est rule – when it comes
to divorce or stipulating the conditions for adoption. The necessarily
complementary approach inherent in these proposals means that the new forms of
parenthood need not exclude their previous incarnation, but complement the
latter through a system of multiple parenthood.

It is only by approaching parenthood from a position beyond the currently
accepted assumptions that the necessary reforms can be contemplated. This
contribution merely provides a multidisciplinary starting point for this
endeavour.

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The incoherent united - Private law concepts under pressure from European
financial law

Post-crisis European legislation has penetrated the member states’ legal orders
even more deeply than was the case previously. This also has implications for
private law at the national level. One could go even further and state that
recently-enacted European financial law has impacted all the traditional areas
and key concepts of private law.

Thus it emerges from recent CJEU decisions that the Court’s interpretation of
the notion of “agreement” is different from that which is currently applied in
the private law of the Netherlands. Contrary to the approach adopted under Dutch
law, the CJEU has recently ruled that the relationship between the issuing
institution and the bond holder is no longer that of an agreement.

As regards the concept of “tort”, there has in the meantime arisen a whole range
of European laws, all of which more or less explicitly encroach on the field of
the national law of torts. In the case of the Regulation on Rating Agencies (CRA
III) and the Regulation on Packaged Retail and Insurance-based Investment
Products (PRIIPS), even the basis for a tort claim is regulated at the European
level. With other European instruments that effect will make itself felt through
the effectiveness principle, even though it would appear that, to a large
extent, the domestic law of torts remains capable of operating independently.
Nevertheless, the substantive rules governing the domestic law of torts
increasingly bear the stamp of European legislation.

The key concept of “ownership” has also felt the impact of European financial
law. The introduction of Article 7:55 in the Civil Code of the Netherlands shows
that the implications of the Financial Collateral Directive (FCD) for fiduciary
transfers of ownership and therefore also the law of property had not been fully
understood. Under Belgian law, the implementation of FCD led to the recognition
of fiduciary transfers of ownership, which has restricted the rights of the
acquirer in property law terms. Thus European financial law has caused a
situation whereby the key concept of “ownership” under private law is no longer
automatically “the most absolute” or indivisible right.

European financial law has also resulted in two key concepts of the Dutch law of
debt recovery, to wit the indivisible nature of assets and the paritas
creditorum principle, no longer applying in their absolute form. The Regulation
on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR), the
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive
(UCITS), and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) have led
to the introduction of new separations of assets in the Act on Book-Entry
Securities and the Act on Financial Supervision. In addition, the implementation
of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in the Law on Bankruptcies
has rendered the paritas creditorum rule, in a formal sense, redundant.

It can be expected that the effects of European financial law on the domestic
private law will not end as of today. A less coherent, but more harmonised,
domestic private law of European origin is, and will be, its outcome. Thus we
will see the “incoherent united”.

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Compensation for contract rescission - performance interest rightly takes
precedence

Assessing additional compensation for contract rescission is a subject which has
become an increasingly prominent item on the scholarly agenda in recent years.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which regulates how far any such
compensation should extend. Nevertheless, ten years ago, the Supreme Court (Hof
van Cassatie) clearly ruled that any additional compensation should serve to put
the creditor into the position he/she would have been in if the debtor had met
his/her obligations.

This issue reveals a clear fault line throughout western Europe. In Portugal and
Switzerland, rescission compensation extends to compensating the so-called
reliance interest. As a result, some Belgian authors have adopted the view that,
carrying this theory to its logical conclusion, the defaulting contracting party
has no obligation whatsoever to provide compensation for the performance
interest. According to this view, the requirement that contractual rescission by
itself should seek to place the contracting parties in the position occupied
prior to the conclusion of the contract affects the extent of any complementary
compensation payable. Compensating the reliance interest thus serves to restore
the pre-contractual situation sought, which is the object of compensating the
direct impact of rescission. On the basis of this conceptual requirement that
the main remedy should be consistent with the additional remedy, payment of the
complementary compensation by itself would enable the defaulting contracting
party to place the disadvantaged party in the position he/she would have
occupied if the agreement had never been concluded in the first place.

This theory, however, has a significant impact on the size of the compensation
which is claimable by the disadvantaged party. It has, moreover, ominous
implications for a number of fundamental principles of the law of contracts,
including the binding nature of the contract and the legal certainty requirement
which underlies it. More particularly, rescission does not amount to negating
the existence of a contractual relationship. Nor does it affect the basic rules
of contract, but merely impacts the contractual obligations. Its retroactive
effect provides a technical explanation for the restitutions involved, but has
no implications for any complementary compensation. Also, rescission differs
fundamentally from voidance, so that there is no need to draw comparisons
between the complementary compensation involved in each case. In addition, the
legitimate expectations of the contracting parties are deserving of protection,
and rescission should not be regarded as an erroneous choice on the part of the
disadvantages party, since in many cases it represents an imposed choice.

The conclusion therefore has to be that, without a shadow of a doubt, even in
the case of rescission, compensation for non-performance is intended to place
the disadvantaged party in the position he/she would have occupied had the
contract been performed. Accordingly, the Belgian Supreme Court should be
extremely wary of allowing itself to be influenced by the highly dubious
Swiss/Portuguese school of thought. The Belgian lawmaker would do well to
endorse the position adopted by the Supreme Court by including in the Civil Code
a rule making the performance interest capable of compensation in the event of
contract rescission.

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Disruptive practices in litigation: effective sanctions in view of efficient
court proceedings

Efficient judicial proceedings require careful and rational forethought from
claimants, before initiating court proceedings; and, afterwards, litigants who
apply the rules of procedure correctly. Failure to comply with these
requirements is, in certain cases, sanctioned in procedural terms by law, but
does not invariably – or to the extent necessary – serve to redress the loss
incurred. This is why it is vital to have available a financial mechanism that
is capable of effectively sanctioning disruptive and obstructive practices in
litigation. In this contribution, the author concludes that the existing
framework of rules is inadequate, and proposes a new formula which is attuned to
the specific nature of court proceedings and enables effective action to be
taken against such disruptive and obstructive practices.

The starting point for this contribution is a recent change in legislation that
allows winning parties to be ordered to pay costs where they have caused
unnecessary expense by negligence or design. The author demonstrates that this
reform has added no benefit whatsoever, given that the legislation in question
continues to cleave to the error of substantive law requirement, which was
already applicable before the legislation was adjusted.

Relying on in-depth analysis in Dutch legal literature, the author advocates the
introduction of a new rule – the prohibition of disruptive practices in
litigation. Every decision to initiate court proceedings (litigation decision)
and every action committed during court proceedings (pendente lite practices)
should be assessed against four criteria: time, cost, quality of outcome and
procedural benefit. Where the additional time or expense caused by the practices
in question is not reasonably expected to lead to a better outcome and/or
improved procedural benefit, or where such a better outcome and/or improved
procedural benefit could also have been reached through less burdensome
practices, this will constitute a disruptive practice in litigation. Such
practices cause loss to the other party (micro-procedural detriment) and/or
damages the conduct of court proceedings (macro-procedural detriment). Where the
loss or damage cannot be redressed by means of procedural sanctions, or by such
means alone, it will be necessary to resort to financial redress. An examination
of the currently applicable rules on redress (Article 1382 Civil Code and
Article 780b Judicial Code) indicates that neither of these remedies is
adequately attuned to the specific nature of civil court proceedings. There is
therefore a need for an alternative which is geared to the characteristic
features of civil court proceedings.

In order to achieve this, the author proceeds in three stages. Firstly, he
describes the objective of his proposal as loss redress and prevention.
Secondly, he examines how this goal can be achieved in the light of the
procedural context. In so doing, the author examines, thoroughly and
purposively, the question of who shall be bound to pay for any loss caused by
micro-procedural or macro-procedural detriment, how such loss is to be assessed,
and who shall be entitled to receive any compensation thus awarded. Various
authorities and recent laws are relied on in order to achieve loss prevention,
as well as loss compensation. Thirdly, the author focuses on the way in which
the proposal should be operated smoothly, without falling into the “trial within
a trial” trap. Finally, the author makes a concrete proposal for an amendment to
Article 780b Judicial Code. According to the author, the proposed rule
guarantees an effective, and at least improved, method of acting against
disruptive and obstructive practices in litigation.

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Sorry?! Compelled apologies under the law of torts

Empirical studies have shown that in some cases the victims of a tort will seek,
in addition to damages, recognition of the unlawful action committed by the
tortfeasor, and of the emotional injury this has caused. This is why they will
seek an expression of sympathy and apology in addition to monetary compensation.
This is especially so in cases where the victim’s identity has been affected, or
where his/her reputation or personal integrity in society in general, in public
life or in a particular community has been damaged (e.g. where the result has
been discrimination, unlawful dismissal, or a breach of certain personality
rights). In such cases, an apology will have three purposes: redress (of
emotional damage), recognition (of victimhood and suffering) and signalisation
(of unacceptable conduct, shared values and rehabilitative effect).

Because of its potentially healing effect, some legal systems enable the courts
to order the tortfeasor to make apology. This is because empirical studies have
demonstrated that even non-voluntary apology is capable of meeting the three
purposes mentioned above. In some countries, the right to enforce apology is
laid down as a general remedy in tort – as is the case in China – or imposed as
a remedy for specific torts (as is the case under the laws of discrimination in
certain South African provinces and Australian states). In other jurisdictions,
such as Switzerland, it is the courts that have recognised the right to order
apology, even though there has been no legislation which lays down this
opportunity. In other jurisdictions still, where the right to order apology is
accepted by neither legislation nor the courts – as is the case in The
Netherlands – a growing number of authors are advocating this remedy. All these
legal systems regard the ordering of apology as a form of equitable relief for
emotional injury. It is no coincidence that it is the common law jurisdictions
which, departing from their traditionally pecuniary approach towards legal
redress, have expressly embodied apology as a legal remedy in appropriate
legislation, and have accordingly led the field in developing this type of legal
redress for others to follow.

Under Belgian law, the right to enforce apology is neither laid down by
legislation nor applied by the courts. Nevertheless, enforcement of apology
could also be qualified as a form of equitable relief for emotional injury under
Articles 1382-1383 of the Belgian Civil Code. The argument that is frequently
raised against this is that a tortfeasor who is compelled to apologise against
his/her will has had his/her right to freedom of expression breached. However,
this argument has been rejected by the European Court of Human Rights.
Enforcement of apology is capable of meeting the test of Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. In order to make a proper assessment in
such cases, the courts must engage in an additional weighing of interests which
is not directly based on the law of torts and reaches a good deal further than
the ordinary test laid down for abuse of law. This is because the court must
judge whether the apology applied for by way of redress is, given the
circumstances of the case, relevant, necessary and proportionate. The conditions
to be met for the award of compensation for the commission of a tort are
therefore necessary, but not sufficient in this case.

The court may determine the substance of the apology to be made (precise wording
– formulation made freely or to be agreed between the parties) or to specify its
formalities (place, time and length of publication, or bilaterally). It may also
combine this with other remedies (equitable or pecuniary relief), on condition
that the integrality principle is observed, and, where appropriate, may order
apology subject to penalty payments. However, this will not be of much avail if
in the meantime too long a period has elapsed, if the apology would merely
intensify of prolong the conflict, or if the tortfeasor continues to deny
his/her unlawful act even though it has been confirmed by law.

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The law in the balance - A plea for a more holistic approach to (procedural) law

This contribution is the printed version of an address held on 31/3/2017 on the
occasion of the acceptance of the TPR Annual Rotating Chair for 2016-2017 at the
University of Utrecht.

The judicial machinery is currently in the doldrums. Three symptoms have been
highlighted as a basis for this paper – (a) the negative image conveyed by the
judiciary, (b) the haunting judicial backlog spectre, and (c) the truculence
displayed by certain players on the judicial scene. The traditional medicine for
this malady has been to adjust and update the rules of civil procedure. Although
such changes in the law have some merits, and are inspired by noble objectives,
they fail to provide us with any structural solutions. The same applies to a
variety of other alternative medications, such as conciliation, mediation and
arbitration. Although it remains necessary to stimulate, optimise and facilitate
such alternatives, the successes they reap remain on a limited scale.

But these are the old techniques. Recent years have witnessed the rise of
certain new technologies – a rise that can be inserted into a new paradigm. The
new divide is between alternative or optional methods of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) as such on the one hand, and the quality they provide on the
other hand. The key questions are how these old and new technologies can be made
to operate at their most optimal and efficient level, and how they could and
should interconnect and interact.

Citing a number of examples, the author examines two new techniques, i.e.
consumer dispute resolution (CDR) and regulatory redress, i.e. redress offered
or encouraged by public invigilators and regulators.

The judicial machinery and those who decide its policies should explore these
new possibilities, and above all emphasise the need for the interconnection,
interaction and integration between these various models. The author illustrates
this by several examples – the preliminary ruling technique, the devolution of
civil claims by the criminal courts, actions for declaratory judgments or
injunctions, feedback loops between ADR bodies and their supervisory
authorities, conferring judicial standing on supervisory bodies, and the new
Belgian procedure for the collection of undisputed civil claims (payment
orders).

Equally essential is the creation of an overarching conceptual framework.
Guiding and general principles must be used as beacons in order to guarantee the
quality of these old and new technologies.

This contribution concludes with a case study on mass harm. In addition to
private class actions, extra-judicial and alternative avenues can also be
highlighted here.

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The legal implications of Blockchain and smart contracts

Bitcoin was conceived as a replacement for banking payments, and is based on the
so-called blockchain technology. This technique makes it possible, on a
decentralised and secured basis, to make anonymous payments which are stored in
a decentralised database. The technique involved should ensure that its
administration, i.e. the database in question, is incapable of being tampered
with. Various applications of this technique have been proposed, such as
replacing the Land Registry by a blockchain. Smart contracts are another example
of this trend. These agreements are based on the notion that computers are also
capable of tackling more complex forms of conditional transactions. Because a
bitcoin-like system is capable of effecting payment via the blockchain
automatically where certain conditions have been met, this provides an
opportunity for ensuring performance. In addition, it has been suggested that,
because the blockchain cannot be located in any specific country or computer,
and therefore is difficult to control by legal – or any other – mechanisms,
transactions based on smart contracts constituted a system which operated
outside the law. The law was incapable of controlling it, so that the code
governing smart contracts has taken the place of the relevant legal rules.

The practice of smart contracts has raised a number of legal issues, such as
their jurisdiction and the law to which they are subject, as well as issues of
contractual interpretation and liability.

However, practice in this area has turned out to be less radical than has been
claimed. It has transpired that there are, in fact, various means by which smart
contracts can be challenged. Thus when it comes to important transactions, the
parties involved may agree to apply different rules which will make an undesired
contract inoperable. Also, smart contracts are not used exclusively as a
comprehensive alternative to ordinary contracts, but are also used as part of
the mechanisms for performing an ordinary framework contract.

Apart from this, smart contracts also give rise to a number of questions in
relation to performance. The law of contracts contains many rules which are
conducive to fair outcomes – whether or not by agreement between the parties
concerned, and taking into account the facts underlying the case. It is
difficult to formulate such decision-making processes in the shape of rules
which are capable of being performed by smart contracts. It would seem that the
use of smart contracts can cause the loss of certain types of legal protection
(such as the right to suspend performance, or to claim compensation).
Nevertheless, smart contracts can, in practice, constitute a sensible solution –
such as in the case of long-distance agreements under which it would be too
unwieldy or expensive to provide authentic legal protection for the consumers
affected.

Finally, the formalisation which is necessary in order to include legal rules in
smart contracts can be a rational exercise which may produce an insight into the
essential structure of the law of contracts.

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The flexibility of the ownership concept in the law of trusts

The trust as an institution that has developed in the common law and in some of
the mixed legal systems (such as South Africa, Scotland and Quebec) is
characterised by its pervasiveness in a wide range of personal and commercial
contexts. This means that the trust in its true form can be employed in a wide
range of contexts and for a variety of purposes, thus displaying what has been
described as its “chameleon-like” quality. This contrasts with the trust in its
“diluted” form (as frequently encountered in Continental Europe), which features
some trust-like properties, but lacks the flexibility typically associated with
the common-law trust as described above.

It is argued that the flexibility of the trust in its true form is facilitated
by, inter alia, the flexibility in the notion of ownership in the law of trusts.
In relation to the South African trust model, this phenomenon is illustrated in
at least three specific areas of trust law. The first concerns the basic
principle that, in civilian or mixed legal systems, the trust is not based on
split ownership between the trustee and the trust beneficiary, but on the notion
that the trustee owns assets in two separate estates (or patrimonies), i.e. the
trust estate and the trustee’s personal estate. Ownership in these two estates
is treated in a remarkably flexible fashion – thus, for example, it enables the
courts to craft new remedies in instances of so-called trust abuse. The second
area concerns the very basic question as to where ownership must be vested in a
trust. Here, South African law recognises a very peculiar trust type – the
so-called bewind trust – under which ownership is vested not in the trustee, but
in the trust beneficiary. This shift of ownership towards the trust beneficiary
contributes to the flexibility of the trust institution and facilitates the use
of the trust in new areas. The third area deals with the type of joint ownership
that exists among co-trustees in a trust where there is more that one trustee
(which is normally the case). In South Africa, the traditional forms of
co-ownership do not explain the automatic transfer of ownership to co-trustees
in the event of, for example, the death of one of the trustees. Research has
shown that South African law has in this context probably accommodated the
English law concept of joint tenancy, with its corollary of the rule of
survivorship. This would explain what happens among co-trustees in the
circumstances described and it once again illustrates the ability of the trust
system to depart from established norms as far as ownership concepts are
concerned.

It nevertheless remains a challenge to explain the flexibility in the concept of
ownership in the law of trusts. In South Africa, this is sometimes done by
attaching certain labels to the trustee’s ownership, such as “bare ownership”,
“ex officio ownership” or even “legal ownership”. Other attempts have focused on
the concept of “fiduciary ownership”, unpacking it in the context of trusts.
However, an extremely useful insight has been that provided by those authors who
have argued that the common law has been able to accommodate the trust in its
“true” form because of its “anti-conceptual” approach to property or, put
differently, “its power to break fundamental rules of the legal system within
which it operates”. It is argued that South African law has shown the capacity
to do exactly this with regard to its treatment of ownership in the law of
trusts. This capacity has probably been facilitated by the fact that the English
common-law trust was initially received into South African law, but later
transformed in a pragmatic (and typically common-law) case-by-case fashion to
align itself with well-known civilian institutions already recognised in the
system.

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Relative termination of limited real property rights

This contribution provides in the first instance a thorough overview of the
grounds for termination with relative effect. The author examines the following
grounds for termination with relative effect in this context: relinquishment,
amicable termination, termination with notice, confusion, forced termination on
grounds of misuse of powers, termination based on a change in circumstances (for
building rights and land leases under Dutch law) and, finally, termination for
breach of contract.

As regards the latter (which is an extraordinary ground for termination) the
author, on the basis of recent doctrine (but contrary to traditional theory),
defends the position that this ground definitely has relative effect, and as
such constitutes an exception to the rule in Article 74 HypW (Law on Mortgages
and Re-mortgages). In support of this thesis he advances a number of arguments –
e.g. the fact that amicable termination is also deemed merely to have relative
effect, or the argument based on Article 28 HypW. However, for termination for
breach of contract to have relative effect, it is a requirement that the
third-party recipient (a) was unaware of the breach of contract in question,
whether as a matter of fact or by a marginal note in the application for
termination (Article 3 HypW of Article 28 HypW), and (b) was not himself the
cause of the breach.

Secondly, this paper focuses attention on the relative effect theory by devising
a new explanatory model for the latter. Firstly, the author shows that the
traditional explanatory model for this relative effect theory, based on the
right of disposal (or its absence) on the part of the usufructuary, holder of
building rights or land-leaseholder is coming under increasing challenge. This
is why he proposes an alternative explanatory model which is based on the theory
of protection of acquirers in good faith; in so doing, the author takes an
in-depth look at the bona fides requirement and relates it to the two principles
on which protection of third party acquirers is based. Thus he demonstrates that
our legal order in fact acknowledges a “hidden” rule of third-party protection
in connection with the acquisition of real property. The author then examines
this discovery in the light of the two explanatory models referred to, and notes
that both these models approach the same phenomenon from a different vantage
point, whilst at the same time reinforcing each other. Taken together, both
models enable a better understanding of the relative effect of certain grounds
for termination. Finally, the author demonstrates that this alternative
explanatory model is also valid when viewed in the comparative context of French
and Dutch law.

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Customary rules in commercial law in the Netherlands and belgium (19TH to 21ST
Century)

This contribution draws a distinction between three types of commercial
practice. Usages-règle (legal customs) are customary practices in the sense that
they constitute repeated conduct based on the belief that it is legally valid.
Very often these practices have a limited scope and are regarded as
supplementing the relevant legislation. Usages-présomption (or usages
conventionnels) are commercial practices which are intended to give concrete
form to, and supplement, arrangements between contracting parties. Where
commercial practices are treated as usages-principe, they are regarded as open
rules which are capable of interpretation by the courts. Usages-règle were
promoted by the Historical School in the early 19th century. Previously,
commercial practices had frequently been treated as usages-principe, in that
they were regarded as being narrowly linked to principles which were equated
with “custom and practice” and could be derived and confirmed from various legal
sources. From the end of the 19th century, commercial practices were
predominantly regarded as usages-présomption in France and Belgium. In the
Netherlands, on the other hand, their status as dogma became less significant,
which was linked to the courts’ increased discretion in interpreting and
supplementing contracts. Accordingly, Belgium needs a legally dogmatic approach
towards commercial practices much more urgently than is the case with the
Netherlands. However, in spite of all the fine distinctions drawn between
customary practices, legally-binding customs and “usages conventionnels”, they
remain subject to the parties’ freedom to contract, and the qualification of
such practices as rules has, in practice, not been completely achieved. In spite
of the trend towards objectification when it comes to applying commercial
practices, the traditions referred to above continue to prevail.

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The review and dertmination of commercial lease rentals by the courts based on
equity - an explorative case study

In commercial lease contracts, as a rule, parties freely determine the rental
price when concluding the contract. However, under certain circumstances, a
party to a commercial lease contract may request the court to impose a new
rental price, both in the course of the performance of the lease contract and
upon renewal of the commercial lease. In that case, the legislator requires the
court to decide “in equity” on the new rental price.

In order to find out how courts (should) make use of this power to decide “in
equity”, the authors first conducted an in-depth analysis of the parliamentary
proceedings relating to the legislation on commercial leases, in order to
discover the lawmaker’s precise intention. This analysis shows that the
legislator’s references to equity were merely intended as an ultimate resort,
viz. where no appropriate points of comparison are available to assess the
normal rental value.

The authors then conducted an empirical analysis which sought to discover
whether, in practice, the courts use their equity powers in line with the
lawmaker’s intention as discovered in the analysis of the parliamentary works.

This empirical analysis was performed in two stages. First, the authors examined
all the cases brought before, and decided by, the five district courts of Ghent,
between 2010 and 2016. They then interviewed the three experts who were
commissioned by these court to submit their findings on the value of the leased
property in these cases.

The number of cases where the district courts were called upon to decide on a
new rental price, was revealed to be very small. Also, among the cases which did
actually result in a decision on the rental price, only one was decided on
equitable grounds. This finding is consistent with the relevant parliamentary
proceedings which indicate that equity is merely intended for disputes in which
exceptional circumstances prevail.

The analysis conducted by the authors is, essentially, exploratory. Accordingly,
the general conclusions drawn from their findings, need to be assessed against a
broader sample of court decisions. Nevertheless, it is to be expected that the
decisions of other district courts on this matter will be similar to those made
by the Ghent district courts.

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Away with De Page ? Long live Laurent ? A plea for an alternative view of the
recent history of Belgian private law

An election held in 2009 crowned Henri De Page (1894-1969), who wrote the
authoritative Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge, as the greatest-ever
Belgian legal scholar. In sharp contrast to the laurels heaped on De Page stands
the image of François Laurent (1810-1887), whose Principes was the seminal text
for the Belgian private law until the publication of De Page’s Traité. Laurent’s
image has been tarnished by the excessive regard he had for the text of the Code
civil and by his rabid anti-clericalism. However, the only way to obtain a true
picture of De Page’s writings is to examine Laurent’s work more thoroughly.

Laurent’s perception of the private law emerges, not from his Principes, which
bound him to the format of a commentary to the Code civil, but from his own
draft proposal for a new Civil Code for Belgium. For this project, Laurent had a
free hand and in many respects this Avant-projet confirmed Laurent’s image as a
hater of Catholics. His anti-clericalism is one of the reasons why his proposal
was never converted into law. However, there is another side to this story. In
his proposal, Laurent also showed concern for the well-being of the working
classes at the expense of the bourgeoisie which then dominated the Belgian
Parliament. In addition, his family law proposals were 100 years ahead of his
time as regards women’s rights, which was also a hard pill to swallow by the
politicians of the day. The nation’s judges also had reason to come out against
Laurent. Although portrayed as a slavish worshipper of the statute law who paid
no heed to the case law, it appears that Laurent had a first-class knowledge of
the latter and for that reason subjected it to intense criticism. He was
especially critical of the authority exercised by the Hof van Cassatie (Supreme
Court). That he cannot in any way be pigeon-holed as a slave to exegesis whose
scope was restricted to the French Code civil is also clear from his extensive
knowledge of foreign law. Accordingly, whilst some criticism may rightly be
levelled at him for his heedless pursuit of his ideological agenda, one should
at the same time find some admiration for his progressive views, his critical
approach towards the courts, and the attention he paid to foreign law.

When Henri De Page’s Traité appeared, it was quick to knock Laurent’s Principes
off its pedestal. However, the success enjoyed by this work does not in any way
mean that it was lacking in ideological underpinning. That much can be gauged
from the various forewords to the Traité and from the author’s works on legal
theory and legal philosophy. He opposed Laurent’s exegetic methods, of which he
drew a very negative picture. As an alternative, he advocated an approach based
on sociological legal positivism, under which the courts would base the law on
social realities. In truth, however, it emerged that it was the case law, rather
than society, which was De Page’s legal source. In this regard, De Page adopted
a less critical stance than did Laurent, and defended the prudent approach
adopted by the Belgian courts. This assessment of the courts was consistent with
De Page’s political views. He regarded the courts as protectors of the
bourgeoisie against a parliament elected by universal suffrage, and was opposed
to any excessive protection of the weaker in society. The success enjoyed by De
Page’s work was not unrelated to the tributes he paid to the courts, in
particular the Hof van Cassatie. Another factor that played a part was his
membership of the Standing Committee of the Council for Legislation (Bestendig
Comité van de Raad voor Wetgeving), which brought him into regular contact with
the highest judges in the country. De Page’s differences with Laurent were not
restricted to his approach towards the courts. Thus, in contrast with Laurent,
De Page had but little knowledge of foreign languages, which was a considerable
handicap for his endeavours in comparative law. (The fact that De Page had no
German also allows us to clear him from any unwarranted accusations of
sympathising with the German occupier during World War II.) The contrast between
Laurent and De Page expresses itself at its sharpest in the field of family law.
De Page is in favour of maintaining the existing order, as can be seen from his
defence of the rules discriminating against extra-marital children. He favoured
the subordinate position of married women, but was ultimately compelled to
adjust his position once the law had abolished the husband’s marital authority,
although he left no-one in any doubt that he had preferred matters to remain as
they were in this regard.

Even though the comparison drawn in this paper is confined to two, albeit highly
eminent, personalities, the question can be asked whether it could possibly
reveal a more general trend. In other areas, such as the commercial law, it is
possible to note that the Belgian law of the 19th century was at times more
creative than it was during most of the 20th. Exactly how representative Laurent
and De Page were is an issue remains a challenging task for legal historians; at
all events, it is clear that the time is ripe for a reassessment of the Belgian
private law following Napoleon. This may be all the more necessary if the
proposed new Civil Code shows itself capable of closing the current chapter in
the history of the Belgian private law which started in 1804.

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The Hierarchy of remedies in consumer sales: EU v. US

The starting point of this contribution is that there is some confusion and
dissatisfaction about the fact that consumers can rely on certain sales remedies
more easily than is the case with other remedies available in the EU and US.
This preference for one remedy over the other causes a so-called hierarchy to
arise between the remedies: a remedy that is more readily available is given a
higher status in the hierarchy than is the case for the others. A hierarchy
entails that some remedies cannot be easily relied upon, which could give rise
to frustration. In the US, damages are the preferred remedy owing to the
irreparable injury rule whereas in the EU there is a strong preference for
remedies oriented towards performance, such as replacement and repair.

On the one hand, the irreparable injury rule – preferring damages over specific
performance – has created a substantial body of literature in the US which
examines the strengths and weaknesses of this rule. It is a fact that it has
attracted the attention of specialist authors on law and economics and legal
philosophers – and more recently, behaviorists have also expressed an interest
in this topic. One particular author has even announced the “death of the
irreparable injury rule”; the latter, however, continues to apply in US common
law of contracts and in the UCC (albeit in a mitigated form).

On the other hand, many authors in the EU, as well the EU legislature, strongly
believe in the virtues of specific performance. The contractual obligation must
in the first instance be met by performing the contract itself. This preference
has led to the introduction of a strict hierarchy of remedies in EU consumer
sales regulation, in which repair and replacement are a right conferred not only
on the consumer but also on the seller. The fact that the consumer also has to
respect this hierarchy of remedies could give rise to inadequate consumer
protection, since it does not sufficiently take account of the consumer’s weaker
position.

Because both systems – i.e. those in the US and the EU – contain imperfections,
the author of this contribution proposes a free choice between the available
consumer sale remedies. This would entail that the consumer could choose between
termination, price reduction, damages and specific performance. Only where such
a choice clearly conflicted with the choice that any reasonable and careful
consumer would have made, could the court intervene and propose a different
remedy.

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Protection of the consumer by the Court of Justice - A bridge too far ?

It is widely known that European legislation has, in the course of the past few
decades, considerably strengthened the rights of the consumer. This contribution
examines the role which the Court of Justice has played in this particular
field. The author notes that the Court has developed its own policy on this
subject which has made an important contribution to the protection of the
consumer. In so doing, the Court has been guided by a realistic notion of the
position of consumers. It starts from the premiss that the consumer is in a
weaker position and is not always aware of his rights. Although it is possible
to argue, from a theoretical point of view, that the Court of Justice has, in
some cases, gone too far in its interpretation of the rights and obligations of
the consumer and of the businesses of traders, a more pragmatic view enables one
to draw the conclusion that the Court, through its case law, seeks to achieve
objectives which European legislation was unable to realise. It should
nevertheless be emphasised that the Court reserves this special protection for
the consumer in the strictest sense of the word, and refuses to accept that
those who act for professional purposes find themselves in the same position as
those who act for professional purposes, but outside their area of expertise.

Below, the author restricts himself to a number of conclusions which illustrate
the role played by the Court in the field of consumer protection:

The Court has regularly interpreted the rules of consumer law in such a way as
to enable the consumer to exercise the rights conferred on him effectively,
without in so doing losing sight of the legitimate interests of the business
world. The result is a consumer-friendly, yet at all times balanced,
interpretation of the rules on consumer sales and the right to cancellation.
Only when it comes to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive does the Court
appear to have neglected the legitimate interests of advertisers in its
interpretation.

• The domestic courts are obliged to raise the rules of consumer law ipso jure
where they are in possession of the necessary data and to apply them, unless the
consumer expressly waives these rules after having been informed of their
possible applicability – and subject to protecting the rights of the defence. In
creating this obligation on the part of the domestic courts, the CJEU relies on
the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. By its broad interpretation of
these requirements and its applicability in every type of judicial proceeding,
the Court, even though it continues to observe procedural autonomy as a basic
principle, is in fact harmonizing the law of procedure in consumer disputes –
something which European legislation has not been able to achieve.

• Applying the rules on unfair contract terms should have a deterrent effect,
which means that an unfair contract term cannot be mitigated, not even
voluntarily by the business in question, and that, once such a term has been
annulled, there is no longer any scope for applying rules of supplementary law
which are not to the consumer’s advantage. This serves to penalise those
businesses which use unfair contract terms, since they will thus benefit less
that if there had been no unfair term at all.

• Passengers suffering long delays in flights have been put in the same position
as passengers of delayed flights who have been offered an alternative flight, so
that they too have a right to compensation (unless the delay has been caused by
extraordinary circumstances which could not have been reasonably avoided). It is
worth noting that the Court has reached this conclusion after having actively
sought out an unclear clause in the Directive in order subsequently to interpret
it in compliance with the principle of equality.

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The transparency requirement and unfair contract terms – a case for reform ?

The transparency requirement stipulated in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive
is an important factor in protecting the consumer against unfair terms and
conditions. Under Article 5 of this Directive, in case of contracts where terms
offered to the consumer are in writing, these terms must always be drafted in
plain, intelligible language. The transparency requirement also plays an
important part in relation to core contract terms – under Article 4(2),
assessment of the unfair nature of the terms relates neither to the definition
of the main subject matter of the contract, nor to the adequacy of its price and
remuneration as against the goods or services supplied in exchange, but only in
so far as these terms are worded in plain intelligible language.

However, the effect of this transparency requirement in the member states has
been highly unequal, in terms of both its application and effectiveness. The
defective regulation of this requirement in the Directive has definitely been a
major contributory factor here. It is true that the Court of Justice has,
through its interpretation, considerably clarified the vague provisions of the
Directive in recent years. Nevertheless, both the legal certainty and
effectiveness of this requirement would benefit considerably from a number of
adjustments. Some of the proposed adjustments consist in the codification of the
case law developed by the Court of Justice.

To clarify the definition and content of this requirement is a matter of
absolute necessity. In the first instance, the wording of the Directive – and
not only its recitals – should make it clear that the transparency requirement
also involves the opportunity to be informed of the terms and conditions of an
agreement prior to its conclusion. Another adjustment could consist in
specifying that the words “plain and intelligible” should also allow “the
average consumer to foresee the economic consequences of the term for him”. This
would merely amount to codifying the Court’s case law. It could also be made
clear that, as is the case in other EU instruments such as the Data Protection
Regulation, the information provided must be concise, communicated in an easily
accessible manner, and worded in clear and plain language. In an international
context, this also entails that the language in which the general terms and
conditions are communicated to the consumer must be the same as that in which
the consumer was approached.

These clarifications will not solve everything, and specific regulation will
still be needed for specific types of agreement. In addition, however, even if
clarified in the manner described above the transparency requirement will remain
a general rule which will not guarantee legal certainty in every case. Neither
the existing numerical tests aimed at expressing the intelligibility and
complexity of a rule, nor its detailed regulation as is applied in certain
foreign jurisdictions, currently provide adequate guarantees that the consumer
will effectively read and understand the general terms and conditions.
Nevertheless, there are lessons to be drawn from the methods applied in
linguistics, and there is evidence that general terms and conditions which are
worded more simply are definitely capable of making them more intelligible. We
therefore deem it extremely useful to lay down detailed guidelines for
formulating simpler general terms and conditions, without making such directions
mandatory law.

Furthermore, transparency will never, by itself, be sufficient to provide the
consumer with adequate protection against unfair contract terms. In many cases,
the consumer will not take the trouble to read the general terms and conditions.
The lack of transparency is one of the main reasons for this, but not the only
or decisive one. Substantive review of contract terms should therefore
definitely be maintained, and, in addition, more thorough requirements should be
imposed for exempting core terms and conditions from such review. This should
only be the case where such key terms and conditions have been brought to the
consumer’s attention in a standardised frame or in a similar prominent manner.
This would make it easier for the consumer to retrieve such essential
information that is excluded from substantive review. At the same time, this
would provide a practical way of drawing the distinction between core contract
terms and other terms. In the United Kingdom, the relevant legislation has been
adjusted along these lines. We would also advocate a rule whereby, in the event
of any dispute or doubt regarding the transparency of a term, the court or the
administrative authority could place the burden of proof on the business in
question. In such cases it would be for the business to prove that such terms
and conditions are sufficiently plain and intelligible for the average consumer
belonging to the target group in question, i.e. the average consumer who
concludes such agreements. Guidelines could be developed which contain
directions as to how such empirical proof can be provided. The standard used
could be similar to the “average consumer” test as applied by the Court of
Justice. However, we would also favour interpreting this “average consumer”
criterion as an empirically-based, rather than as a purely normative, test.
Under this test, a contractual clause would become intelligible where the
majority of a target group of consumers is in a position to understand it
correctly – in the words of the Court of Justice, in a position to evaluate the
economic consequences which derive from it. This ability to place the burden of
proof on the business will also create an incentive to limit the number of
contractual terms in the standardised frame.

Finally, the sanction for an infringement of the transparency requirement should
be specified more clearly in the Directive. Here too, codifying the case law of
the Court of Justice can provide the necessary degree of legal certainty. Not
only is there the rule that the interpretation most favourable to the consumer
shall prevail; in addition, transparency is also a factor to be taken into
account when assessing the fairness of a term. Where there is an lack of
transparency, this can be sufficient to prompt the conclusion that the term in
question is unfair, without making this an automatism. It should also be stated
clearly that transparency cannot constitute a defence or make unequal terms
fair.

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Installing onshore wind turbines in the region of Flanders - a private law
perspective

The available legal literature on the installation of wind turbines frequently
focuses on developments in the law relating to energy on the one hand, and in
the administrative law on the other – i.e. policy objectives, licencing and
appeal procedures, etc. However, the private law dimension is also an element
which is not to be underestimated when it comes to establishing the legal
framework for wind energy projects. However, legal areas such as the law of
property or the law of obligations remain – unjustifiably – under valued in
relation to the installation and operation of wind turbines.

This contribution is the result of a legal analysis of the various stages
involved in the installation of wind turbines. In so doing, the author has
combined various research methods. Interviews with experts and a qualitative
analysis of the relevant documents have brought to light several key legal
issues which have been either neglected or merely treated as a marginal issue in
the existing legal literature.

In this regard, we should consider the various obstacles involved in obtaining
the various rights that relate to the use of land belonging to third parties in
order to be able to build both the wind turbines and the related infrastructure.
Both at the pre-contractual stage and when it comes to obtaining the necessary
property rights (building rights, easements) even the most minor detail is
crucial. Each clause has constantly to be re-examined in the light of, and
geared to, inter alia, the parties involved and the defining features of the
project. Agreements regarding the fees paid for, and the expiry of, the
contracted user rights represent a mere fraction of the issues which frequently
give rise to discussion. The various “intervening” parties, such as tenant
farmers and suppliers of credit, are capable of causing even greater
difficulties when it comes to obtaining the necessary user rights. The right to
use wind, and accusations of “wind theft”, also represent an increasingly
relevant factor.

The author makes it clear that the interaction between energy law,
administrative law and private law is capable of rendering the legal framework
for the operation of wind energy projects a highly complex matter. In order to
reconcile the disparate – and at times even contradictory – interests of the
various parties involved, an exercise in balancing these interests is necessary
at each stage of the installation of wind turbines and wind turbine parks. Such
an exercise does not appear to be devoid of complication and will involve the
expenditure of a good deal of time and energy. Whereas the process of developing
of wind turbines is currently quicker and more straightforward than was the case
20 years ago, the same cannot be said in legal terms – at least not in every
case.

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A sustainable property law: Towards recasting of our law of property?

With the increase in climate change, the finite nature of fossil fuels, and the
growing inequality in the (Western) world, as well as the commitments entered
into by the nations of this world in the context of the 17 United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals, is it time to revalue our law of property – i.e.
inject it with new values? Because of this question, the urgent need to heed the
issue of sustainability is greater than ever. The laws relating to things
provide the building blocks on the basis of which we mould our society – which
is why they are eminently suitable for enabling us to mould a sustainable
society.

Revaluing our property law requires the insight that this law was created on the
basis of a liberal and neo-liberal philosophical and economic mindset. In this
context, we need to consider the earthquakes caused by the extraction of gas in
Groningen, and the mortgage loans granted to customers of whom it is clear from
the outset that they will not be able to pay their debt.

By opting for another philosophical basis, property law can embark on a new
pathway which is focused not only on growth, but also on the use of our
resources for the benefit of ourselves and of the generations that follow us. A
new theoretical framework is needed on the basis of which the circular economy
and the shared economy could operate, and on the basis of which new, innovative
and especially sustainable projects can be shaped. Here, we can consider not
only the collective installation of windmill parks, but also the sustainable
creation and sharing of goods – whether by using existing sharing platforms or
by some other means.

There are currently already many initiatives which are based on the sustainable
use of things. These initiatives avail themselves of the existing rules of
property law. The car sharing firm Cambio, but also the communal purchase and
installation of solar panels, are examples of this. These types of initiatives,
as well as the problems they encounter – such as the property rules on accession
– are receiving increasing attention in legal literature. At the same time,
there is a lack of an all-embracing theory capable of systematically shaping a
continuous system of coherent and sustainable solutions. The development of a
sustainable system of property law requires a set of rules on the basis of which
problems are capable of being solved – i.e. an algorithm – by which a solid
sustainability requirement could be introduced in the law relating to property
and under which the rules of private and of public law could be combined in
order to develop the law further. On the basis of this algorithm we will be able
to decide how we are to interpret our current rules, and whether our rules can
continue to apply in their present form. Such an algorithm could also be used in
order to create new property rules. Accordingly, our entire system of
legislation relating to things and property rights, including the relevant
restricted property rights, and our rules of procedure must be re-evaluated for
this purpose.

The notion of achieving sustainability by pouring all the relevant rules into
the mould of service provision contracts is not the right way to go about this.
Revaluing them, i.e. integrating new values into our system – in this case
general well-being – by creating a relevant obligation under property law,
brings the law relating to goods to the forefront. Thus we all have a duty to
think about how we handle our possessions – such as, for example, our houses.
Thus we can provide the building blocks that will enable us to work together in
creating a sustainable economy in which, in addition to general well-being,
economic growth for everybody and the continued development of new initiatives
occupy a central place.

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Limitation of non-contractual actions for damages to compensate infringements of
anti-trust law: a three-way enigma

In order to stimulate the enforcement of competition law by means of private
law, the Economic Law Code has, for the purpose of implementing Directive
2014/104/ EU, incorporated a number of rules on compensation claims, which
include a number of specific provisions on time limitation.

Regarding the limitation of non-contractual compensation claims for
infringements of anti-trust law which were started or occurred before the new
legislation entered into effect, the author of this paper informs us that, as
matters stand at present, account must be taken of a complex interaction between
(1) the rules on limitation laid down in Article 2262bis, §1, paras. (2) and (3)
of the Civil Code, (2) the Constitutional Court decision of March 10, 2016, and
(3) the new rules on limitation which result from the implementation of
Directive 2014/104/EU, being Articles XVII.90 and XVII.91 of the aforementioned
Code.

Bearing in mind this three-way conundrum, the author adopts a step-by-step
approach in order to determine whether a non-contractual compensation claim for
infringement of anti-trust law which was started or instituted before the new
legislation entered into effect, i.e. 22 June 2017, is time-barred or not.

It also emerges from this contribution that problems could arise in relation to
the limitation of claims when it comes to determining the joint and several
liability of the members of a trust arrangement. Traditionally, it has been
accepted that limitation in time is a “common” defence and is therefore capable
of being relied upon by all the jointly and severally liable parties. This could
produce the – undesirable – consequence that, where such limitation has been
determined for each member of the trust arrangement individually and has entered
into effect for one of these members only (e.g. because that one member had
failed to lodge an appeal against the decision of the competition law authority)
the other members would also be allowed to rely on time limitation. However, the
author, assisted by a comparative glance at other legal systems, demonstrates
that, when it comes to joint and several liability in the passive sense, time
limitation conceived as a common defence need not be regarded as the most sacred
of cows …

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Could environmental servitudes or land charges be an effective patrimonial law
instrument in the cause of environmental protection?

Environmental servitudes or land charges constitute a limited patrimonial right,
which may not necessarily be a “servitude” within the meaning of Article 637 of
the Civil Code, but nevertheless imposes certain obligations on the owner of the
servient tenement in the interests of environmental protection. Examples of
these are orders prohibiting the removal of valuable plants, hedges or woods,
banning the use of certain harmful products, or imposing an obligation to engage
in biological farming. This contribution examines in detail the extent to which
environmental servitudes are capable of definition, why they are appropriate
legal devices, which legal forms they could take, and what factors need to be
taken into account should the lawmaking authorities wish to embed environmental
servitudes in the existing body of legislation.

The first reason why environmental servitudes are appropriate legal devices is
that they are private law instruments, thus making it possible to circumvent any
restrictions imposed by the public law. This is particularly relevant for
private individuals who normally are unable to avail themselves of public law
instruments, but are free to use those in the private law sphere. Private
individuals are thus better able to serve their own needs and desires without
being hamstrung by the vicissitudes of political priorities. The public
authorities will also find them a useful legal device, because, being private
law instruments, they are in principle consensual – which makes it unlikely that
they will be challenged before the administrative courts – and are not subject
to the restrictions resulting from the legality principle (which could restrict
the use of public law servitudes). The use of a patrimonial right rather than a
personal right is inspired by (a) the broader opportunities to rely on a limited
patrimonial right against any legal successors or third parties, and (b) the
more solid protection of patrimonial rights which it provides against any
insolvency on the part of the person on whom the servitude is imposed.

Environmental servitudes can assume various legal forms. The rights which
provide usage and enjoyment of property, such as the right of usufruct, and the
various security interests in property are not suitable legal formats for
environmental servitudes, since they deprive the owner of the full use and
enjoyment of his land (rights of usage and enjoyment) – whereas the object of
the exercise is merely to have him act in accordance with environmental policy
objectives – or restrict themselves to securing the performance of obligations
(security interests in property). Certain foreign legal systems, as well as the
extremely scarce Belgian case law on the subject, indicate that frequent use is
made of ordinary servitudes, of patrimonial rights which are similar to
servitudes, of ground rents (i.e. patrimonial rights which impose a positive
obligation on the owner of the servient tenement) and of patrimonial rights sui
generis. Under Belgian law, ground rents no longer exist as patrimonial rights,
there are no patrimonial rights similar to servitudes, and the numerus clausus
which applies to these rights makes it impossible to give sui generis
patrimonial rights a lawful basis. The only legal form which could be used to
accommodate environmental servitudes is the ordinary servitude as defined in
Article 637 Civil Code. However, this gives rise to a number of problems: (a)
there is a need for a dominant tenement which (b) must benefit directly and
immediately from the servitude, and (c) no positive major obligations may be
imposed on the servient tenement. Therefore, environmental servitudes can only
be used on this legal basis if these three requirements are met, which means
that their scope will be considerably restricted. This type of restriction
appears to be undesirable, given that the importance of a healthy environment
for man and society requires that the former be protected as effectively as
possible.

Naturally, the lawmaking authorities may embed environmental servitudes
expressly in legislation in order to avoid these problems. However, in so doing
they will need to ponder a number of issues. One of these would be the legal
form this would take. The most straightforward solution would be to create a
limited patrimonial right, which could be modelled on an existing patrimonial
right in order to minimise the number of new rules to be enacted. However, it
could ultimately be desirable to create a new and more general category of
limited patrimonial rights, which reduces the risk of discrimination. However,
the danger with this approach would be that it could produce undesirable side
effects. Other examples of the issues that would need to be resolved are the
maximum duration of environmental servitudes – given that the environment exists
for eternity, it would appear appropriate for these servitudes to have eternal
effect – and the question of who would be entitled to institute claims for the
protection of these servitudes.

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Civil law protection of the voice in a commercial context

Technological advances in the recording and reproduction of vocal fragments
represent one of the main factors that have caused a flourishing contractual
practice to develop during the past few decades concerning the voice.
Professional voice actors “dub” foreign language films, record audiobooks or
lend their voice to cartoon characters or all manner of software applications
(e.g. navigation systems, digital assistants such as Apple’s Siri, etc.). In
addition, people in the public eye who are recognisable because of the
characteristic sound of their voice recommend commercial products in radio
commercials. However, the important part played by the voice in commercial law
terms has led to a number of abuses which take the form of, inter alia, secret
recordings, misleading voice distortions and parasitic imitations. In spite of
this, the author notes that the legal framework that regulates use of the voice
in a commercial context has hitherto attracted but scant attention in the legal
literature. This contribution seeks to provide an overview of the existing civil
law rules providing protection which are dependent on the concrete use of the
voice, and at the same time to discuss the applicable rules and the conditions
for their application. In so doing, the author raises the question whether there
is such a thing as the “right to one’s voice” which would protect the
individual’s personality through his/her voice, regardless of the content of the
spoken pronouncements. Although there are currently a number of authors who
regard this type of subjective right as an established right, and include it in
the broad category of personality rights, they frequently do so without any
previous critical and fundamental analysis. With this contribution, it is
intended to remedy this glaring omission through a comparative study of the
relevant Belgian, French, Dutch and Swiss laws.

In Chapter One, the voice is treated as a medium of content. This means that,
firstly, the voice can be protected indirectly to the extent that it gives
expression to a person’s creative mind through the oral interpretation of an
authored work. In view of the need to protect the interests of those artists who
use their voice for both advertising purposes and by way of entertainment,
particular attention is given to the associated rights which apply to them.
However, there are several types of voice usage which, because of the
restrictive conditions for the application of the relevant rules, fall outside
the scope of such protection – such as non-artistic interpretations (e.g. the
use of a neutral voice when recording sounds for voice-activated technology) or
imitations of the voice (and not of the protected performance itself). Secondly,
the voice can, as a medium of content, convey private information, or enable the
listener to identify the voice owner within his private sphere. In such cases,
the person in question may derive his protection from his right to privacy, and
have unlawful use of the voice penalised on that basis.

In Chapter Two, the author examines the legal rules that apply where the voice
is merely used as a patrimonial right. In some rare cases – which concern mainly
the use of misleading voice imitations – unlawful use of the voice is penalised
as an unfair commercial practice. Here, the protection provided seeks to
safeguard not so much the person or his work per se, but the assets of a
business that holds property rights to a voice or its recording. Trade mark law
is also capable of restricting the use of another person’s voice, but here, the
scope of the protection given is limited to such vocal sequences as have been
specifically registered as trade marks.

In Chapter Three, the author asserts that the voice is an aspect of one’s
personality which is just as characteristic of any person as is his visual image
or name. He adds that effective protection of the voice is only possible where
the voice is also treated as an integral personality trait. Copyright, the right
to privacy and other personality rights have their uses for the purpose of
restraining commercial misuse, but do not appear capable of providing protection
against certain types of unlawful reproduction and voice imitation. From the
recent case law on this subject, it emerges that this is the reason for the
ever-increasing number of cases where the law is applied to voice usage. In
terms of the conditions for its application, and the manner in which
infringements are penalised, the right to one’s voice displays many similarities
with other personality rights, whilst nevertheless constituting a protective set
of rules in its own right.

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Accomodating digital products in the Belgian private law

This contribution examines the extent to which the currently applicable Belgian
private law is capable of accommodating digital products. The author decided to
centre his analysis around three crucial and topical subject areas – liens on,
and the attachment of, digital data; electronic contracting and signing in
relation to real estate agreements, and the tort liability for loss caused by
robots.

As regards liens on, and the attachment of, digital data, the author firstly
finds that, under the law as it applies today, the main focus must at all times
be on the data carrier. Digital data not being goods, they cannot themselves be
the subject-matter of an attachment or lien. The paper then proceeds to
demonstrate that the two possible “loopholes” that would enable digital data to
be made subject to an attachment or a lien, i.e. by applying these two
mechanisms to the data carrier, or to a right someone has in relation to digital
data, do not constitute fully adequate alternatives. Thirdly, the article
highlights a number of issues that deserve particular attention, including the
importance of the exclusivity factor when dealing with certain types of data,
and the issues that law-making authorities will need to take into account if and
when they decide to make it possible to subject digital data to liens and
attachments.

The conclusion drawn from the second part of this contribution is that mutual
consent concerning a sale of real estate that is reached electronically is
capable of being signed, and that private sale agreements may also be signed
electronically, but that notarial deeds cannot, for practical reasons, as yet be
drawn up and signed digitally. Accordingly, in order to be able to rely in good
faith on the sale of real estate against third parties, a notarial deed on paper
remains necessary.

The third and final part of this paper demonstrates that the law relating to
contractual liability is better equipped to accommodate (to various degrees)
self-acting digital products than is tort liability. Here, the rules on
contractual liability will enable the liable party to be identified just as
reliably as would be the case in relation to the use of any other product. If
the desired outcome is not reached, or if the necessary steps to achieve this
outcome have not been taken, the contractual party will be held liable,
regardless of whether it was that party’s own act or omission, or that of a
robot, which caused this to happen. The rules on tort liability, on the other
hand, are centred largely around fault-based actions, and around a comparison
between a thing that causes loss and a model that represents the norm. As
self-driving cars become increasingly self-acting, fault-based liability will
increasingly fold into the background, and the emphasis will very much come to
rest on omission-based liability, the scope for which will, however, remain
restricted, because cars of this type will leave the “driver” but few
opportunities to intervene. As regards object-based liability, finding the
appropriate model that fits the norm, or finding the most justifiable safety
expectations as a standard of comparison for a loss-causing self-driving car
will become a difficult task.

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Digitalisation and the Dutch Civil Code

This contribution examines the private law issues which arise from the
digitalisation process and from digital products.

In the first instance, the author analyses the technique and legal status of
electronic signatures. Here, the principles on which safe electronic
communication is based play a crucial part. These principles concern the issues
of identification and authentication (i.e. the assertion of an identity and its
reliable verification), integrity (ensuring that an electronic message remains
unchanged), confidentiality (ensuring that an electronic message remains secret)
and irrefutability (avoiding any unjustified denial that a message has been
compiled, sent or received).

The author asserts that electronic signatures differ as to their nature from
handwritten signatures. Where a handwritten signature has been put to a private
instrument, the approach is based on bona fides. This is because the signatory
can simply and firmly deny that he/she made that signature. Where this occurs,
the burden of proof rests with the party seeking to rely on that instrument. The
bona fides under this principle consists in an assumption that the placing of a
signature shall not be unjustifiably denied. Electronic signatures, on the other
hand, are subject to a riskbased approach – in many cases, they only produce the
same legal consequences as handwritten signatures if they are sufficiently
reliable. This reliability principle is subject to a risk analysis. In
performing this analysis, the risk of unjustified denial will need to be
mitigated. This serves to give substance to the irrefutability principle.

The author further discusses the status of digital products. Digital items such
as databases and software currently appear to be incapable of governance by the
law relating to goods. When it comes to disputes involving databases, the courts
should give greater consideration to the law on data protection. In relation to
software, the copy principle cannot be sustained in a digital environment.

Finally, the author examines self-acting systems. The current rules governing
the creation of agreements still appear to be adequate in order to regard a
person contractually bound where such a system enters into operation. The
existing rules on statute-based tort liability also appear still to be equal to
the task.

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Comparative legal research - its structure, practice and theory

The principal challenge set by comparative legal research is that the researcher
must find a way of handling “foreign” law. This means becoming acquainted with a
body of law in which you essentially received no training, which as a discipline
is alien to your way of thinking, and which has specific institutions and
principles, unspoken codes and commercial practices, as well as its own history,
ideology and self-image. This should be done in a manner which is understandable
not only to those whose thinking is located within the legal systems concerned,
but also to outsiders. Moreover, this must involve more than merely “mapping”
the various differences and similarities between various legal systems. Because
much of the available material regarding legal method has remained stuck at the
theoretical level, its practical relevance appears to be but minimal. It is here
that the most profitable endeavours can be made, and the most important object
of this paper is to provide a guide for the effective performance of comparative
legal research. This has been done by, inter alia, building a research structure
or objective in the form of a step-by step plan.

In this regard a number of more specific questions and challenges of methodology
also arise. How does one formulate a research question? Which legal systems does
one wish to involve in one’s comparative research? Where can there be said to
exist comparability, and what will be the role played by the tertium
comparationis? To what extent does an analysis of foreign law differ from actual
comparative research? What is the meaning of the neutrality principle when it
comes to comparative legal research?

When we consider and study the object and structure of comparative legal
research, as well as the methodological issues that may arise in this regard, we
are automatically also confronted with a number of fundamental questions as to
what we need to regard as legal sources, and as to the disciplinary identity of
legal research. Given that the various approaches towards this question have a
considerable influence on the manner in which the object of the research is
performed, and on the manner in which research develops, these questions are
examined separately – as is the question as to what is actually the specific
nature of comparative law.

The expectation from all of the above is that the interaction between structure
(research objective), practice and theory can provide an insight into the actual
performance of comparative legal research.

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Product liability for self-driving motor vehicles

The arrival of self-driving motor vehicles arouses expectations of a major
upheaval in the manner in which vehicle damage claims will be settled. When
penetrating the inner sanctums of tort liability law, the interested lawyer will
hear voices asserting that product liability is ready and primed to take over
the baton of fault-based liability as the standard mechanism for settling
compensation claims. However, if we consider product liability law in its
current state, one cannot deny that the latter is in itself insufficiently
up-to-date for the purpose of adequately regulating this innovative type of
vehicle and any torts that may arise from it. Accordingly, the author of this
paper formulates a number of proposals aimed at readying product liability for
the arrival of self-driving motor vehicles. However, given the major role which
self-driving vehicles are about to assume in society, their introduction also
provides an excellent opportunity to reassess certain aspects of product
liability in general. Thus product liability will not only have a part to play
in the introduction of self-driving motor vehicles – the latter will also be of
considerable use for the development of the law of torts in general and product
liability in particular.

The first issue to arise in this regard concerns the relevant software. To this
day, uncertainty persists as to whether software in itself – independently of
its carrier – constitutes a product within the meaning of product liability.
However, this can definitely be said to be the case, so that where the defective
operation of any software the victim will be able to engage not only the
liability of the end producer of the self-driving motor vehicle, but also that
of the manufacturer of the deficient software.

The second – and possibly most important – problem in this area resides in the
fundamental incompatibility of the “consumer expectations” test with innovative
products such as self-driving motor vehicles. The lack of clarity and certainty
to which this situation gives rise is a major impediment to their introduction –
this is the so-called chilling effect. In order to redirect the focus towards
the product itself, so as to provide both the producer and the consumer with a
greater degree of certainty as to the existence or non-existence of product
deficiency, it would appear advisable to adopt the “risk/utility” approach
instead. Such a difference in approach is less momentous than it might seem at
first sight, given that both the courts and the leading authors have been known
to apply risk/utility criteria when applying the “consumer expectations” test.

Thirdly, the scope of the material damage which is capable of attracting
compensation should be extended to cover material damage beyond the private
sphere. It would also appear desirable to abolish the franchise deductible in
any future legislation on this subject. If product liability is to assume the
role assigned to it by the inner sanctum voices referred to earlier, there must
be available a sufficiently broad range of loss types capable of compensation,
without the victims being compelled, as they are currently required, to claim
under a different set of compensation. In addition, a comprehensive exercise in
harmonising the rules on compensable loss is highly desirable, in view of the
cross-frontier nature of torts involving self-driving motor vehicles on the one
hand, and the aims of the EU Product Liability Directive on the other.

The laws governing the right of recovery, which is capable of applying as
between the producer claimed against and any jointly liable producers, would
also benefit from regulation at the European level. Failing this, there is the
danger that producers will relocate to member states whose rules on the right of
recovery best serves their interests – an outcome which is also inconsistent
with the aims and objectives of the Directive.

Finally, the ten-year expiry period also presents several problems when it comes
to the introduction of self-driving motor vehicles. More specifically, this
expiry period is difficult to reconcile with the inevitable software updates, or
with the fact that self-driving motor vehicles are themselves capable of
developing certain practices. Serious consideration should therefore be given to
abolishing this expiry period.

It is important to consider these proposed adjustments together, rather than
separately. Whereas one particular proposal will result in the balance shifting
slightly towards the producer, another will serve to restore the balance. If
either of the parties involved in this legal relationship, i.e. the producer or
the (potential) victim, acquires the impression that the rules on product
liability are too heavily weighted in the interests of the other party, a
certain chilling effect will undoubtedly be the result. Given the certainty that
self-driving motor vehicles will lead to a more efficient and safer use of our
roads, this is an outcome that must be avoided at all cost.

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The company and estate interest and the conundrum of Dionysius - Towards new
wine in old bottles?

In this contribution, the central issue is the following: “In whose interest
should the administrators of a company/estate act”? This question may at first
appear to deal with two separate issues, but is conceived by the author as a
single inquiry. Companies experiencing financial difficulties and those in good
financial health have this in common – they will be administered by a body or
person, where appropriate in the form of a trustee. Accordingly, both company
law and insolvency law will be faced with the same question. The dichotomy
reflected in the question on which this paper is based concerns, in essence, a
company’s financial situation. The author accordingly seeks answers in the legal
and legal/economic theories that govern both company law and the rules on
insolvency.

In Part One (nos. 4-13), the author concludes that the existing legal theories
fall short of providing an appropriate and complete answer to the question posed
in this paper. The basic principles governing the company interest and the
estate interest – both in the broad and relatively narrow sense – currently find
themselves in a state of flux. In addition, the courts and legal authors are
frequently at odds with each other on this subject.

In Part Two (nos. 14-53), the author actually seeks to solve the conundrum and
in so doing consults the existing legal and economic theories relating to
business units and insolvency procedures. In his search for an adequate answer,
he examines successively the transaction cost theory (nos. 18-19), the contract
theory (nos. 20- 21), the property rights theory (nos. 22-25), the
agent/principal theory (nos. 26-31), the law & finance literature (nos. 32-37),
the team production theory applied to business units (nos. 38-39), the
creditors’ bargain theory (nos. 40-44), the broad contract theory (nos. 46-47),
the “dirty, complex, elastic and interconnected view of bankruptcy” (nos.
48-49), the team production theory applied to insolvencies (nos. 50-51) and the
explicit value approach (nos. 52-53).

In Part Three, the author, on the basis of the contract and property rights
theories, combined with valuable insights obtained from other theories, takes a
normative approach under which the company/estate should be administered in the
interest of the residual economic property rights holders (no. 55). For
financially healthy companies, these holders are, in principle, the shareholders
(including the creditors as “future shareholders”); in the case of companies
experiencing financial difficulties, they are the creditors (including the
shareholders as structurally secondary creditors). Thus the company and estate
interest acquires a dynamic dimension. For this approach, the author finds
authority in a positive economic analysis of the current reforms of Belgian
company and insolvency law (no. 56). In so doing, the author concedes that the
administration of a company or estate should be monitored by the residual
economic property rights holders, unless the expenses incurred by the principal
are, in essence, disproportionately high. Here, we are dealing with a cost/
benefit assessment between the increased principal costs and the reduced agent
costs.

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Does extinctive prescription exist, or is it merely a form of acquisitive
prescription? Prescription as monist or dualist concept

It is generally accepted that there is a fundamental difference between
acquisitive and extinctive prescription, the implication being that the authors
of the Napoleonic Civil Code erred by dealing with them under one and the same
heading. Recently, the authors Frédéric Zenati-Castaing and Stephanie Fournier
have attempted to disable this assumption, maintaining as they do that
extinctive prescription is a variant on acquisitive prescription. This enables
the debtor to acquire the obligation owed by him through acquisitive
prescription – after which the obligation is extinguished through merger of
debts. Our contribution examines this challenge to the prevailing assumptions.

In historical terms, it does appear that there has been a tendency to regard
extinctive and acquisitive prescription as one and the same concept (absolute
monism), as was, for example, the case under the customary law of Paris.
However, even at that time this had not prevented a number of authors, such as
Pothier, from making a clear distinction between extinctive and acquisitive
prescription.

The text of the Napoleonic Civil Code also supports the notion that extinctive
and acquisitive prescription amount to the same concept. However, if we take
note of the intention displayed by the drafters of the Code, the position
becomes much less clear. There are a number of unambiguous statements which
establish a difference between extinctive and acquisitive prescription.

A comparative examination of the requirements for, and implications of,
extinctive and acquisitive prescription also indicates that there are
fundamental differences between both these concepts. Thus possession is only a
requirement under acquisitive prescription, as has been confirmed by the Supreme
Court (Hof van Cassatie), even though what could be described as “negative”
possession can also play a relevant – although in most cases limited – part when
it comes to the extinctive prescription of certain limited property rights. In
terms of the effect of both types of prescription, it is only acquisitive
prescription that has acquisition of ownership as its outcome.

Nevertheless, it would appear that both extinctive and acquisitive extinction
entail that a right – being a legal situation – is, during a certain amount of
time, countered by a factual situation, after which the factual situation
becomes consolidated. As a result, both these concepts belong to one and the
same legal category (conceptual monism). This is comparable to the relationship
between sale and lease – both concepts are fundamentally different, but fall
within the scope of agreements; consequently, there are a number of rules which
apply to both these concepts.

The conclusion to be derived from the foregoing is that there is indeed a
fundamental difference between extinctive and acquisitive prescription.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that they present no similarities,
given that the element they have in common is the lapsing of time. Indeed, there
are a number of other rules which are common to both these types of
prescription.

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The majority shareholders‘ duty of company loyalty - reassessing the scope and
abuse of shareholders‘ voting rights

The principle of majority decision-making in companies creates the risk of the
majority shareholders enriching themselves at the company’s expense. The
requirement of good faith which governs the performance of contracts goes some
way towards mitigating the agency issues that potentially arise from this
situation. The exact nature of the conduct which this requirement imposes on the
shareholder is qualified by whatever status is attributed to his/her voting
rights. On the one hand, these rights could be qualified as functional, as are
those enjoyed by the company directors. On these terms, the shareholders are
required to act in the interest of the company if they are not to be found
guilty of misuse of powers. However, these voting powers could also be regarded
as being quasi-discretionary, as is the case with the owners’ powers. If this
approach applies, shareholders are not bound to act in the company’s interest,
but are merely required to refrain from abusing their right. The distinction
between these two conceptions is particularly marked where any conflict of
interest arises between the majority shareholders and the company itself. Only
where a functional concept of voting right applies does an obligation arise to
subordinate the shareholders’ individual interest to that of the company – i.e.
that which the author of this paper describes as the “duty of loyalty”.

By analogy with the fiduciary obligations imposed under the common law
jurisdictions, various functional powers arise where the ownership of an asset
is split by separating title or control from the economic or financial interest.
The shareholders entrust control over their contribution to the company organs,
whilst all the time retaining its economic or equitable ownership. This entails
that the powers held by the general meeting of shareholders are, in principle,
functional. This is because the shareholders are merely the beneficiaries of the
company’s assets as a group, whereas the decisions are made by shareholder
majority. However, the general meeting is unable to act in the company’s
interest if its members, who play a part in the decision-making process, do not
themselves act in the company’s interest. Accordingly, the shareholders’ voting
rights are definitely rights that are functional and must be exercised in the
company’s interest.

Where the shareholders refrain from exercising their voting rights in the
company’s interest, they are guilty of misuse of powers. The traditional view
has been that, in this area, the courts should apply the “highly deferential
standard of review” test. This entails that the courts should not assess the
decision in question on its suitability or acuity. Any review of a decision as
to whether it constitutes misuse of powers can only be based on a procedural
test, with the court assessing whether or not the shareholders acted rationally
and subjectively in good faith. In essence, this creates a quasi irrebuttable
presumption that the decision in question serves the company’s interests.
However, such an assumption is untenable where there exists a conflict of
interest between the majority shareholder and the company. Where a conflict of
interest arises, the court will also need to assess whether the majority
shareholder acted loyally, i.e. whether he subordinated his interest to that of
the company. The test used by the courts should not be the highly deferential
standard of review, because loyalty, just as much as rationality and acting in
good faith, is a criterion by which the courts may test the shareholders’
actions, whether fully or not.

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Force majeure and hardship - a case of split personality?

Having concluded an agreement, a contracting party may, as a result of a change
in circumstances, experience difficulties in performing his contractual
obligation. Such changes in circumstances could take the form of a financial and
economic crisis, a fierce storm, or a ban on exports. Force majeure and hardship
(which, for the purpose of the contribution, includes the English doctrine of
frustration of purpose) are the two doctrines which come to the fore where
difficulties of this nature arise which are beyond that party’s control. Both
these doctrines are used in order to remedy a situation whereby the party owing
the obligation experiences difficulties in performing it because circumstances
changed after he had concluded the agreement. However, the Belgian substantive
law only allows such a party to plead force majeure. In principle, hardship has
no place in the Belgian substantive law.

Force majeure and hardship have many common requirements. In each case, it is
necessary for an extraordinary change of circumstances to have occurred after
the conclusion of a contract, on the understanding that this change was not
attributable to the party owing. The change in circumstances will not be
attributable to the party owing if the latter was unable to foresee the change
at the moment of concluding the agreement or to avoid the change. In addition,
it is required that the party owing had not agreed to assume the risk of the
change in circumstances.

However, there is one requirement which is deemed to constitute the essential
difference between force majeure and hardship – the impossibility requirement
which characterises force majeure is said to differ from the serious impediment
requirement on which hardship is based. The party owing may only plead force
majeure where he can demonstrate that it is impossible for him to perform the
obligation. The established view is that it is insufficient for the party owing
to have experienced serious difficulties in performing his obligation – in such
cases no specific remedy would be available to that party under the ordinary
law, given that, in principle, hardship has no place in the current Belgian law.

In this contribution, the author examines this one requirement which is said to
represent the essential difference between force majeure and hardship. A key
question that arises under this essential point of difference is whether the
situation of the party for whom the change in circumstances has made it
impossible to perform his obligation is truly different from that of a party who
experiences serious difficulty in performing his obligation as a result of a
change in circumstances.

As regards force majeure, an extensive analysis of the Belgian case law on force
majeure, coupled with a brief survey of the French, German and English approach
towards this question, shows that it is deemed impossible for a party to perform
his obligation where it is clearly unreasonable to require him to perform it
subject to this change in circumstances. The party owing cannot therefore be
bound to make a clearly greater effort to perform his obligation than the effort
which is expected of a normally diligent person experiencing the same concrete
circumstances.

Under the doctrine of hardship, there is a turning point as from which
performing the obligation becomes not merely difficult, but seriously difficult
for the party owing. From a comparative study of this question, it emerges that
bona fides (good faith) is a suitable criterion for determining the stage at
which this turning point has been reached. Therefore, the party owing will be
deemed to experience serious difficulties in performing his obligation where the
other contracting party would clearly be acting unreasonably by requiring the
party owing to perform his obligation subject to this change in circumstances.
The party owing is accordingly deemed to experience serious difficulty in
performing his obligation where he is required to make a clearly greater effort
to perform his obligation than the effort which is expected of a normally
diligent person experiencing the same concrete circumstances.

Consequently, the author can conclude that the essential difference between
force majeure and hardship has no basis in reality. The situation of the party
owing for whom it is impossible to perform his obligations is not actually any
different from that of the party owing who experiences serious difficulty in
performing his obligation. Therefore, the party owing will be able to plead
force majeure where he is required to make a clearly greater effort to perform
his obligation than the effort which is expected of a normally diligent person
experiencing the same concrete circumstances. This criterion applies equally to
the three types of impossibility (material, legal or moral impossibility) and to
the situations which have traditionally been reserved for hardship (including
the frustration of purpose doctrine). This criterion will also come into play
where the party owing is faced with a serious distortion in the relative values
of the mutual obligations as agreed between the contracting parties when
concluding the agreement, and where the party owing no longer can fulfil the
objective he sought to achieve with the agreement and which the other
contracting party has in a certain sense made his own.

The general conclusion necessarily to be drawn from the foregoing is that force
majeure and hardship apply to the same situations. Where there is no difference
in the requirements to be fulfilled, both doctrines will apply to the same
situations. Accordingly, those situations which have traditionally been reserved
for the doctrine of hardship can also be brought within the scope of force
majeure. From this contribution, the concrete conclusion arises that Belgian law
does not need the notion of hardship as distinct from force majeure.

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Quiet watchman or mediator? The role of the courts in business restructuring and
bankruptcy from a historical perspective

It is possible to assess the Belgian law on court-ordered restructuring, as laid
down in the 2009 Law on Business Continuity and in Part XX of the Business Law
Code (Wet Continuiteit Ondernemingen – WCO), from a historical viewpoint. Many
of the relevant rules continue to be conditioned by the historical link with
bankruptcy and suspension of payments, as a favour bestowed on the unfortunate
debtor. That much is clear from the limited involvement of the creditors in the
procedure for court-ordered restructuring.

In the course of the 19th century, provision was made for short-term
postponements of payments. Initially, this was a favour conferred by the public
authorities – over which the creditors had no control. The rationale behind it
was that the suspension of payments was largely a monolithic concept, which
meant that there was no need for any debate on the substance of this measure.
Another factor was the narrow, business-oriented interpretation of this concept.
As from 1851, suspension of payments (sursis de paiement) became dependent on
approval by the majority of creditors representing 75 per cent of the total
volume of debts owing. Thus, the suspension of payments became more closely
associated with bankruptcy. However, even after business restructuring not
associated with bankruptcy was made possible in 1883 – in the shape of
composition (concordat préventif) – the right to initiate and determine the
contents of the agreement reached remained with the debtor. Admittedly, the
creditors had the right to consult each other on the proposed agreement, and
provision was made for some mediation by the delegated judge. However, these
measures, which represented a recognition, to a certain degree, of the unique
nature of the restructuring procedure, disappeared in 1946. In 1997, they were
partially reintegrated in the Law on Composition (Wet Gerechtelijk Akkoord –
WGA); however, the 2009 Business Law Code opted for a strict “open portal”
approach and repealed them once again. Here, a distrustful attitude towards any
creditor-led procedure combined with the lingering implicit notion, referred to
above, of the need for temporary protection for the debtor – however
undifferentiated this may be. Since then, the debtor has enjoyed a virtually
exclusive right to initiate and determine the terms of the restructuring
programme, which can merely be approved or rejected. All this is inconsistent
with the intrinsic nature of the law relating to restructuring, which is based
on the principle of co-operation as well as an assumption of a thorough
assessment of the interests of all the parties involved, with a view to enabling
the business that finds itself in difficulties to survive.

In addition, the limited degree to which the restructuring plans are subject to
assessment is a consequence of the notion, mentioned above, of a restructuring
programme subject to little differentiation and of a narrow, business-oriented
approach. There is also the historical link with the rules on bankruptcy, over
which the commercial courts had little control. On this issue, the Belgian law
relating to business restructuring as it applied during the 19th, 20th and 21st
century was very much based on the bankruptcy law model. Admittedly the 1997 WGA
made provision for a business-oriented analysis, by the courts, of the relevant
application and restructuring plan. This measure was, again, excluded from the
WCO. Even though the laws regarding restructuring are currently regarded as the
exception, rather than the rules, to the ordinary rules on this subject in the
applicable private and procedural law, this is the reason for the subsistence of
the statutory restrictions which are a historical legacy of the law on
bankruptcies. However, some business-oriented oversight of the contents of
restructuring plans remains necessary in order to meet the objectives of the
rules governing the restructuring procedure, which is to enable the revival of
the business in question.

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"Justice ou liberté?” The influence of the first world war on Belgian Private
law

In 1921, the Brussels lawyer Georges Marcotty wrote: “Fatalement, la guerre
engendre de multiples conflits dans tous les domaines du droit, procès en
matière de successions, procès en matière d’absence, d’état civil, d’assurances,
de marchés de fourniture, d’exécution de contrats de tous genres” (Inevitably,
war will bring about many developments in all areas of the law – especially in
the procedural rules affecting succession, proceedings in absentia, the civil
registration authority, insurance, public procurement, and the performance of
all types of contract). The First World War had a distinct effect on the Belgian
private law, which had experienced but few radical changes since the country’s
independence in 1830.

In the field of legal history, the commemoration of World War I has revived
interest in the question of Belgium’s neutrality, and recent years have
witnessed the publi- cation of detailed studies on the penalisation of Flemish
“activism” (i.e. ideological connivance with the German occupier), martial
courts, and other related issues of criminal law. Unlike the situation in
Belgium’s neighbours, the private law implications of World War I received but
minimal attention in this country. This general overview seeks to provide any
researchers in this area with some possible avenues to explore in this field,
and to provide them with a starting point.

The main theme of this contribution concerns the various measures taken by both
the Belgian authorities and the occupying forces, and their implications for our
private law, both during and after the War. To put it briefly – how did World
War I affect the Belgian private law?

In 1920, the Journal des Tribunaux shed some light on this subject in an anon-
ymous contribution entitled “Justice ou Liberté?”. In so doing, the author was
making a fervent case for tenancy laws which were more “equitable” – i.e. fairer
in social terms. Did this notion of social fairness express itself in other
proposals in the Belgian private law? For an answer to this question, the author
refers to the legislation which can be found in the laws as published in their
official organs (i.e., for Belgium, the Belgisch Staatsblad, for the German
occupiers, the Verordnungs- blätter). These sources are supplemented by
information derived from the parlia- mentary proceedings and the legal
literature of the day. This contribution taking the form of an overview, the
legislation in question has not been assessed against its application. However,
the author firmly concludes that World War I released the private law from the
freedom principle and broke, once and for all, with the notion of the “watchman
state”.

Following an overview of the legal patchwork that Belgian law undoubtedly was
during the Occupation – given that three legal systems governed Belgian territo-
ry at that time – this contribution focuses on the organisational and procedural
changes brought about by the Occupation. Both the German and the Belgian au-
thorities issued rules which were aimed at enabling the law to take its course
as far as possible. The author deals successively with the laws governing
damages, the general law of contracts, the law of landlord and tenant, family
law, property law and – albeit briefly – company law. Each section specifies the
subject areas which could give rise to a new and in-depth inquiry capable of
further investigation.

World War I was much less a watershed than a turning point in the Belgian pri-
vate law. Such changes as were implemented were implemented following this world
conflict, such as the rule allowing single-judge proceedings, had already
featured on the political agenda for some considerable time. Moreover, the
public intervention which has occurred since the start of the 20th century
ruptured the strict summa divisio between the public and the private law. The
law increasingly protected both the general interest and the mutual interest of
its citizens. Freedom gave way to solidarity, and the “nightwatchman state”
which prevailed during the 19th century disappeared with the Armistice.

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The great war and the dutch law of contracts - neutrality, resistance and
responsiveness

In order to avoid being trapped between the Central Powers and the allied
armies, the Kingdom of The Netherlands adhered strictly to its neutral stance
during World War 1. Although this enabled this country to exempt itself from the
battlefield, the War definitely left its mark on its social and economic
relations. This paper essentially deals with the direct and indirect impact
produced by the Great War on the Dutch law of contracts.

The first direct consequence was felt almost immediately following the events of
28 July 1914. The legal framework for these direct consequences, such as the
crip- pling of trade, financial transactions and food supplies, proved to be
unequal to the situation. The result took the form of rapid interventions in the
free market on the part of the authorities, which meant suspending stockmarket
activity and extensive regulation of banking and currency activity.

Another aspect of the Great War which had important implications for the law of
contracts concerned a public limited liability company called NV Nederlandse
Overzee Trustmaatschappij (NOT). In September 1914, a major network of con-
tractual obligations was set up which was nurtured by NOT. The latter developed
a network of contracts aimed at underpinning the Dutch Government’s neutrality
in its trading policy. Allowing a private corporation to take the lead in
regulating import and export trading activity gave rise to some astute
arrangements between the English Admiralty and the German Empire – given that
the economy of the Netherlands was dependent on both. The system of “consents”
which NOT ap- plied to imports and exports was a trading system which was based
entirely on self-regulation, and therefore on the law of contracts and which was
capable of distinguishing between qualified smuggling and the free exchange of
goods. Later during the War the part played by the law of contracts became
redundant, and the business of importing and exporting became increasingly
problematic.

Another element which played a part in this matter was the question of “force
majeure”. Because of the rapidly rising prices of goods and of their conveyance,
the notion of “force majeure” in the law of contracts came under increasing
pres- sure. Since the introduction of the Civil Code in 1838, no international
conflict as disruptive as WW1 proved to be had arisen. So to a certain extent
World War 1 served as a “stress test” for the continuity of the essential
principles of the law of contracts, such as force majeure and frustration. It
would appear that, during the early stages of the War, no attempt was made at
finding an accommodation with pressured debtors – pleas of force majeure were
seldom acknowledged. Nor did the legal authors of that time display much
sympathy towards debtors who were faced with increasing cost prices. The
narrative that prevailed was that they resorted to force majeure in order to be
released from their obligations and subsequently to conclude agreements on much
more favourable terms. Their pleas were met with little sympathy. However, as
the War continued to rage, some changes were made. It is true that debtors who
entered into obligations in the full knowledge that they were doing so in
wartime conditions were frequently held to risk acceptance. Nev-ertheless, some
lower courts were prepared to issue rulings which were prepared to make
concessions to unexpected circumstances. These cautious developments encouraged
two lines of argument, i.e. (1) the debate as to whether force majeure
accommodated both objective and subjective impossibility (i.e both
impossibilitas and difficultas), and (2) whether unforeseen circumstances could
give rise to re- scission or adjustment of the contract in question. During, and
immediately after, the Great War neither of these lines of argument were settled
by the courts, but did feature in the legal literature at that time. The
Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) remained quite reticent on this issue – in
1926 it ruled that a display of bona fides was unable to detract from a
contractual obligation once undertaken, even in the light of the fundamental
change in values which followed the War. In 1931, the Supreme Court continued
this strict approach with the “Mark is Mark” decision, in which it held that, in
relation to debts expressed in money, the nominality principle could not be set
aside, not even in times of hyper-inflation. However, a number of legal authors
took issue with this approach, and the lower courts frequently ploughed their
own furrow. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to regard World War 1
as one of the factors which explain the eventual introduction of the “unforeseen
circumstances” doctrine, and the subsequent advance made by the bona fides
principle. At the same time, the decisions made by the Supreme Court at the time
could to a certain extent be regarded as an expression of The Netherlands’
policy of neutrality.

An analysis of the events and developments of the day indicates that such dogmas
as the freedom to contract and the free market died once and for all during the
Great War, even in a neutral country such as The Netherlands. It is certainly
the case that, in the longer term, when it looked as if the War was going to
rage for much longer than many had expected, the compulsory distribution of
goods and services, and the extensive intervention in contracts and market
regulation to which it gave rise became a matter of necessity. Accordingly,
World War 1 can justly be regarded as the definitive end of the laissez-faire
principle in the law of contracts.

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The position at private law of transgender people in Belgium

Since 2007, Belgian law includes legislation enabling transsexuals to change
their sex registered in the Civil Status Registry (CSR), before the relevant CSR
official. Until 1/1/2018, this was only possible under strict medical
conditions, which included evidence of sterilisation. The Law of 25/6/2017 has
vastly improved the legal position of transgender persons. The Belgian
Government considered that its obligations under international human rights law
impelled it to introduce a system based on the principle of self-determination.
The Law of 18/6/2018 modernised and digitalised the CSR, as a result of which
the specific civil certificates changing registered sex, renewing a change of
registered sex, and annulling a change of registered sex are no longer drafted
on paper and kept in traditional files, but are drawn up and kept in an
electronic databank.

In Belgium, legal gender recognition is effected by means of a procedure that
takes place before the CSR official and is conducted over two stages, including
a compulsory waiting period. The interested party shall, in the first instance,
make a submission in writing that, for some considerable time, they have been
convinced that the sex registered in their birth certificate no longer conforms
to their lived gender identity, and that they desire the legal consequences of a
change of their registered sex. During the applicant’s first appearance in
person, the relevant CSR official draws their attention to the irrevocable
nature, in principle, of such change, gives them an information brochure, and
provides them with details of transgender organisations. The Public Prosecutor’s
Office may issue a negative opinion regarding the desired change of registered
sex as being contrary to public order – which will be based almost exclusively
on fraud (including identity fraud). Where the Public Prosecutor’s Office issues
such a negative opinion, the CSR official must refuse to effect the relevant
change of registered sex. In order to reduce injudicious applications, there is
a compulsory waiting period, from three to six months, between the applicant’s
first and second appearances, during which the latter must submit a written
statement affirming their initial intention and proving their awareness of the
consequences thereof. Only once this has been completed the change of registered
sex may be formally adjusted.

Where the CSR official refuses to effect the change, the applicant may appeal to
the Family Court. When it comes to minors, the applicant must be aged 16 or over
and requires confirmation by a child-and-youth psychiatrist that the minor in
question has sufficient powers of discernment for their continued conviction
that their sex registered at birth does not conform to their lived gender
identity. In so doing, the minor must be assisted by both parents or a legal
representative. Where such parents or legal representative refuse to provide the
required assistance, the minor in question may request authorisation from the
Family Court to make the relevant application, assisted by an ad-hoc guardian.

Where the application is contrary to public order, the Public Prosecutor’s
Office is obliged to apply for annulment of the change in question.

In principle, any change of registered sex is irrevocable. However, the relevant
legislation makes it possible to ‘return’ to the sex registered at birth via a
procedure conducted before the Family Court, on production of evidence of
exceptional circumstances, which, in light of the preparatory Parliamentary
proceedings and the information brochure, are open to the widest possible
interpretation. Any change in the transgender applicant’s first name(s) is also
effected by the CSR official by means of a statement made in good faith which is
attached to the application, no medical conditions being required. Transgender
persons have the right to amend their first names in return for a concessionary
fee, amounting to a maximum of 10 per cent of the municipal charge which may,
but is not compulsory, be levied. Minors may apply for a first-name change from
the age of 12 onwards.

Belgian law has specific rules governing the filiation of transgender persons.
Transmen who bear children become mothers. The filiation of transwomen who, by
natural childbirth or medical intervention, have created children is determined
by applying the rules governing paternity by analogy, but on condition that the
transwoman in question is mentioned as co-mother. In all other cases it is the
new gender that shall be determinative.

Belgian law also makes provision for specific rules which protect transgender
privacy, by restricting the category of persons having the right to obtain
copies of the relevant entries, and by restricted access to certificate changing
registered sex through the electronic database of the CSR.

In spite of all these progressive changes, the Belgian Constitutional Court has
annulled a number of sections of the Law of 25/6/2017, following a request by
three LGBT interest groups. This was effected by its judgment of 19/6/2019, at a
time when the contents of the annulled provisions had already been incorporated
into other Articles – as yet unchallenged – of the Civil Code (CC). The basic
provision, which is the former Article 62bis CC (now Article 135(1) thereof) has
been annulled in that this provision contains a lacuna, to the extent that it
makes it impossible for persons having a non-binary identity to change their
registered sex in light of their actual gender identity. The Court also annulled
(a) the irrevocable nature – in principle – of the change of registered sex, (b)
the judicial “return procedure” before the Family Court, and (c) the rule that
first-name change subject to a concessionary fee and motivated by gender
incongruence, may only be granted once.

Out of respect for the fundamental rights of gender fluid persons, the author
advocates that not only the annulled contents of the relevant Civil Code
provisions be deleted, but also that measures be adopted which go further than
such amending legislation – in that it adds one or more gender categories to the
binary categories currently in existence, both for the purposes of gender
registration at birth and in the context of any subsequent change. This should
be followed by the final step – the removal of any sex or gender identity from
one’s personal civil status.

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Non-rivalrous property in the light of the acquisitive effect of possession of
intellectual property rights

Intellectual property rights have the particular characteristic that they are
non-rivalrous items of property, which means that they are capable of being used
simultaneously in the same manner by more than one person. Thus many persons can
read or print the same book, several firms are capable of using the same brand
name, more than one entrepreneur can apply the same industrial process. This
particular characteristic has prompted many legal authors and courts to conclude
that acquisitive prescription of intellectual property rights is impossible to
achieve, more particularly because any such prescription would at all times be
ambiguous. This paper seeks to establish whether in fact this supposition is
correct, as it could give rise to doubt.

This starting point makes it possible to examine how the non-rivalrous nature of
goods could influence the law of property. This is because the latter is based
on the assumption that goods are, in principle, rivalrous – in that all material
goods, and many non-material ones, are rivalrous. As a result, acquisitive
prescription appears to be a highly suitable vehicle for this characteristic,
based as it is, to a large extent, on a factual situation, i.e. possession,
which is perfectly capable of adjustment (more particularly in the shape of dual
possession, under which two equal rights can apply at the same time) and not
being dependent on such instruments as public records which could be capable of
diminishing the non-rivalrous nature of intellectual property rights.

It would seem that, in principle, there is nothing to prevent acquisitive
prescription from applying here. The current law does not prohibit acquisitive
prescription of intellectual property rights – except in relation to immaterial
rights, which, however, have no impact on property rights. Non-material property
is capable of possession. Moreover, the non-rivalrous nature of intellectual
property rights has an impact only where there is a case of dual possession,
which can only apply where there is more than one possessor. Accordingly, the
argument that the possession of intellectual property rights is an ambiguous
proposition has no validity whatsoever.

The non-rivalrous nature of intellectual property rights is not by itself
insurmountable either. It would appear that, in several respects, the law has
taken this into account and provides ways of weakening the exclusive nature of
intellectual property rights. It therefore requires no leap of the imagination
for the same considerations to apply in relation to acquisitive prescription
where there is dual possession and, therefore, two parties are in possession of
the same intellectual property rights – without them being joint owners or
possessors.

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The underestimated role of the freedom to contract under the current and future
law of property: real obligations as a test case

The finding that property law has many gaps which can be rectified by means of
the law of contracts forms the basis of this article. This is illustrated by
means of several issues concerning real obligations, or obligations related to
property rights, such as the maintenance of property subject to an easement and
the periodic payments owed by the holder of a building right.

The first part of this article analyses several deficiencies in the law of
property which are rarely debated in Belgian legal circles, but in respect of
which Dutch law is at a more developed stage. The regulation of property rights
is discussed, in particular the question if and to what extent rights,
obligations and powers agreed upon by parties which create a right relating to a
property come within the scope of the law of property and thus become part of
the relevant property rights. In addition, the legal effects of the transfer and
forfeiture of a property right are not adequately regulated by legislation. It
is, for instance, unclear if and to what extent the transferor of a property
right remains liable for the obligations connected to the property right after
the transfer has been effected. Dutch legislation contains statutory provisions
for specific property rights and the Belgian Reform of Property Law introduces
provisions aimed at determining the effects of both the transfer and forfeiture
of a property right.

The second part of the article concerns the question of how parties creating or
transferring a property right can as effectively and comprehensively as possible
regulate their legal position, bearing in mind the deficiencies mention above.
Even where statutory regulation applies, the parties may wish to depart from it,
in which case the permissive or mandatory nature of the statutory regulation
must be checked. This article demonstrates that the parties have many
opportunities to regulate property law by means of one or more contracts. In
some cases, this contractual regulation can even confer quasi-proprietary status
on merely personal provisions, such as a perpetual clause and a restriction of
the power to dispose of the property and/or property right.

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The impact of the new B2B legislation on freedom of contract and legal certainty
- a comparative analysis

Belgium’s law of obligations is based on the principle of contractual freedom.
This principle guarantees the freedom on the part of the parties to determine
the terms of their agreements themselves. The traditional justification for this
principle has been that each party is placed on an equal footing and is
therefore capable of protecting its own interests. However, where one of the
parties to an agreement appears to be in a weaker bargaining position than the
other, corrections are desirable. In such cases, legislation can be adopted that
seeks to create a level playing field for all parties – more particularly by
means of rules which protect the contracting parties against boilerplate terms
and conditions. For the first time in Belgium, the Act of 4/4/2019 has laid down
rules aimed at protecting businesses against unfair contractual terms in
business-to-business (B2B) transactions. These new rules complement existing
legislation on unfair terms in business-to-consumer (B2C) agreements, but depart
from its substance. The lawmaker has justified the extension of B2C protection
rules to B2B situations, arguing that unequal bargaining positions also arise
where the parties act as part of their professional activity, so that they too
require protection. This paper examines the areas in which the new B2B
legislation is capable of restricting freedom of action, and to what extent the
additional protection provided undermines legal certainty. In so doing, the
authors examine the legislation’s rationales, and analytically compare Belgian
law to the law in Germany, France, the Netherlands and Italy.

The first striking aspect of the new Belgian legislation, is that its potential
for restricting freedom of action is greater than is the case in the
neighbouring countries. This results from the broader scope, in personal and
material terms, of the Belgian rules, as they cover virtually every type of
contractual term, be it individually negotiated or not (except for key terms to
the extent that they are clear and comprehensible), in all types of agreement
(excluding financial service agreements) and between all categories of
businesses – big or small.

In particular, the promulgation of a “grey list” of terms and conditions that
are rebuttably deemed to be unlawful, may well lead to a far-reaching
restriction of the parties’ freedom to determine the terms of their agreement.
That list covers a number of contractual terms which frequently arise in
practice, including disclaimer clauses and clauses on unilateral changes.
Moreover, the list also includes two provisions construed so broadly that they
essentially introduce additional fairness tests with general scopes of
applications. One of these two provisions targets clauses that “inappropriately
restrict” the rights of the other party in the event of contractual default. The
other targets clauses by which a party “transfers an economic risk” without
consideration. Neither of these grey-list restrictions apply as such to B2B
agreements in the analysed foreign legal orders.

The introduction of the grey list will leave businesses with difficult strategic
choices. Either they opt for legal certainty and refrain from using clauses that
may correspond to one of the provisions in the grey list, or they do not refrain
from doing so. In the latter case, they risk that courts will subsequently rule
that these clauses are void, in lack of sound arguments to rebut the presumed
unfairness. Pending the first relevant court decisions relating to this
legislation, businesses’ choices will determine the actual scale of impact the
new legislation will have on private parties’ freedom of action. More businesses
opting for legal certainty, will mean a more significant impact. If, by
contrast, businesses are prepared to take the risk, the resulting impact will be
rather limited in the short term. In any case, businesses will inevitably always
run the risk that their terms, other than key clauses, are found unlawful
because they create a significant imbalance between the parties’ rights and
obligations.

In the longer term, the judiciary’s approach will be decisive for the impact
that these rules will have on private parties’ freedom of action. This is true
for the impact of both the grey list as the general prohibition on unfair terms.
During the parliamentary stages leading to this new piece of legislation, the
drafters frequently stressed that the new B2B Act was not intended to undermine
the principle of contractual freedom (intended term: freedom of action).
However, any legislation regulating unfair terms will as such restrict the
freedom to determine the terms of agreements. Hence, probably the repeated
reference to the principle of contractual freedom is to be read as a plea for
courts to exercise restraint when applying the new B2B rules. Yet, it remains to
be seen whether courts will indeed look for guidance in the travaux
préparatoires when interpreting the new legislation. Such an approach is
definitely not to be expected in instances where the actual wording of the B2B
Act is not reflecting the statements made during the parliamentary stages, which
is often the case.

Legal uncertainty is not the only potential consequence the new B2B Act will
produce. Indeed, the new act also leaves a lot of questions unanswered with
regard to the private-law remedies to unfair terms. Thus, businesses will face
an additional issue when they face the aforementioned choice between legal
certainty and freedom of action: they will be unable to assess the probable
impact when a court upholds the unfairness of one of their terms. If, on the one
hand, courts have the power to limit or convert unfair terms so that they are no
longer unfair, finding clauses unfair will have relatively limited consequences.
Yet if courts, by contrast, may not limit or adapt terms, then they will be
compelled to declare all unfair terms null and void. In the latter scenario, the
private-law remedy will have a considerably greater impact for a lot of types of
contractual terms. In short, if the new B2B Act’s remedy allows courts to limit
or convert unfair terms into legitimate clauses, then businesses will probably
be more inclined to take the risk of using “edgy” clauses. Hence, if courts have
the power to limit and convert terms, the result will probably be more legal
certainty and less erosion of the contractual freedom of action.

Save if the new B2B Act is modified or if courts adopt an extremely restrained
approach when the legislation enters into effect, the new B2B legislation will
cause a great deal of legal uncertainty and will significantly undermine private
parties’ freedom of action. What is more, the scope of the new rules is
construed so broadly that, in the end, the common law of contracts will no
longer fully apply to agreements between businesses. This is highly remarkable,
as B2B agreements make out the largest share of agreements concluded on a daily
basis. All of this means that the mandatory rules in the Economic Law Code will
largely replace a number of fundamental rules laid down in the 1804 Civil Code
and in the proposals for a New Civil Code. None of the examined foreign legal
order go as far the Belgian legislator in their search for protection of weak
contracting parties. Hence, it is very doubtful whether the aim of protecting
businesses in weaker bargaining positions, i.e. new B2B Act’s rationale, can
indeed justify the Act’s consequences.

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Bankruptcy proceedings and executory contracts - Article XX.139 of the Business
Law Code (BLC) comparatively examined

In principle, when bankruptcy proceedings are opened, this does not in any way
affect any executory contracts to which the bankrupt in question is a party.
Executory contracts can be defined as those (a) which have yet to be completed
in their entirety, both by the bankrupt and by any other party to the agreement
at the time when the bankruptcy proceedings were commenced, and (b) under which
the bankrupt in question is obliged to meet his/her obligations in order to be
able to claim performance of such obligations as have yet to be performed by the
other contracting party. The usefulness of this definition, however, only comes
into its own when the Bankruptcy Trustee assumes the obligations under this
agreement. Where this is not the case, it is of no relevance whether the
agreement in question remains executory. This is because the Bankrupty Trustee
will need to reach a decision in relation to all the obligations which had yet
to be performed in their entirety by the bankrupt. It is in this respect that it
is preferable, from the point of view of precision, to use the term “existing
obligations” rather than “executory contracts”.

First of all, the Bankruptcy Trustee may prefer to assume the executory
contract, as a result of which the obligations resulting from it will be
regarded as administrative expenses. However, any decision by the Bankruptcy
Trustee to assume the executory contract will not invariably be one that
achieves effective results. Any individual creditor will be able to seek
termination of an executory contract based on the debtor’s failure to perform
prior to the opening of the bankruptcy proceedings. In this respect, those
upholding both the Belgian and American law on this subject steadfastly adhere
to the ordinary laws of property and contract. However, under the laws of
France, the Netherlands and Germany, any decision made by the Bankruptcy Trustee
will, to a certain extent, be protected against the individual creditor’s right
of termination. On the other hand, the Bankruptcy Trustee may decide to reject
an executory contract. Any such decision is incapable of producing consequences
other than defective performance on the bankrupt’s part before bankruptcy
proceedings are commenced. In this respect, the law on bankruptcy does not
depart from the ordinary laws of property and contract. However, bankruptcy
proceedings will increase the risk that such failure of performance will occur
because the individual creditor has no right to claim performance in kind from
the Bankruptcy Trustee.

The Bankruptcy Trustee’s power to assume or reject is restricted in two ways.
First of all, any opening of bankruptcy proceedings results in the termination
of any agreements entered into on a personal basis in relation to the bankrupt.
The author is of the view that the way in which this rule is formulated is too
broad. It finds no support even from a comparative perspective. The only
exception to this objection could be in relation to those agreements based on
personal considerations in the strict sense of the term, i.e. those that make it
impossible for the receiver to render the bankrupt’s obligations incapable of
performance. Secondly, agreements concluded between individual creditors and
bankrupts may contain a clause which determines that the agreement in question
shall terminate at the time at which bankruptcy proceedings are commenced. Such
clauses are lawful and enforceable under Belgian law. However, when we consider
this issue comparatively we discover a tendency towards prohibiting such
termination clauses.

Two decisions by the Belgian Supreme Court, made in 2004 and 2008, have slightly
extended the range of options available to the Bankruptcy Trustee. The latter
now has the right to terminate the relevant agreement where it is necessary to
do so for the purpose of liquidating the bankruptcy estate. This right of
termination has now been incorporated in Article XX.139(1) of the BLC. This
gives the Bankruptcy Trustee the option to (1) frustrate such obligations as are
immune to a non-performance order, (2) free an asset from any personal rights
which are capable of being raised against the estate in question, and (3)
enhance the financial position of the bankruptcy estate. This unilateral right
to terminate is an application of the paritas creditorum principle. It also –
just as is the case with the provisions with respect to transaction avoidance –
extends the recovery rights at the disposal of the joint creditors. In
comparative terms, this kind of solution can only be found in the relevant
French law. Under the other legal systems examined, the Bankruptcy Trustee has
no rights of termination that depart from the ordinary rules relating to
bankruptcy. Under German law, however, the Bankruptcy Trustee may achieve this
outcome by deciding to reject the bankrupt party’s existing obligations. There
are also US court decisions which support this theory. However, many American
authors deny the Bankruptcy Trustee the right to terminate obligations
unilaterally – and the Supreme Court has applied this doctrine. The Dutch law on
this subject not only lacks such unilateral termination rights, but, in
addition, restricts the effectiveness of any decision to reject in relation to
passive obligations.

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Consumer protection, Servitisation and product-service-systems (PSS) agreements

Servitisation – the process whereby value is created by added services to
products – is currently very much in the ascendant. Various
product-service-systems (PSS) have entered the marketplace, not only in the B2B
area but also increasingly in the B2C field. This paper examines whether Belgian
law provides the consumer with adequate protection against servitisation and PSS
agreements.

In the introduction, the authors examine the three essential types of PSS
agreements – those that are product-oriented, use-oriented and result-oriented –
and seek economic, legal and policy-based explanations for the breakthrough
achieved by servitisation and PSS agreements. These new business models
definitely provide opportunities for businesses and customers, even though they
present a number of obstacles in terms of behavioural economics. Servitisation
and PSS agreements can also be seen as part of a transition towards a more
circular economy. However, servitisation and PSS agreements are not by
themselves more environmentally friendly than the traditional model based on the
single sale of products.

An analysis of the current Belgian legislative framework for the three different
types of PSS agreements – product-oriented, use-oriented and result-oriented –
constitutes the core of this paper. Both the contractual aspect and the
application of the general rules of obligations and consumer law are dealt with.
The thread running through this paper is that, under PSS agreements, the
consumer enjoys less protection than is the case under a traditional contract of
sale on the basis of which he becomes the owner of the item sold.

The Belgian law of contracts provides a considerably lower level of protection
in the case of services (hire and contracting for work) when compared with the
protection enjoyed under consumer contracts. Thus servitisation in its sharpest
form creates a more favourable legal context for the PSS supplier, one in which
the relevant law one in which the relevant law is almost entirely of an
auxiliary and non-binding nature. Accordingly, the role played by the ordinary
rules of consumer law as a counterweight becomes all the more important.

When PSS contracts are entered into, the consumer is, at least in theory,
protected by the many existing information requirements which result from the
ordinary rules of consumer law. However, the high degree of complexity presented
by price setting mechanisms, as well as the considerable degree of variation
that exists between the various rights and obligations of the consumer in such
agreements, make it difficult to provide the consumer with adequate information
in the absence of a uniform and mandatory set of rules. Also, in many cases the
“green” nature of PSS agreements is not communicated effectively. Consumer
credit law appears to provide little by way of protection when it comes to PSS
contracts.

Once a PSS agreement has been entered into, consumer protection comes mainly
from the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and its implementing legislation.
However, this remains essentially a negative protection mechanism, which
prohibits and renders void unfairly weighted terms and conditions, but fails to
guarantee minimum levels of rights and remedies for the benefit of the PSS
consumer.

When examining the rules governing use under use and result-oriented PSS
agreements on the basis of additional contractual rules on hire and contracting
for work, we learn that the consumer finds himself in a much less solid position
than would be the case if he buys the product and thus becomes its owner.

This paper also examines a number of aspects which relate to the law of property
as well as the rules relating to security rights and to the right to suspend
performance. In the case of product-oriented PSS agreements, the consumer finds
himself in the traditional and strong legal position as owner and holder of the
product. However, the supplier will be able to strengthen his position by the
insertion of a retention of title clause. Possessory liens could also act as a
corrective factor of which only the supplier is capable of availing himself.
Both parties could rely on a plea of non-performance. On the other hand, under
use-oriented and result-oriented PSS contracts the consumer enjoys but a weak
fundamental position as a retainer who does not enjoy the advantages of
possession protection or acquisitive prescription. As matters stand at present,
these agreements also lack any minimal level of social protection benefiting the
consumer who, using this type of agreement, will purchase a considerable
quantity of goods which could be crucial to his daily existence and which can be
reclaimed by the supplier on termination. However, awarding a right of use
without transfer of ownership also creates risks for the supplier, because he
loses physical control over his property. Both the plea of non-performance and
the right to possessory lien will, for this type of servitisation model, be to
the consumer’s advantage. Much appears to depend on the actual type of PSS
agreement and on its possible terms and conditions, which once again emphasises
the importance of the general rules of consumer law.

An examination of the differences between contracts of sale and contracts for
services, in terms of conformity and quality, confirms the lower level of
consumer protection which prevails here. There is as yet no uniform and
mandatory set of minimal rights relating to services and remedies where PSS
suppliers fail to meet their obligations. It is true that the restricted Belgian
rules on hire and contracting for work give us some points of reference in
addition to the general law of obligations, but provides but little protection
and is, moreover, not invariably adjusted to take account of PSS agreements.

This paper concludes with an overview of various possible solutions, including
standardising services, standard agreements and new auxiliary or mandatory rules
of contract law for PSS agreements.

It appears that the current state of the private law, including consumer law,
has been built around ownership and contracts of sale. This paper further
demonstrates that, in many respects, the consumer’s position under B2C PSS
agreements is weaker than is the case for consumer sales agreements. However,
this paper also shows that there are several possible ways of responding to
these consequences of servitisation. Regarding the most desirable way of
achieving this, and on the question whether this should be done at the national
or at the European level, there will be differences of opinion. This is why the
most compelling issue to arise here is that a start should be made with serious
reflection and debate on this issue.

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Consumer protection under servitisation

Servitisation is the trend whereby traders are increasingly offering services in
addition to, or instead of, products. In recent years, the various consumer
markets have witnessed a clear increase in such services – for example, with
cycling-exchange firms such as the Dutch, and in the field of home accessories
such as washing and coffee machines. This consultation paper examines the
question as to what servitisation means in terms of protecting the consumer in
his/her contractual relations with service providers. Here, the emphasis is on
traditional consumer contracts, i.e. agreements where the offeror acts on behalf
of a business or profession, whereas the buyer (i.e. the consumer) does not act
in this capacity. In addition, the author examines the protection enjoyed by
consumers in relation to a number of issues – more particularly in the law of
contracts and torts – where they conclude services contracts with other private
parties via an online platform.

The author concludes that there are certain aspects of consumer protection which
will continue to suffer inadequate guarantees if the trend towards the provision
of services and away from purchasing is to continue. Thus, for example, the
transparency of contractual terms and conditions is, in the case of
servitisation, frequently less satisfactory than is the case under contracts of
sale because, inter alia, services contracts are much more diversified. In
addition, this sector is not covered by objective quality standards as is the
case with contracts of sale, and is subject to considerable uncertainty as
regards the availability of remedies. More generally, it has been noted that
servitisation is capable of increasing social inequalities. Whereas articulate,
well-informed and wealthy consumers are able to enjoy the benefits of
servitisation, including those offered by the online economy, this trend could
make the economic position of the less wealthy and more vulnerable consumers
even weaker. These conclusions call for a reappraisal of consumer protection as
it is regulated under the current rules of private law.

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Equity and unjustified enrichment

In the civilian tradition reference is at times made to fairness or equity in
determining whether a person who has been enriched at the expense of another
should be obliged to return the enrichment. The aim here is to examine the
relationship between the concepts of enrichment and fairness more closely. The
focus is especially on the South African law of unjustified enrichment, which
essentially consists of a variety of uncodified civil-law actions aimed at
returning enrichment. To aid an understanding of the role of fairness in
awarding these actions, historical and comparative perspectives are adopted,
which hopefully may be of interest to a broader private-law audience.

The choice of topic is partly motivated by recent debates on the foundations of
unjustified enrichment as a source of duties of restitution and on the role that
fairness play could in this context. South African law has not traditionally
paid much attention to these questions, but it has been argued more recently
that fairness deserves greater recognition in our law of unjustified enrichment.
The role of fairness in awarding restitution is also relevant in the context of
other legal systems, because uncertainty about this role could possibly support
arguments that the notion of unjustified or unjust enrichment is too vague to
warrant recognition as an independent branch of law or source of obligations.
Finally, in some systems, such as Dutch law, significant concern exists that
courts sometimes treat a general enrichment action as an equitable action and
that they do not properly limit its field of application.

Unfortunately, the basis for and consequences of views on the role of fairness
in imposing duties of restitution, especially in the context of the law of
unjustified enrichment, are often not articulated clearly. Fairness has indeed
often featured in the civilian tradition when awarding remedies which are aimed
at restitution and in some systems are brought home under enrichment law. The
argument here is that if this practice is viewed more closely, it becomes
apparent that references to fairness only fulfil a limited number of functions.

First, fairness was never the basis for a general judicial discretion to order
restitution according to the facts of the case. Such a drastic discretion may be
warranted in other areas of the law in exceptional cases where awarding a remedy
is so complex and unpredictable that it is not susceptible to regulation by way
of specific rules. However, this justification does not apply to the modern
South African law of unjustified enrichment, which contains detailed provisions
on the giving up of gains. At best, there are specific exceptional cases where
courts enjoy a limited discretion to award restitution, for example when
transfers made in fulfilment of illegal agreements are reclaimed, or where
enrichment is imposed on another. But such limited, defined discretions are
found across the legal system.

Secondly, fairness traditionally fulfils the function of catalyst for the
development of new rules. However, while references to the demands of fairness
may historically have been useful to promote legal development, they are of
secondary importance in modern South African law. To justify a legal development
it appears to be much more important to identify and weigh up relevant policy
considerations, than to refer to vague and contradictory notions of fairness, or
to other values like Ubuntu or good faith.

Finally, references to fairness in the law of unjustified enrichment could
simply serve to explain or justify why the law at times requires that a benefit
must be returned. It has been appreciated since Roman times that in certain
cases it would be unfair for a person to be enriched at the expense of another.
However, these references to fairness do not shed much light on why only some
cases of enrichment at the expense of another give rise to a duty of
restitution. The law of unjustified enrichment is not more based on fairness
than other areas of law such as the law of contract or the law of delict or
tort. Ultimately, the explanation or justification that the law of unjustified
enrichment promotes corrective justice may be more illuminating, especially when
it is necessary to delineate its boundaries with other fields of law.

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Torn between buyer and owner – the art to close the gap in the law of property

The owner who has had an item stolen and subsequently succeeds in relocating it
will normally not find it in the hands of the thief. In most cases, the stolen
item will be held by a buyer who had acquired it unsuspectingly. Can the theft
victim expect such an innocent buyer to return the item without demur, in spite
of the price the latter himself paid for it? Returning the item is difficult for
the buyer to stomach, given that it is normally impossible for the latter
subsequently to recover the price he paid for the item from the person who sold
it to him. This is because thieves and receivers of stolen goods are mostly
insolvent at the time, or simply vanish into thin air as soon as they have done
their deed. Restitution, therefore, does not solve the issues resulting from
theft – all it does is to transfer the problem from the theft victim to the bona
fide buyer. It is precisely for this reason that the conflict between the theft
victim and the bona fide buyer of stolen moveable property is described as a
true legal dilemma in the available literature. Neither of these parties did
anything wrong, and therefore it would appear that both the theft victim and the
buyer may lay claim to the item in question. In order to examine the
complexities of this dilemma fully and in depth, the author of this paper
provides in the first instance a thorough analysis of the solution advanced by
the Belgian law of property. From this analysis it emerges that in most cases
the interests of the bona fide buyer tend to take precedence – indeed, under the
relevant Belgian law the original owner will, more often than not, find it
impossible to recover the item from the bona fide buyer.

Given that the conflict between theft victims and bona fide buyers is classed as
a legal dilemma, there is little prospect that the solution advanced by the
relevant Belgian law will enjoy total and universal support and approval. This
is why the author has analysed this problem from a comparative perspective. We
can thus align the results of this comparative analysis and note that, among the
western systems of property law, there is a chasm between those which tend to
favour the interests of the bona fide buyer, and those which give precedence to
protecting the original owner. These comparative data also indicate that this
difference of preference coincides with the divide between the so-called civil
law and common law jurisdictions.

Having thus examined and explained the buyer/owner dilemma under the ordinary
law of property from a comparative perspective, this contribution pays
particular attention to the specific situation where the stolen property
qualifies as an item of cultural heritage. This prompts the question whether
this fact alters the conclusions drawn from the author’s analysis of the
ordinary law of property on this subject. This is because cultural goods differ
to a certain extent from other types of personalty in view of their uniqueness,
their frequently irreplaceable nature, and the special significance they present
not only for their owner, but also for society at large. This is one of the
reasons why it would appear that, in the course of the past few decades, quite a
few countries have included in their laws on moveable property provisions
imposing far-reaching obligations to effect restitution in relation to objets
d’art and cultural goods. Accordingly, the balance struck between the victim of
theft and the bona fide buyer, which this contribution describes in general
terms, will frequently assume a different form when it comes to stolen objets
d’art and cultural goods. The author accordingly argues that the gap in the law
of property between the Continental-European and the Anglo-American
jurisdictions regarding the return of stolen cultural goods is much less
significant than is the case for other types of moveable property.

In support of this contention, the author draws attention to four developments
in the law relating to property of cultural value. In the first instance, he
explains that the free movement of the most valuable cultural goods has, in
several ContinentalEuropean jurisdictions, been restricted as a result of
national measures adopted for the protection of objects of cultural heritage.
Thus, all the civil law countries examined in this contribution have placed
limits on the ways in which protected goods can be taken out of the country’s
territory. In addition, the law relating to cultural goods is also subject to
private law restrictions on movement in several Continental-European
jurisdictions. Specific laws on cultural property confer on objets d’art a
status that renders them incapable of prescription and/or even of
commercialisation. As a result, the ordinary rules of property law regarding a
non domino acquisition or acquisition by prescription will not apply to their
fullest extent, which considerably weakens the buyer’s position.

The laws on state property, which in many Continental-European countries govern
public assets, affect the ordinary rules of property when it comes to solving
the buyer/ owner dilemma. This is because they protect the public authority
which has been the victim of theft against restitution – at the bona fide
buyer’s expense. Given that a considerable number of cultural goods have been
purloined from publicly-owed collections, the prevailing law on state property
spectacularly enhances the chances of successful claim for the restitution of
stolen cultural items. Thus it is that the law on state property reduces the
gap, described above, in the law of property when it comes to solving the
buyer/owner dilemma.

Various initiatives aimed at restitution, based on considerations of human
rights, have drawn the solutions proffered by the civil law and common law
jurisdictions even more closely together. International agreements concerning
cultural goods plundered during the Holocaust have, in several jurisdictions,
been translated into additional means of obtaining restitution. These
mechanisms, based on alternative dispute resolution, concerning cultural goods
plundered during the Holocaust have – once again mainly in the civil law
countries – proved to be significant for the purpose of solving the buyer/owner
dilemma. This prompts the conclusion that these measures have also served to
close the gap even more between the owner-friendly common law and the
buyer-friendly civil law jurisdictions.

Finally, this contribution highlights the impact produced by a number of
international and supranational rules on cultural goods, such as the European
rules on restitution based on the combined effect of the so-called Cultural
Goods Regulation and the Restitution Directive. The latter ensures that valuable
cultural objects from an EU member state enjoy a special status in the law of
property within the EU. Where a buyer/owner dilemma arises in respect of this
type of cultural objects, the latter will in most cases need to be returned,
which once again weakens the position of the bona fide buyer and causes the
continental-European jurisdictions to continue to gain traction against the
prevailing Anglo-American models.

In essence, the 1970 UNESCO Convention seeks to achieve the same level of
international enforceability of national rules relating to cultural objects,
albeit on a global scale, in order thus to strengthen the campaign against the
illegal trade in works of art. In countries such as Switzerland, The
Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Austria, which have already proceeded to ratify
and, accordingly, to implement the UNESCO Convention, there now applies an
effective obligation to return such cultural goods as circulate illegally in
contravention of the UNESCO Convention. Thus the aforementioned
Continental-European countries once again serve to undermine the protection of
the buyer – which is so characteristic of their ordinary law of property.

Although Belgium also ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention in 2009, it has yet to
take any practical steps to incorporate it in its law of property. The author
accordingly – makes a plea to that effect, not only so that this country can
comply with the international commitment it has made, but also, and especially,
on the basis of his conviction that this will provide a further spur towards
finding common law and civil law solutions to the buyer/owner dilemma.

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Party autonomy in the belgian law of property

This contribution examines the limits of party autonomy when it comes to the law
of property. The traditional theory is that property law is governed by public
policy, whereas the law of obligations constitutes permissive law. On the basis
of this analysis, the author concludes that the law of property and the law of
obligations are drawing nearer to each other, and are doing so at several
levels.

The traditional justifications for the closed nature of property law (the
so-called numerus clausus principle), i.e. historical developments and the
economics of the law, are open to criticism. At the very least they lead to a
more nuanced perception of the traditional split between personal and property
rights. The historical explanation for the closed system, namely that it
represented a reaction against the Ancien Régime, should, on closer examination,
be subject to considerable qualification. The reasons advanced to justify the
numerus clausus principle which are based on legal economics can to a
considerable extent be countered by the introduction of an effective system of
open access and scrutiny of property rights.

However, in relation to the party autonomy principle, certain differences exist
as between the various property rights themselves. More particularly, there is a
difference in party autonomy between the rules governing the rights of use and
enjoyment of property on the one hand, and those governing security interests on
the other hand. As regards the rights to use, there is a great deal of overlap
not only between the property rights to use among themselves, but also between
property and personal rights. By varying the terms of the contracts in question,
a lessee can, under certain circumstances, acquire more leverage than a
usufructuary, or holder of a long lease right or building right. Moreover, lease
agreements are frequently effective against bona fide third parties without
requiring publicity in the land register, which is not the case in relation to
property rights of use. The exclusivity principle merely plays a very minor part
when it comes to defining the limits of property rights and of any party
autonomy involved. Both personal and property rights are capable of conferring
rights of exclusivity. At the same time, however, the extent of such exclusivity
is capable of variation. The author draws up an external and internal
exclusivity matrix on the one hand, and an objective and subjective exclusivity
matrix on the other hand. The result, however, is a finding that the summa
divisio between property and personal rights is at best one of degree and not
one of substance.

In relation to security interests, the parties are confined to a more
restrictive straitjacket, for here, consideration needs to be given to the
circumstance that exceptions to the principle of creditor equality are subject
to strict interpretation. However, even when it comes to security interests, it
is possible to see an opening – as witness the increasingly positive approach
taken in relation to the fiduciary ownership of security interests as a result
of, inter alia, certain changes made in the statute law.

The Draft Law Amending the Law of Property, which aims to rewrite Book II of the
Civil Code, reflects this development. This Draft Law continues to apply the
Typenzwang principle at its strictest, but restricts the essential features of
those property rights which are not capable of contractual variation.

Instead of a centrifugal model, under which the relevant restrictions are
imposed when it comes to the splitting up of property rights, we would advocate
a centripetal model under which the areas which have been split off are
reintegrated into the law of property at the point where they in danger of
causing economic harm. In other words, the author advocates a less rigid
approach when it comes to creating property rights. However, where it would no
longer be possible to justify the creation of these property rights from an
economic point of view, this splitting off of ownership rights should,
logically, be done away with. The reintegration of full ownership rights should
be facilitated. In other words – the ex ante approach should be replaced by an
ex post approach.

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The principle of party autonomy in the law of property of the Netherlands

The law of property is normally regarded as a legal area which is almost
exclusively subject to rules of mandatory law and leaves very little scope for
party autonomy. It takes but little encouragement for the law of property and
the law of contracts to appear as polar opposites. This paper goes a long way
towards putting this picture into some perspective – at least in relation to the
law of the Netherlands. It is true that the law of property and the law of
contracts are kept strictly separate (Decision of the Netherlands Supreme Court
of 3/3/1905). However, this is not to deny that the courts are given the
necessary scope – of which they have availed themselves in key decisions – to
accept solutions in cases involving the law of property which may not be rooted
in the relevant legislation in so many words, but are fully capable of insertion
in the relevant legislation and fully consistent with decisions which are fully
in compliance with this legislation (Decision of the Netherlands Supreme Court
of 30/1/1959). The Netherlands law of property is not insensitive to the demands
which the law makes of our society, or to the part it plays in it, and has
frequently displayed its flexibility in this regard.

It is almost feels like pushing at an open door to stress that party autonomy
occupies a prominent position in the Netherlands law of property. Although the
starting point still is that the law of property is governed by mandatory law,
there is no reason to minimise party autonomy when it comes to any area of
property law. Thus it is generally accepted that, within the closed system of
property rights in the Netherlands, the contracting parties enjoy a considerable
degree of freedom when it comes to determining the substance of restricted
proprietary rights. Not only does the Netherlands civil code provide
considerable scope for arrangements which depart from the norm – it is, in
addition, generally accepted that transactions which are not are not explicitly
regulated by the statute law may be arranged between the parties themselves and
be enforceable against third parties, provided that there is a sufficient link
between the relevant arrangements and the definition of the relevant restrictive
property right. Rules which makes no provision for the possibility of concluding
varying agreements are, in property law terms, mandatory. They nevertheless
leave the parties concerned the freedom to determine their legal relations by
varying stipulations agreed by contract – and therefore without being
enforceable against third parties – unless such varying clauses are rendered
null and void by law. In joint ownership arrangements party autonomy also has an
important part to play. By using the management opportunities provided by
Article 3:168 of the Civil Code, the joint owners are given ample opportunity to
conclude arrangements between themselves regarding their (exclusive) powers,
including their enforceability against third parties.

Party autonomy can also play a part outside the context of determining the
substance of property rights. Given that property rights do not, in principle,
have a scope which is exclusive, or excludes each other or any alternatives from
the law of obligations, the parties are able to choose which legal mechanism
they will use in order to regulate their legal relations. Thus agreeing to
building and planting rights can constitute an alternative to conversion into a
condominium of flats, and an overhang situation can be legalised in a variety of
ways. Thus the choice made by the parties of whatever legal mechanism they
favour helps to define the property law relationships between all the parties
concerned.

There are also aspects of the law of property where party autonomy appears to
have a more limited scope. Concluding agreements which are also binding on third
parties regarding the (exclusive) right of disposal held by a non-title holder
is viewed with a certain degree of reticence. The influence brought to bear by
the parties when applying rules such as those governing accession or conversion
appears to be minimal. However, there is a knock at this particular door as
well, taking into account the demands made by the circular economy.

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Managing overruling a qualitative empirical study of the reversals in the case
law of the Belgian Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation)

The reversals experienced by the case law of the Belgian Supreme Court are a
well-known but rarely studied phenomenon. On the basis of qualitative empirical
research, this contribution brings a different perspective to the existing
theories regarding this phenomenon. Twenty judgments, issued in the period
between 2002 and 2017, and which, according to the Court’s annual report,
constitute a change in its case law, are examined. The emphasis of the analysis
is placed on the manner in which these changes were announced and on their given
or underlying reasons.

This analysis shows that the Court relies to a large extent on the by-products
of its decisions in order to make it known that they have been overruled, such
as the annual report, a footnote to the judgment as published, or the opinion of
the Advocate General. The annotations in legal journals are, in practice, likely
to constitute the most important source of information here. Only twice did the
Court expressly announce the overruling of a decision. The grounds for the
reversal are only rarely discussed by the Court. If we bring together several
sources, it would seem that the overruling of a decision is often the result of
external events, such as a judgment of the Constitutional Court. Other
justifications include the absence of judicial peace, a change in the social
context or the correction of an earlier error.

This method of announcement is flawed because the overruling of a decision is
being publicized through a non-authentic source, and often with considerable
delay. Openly admitting the reversal in the judgement itself constitutes a
better modus operandi. The European Court of Human Rights requires that
reversals in case law be explicitly reasoned and announced. The French and Dutch
Supreme Courts have set an example here. In both countries, the Court reverses
its case law through ample reasoning and references to the earlier decision(s)
that it abandons. Customizing the retroactivity of the reversal is not unusual
in this context. The difference between the practice developed by these
countries and Belgium must be viewed within a broader context of the overt
recognition of the law-making effect of the Supreme Court’s case law. The
examples set by its neighbouring countries are a point of reference for Belgium
and should be followed. However, as long as the Belgian Supreme Court continues
to portray, in its judgments, the fiction that all that has occurred is a mere
application of the law, a change in the way the Court reverses its case law
cannot be expected any time soon.

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The circular real estate economy into the future

The circular economy is currently one of the most promising pathways for
rendering our economy more sustainable. One of its effects is known as the
“service model” – rather than selling goods to the consumer, the producer offers
the consumer the possibility of using them without any transfer of ownership
taking place. In the field of real estate, an increasing number of circular
initiatives are being developed; however, such attempts come up against certain
obstacles presented by the existing law on real estate. This is the case both in
Belgium and in the Netherlands.

First of all there is the law on accession in real estate, which is the result
of the notion of “componenting”, which in turn is an application of the unity
principle. This forms an obstacle to the renting of moveable objects (goods or
items) which are incorporated into real estate. In principle, the lessor of such
moveable property will lose his right of ownership to the object in question to
the real estate owner as a result of real estate accession. However, this
contribution shows how this problem can be overcome by means of a broader
interpretation of the old-established exception to real estate accession, i.e.
the rules on building rights. Such a broader interpretation is necessary
because, under its current interpretation, the buildings in question must
display a certain degree of individual separateness (separateness requirement),
whereas in a circular economy the idea is precisely to be able to accommodate
all the components of a real estate in the hire in question. Actually, this
broader interpretation of the rules on building rights amounts to a less strict
and more modern interpretation of the unity principle which is justified because
in a circular economy, the rationes underlying that principle, i.e. legal
certainty and value protection, are pursued more effectively using a different
method than by imposing restrictions on the property that is the subject-matter
of the building right. This article extensively elaborates such a solution under
Belgian and Dutch law.

The second consideration here is the question whether the various parties
involved in the renting of moveable objects which are not incorporated into the
real estate are sufficiently protected against the various risks with which they
are faced, such as a lessor who then sells, the other party’s insolvency, etc.
For these risks as well this contribution elaborates a number of solutions.

Thus it is that the author of this article hopes to have contributed towards the
future development of the Belgian and Dutch law governing the circular real
estate economy.

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Data Ownership? reculer pour mieux sauter

In this contribution, the author makes five recommendations with regard to
future research on the “ownership” of data.

The first three of these recommendations relate to the central planks of this
research, to wit the notions of “ownership” and “data”. In the course of his
analysis, the author starts from the conclusion that, frequently, the scope of
these notions has not been staked out – or if it has been, only in a limited way
– in relation to (closely) related, but not identical, concepts. The author then
proceeds to demonstrate that it is definitely necessary to demarcate (a) the
first of these notions in relation to the various rights and powers which are
frequently referred to in legal literature as “ownership” or “property”, and (b)
the concept of “data” in relation to information, digital data, databases and
data carriers, given that the answer to the question whether “data” are capable
of “ownership” can differ depending on their actual meaning. This is why the
author’s first and third recommendations are that it is necessary to be very
precise when it comes to defining the exact scope of the notion of “ownership”,
and as to what exactly can be regarded as subject-matter of “ownership”. As
regards the latter, the second recommendation advocates close co-operation with
information technology specialists.

The fourth and fifth recommendations concern the approach and focus to be
adopted when researching the “ownership” of data. An examination of the legal
literature on this issue reveals that the notion of “data ownership” – and more
particularly its possible implications – is approached from an economic angle,
and that, when it comes to charting the scope of these implications, the focus
is invariably on the industrial players (on the data market), on the buyers of
digital products, and on data subjects. However, as the author states in the
fourth recommendation made in this paper, the law, including the law of
property, must also be taken into consideration and be a relevant factor in this
debate. The law of property itself can also feature arguments for and against
the introduction of the notion of “data ownership” – such as the fact that the
law of property provides a “complete package” for the regulation of data
control. The author continues to pursue this legal angle in his fifth
recommendation, which calls for consideration to be given to creditors to whom
data owners are debtors, as an additional category of interested parties in the
debate. In support of this argument, the author examines the question of liens
relating to data, and of the possibility of their attachment (seizure) – and
more particularly the difficulties and imperfections in this regard presented by
the law in its current form. He shows that recognition of data ownership would
improve this state of affairs – if only partially.

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The role of comparative law in the rulings of the Belgian Court of cassation

In a small jurisdiction such as ours, comparative law has an important part to
play. Although this is taken for granted in the fields of law teaching, legal
research and legislation, there are many who regard this as a problematic factor
when it comes to the courts and their rulings. Is it legitimate to impose on our
litigants solutions inspired by information gleaned from foreign jurisdictions?
Nevertheless, it does appear that, in Europe, the higher courts are increasingly
taking account of the rulings made by their counterparts. In this contribution,
the author seeks an explanation for this development. He also examines the case
law of the Belgian Hof van Cassatie for evidence thereof. On the basis of the
Court’s case law during the 2002-2017 period, he also attempts to provide a
picture of the legal areas, the types of cases, and the legal systems involved
in this development, and assesses the significance that this represents for
legal scholarship. This contribution has also been incorporated into the Court’s
Annual Report for 2018.

From this analysis, it appears that the Court does not insulate itself from
legal information which foreign legal systems are capable of providing. In
practice, however, arguments based on foreign law only appear in a handful of
its decisions. This is because the majority of legal issues which arise before
the Court are perfectly capable of being solved without the need to resort to
foreign legal sources. In addition, most of the Court’s members tend to be
hesitant about venturing into foreign legal systems – they are clearly no
champions of “legal tourism”.

Viewed against the total number of decisions made, the part played by
comparative law is a minor one. Where, however, account is taken only of those
decisions in which the Court has a creative part to play, the number of cases
thus affected is a respectable 3.66 per cent. In practice, however, it would
appear that this tally is actually a few percentage points higher, given that
any consultation of foreign sources by the members of the Court does not
invariably reveal itself openly.

It also would seem that the Court only involves foreign legal sources in its
decision-making where this is justified. From the Advocate-Generals’
submissions, it appears that the Court does so for certain types of legal issues
– types which can also be found in the decisions of other higher courts. The
cases in question concern mainly (1) issues relating to legal rules which are
common to other jurisdictions, (2) issues where the court enjoys a considerable
degree of discretion and/or which are not purely legal, but are also subject to
underlying social and moral considerations, and (3) issues which are highly
technical in legal terms and for which a harmonised solution is appropriate.

As for the legal systems opted for, the comparisons made are mainly with sources
from similar rule-making systems. It will therefore cause no surprise to learn
that pride of place is given to French law, followed by that of The Netherlands.
The cases in question relate mainly to the private law, although no legal area
is excluded.

Where the Court does take account of foreign precedents, these only have a
persuasive or inspiring effect – so in so doing, the Court is not imposing such
precedents on the litigant. In many of the cases mentioned above, moreover,
these precedents were not actually followed. The influence exercised by foreign
precedents on the outcome of the case is at its most pronounced in relation to
legal issues which concern the interpretation of common legal rules, such as
those contained in treaties, and where it is indeed appropriate to seek
harmonised solutions. This influence is less pronounced where we are dealing
with issues over which the court enjoys a substantial measure of discretion, or
which are decided on the basis of social and moral considerations. In such
cases, the part played by foreign precedents is that of adding new areas to the
legal imagination. The added value here is that a broader range of potential
solutions and arguments is made available. This wider range of arguments and
counter-arguments invites a stronger basis for justifying the solution opted for
– which is, however, vindicated exclusively within the parameters of the
national law.

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The principles governing legal persons

The object of this contribution is to examine the essential principles of law
governing legal persons. A legal person is defined as a bearer of rights and
obligations which is not a living being, and which was created in order actually
to achieve a specific objective set by its creators. As a legal entity, a legal
person enjoys an existence equal to that of a human being – in the sense that it
enjoys equality when it comes to exercising and enforcing its legal rights.
Because of its very nature – the legal person not being a human in flesh and
blood – there are a number of personal rights it is unable to exercise, not
being a human having body and feelings; nor can it enjoy any rights under family
law, deprived as it is of any family. A legal person is, however, capable of
having or acquiring other rights such as ownership, intellectual property rights
and fundamental rights.

Legal personality is a legal instrument which the law makes available to humans.
Recognising an association of persons or an asset as a legal person can only be
justified where the association or the separate asset have acquired their own
interest which displays a degree of durability as distinct from the interests of
other parties, and are provided with a degree of organisation which is capable
of defending their own interests. Its legal recognition has a specific
objective. Legal personality can only be used for the purpose defined by law –
i.e. the “legal specificity” principle. That purpose defines the limits of the
legal person’s capacity to exercise and enforce its legal rights. In this, the
legal person differs from a human being, who experiences no such restrictions.
As a result of the new description of the legal objective of companies which may
also include a non-profit making objective in their articles of association, as
well as removal of all restrictions on the activities of non-profit making
associations, the legal specificity principle has been weakened in so far as it
has hardly any impact on the leal person’s ability to exercise and enforce its
legal rights. As and when it is created, a certain legal format must be opted
for – this can be accompanied by additional restrictions imposed by statute
which are capable of limiting the person’s legal capacity. The legal person in
question shall be regarded as a business, regardless of whether it has a
profit-making objective or not. As such it will be subject to the provisions of
the Business Law Code.

To be able to function, legal persons need human beings. As matters stand at
present, only humans are capable of taking independent decisions. For this
purpose, the law has developed the “organic capacity” doctrine, under which
human beings who are part of the organ may enter into obligations for and on
behalf of the legal person in question. The organ does not act as an agent for
the legal person, but is an integral part of the latter.

The objective pursued by the legal person, as specified in the articles of
association, defines its interests. It is in the furtherance of these interests
that the legal person acquires assets in order to achieve this objective. The
legal person’s organs are required to act in furtherance of these interests.

The legal person has its own identity which distinguishes it from other legal
entities. This identity consists of its name, registered office, legal form,
nationality and business number (awarded as a result of its compulsory entry in
the Crossroads Bank for Enterprises. As is the case with human beings, legal
persons also have a status which determines its position in society.

Depending on their legal form, legal persons are divided into (a) associations,
companies and foundations, (b) profit-making, non-profit making and public
interest legal persons, and (c) legal persons with, and legal persons without,
personal liability conferred on their partners or members.

This contribution finally discusses a number of issues which are specific to
legal personality. The author examines the legal relationship between the legal
person on the one hand, and its founders, members or partners on the other hand.
This relationship creates a contractual space in which the legal person and its
members or partners relate to each other and in which their actions in relation
to each other have certain legal implications. The decisions made by the legal
person’s organs also serve to define this contractual space. The author further
examines the issue of management in the legal person’s interest and concludes
with a discussion on abuse of legal personality.

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How discharge by limitation has developed under the ECHR

The effect of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the private law
of acquiring property continues to grow. Unlike the older decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the latter’s recent case law on this
subject continues to receive relatively little attention – a least in the
Belgian legal literature. This contribution discusses the case law developed in
this area during the 2010-2020 period, and its effect. The author has analysed
the recent ECtHR decisions in the light of two questions.

The first concerns the various legal grounds on which the national rules on
discharge by limitation are capable of being challenged before the Court. For
these legal grounds, the question arises as to what is the relationship – i.e.
what are the similarities and/or differences – between these grounds.
Specifically, the relevant provisions here are Articles 2 and 6 ECHR and Article
1 of its First Protocol. These legal grounds differ as to their scope, but the
criteria by which the rules on limitation are assessed against these legal
grounds are the same. Article 6 ECHR has the broadest scope, and is the legal
ground which is used the most frequently by the Court.

The second question examines what are the minimum standards applied by the Court
when assessing the various aspects of the (Belgian) rules on discharge by
limitation. These aspects are those which have arisen in the Court’s recent
decisions. Here, we are dealing with the starting point of the limitation
period, the effect produced by the parties’ actions and behaviour on the rules
on limitation, and the parties’ inability to act during the limitation period.
From the discussion on the second question it emerges that it is the ECtHR
decisions regarding the starting point of the limitation period which have
produced the greatest impact. Subjective limitation periods pass the test set by
the ECtHR more easily than those based on objective criteria. This appears to be
narrowly linked with the notion that subjective limitation periods tend to give
more weight to the creditor’s interests than they do to those of the debtor.
This is why the Court considers an objective starting point for the
consolidation of damage to be compatible with the ECHR, since this starting
point also gives extensive protection to the creditor. The national rules on
limitation also need to take into account situations where it is impossible for
the creditor to act. This again works to the creditor’s advantage. On the other
hand, the Court does impose a considerable degree of responsibility on the
creditor when it comes to instituting his/her action.

In its case law, the ECtHR increasingly restricts the member states’ discretion
when it comes to the rules on limitation in the private law on acquiring
property. On the other hand, the Court does take account of the concrete
circumstances of the case when assessing the rules on discharge by limitation.
This reveals a somewhat restrictive approach on the Court’s part. The rules on
discharge by limitation should only be sidelined where it clearly emerges from
the concrete circumstances of the case that the protection given to the
creditor’s interests is disproportionate to those of the debtor. Nevertheless,
it cannot be ignored that the extent of the Court’s intervention in this area is
very much on the increase.

Here, it is significant that the Court has formulated in general terms how best
to frame the rules on discharge by limitation, without any regard whatsoever for
the relevant concrete circumstances.

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The new law of property - an economic assessment

As a result of the Law of 20/2/2019, the law of property as contained in the
Belgian Civil Code was fundamentally revised and renamed (from “zakenrecht” to
“goederenrecht” – both of which, in Anglo-Saxon legal parlance, would translate
as “property law”). Since the last few years of the 19th century there has been
a debate in Belgium on the possible revision of the Civil Code. Under the
Michel-led government (2014- 2019) this was actually carried into practical
effect. There are mainly two factors which explain why it took so long to revise
a private law code. Private law rules are to a large extent “nomocratic” and
have no specific political objectives. This bestows on them and their contents a
considerable degree of timelessness. Also, in most cases private law rules are
concerned with the proper functioning of civil society and of the marketplace,
and are not aimed at conferring any advantage on a specific group. This is why
the politicians are less inclined to expend their political energies on their
reform.

A set of property rights which are clearly articulated and easily enforced is
crucial for the prosperity and well-being of society. It ensures social peace,
an efficient marketplace and enables the internalisation of negative
externalities. In these terms, this places the nations of Europe and North
America in a privileged position. In the less developed countries, and
particularly in the rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa, the protection and
formalisation of property rights remain at a low level, which is not conducive
to economic advancement.

The new law of property did not involve any revolutionary reforms. In fact there
was no need for this, given that political experiments which abolish or
undermine property rights have proved to be far from successful. However, the
new legislation did integrate a number of rules developed by the courts.
Generally speaking, these changes have proved to be efficient. This can to a
certain extent be explained by Richard Posner’s theory concerning the efficiency
of the common law as driven by the law of precedents. Examples of this are the
rules on cross-boundary conflicts and neighbourly nuisance. At the same time,
under the new rules real property is defined in three-dimensional terms, and has
used a specific rule on the right of superficies to confer property rights on
above-ground or subterranean structures which are unconnected to the surface
area. These changes made it possible to confer what are known in Anglo-Saxon law
as air rights and subsurface rights.

In relation to cross-boundary building, the courts may decide not to issue a
demolition order, but to restrict themselves to compensation. This is
economically efficient. In many cases the cost of demolition and rebuilding
exceeds the value of that portion of land which was infringed. Demolition orders
are therefore inefficient in terms of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Normally, any
parties thinking rationally would come to some agreement. Since the parties in
question are mutually in a bilateral monopoly situation, no such agreement can
be guaranteed and, were compensation to prove impossible to achieve, demolition
could still be the outcome. This is why it is efficient also to provide for the
possibility of compensation.

As regards neighbourly nuisance, rules on excessive nuisance based on no-fault
liability were included in the Code. From an economic point of view, there is
efficiency in legally penalising nuisance, given that this enables the
internalisation of negative externalities. Non-excessive – and therefore
bearable – nuisance may, from an economic point of view, concern (a) trivial
nuisance, because litigation and court administration costs may exceed any gains
made from such internalisation, and (b) cases of mutual nuisance because here,
the possible legal measures not only cancel each other out, but result in a
“negative sum game” because of the litigation and court administration costs
involved. The courts have been given a broad range of penalties to apply
(compensation, injunction, preventive measures). When opting for any of these
measures, the courts should take into account the transaction costs as between
the parties involved, and the nature of the loss caused. Where the transaction
costs are low and the loss is considerable, they should opt for an injunction.
Because, should the value of the enjoined activity exceed that of the damage
caused, the parties could come to an agreement, given that the transaction costs
here are low. Where the transaction costs and the value attached to the disputed
activity are high, however, it would be preferable to order compensation. Where
an injunction is granted, it cannot, because of the high transaction costs, be
guaranteed that the injunction could not be bought off by means of an agreement
between the perpetrator and the victims.

Although most of the changes in the law of property – the majority of which are
based on developments in the case law – are deserving of support in economic
terms, this reform has forfeited a number of opportunities for change and for
the removal of a number of outdated rules. For acquisitive prescription, the
30-year period requirement has been maintained. In present-day society this can
no longer be justified. The actual content of the property right could have been
modernised by replacing the ‘three sticks’- approach devised by Bartolus
(utendi, fruendi, abutendi) by a definition that diversifies further into more
components of the right. An opportunity for such reforms could perhaps arise in
the context of any European Restatement.

Although most of the changes in the law of property are deserving of support in
economic terms, there remain a number missed opportunities to bring this law of
property in line with current ways of thinking. The systematic involvement of
economy-based considerations could have played a useful part here. These could
have been integrated into the regulatory impact assessment, which is part of the
preparatory work which precedes the legislation, but which appears to have been
of no account in this case.

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Implementing the EU digital content and digital services Directive in the
Belgian legal order

The key issue in this contribution is – how should the Belgian law-making
authority adjust its current legislation when incorporating the Directive (EU)
2019/770 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital
content and digital services in its legal order? The effect of the Directive on
which this paper is based is overwhelmingly positive, in terms of the improved
guarantees with which the consumer is provided when purchasing digital contents
and services – in the shape of enhanced information requirements, clearer
compliance criteria, reversal of the burden of proof, as well as enabling
businesses that engage in cross-frontier trade to enjoy a greater degree of
legal certainty (lower costs for SMEs). The Belgian authorities being obliged to
take the necessary measures in order to implement the Directive before 1/7/2021,
this contribution will examine its implications under Belgian law.

Essentially, the Directive seeks a maximum degree of harmonisation for a limited
number of issues arising under consumer agreements involving digital products
and services. When implementing this rule, the law-making authorities should
also take into account those legislative instruments which have already achieved
a maximum degree of harmonisation, such as the amended Consumer Rights Directive
and the General Regulation on Data Protection. In the absence of a specific
legislative framework, any analysis of the legislation to be adopted will need
to find some inspiration in existing legal rules on purchase and sale, services,
licensing agreements, etc. Given the trend towards servitisation, which
represents a trend away from sale/ purchase towards product user rights, care
must be taken that these amendments are for the most part applied uniformly when
it comes to digital products and services.

In addition to the new terminology to be introduced by the Belgian authorities,
the Directive makes provision for a number of important extensions. In the first
place, there will henceforth be provided a legislative framework for both the
paying and the non-paying consumer (i.e. those “free” digital services in return
for which the consumer provides his/her personal details). In terms of the
persons affected, the Directive gives the member state a broad measure of
discretion when it comes to extending the protection given to those described as
“consumers” and “traders” to categories which previously enjoyed no protection
whatsoever. In order to provide a measure of future durability, various forms of
digital content and services will come within the scope of this legislation.
Another issue to be faced is that of interpretation, i.e. who and what qualifies
under this legislation – and here, it is recommended to follow the trend which
is noticeable at the European level, viz. to apply the law at the level of the
general principles of the law of contracts.

This contribution also examines the compliance requirements which must be met by
the digital contents and services in question. In terms of the legislation to be
adopted, this takes the form of a combined compliance test, to which should be
added those specific features which are relevant to their digital context. The
legal difficulty arises in the shape of the compliance test – in contrast to the
Belgian rules under which this takes the form of a separate guarantee (i.e. the
rules on hidden effects). The Directive also to a considerable extent reflects
the hierarchy among legal remedies imposed by the rules on consumer sales, which
will probably present few problems when it comes to its implementation. The
implementing legislation to be adopted will, for the consumer of digital
content, take on a slightly different complexion when it comes to seeking legal
redress, given that it will now be for the trader to decide which legal remedy
he/she considers to be the most appropriate.

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Reforming the law of property

The Law of 4/2/2020 has comprehensively and substantially reformed the Belgian
law of property. The previous legislation remained largely that which dated from
1804 and was hopelessly outdated. The Belgian law of property had to a large
extent become court-based, given that the case law had become its main legal
source. This did not serve the cause of durability, legal certainty or equity.

The said Law introduces Book 3 of the new Civil Code and will automatically
enter into effect on 1/9/2021 – with the exception of the provisions governing
public access to land charges, which will enter into force by 1/7/2022 at the
latest. This Book contains new provisions regarding ownership, joint ownership,
land leases, building rights, usufruct, servitudes, public access to land
charges, etc. Book II of the previous Civil Code, as well as legislation such as
the Laws governing land leases and building rights (both dated 10/1/1824) will
be repealed. This paper examines this reform in the light of the differences it
presents with the previous law, and taking into account the relevant legal
practice. It also has a comparative element in the shape of the legal position
in the Netherlands, France and Québec – and to a lesser extant that of Germany
and Switzerland.

The reform as adopted is based on the following tenets; (1) an integrated
approach towards the law of property, (2) its instrumentalisation, (3) its
modernisation, (4) rendering it more flexible and (5) an extensive comparative
approach. The reform also serves to make the law of property more durable. As
regards the latter, attention should be drawn to, inter alia, the additional
opportunities for the multiple use of the land, the extension to 99 years of the
maximum duration of a building right; in addition, under certain exceptional
conditions the duration of a building right may even stretch to eternity. Where
such exceptional conditions apply, they may give rise to some type of “volume
ownership”. Of this aspect, the notion that jointly-owned items of property
should be used taking account of the general interest – including that of future
generations – is a significant example.

A novel feature of the reform is the appearance of a general section containing
provisions which are common to all property rights. These determine in the first
instance what are the existing property rights as well as the extent to which
freedom of action applies – the law or property is permissive law, with the
exception of the applicable definitions and those provisions which expressly lay
down that they are incapable of derogation. This Title also contains general
provisions governing the creation, extinction and transfer of property rights,
their nature (property substitution, confusion of property, property adjustment,
unity principle) – as well as public access to property rights, a significant
aspect of which is the opportunity to enter additional deeds, such as land
purchasing options, pre-emption rights, and deeds of succession, in the
registers of land charges.

When it comes to the practical application of the law, the reforming legislation
has extended the range of options. Thus there is a reduction, to 15 years, of
the maximum duration of a land lease, the extension, to 99 years, of the maximum
duration of the right to usufruct by legal persons, and a set of generally
applicable rules governing personal and property rights in relation to public
property, as well as legislation governing consensual joint ownership and its
termination.

In structural terms there is also a new feature in the shape of a separate Title
governing neighbourly relations, in which the rules regarding excessive
neighbourly nuisance have been codified for the first time; however, this Title
also contains provisions simplifying the rules on common fencing and servitudes.
Thus, acquisitive prescription and owner designation have been made an option
for all visible servitudes.

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The conclusion, validity and performance of a real estate sale - deceptively
simple

During the past few decades, the Belgian regions have introduced a number of
information requirements which need to be complied with by the seller of real
estate. Failure to comply is frequently and expressly penalised with the
voidability of the underlying sale. For other information requirements, the
penalty merely consists in an administrative fine. However, the relationship
between these penalties and the ordinary law of obligations is not entirely
clear. Nevertheless, a closer association with these ordinary rules could be of
considerable benefit to all concerned. Thus it is that, on the one hand, an
administrative fine gives but inadequate protection to the purchaser. On the
other hand, to render the sale in question voidable as a penalty for
non-compliance with these information requirements is in many cases a
disproportionate measure which unnecessarily affects the seller as to his legal
certainty. It is precisely by viewing these measures in the light of the
ordinary law of obligations that this contribution examines whether the
resulting penalty could not be applied in a more proportionate manner.

In the first instance, the author examines the effect of these penalties on the
conclusion of real estate sales. Experience reveals this effect to be minimal.
Given the importance which the relevant law-making authorities have attributed
to the underlying elements of the sale on the basis of these information
requirements, it appears to us appropriate to draw the conclusion that the
assumption can be made that these elements are essential to the purchaser. This
can even be assumed on the basis that it is merely in certain exceptional
circumstances that this will not be the case. The author argues that the
effectiveness of such qualifying considerations is ensured because of the broad
scope of the ordinary rules of obligations, which acts as a threshold for the
system that enables these transactions to be made. A non-existent agreement
cannot be unlawful.

The author further examines the relationship between these information
requirements and the ordinary rules on the conclusion of agreements. It is
frequently the case that voidability as a penalty for non-compliance with an
information requirement exceeds the scope of the same type of penalty as applied
under the ordinary laws on this subject. Thus, unlike the validity-affecting
factors mistake and misrepresentation, there is no requirement that the
purchaser was drawn into error on a fundamental aspect of the agreement. This
ensures that this penalty is applied too drastically and too automatically. A
restriction is therefore necessary. Here, the prohibition of abuse of law can be
invoked. The innovative application of the partial voidance theory could also
provide a solution.

The author also examines the impact produced by the regional pre-contractual
information requirements on the obligations of the parties when it comes to the
performance of the contract. Here, it becomes clear that the information
exchanged definitely influences the seller’s obligations. These information
requirements also appear to ensure that the seller will find it more difficult
to invoke an exemption clause.

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Conflicts of interest in Belgian company law: a critical analysis of the code of
companies and associations after implementation of the second shareholders
rights directive

This contribution analyses the relevant Belgian procedures governing financial
conflicts of interest affecting company directors (Article 7:96 of the Belgian
Companies and Associations Code) and transactions with related parties (Article
7:97 of the Belgian Companies and Associations Code). The focus here is on the
recent changes caused by the introduction of the Companies and Associations Code
and the Law implementing the Shareholder Rights Directive II (“SRD II”). The
paper analyses the rationale and history underlying these conflict of interest
procedures and assesses how these procedures reconcile the protection of
shareholders with the flexibility to manage the company in question.

The author concludes that the recent changes have rightly increased shareholder
protection. For example, the rule prohibiting conflicted directors from voting
has been extended to unlisted companies under Article 7:96. In addition, the
scope of article 7:97 has been greatly extended by the new definition of what
constitutes a related party; also, the relevant procedure has been strengthened
considerably by the rule that (a) the company directors involved in the
transaction are no longer allowed to vote on it, and (b) the information
pertaining to the transaction must now be published immediately, and not merely
in the annual report.

Nevertheless, the author makes a number of proposals for improvement. For
example, the scope of the conflict of interest procedure in article 7:96
continues to include a number of gaps with regard to affective and functional
conflicts of interest. However, this is already partially solved by the fact
that Article 7:97, which lays down a stricter procedure, will often also apply
to financial conflicts of interest affecting directors.

A second issue is that no general procedure governing conflicts of interest
procedure has been formulated for transactions which come within the
jurisdiction of the General Meeting. The Belgian lawmaker would be well advised
either to give the Board of Directors a veto over transactions with related
parties – and to apply the conflict of interest procedure to that decision – or
to introduce a rule prohibiting conflicted shareholders from voting on
transactions with related parties.

Thirdly, the rule exempting subsidiaries contained in Article 7:97 is formulated
very broadly. The only case where the exemption does not apply arises where a
controlling shareholder has a holding of 25 per cent or more in the subsidiary.
It does apply where a different category of related party (such as a director or
a shareholder with significant influence) has such a holding. The author takes
the view that this constitutes an infringement of the Shareholders Rights
Directive II, because the procedure does not, in certain cases, provide adequate
protection against conflicts of interest involving transactions with
subsidiaries. The author therefore proposes that the law be amended in such a
way that the exemption relating to subsidiaries does not apply where a party
related to the listed company has an interest in the subsidiary which conflicts
significantly with that of the listed company.

Fourthly, the lawmaker could still adopt measures making the independent
directors even more independent from the primary shareholders – for example by
protecting them against dismissal by the primary shareholder or by having
directors appointed and dismissed by minority shareholders. In addition, the
role of these independent directors should also be expanded: instead of giving
non-binding advice when the transaction ends, they should be involved in the
negotiation of transactions with related parties from the outset and be granted
a right of veto.

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Cooling-off period with contractual certainty: exploring rental agreement option

A rental option agreement is an agreement under which at least one of the
parties (“the option provider”) gives its beneficiary (“the option taker”) the
right to decide to conclude with the latter a rental agreement, the creation of
which subsequently merely lacks the option taker’s consent. The option taker may
decide independently whether to exercise – or not – his right of option. Thus
option rights become an interesting instrument in situations where the parties
need a degree of flexibility and certainty with a view to concluding the
contract envisaged. Contracts of sale are an example of this, but the inclusion
of option rights can also be useful when it comes to rental agreements. When
seeking out a suitable property for rent prospective lessees do not act with
ill-considered haste. Because a waiting period is capable of causing
uncertainty, the renters will seek to consolidate their chances of securing the
property in question. A right of option can be a useful mechanism here.
Conversely, rental options can also benefit the lessor. By acquiring several
rental options the latter can make a better considered choice before committing
himself to a rental agreement.

This contribution examines option agreements, focusing specifically on their use
in rental agreements. This is because rental option agreements only represents a
useful mechanism for achieving certainty and flexibility if the parties have
themselves ensured certainty concerning the option agreement – and possibly also
its scope and implications.

For this purpose, the author examines in the first instance the legal
characterisation of option agreements and of option rights. Thus a distinction
is drawn between option agreements applied to rental agreements and other
pre-contractual rental arrangements (such as rental offers and preference
agreements) which may be concluded during the negotiations – which can occur
within a tight timeframe. The author also examines the divergences in the way
the expression rental option can be understood – rental options are not all the
same. Thus, a distinction can be drawn between rental options, options to renew
commercial leases, and options to extend rentals. In all these cases the rights
will be different as to their scope.

The paper then discusses the lawfulness, creation and terms and conditions of
rental option agreements.

The lawfulness of rental option agreements between two private parties is
accepted in principle. However, where the option taker is a business, and the
option provider is a consumer or another business, its lawfulness in principle
comes under challenge in the light of the rules concerning unlawful terms and
conditions [Article VI.83 (1) and VI.91/4 (1) of the Business Law Code (WER)].
This is because rental agreements cause an asymmetric situation to arise as
regards the consent of both parties to the rental agreement. However, the
automatic voidance of the rental option agreement is not a desirable outcome,
because this would render the option impossible to be exercised where the
agreement in question has a lawful purpose.

As regards the actual conclusion of the agreement, the author considers the form
– whether compulsory or not – assumed by the rental option agreement. The latter
is free-standing innominate agreement which is not in itself subject to
statutory requirements as regards its form. Whether the written agreement
requirement to which a rental agreement itself is subject also applies to the
right of option relating to it needs to be determined by means of a purposive
interpretation.

Finally, the author briefly examines the price, duration and lifting of the
option.

The parties are free to agree to a price by way of consideration for the
awarding of an option right. Although some are of the opposite view, a
substantial price cannot be automatically equated with a situation whereby the
option taker had already committed himself to a rental agreement. The parties
are in principle free to fix the duration of the rental option agreement. If the
latter has been concluded for an indeterminate period, the option provider may
free himself from it by cancelling it subject to a period of notice.

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Acquisitive prescription and the non-bona fide possessor A three-way dialogue
between belgium, the Netherlands and South Africa

Acquisitive prescription is frequently regarded as raising ethical problems,
entailing as it does that the owner loses his ownership rights against his will
and without any compensation. Such acquisition could be tolerated where the
beneficiary of this type of prescription possesses the property in question on a
bona fide basis, and cannot be faulted, given that here, we have a conflict
between two parties who are deserving of protection. However, acquisitive
prescription by someone who does not possess property on a bona fide basis (or
possesses it mala fide under Belgian law) gives rise to a higher level of
objection. This is because the latter merely deserves very limited protection,
so that his dominant position should not be an automatic given.

Traditionally, Belgian law has allowed the non-bona fide possessor to obtain
property through acquisitive prescription, subject to the proviso that he cannot
claim any reduced prescription periods. It is certainly the case that the courts
frequently adopt a reluctant attitude towards non-bona fide possessors of
property, and the rules that prevent possession provide several openings for
such reluctance. For many years, Dutch law refused to recognise acquisitive
prescription by the non-bona fide possessor.

This was changed in 1992. However, the Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad)
places possessors who can be seriously faulted at a great disadvantage, given
that they remain capable of being held liable in tort. South African law, on the
other hand, adopts an indifferent position when it comes to bona fide, and
merely applies a uniform 30-year prescription period.

Acquisitive prescription by a non-bona fide possessor can be justified by a
number of decisive arguments: (a) possession for a sufficiently long term brings
about a reversal in legitimate title, i.e. in the legitimacy of the parties’
position, (b) it serves the interest of legal certainty – including that enjoyed
by third parties – given that acquisitive prescription forms the basis of secure
property rights; (c) possession by prescription puts the former owner in the
wrong and serves to penalise him for an idleness on his part which is socially
undesirable, (d) it also serves to protect bona fide possessors, given that can
be difficult to prove at what precise time the possessor ceased acting in good
faith, and the lack of bona fide was established.

The counter-arguments are based on the moral repugnance attaching to the
non-bona fide possessor’s position. As far as Dutch law is concerned, an
additional objection is that insufficient attention is given to the requirement
that the non-bona fide possessor should justify his position, which serves to
undermine this legal concept.

In practice, the law has succeeded in managing these “for and against” arguments
in several ways. The most significant factor here is that the non-bona fide
possessor is required to complete a longer term of prescription, i.e. 30 years
in Belgium and 20 years in the Netherlands. In addition, a great deal of
attention is given to the notion of possession itself, being one of the
essential requirements for obtaining acquisitive prescription. More particularly
the various rules preventing possession are capable of keeping non-bona fide
possessors in check. Consideration is also given to the various types of
compensation which are chargeable to the non-bona fide possessor – and here,
Dutch law has been in the vanguard. The new Belgian property legislation has
also taken a big step in this direction, but its implementation leaves a great
deal to be desired. It also needs to be said that there are considerable
differences among the legal systems in question as regards the protection of
public property. Belgian legislation provides a high degree of protection,
whereas this is not the case when it comes to The Netherlands – which may
explain why the Dutch authorities tend to frown on non-bona fide possessors
given that, in the Netherlands, it is possible to acquire major items of public
property from the authorities).

When it comes to legal reform, two solutions suggest themselves. In the first
instance, one could subscribe to the Dyal Chand theory, and emphasise the
importance of all such legitimate interests as are involved. As a result,
applying the requirements for prescription is no longer and black-and-white
issue, but is subject to various nuances.

For example, the possessor could be awarded a right of use.

However, a more attractive proposition would be to oblige the mala fide
possessor to pay compensation, as is currently the case in The Netherlands and
Belgium.

This makes it possible to enhance the legitimacy of acquisitive prescription and
to protect the interests of all those involved, including third parties. This
also serves to discourage taking possession on a non-bona fide basis. However,
it is important to ensure that the former owners are protected against the
non-bona fide possessor, which is not the case in Belgium. It is also necessary
to take into account the relevant circumstances, but even the existing
mechanisms pay but little heed to this requirement.

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Financial force majeure: How force majeure is interpreted in relation to
obligations for the payment of money

Payment issues have always been with us. Where a debtor is no longer able to pay
the sums owed under his financial obligations, the latter may resort to pleading
force majeure. However, this will only be possible in exceptional circumstances,
given that money is a replaceable item, and only seldom is there a transfer of
risk for the actual payment of the sum in question.

Nevertheless, there are a number of exceptional circumstances which may give
rise to force majeure. In the first instance there are the faits du prince, i.e.
measures taken by the public authorities, such as restrictions on bills of
exchange, or embargos.

Secondly, insolvency on the part of the debtor could also give rise to force
majeure in relation to obligations to pay the sum owed. This is because there is
trend among the courts to interpret the impossibility requirement for force
majeure in a more qualified and humane manner. Thus the difficulties experienced
by the debtor in meeting his obligations could sometimes be qualified as force
majeure, regardless of the replaceable nature of money. However, the Supreme
Court (Hof van Cassatie) has consistently held that a debtor’s insolvency cannot
release him from his obligation, but can only give rise to its suspension.
Thirdly, force majeure could also apply where meeting the obligation in question
would place the debtor in an intolerable position – if only in respect of future
transactions. Fourthly, the seller of a specific coin or banknote could plead
force majeure if they are destroyed.

However, in all these circumstances the other requirements for force majeure
will need to be met, to wit (i) that the debtor cannot be held responsible for
his failure to meet his obligations, (ii) the fact that the debtor had not
assumed the risk of the circumstances in question arising, and (iii) that these
circumstances arose after the contract was concluded. In the light of these
requirements, there are a number of obstacles which the debtor will need to
overcome before being able to rely on force majeure. Thus, for example the
debtor will need to demonstrate that he managed his financial affairs
competently and that he had taken adequate financial precautions before entering
into the obligation to pay the sum in question.

Force majeure can either temporarily suspend performance of the obligation –
where the impossibility to perform is only temporary, or it can release the
debtor from further performance where the impossibility is permanent. The courts
have at times been inconsistent when applying these principles.

However, where the requirements for force majeure have not been met, the debtor
can rely on a number of alternatives, including unforeseeability, the mitigating
effect of having acted bona fide, periods of grace, and certain measures of
support taken in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. These legal concepts are
speedier to invoke than force majeure, but their consequences are frequently
less effective.

Finally, where the Vienna Convention on the Sale of Goods applies to the
agreement in question, the debtor may rely on Article 79 thereof. The Supreme
Court (Hof van Cassatie) interprets this provision in such a flexible way that
payment issues based on this rule can prompt the renegotiation of the said
agreement.

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Assessing the legislative frameworks in Europe, China and the US concerning the
use of personal data in combating global health crises. What lessons can be
drawn from the COVID-19 pandemic?

Because of the far-reaching digitalisation of our lives, personal data are
having an increasingly important role in society. During the Covid-19 crisis, it
has emerged that personal data can be used effectively in combating a global
health crisis. It is expected that, in future, the use of personal data will
have a crucial role in managing health crises such as this one. This
increasingly creates a field of tension between free movement and the use of
personal data on the one hand, and the protection of such data on the other
hand. This paper attempts to formulate a response to the question whether the
law-making frameworks that currently apply in Europe, China and the US provide
adequate protection for personal data during a global health crisis, and whether
the currently applicable legislation does not obstruct the effective use of such
data. In this contribution, the proportionality principle is used as a criterion
for assessing the balance between the right to the protection of personal data
on the one hand, and the right to life and health on the other, where personal
data are used in combating a global health crisis.

Under the legislations in question, personal data are subject to a sliding scale
of protection from weak to strong. With its GDPR, Europe can be found at one
extreme end of the scale, providing as it does a high level of protection for
personal data. However, this does render more problematic the effective use of
personal data in combating a global health crisis. The People’s Republic of
China (PRC) finds itself at the other end of the scale, given the weak
protection it gives to personal data. However, it does enable the effective use
of such personal data. The position of Hong Kong, on the other hand, has shifted
towards European standards – influenced by English law, Hong Kong definitely has
provided stronger protection of its citizens’ personal data. However, where
emergencies arise the PRC can impose its legislation on Hong Kong, and thus
nullify such protection. On the said scale, the US finds itself between China
and Hong Kong, with its fragmented and incoherent federal legislation on data
protection on the one hand, and the ever-stronger rule-making powers wielded by
the state authorities on the other.

From an examination of the relevant legislative frameworks, and the use of
personal data via contacttracing-apps, one can conclude that the circumstance
that the existing legislation was not designed for use in crisis times
represents the biggest problem for the effective use and re-use of these
personal data during a global health crisis. To be able, in future, to make
proportional use of personal data in combating a global health crisis, whilst at
the same time protecting such data as strongly as possible, there is a need for
national legislation specifically regulating the use of or personal data during
a global health crisis. In order to avoid yet another patchwork of legislation
on the subject, the author takes the view that international guidelines should
be adopted and/or an international organisation be created that allows the
various national databases to be accessed quickly and effectively, or that
enables data to be analysed quickly and efficiently using a specific database at
the supranational level during a global health crisis. In addition, the
individuals affected should be given the opportunity, acting within the
constraints of the law, to relinquish their data in the public interest.

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Thus the last shall be the first – Priority ranking in the event of a company
restructuring

The question whether the ex ante ranking order enjoyed by the various rightful
claimants to the assets of a company should be respected where the latter has
been restructured is an issue which has hardly ever been tackled in the Belgian
– and European – legal literature. In Belgium, however, the position has assumed
relatively extreme proportions. Where a company has been re-organised by court
order as a result of a collective agreement, the disfavoured shareholders can,
almost structurally, retain their position in the company capital, whereas the
unsecured creditors are invariably subjected to reductions. The systematic
failure to observe a previously-agreed ranking order in the event of a company
restructuring is not only anomalous in the strictly legal sense, but also has
far-reaching financial implications. It is extremely doubtful whether a set of
insolvency rules that enables the shareholder – or any other rightful claimant –
to bypass the ex ante ranking order by starting a re-organisation procedure can
be regarded as the ultimate in effectiveness.

In this regard, the US courts and legal literature have enjoyed a much longer
tradition which can be traced back to the mid-19th century. When a number of
large railway companies became insolvent during this period, the secured
creditors and shareholders joined forces against the unsecured creditors. When a
restructuring took place, the latter found themselves, as it were, booted off
the liabilities side of the balance sheet, whilst the secured creditors and the
shareholders split the value resulting from the re-organisation amongst
themselves. These practices were, however, halted by the Supreme Court in a
number of renowned decisions. At first, this was done on a somewhat pragmatic
basis – where all the rightful claimants had been treated in a reasonably
“honest” and “fair” manner, the Supreme Court allowed the ranking order to be
disregarded. This “doctrine” was later described in the legal literature as an
extrapolation of the “relative priority” rule (RPR). In its Los Angeles Lumber
decision (1939), the Supreme Court changed tack and introduced a strict
application of the “absolute priority” rule (APR) – no longer was it permissible
to depart from a pre-existing ranking order where a re-organisation had
occurred. Thus any dissenting creditor whose claim was not entirely met was able
to scupper a re-organisation plan if a party that came lower down in the
priority ranking – e.g. a shareholder – retained a share in the assets under the
plan. As the years went by, this application of the APR was made more flexible
by the courts and the legal literature. At present, no single creditor may, on
his own, (where the category to which he belongs votes in favour of the plan)
veto an entire re-organisation plan by enforcing the APR. In addition, the US
courts accept that, in the event that not every creditor is paid, the
shareholders – for example – retain their claim if they make a new contribution,
or where they receive these claims from creditors placed higher in the ranking
order. Another alternative, in certain cases, is for the company in to meet the
claims of creditors of lower rank during the restructuring procedure if to do so
plays a useful part in keeping the company alive. Finally, on a more structural
level, the APR may be departed from in the case of certain smaller businesses,
where the shareholders frequently play a crucial part.

When contemplating the manner in which the APR has developed in the US, one
notes that the applicable rules have become increasingly sophisticated. In this
regard it becomes clear that the US version of the APR in its current form
complies to a large extent with the financial model which we have outlined in
this paper. To put it briefly, a sound and effective system of rules governing
company re-organisation respects the previously-agreed ranking orders, except
where the parties involved have agreed to depart from it in certain specific and
well-defined cases. Where the relevant insolvency rules fail to do so, the
company will – in most cases imperceptibly – experience a rise in its capital
costs as a whole, and a number of profitable projects will be abandoned.

When considering the Belgian rules on judicial re-organisation by collective
agreement (JRCA), it is clear that these are out of kilter with existing
financial models. Moreover, the JRCA system could be described as remaining
impaled on a point which had already been passed by the US in 1864, given that
the JRCA enables the shareholders and a group of creditors – mostly secured – to
connive in compelling another category of creditors – mostly unsecured – to
incur sizeable reductions without the shareholders contributing a single penny.
It is difficult to imagine a more frontal assault on ex ante agreements (known
as the “creditors’ bargain”).

This anomalous Belgian system of granting structural advantage to the
shareholders will change once the Belgian parliament implements the EU
Restructuring Directive. This provides the opportunity to opt for the
introduction of some form of RPR or APR. Although in principle we favour a
relatively strict, but qualified, APR even the introduction of a European RPR
will represent a considerable advance for the relevant Belgian law. This is
because the European RPR, however vague and ineffectively worded, prevents the
disproportionate dispossession of the higher ranked categories by those lower
down the order.

Nevertheless, subject to empirically-tested evidence to the contrary or in the
absence of abstract arguments which are hard to refute, we believe that APR
should be the fundamental rule. This is because it ensures that, in the event of
a cross-class “cram down”, each category may claim its share in the
restructuring value. However, in full consistency with our economic approach, we
can also consider a number of “effective” qualifications of the APR.

In the first instance, secured creditors only have a preferential claim on the
liquidation value of their security (valued on the basis of a sale in “piecemeal
liquidation” or in “going concern”) and not on the restructuring value (i.e.
valued if the agreement is concluded, e.g. using a “discounted cash flow”
method). This is because no security interest can be placed on the earning
capacity of the business, i.e. the “going concern surplus”. In this allocation
we can therefore identify a bifurcation: on the one hand there is the allocation
of the liquidation value (on which the secured creditor has a preferential
claim); on the other hand there is the allocation of the “going concern surplus”
(on which the secured creditor has, in principle, a concurrent claim in relation
to his share which is in negative equity).

Secondly, the shareholders can retain their interest (or part of it) where, in
exchange, they contribute a new value to the business. Although this is known as
the “new value exception”, it does not in fact represent an exception – the
shareholders retain their interest in exchange for fresh financing. Crucial
shareholders may also retain an interest, even without making a financial
contribution which is valued by the market. We are dealing here with a
contribution in kind, more particularly one made by shareholders without whom
the continuity of the business is imperilled. Similar considerations apply when
it comes to certain strategic creditors. Here also, there is no question of an
exception to the APR: the restructuring value which is protected by the APR
represents the value of the business without any further involvement by the
“insiders” (strategic creditors). This is because the latter cannot be compelled
to remain involved in the business against their will and without receiving
adequate compensation. Here, accordingly, the shareholders retain their share
interest, precisely because they remain involved in the business through their
contribution in kind. The practice of “gifting” is no exception to the APR
either – in this case also each of the parties receives the share in the
restructuring value to which they are entitled in accordance with the statutory
or contractually-agreed ranking order.

Thirdly, the “20 per cent rule” which currently applies under Belgian law
amounts, in fact, to no more than a system of allocation which departs
significantly from the statutory or contractually-agreed ranking order. (APR)
and collides with our approach to law and economics, which includes the
“creditors’ bargain” theory. The continuation of the 20 per cent rule can only
be justified where the need is felt to increase the recovery potential of
unsecured creditors and to reduce that of the secured creditors. Although this
may be a noble objective, it is out view that allocation of value is an issue
which is best dealt with outside the scope of insolvency law. The question
arises, moreover, whether in fact that 20 per cent rule cannot be replaced by
something better. A “carve-out” or “prescribed part” system – as it applies in
the United Kingdom – produces an entirely different effect.

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Is a system of direct professional risk insurance in sight in the Netherlands?

In the Netherlands, the rules governing compensation for the victims of
occupational illness are different from those applying in Belgium. Whereas in
the latter such compensation is provided via an insurance fund, and compensation
for accidents at work is provided on the basis of insurance which the employer
is compelled to contract, the victims of occupational illness in The Netherlands
are to a large extent obliged to rely on the law of torts if they are to obtain
compensation for the loss they have incurred. However, several bodies in the
Netherlands have proposed that the employer be required to contract insurance
for occupational illness as well, for the benefit of the workers thus affected.
It is a model that tallies with that which applies in Belgium for accidents at
work. In The Netherlands, a commission of inquiry, led by Ton Heerts, has, in
the course of the past 12 months, concluded that the settlement of occupational
illness claims could be simplified, and that the recovery of loss resulting from
an occupational illness through the law of torts is difficult to obtain. In this
contribution, the issue of compensating loss related to occupational illness in
the Netherlands is subjected to critical examination, various alternative
solutions are discussed, and, more particularly, attention is given to the
possibility of introducing a system of direct insurance for occupational illness
(based on the Belgian model for accidents at work insurance). The author
examines a number of issues in this regard, as well as certain questions which
could arise if such a system of direct insurance were to be introduced, but
concludes that, compared to the current model involving the parties concerned –
but in particular the employees affected – such a system presents many
advantages.

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What kind of future for the subjective formal contract? The “De Decker Model”
assessed in the light of the ban on fraudulent evasion of legal rules

In principle, a contract of sale is created by the mere meeting of minds between
the parties regarding the item sold and the price (Art. 1583 Old Civil Code).
However, where the item in question is real estate, such immediacy is not
invariably desirable. By using the De Decker model, conveyancing practitioners
have attempted to mitigate the practical drawbacks of this rule. This model
makes provision for three stages. Under the first, there are consecutive options
which give the parties involved the time definitely to commit themselves so as
to enable them to discover the necessary information. Once this option has been
exercised, a sui generis agreement is created whereby the parties commit
themselves to buying/selling the real estate in question. Contrary to what
happens with an ordinary purchase option, in the case of real estate the sale
will not be created with the exercising of the option. This is because the De
Decker model contains a subjective formal agreement clause, by which the sale is
created only where the formal requirement has been met, in this case the
execution of a notarial deed.

The use of this model has given rise to a number of questions as to its
operation and validity. In this paper, the author examines the various stages of
the model, and assesses it in the light of the ban on fraudulent evasion of
legal rules. Given that this prohibition does not exist as a legal concept in
its own right, it is used here as a general term covering a type of issue – to
wit whether it is lawful or not to circumvent the drawbacks attached to an
ordinary sale with a suspensive condition by using a clause requiring a
subjective formal contract.

The inclusion of a formal requirement is nothing new. It is perfectly possible
to postulate that the creation of an agreement will only be considered – and
that the meeting of minds between the parties will only deemed to have taken
place at that moment – with the fulfilment of such a requirement. Under the De
Decker model, the parties, by exercising the option, make it known that they
already have a fully- fledged agreement as to the purchase/sale (i.e. the legal
requirements have been met) but that they only envisage its completion once the
conveyancer (Notary Public) has succeeded in fully informing the parties, and is
in a position to state that there are no legal objections to it. However, where
the parties have already committed themselves to the purchase/sale when
exercising the option, and intervention by the Notary Public becomes a formality
requirement or a suspensive condition, it is certain that a truly subjective
formal agreement will not have taken place, which will, inter alia, have
implications for the extent to which the parties are bound by the arrangement.
Where the parties fail to meet the registration requirement which results from
the existence of the agreement – even if it is an invalid one – they evade this
requirement.

Depending on the parties’ objectives, therefore, the following distinction must
be made. Either they already wish to be committed to the purchase when
exercising their option (which can itself be modified), or they are merely
stating that they will only agree to the lawful parts of the sale when
exercising their option, but only wish to express their will immediately after
having informed the Notary Public – and therefore when signing the notarial
deed. In so doing, the parties merely need to meet the general due diligence
requirement.

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The forfeiture rule no longer applies! Forgiveness of the undeserving heir

A criminal act does not necessarily produce consequences under criminal law. The
possibility of heir forfeiture confirms that a criminal conviction can impact
succession as well. The key idea behind this extension is that criminal acts
should not yield any advantage. However, lately, the notion that the undeserving
heir should forfeit any succession right lost its categoricalness. For some time
now, laws of succession in Italy, France, the Netherlands and Germany bestow the
testator the right to lift this forfeiture. This right of the testator confirms
the trend whereby the law of succession is increasingly becoming an area that
the testator governs by independent decisions rather than one which needs to be
directed entirely by the public authorities. Since the enactment of the Law of
10 December 2012, the Belgian succession law has joined this trend.

A remarkable feature of this (legal) current, found in the relevant legislation
or other sources of law, is its reference to the concept of forgiveness. This
concept is the vehicle that allows the testator to cancel the heir’s forfeiture.
However, not all the legal orders in question approach the right to such
cancellation in the same manner. There are at least two different approaches to
be considered – the formal and the informal.

The Belgian rule, laid down in Article 728 of the (previous) Civil Code (Article
4.7 of the new Belgian Civil Code), is marked by a high degree of formality. Any
forgiveness must meet several conditions as to form – i.e. such forgiveness must
be contained in any one of the three formats a last will can take – and must be
given in writing. Under Belgian law, forgiveness is a legal act that has strong
similarities with the formation of a will. This approach is advantageous because
it has the potential to rule out any scope for discussion. At this level,
accordingly, the Belgian system is undoubtedly conducive to legal certainty.
However, it also enables forgiveness to be used for estate planning. The Dutch
system, on the other hand, is less formal. Here, forgiveness does not take the
form of a legal transaction. It treats forgiveness as a fact to which the
relevant legislation attaches legal consequences. In the Netherlands, the
specific facts and circumstances help determine whether forgiveness has taken
place. Under this approach, legal forgiveness closely dovetails with actual
forgiveness. In the Netherlands, the testator is not obliged to take any further
steps – whether legal or not – to ensure that his forgiveness benefits the
undeserving heir. On the other hand, forgiveness may become hard to discern from
associated concepts such as justification, reconciliation and forgetting.

The formal and informal systems each have their advantages and disadvantages.
The varying methods to establish forgiveness within each system do not imply
that insight gained from one approach cannot be of benefit to the other.
Although the relevant Belgian law legally corsets the entire issue, it will
remain necessary to use facts and circumstances of each case when interpreting
the unilateral legal act of forgiveness. The Dutch case law on this subject, and
the Belgian and Dutch case law on reconciliation in divorce law (which has, in
Belgium, lost its importance due to the legal reforms of 2007), provide useful
pointers to identify forgiveness.

In addition, the abundant literature concerning forgiveness also plays a
significant part. Philosophical insights on this subject enable us to define and
refine this concept even further.

Although forgiveness in the law of succession appears, at first glance, to be
merely a private affair, it also has a broader social function. By excluding
attempts to particular criminal offences from forgiveness’ ambit, the Belgian
legislation delineated the, at least in the legal sense of the term
unforgivable. Not only unforgiveability in a personal sense but also in
principal sense is defined. Some particular actions are so improper that they
exclude the undeserving heir to benefit from the succession, even if the
testator is not personally impaired to forgive them.

The relevant Dutch law, on the other hand, has refrained from restricting the
scope for forgiveness. It even recognises the possibility of anticipative
forgiveness, which can help overcome the personal impossibility to forgive. The
future testator can forgive a future heir for particular future actions. For
instance, the testator who wishes assistance when terminating his own life can
anticipatively provide the heir with the necessary protection under the law of
succession. This possibility nuances the presumption of wrongdoing which is
firmly associated with forgiveness. Here too, forgiveness transcends the purely
private sphere, since the other heirs, the public authorities, and, even in a
broader sense, society as a whole, will be compelled to accept the authorisation
given by the testator as actual forgiveness.

Moreover, the impact of forgiveness on third parties is not restricted to cases
where it is anticipative. As forgiveness can free heirs of their forfeiture
status, it changes the norms of interaction between the victim and the
perpetrator and the perpetrator and the wider community. Due to the testator’s
forgiveness the comunity can no longer deny the perpetrator’s status as heir.
Furthermore, forgiveness given in the context of forfeiture may also modify the
outcome of the criminal proceedings which attend the offence. The introduction
of forgiveness in the rules governing forfeiture allows it to exert influence on
the individual and the societal level.

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Application ex officio of rules of evidence: a task for a proactive court?

The task allocation as between the courts and the parties in adversarial civil
proceedings is governed by the “party sovereignty” principle on the one hand,
and the general rule on supplementary legal grounds on the other hand. Where it
is incumbent on the parties to present the facts to the court, the latter is
bound to examine and assess these facts, and to apply the correct legal rules
accordingly. In so doing, the court (a) may not raise any objection which the
parties had excluded in their submissions (b) may not change the subject-matter
of the action, (c) must base its decision on such facts as have been lawfully
presented to it and (d) must also respect the parties’ procedural rights.
Although the court has broad powers to raise legal rules ex officio – albeit
within the limits referred to above – it is only under an obligation to do so
where to apply them is required by those facts which have been specifically
presented by the parties in support of their claims.

Traditionally, this task allocation has been interpreted strictly. In recent
times, however, it has become accepted that the role of the courts is in no way
a passive one. Moreover, the parties are also expected to act as responsibly as
is required. Thus the parties determine the limits of the dispute by presenting
their facts; in addition; however, they are also bound to co-operate in good
faith when it comes to such issues as the production of evidence. For its part,
the court is obliged not only to examine and assess the facts presented by the
parties, but also to apply the correct legal rules accordingly. In addition, the
court must direct the conduct of the trial in a proactive manner. Moreover, this
trend to require a more pro-active role on the part of the courts can also be
identified in the French and Dutch legal systems.

It is also – and maybe even especially – in the field of evidence that the task
allocation between the courts and the parties has a significant part to play. It
is certainly incumbent on the parties to provide and substantiate their
evidence, as well as to co-operate in good faith when it comes to producing all
the available evidence. The court, on the other hand, has the power to order
investigations into various aspects of the case, is obliged to assess the
evidence provided and, under the new rules on evidence, even has the power to
reverse the burden of proof. Therefore, the court no longer has a passive role
when it comes to assessing the evidence.

Even though, as a result of the case law of the Supreme Court, the general
principles governing the task allocation between the courts and the parties have
now become clearly formulated, legal scholars are currently divided on the
question whether these very principles governing the courts’ power to present
additional legal grounds also entail that the courts are also empowered to apply
ex officio the relevant substantive as well as procedural rules of evidence. The
decisions of the Supreme Court on this subject are subject to widely differing
interpretations in the available legal literature.

Starting from the traditional approach towards the role of the courts, and based
on the case law developed by the Supreme Court, some authors cleave to the view
that the Supreme Court decisions regarding this general principle are
inconsistent with the prevailing rules on evidence. In their view, it is for the
party on whom the burden of proof rests, and therefore not for the court, to
substantiate the evidence submitted by them. Against this approach there is a
more updated one which holds that the general principle regarding the provision
of additional legal grounds also applies when it comes to evidence – subject,
however, to the court observing the relevant procedural rights of defence and to
the condition that the issues relating to the evidence had already been featured
in the legal proceedings to date.

In the light of the general principles governing the task allocation between the
court and the parties, it is this updated approach which, for a variety of
reasons, should be adopted. In the first instance, there is no valid reason why
the general principles regarding additional legal grounds should not be applied
to the rules of evidence also. The latter are also legal rules – the fact that
they are permissive law is irrelevant. Moreover, the court being empowered, even
ex officio, to apply rules of evidence can be justified – albeit to a large
extent implicitly – by the existing case law of the Supreme Court (1). Secondly,
the party sovereignty principle does not prevent the court from applying the
relevant rules of evidence – given that these rules can be applied regardless of
the parties’ freedom to act (2). In addition, the legal system of France and of
the Netherlands, which are closely related to those of Belgium, apply similar
principles and have the same approach as regards the task allocation between the
courts and the parties (3), the ex officio application of the rules on evidence
by the courts is consistent not only with the object of these rules per se (4)
but also, in a broader perspective, with the expectations which society
currently has of the role of the courts (5). Finally, the new rules on evidence
also tend to favour a more pro-active role on the part of the courts (6) – a
role which at least entails that the courts are actually empowered to apply the
relevant legal rules, including those governing evidence.

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Compensating Immaterial Damages in the Netherlands and Italy: A comparative
historical analysis

Prior to the 19th century codifications, the law of both the Netherlands and
Italy made provision for the compensation of immaterial damages. This
represented a departure from the Roman law principle that the body of a free
citizen could not be valued in money terms. In Italy, this rule appears to have
more weight on the eve of the codification era. Both the Netherlands (following
independence in 1838) and Italy (in 1865, following unification) had their law
codified based on the French Code civil, containing broadly worded provisions
regarding tort liability. However, the Code civil contained no provisions
regulating compensation for immaterial damages. The 1865 Italian Codice Civile
provided no basis for immaterial damages, whereas the Burgerlijk Wetboek of the
Netherlands only contained rules providing a right to compensation for
immaterial damages in the event of (intentional) defamation. Although the issue
of providing compensation for immaterial damages was initially a controversial
one in the Netherlands, and prompted mutually contradictory solutions by the
courts, it would seem that the Italian courts decidedly leaned towards the
victims’ cause, whereas in the Netherlands matters only changed in this regard
during the Second World War when the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) made a ruling in
favour of compensation for pain and loss of quality of life. This decision was
in line with the traditional law which had previously governed the country, and
was also based on, inter alia, comparisons with other countries (including
France and Belgium). There appeared to be no issue with placing immaterial
damages within the scope of the term “harm” as featured in Article 1401 et seq
of the Civil Code. Subsequently, the notion of “moral harm”, derived from the
French legal literature, was introduced in the Italian legal literature, for
which compensation had initially been awarded in 19th century court decisions.
Thereafter, however, stricter criteria were applied by both the courts and the
legal literature, whereby compensation was only awarded for harm which resulted
from a criminal act. In this regard, only the indirect financial loss (indirect
moral harm) suffered by the victim was capable of compensation, which in
practice led to differential levels of compensation for equal levels of harm.

Both countries subsequently were given a new Code – Italy in 1942 and the
Netherlands in 1992. The Italian version codified the existing legal literature
and case law, drawing a distinction between economic harm (il danno
patrimoniale) and immaterial damages (il danno non patrimoniale). This
distinction is comparable to that which is made between property harm and “other
loss” in the Netherlands (Article 6:95 Civil Code). Under both systems governing
compensation, the second category is only eligible for compensation where the
law so allows. In Italy it was the medical/legal literature and the courts,
rather than the legislators, which gave a prominent place to personality rights
during the second half of the 20th century. Here, qualifying health as a
constitutionally protected subjective right played a major part, health being
deemed to include not only physical injury but also its psychological
implications. However, the notion of danno biologico, originally a
constitutional right to health, subsequently became a general clause capable of
accommodating various types of claims. Over and above this, an additional
opportunity is created to bring a claim in the event that the victim’s everyday
life deteriorates (danno esistenziale). Pain and suffering came to fall within
the scope of a separate form of immaterial damages, i.e. moral harm.

In the Netherlands, compared to the Italian legislation, compensation for harm
to property is capable of accommodating more compensatable expenses, such as
travelling costs and expenses related to replacement household help. Article
6:106 of the Civil Code also provides more opportunities for the compensation of
immaterial damages than was initially the case in Italy, because of the criminal
act requirement. Although the Italian system sets standards for compensation in
the shape of tables, in the Netherlands standardisation is attempted through
case-by-case comparisons. By using this method, the Italian system promotes
equality of treatment. However, as time passed personal circumstances
surrounding the case were also taken into account, which served to weaken
equality of treatment created by the tabling method. However, in so doing the
Italian system comes closer to that of the Netherlands.

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Provision of services by ass ociations of joint owners

The association of joint owners (AJO) is responsible for the management of a
specific apartment building, or group of buildings, the ownership of which is
held its members – i.e., the joint owners. Thus they manage third-party
property, and in addition represent the joint owners in this context. For the
avoidance of abuses, the legislation in question has restricted the AJO’s
objectives “exclusively (to) […] the maintenance and management of the building
or group of buildings”. Restrictions are also placed on its assets, which are
namely confined to such moveable property as is necessary for the achievement of
this objective. The last-named rule is intended to avoid a situation under which
the AJO could become a civil real estate company, whereby the joint owners would
cede their property rights to the AJO.

Some types of joint ownership, however, have specific needs. For example, there
may be a desire to provide the joint owners, users or certain third parties
(e.g., parking facilities or promotion events in a shopping centre, restoration
and security services in assisted residential living spaces, neighbourhood
parties, or the renting of a room in a co-housing community …). Other types of
joint ownership can also, in the light of the trend towards servitisation, and
the transition towards a circular real estate economy, give rise to the need for
other types of service – e.g., car-sharing, energy audits, sponsoring events for
renovation, repairs to privately-owned property, etc.). Nevertheless, the
existing law relating to apartments does not invariably provide adequate levels
of legal certainty or flexibility in order to meet the specific needs of a
particular property in joint ownership. More particularly there is uncertainty
concerning the acceptability of services which benefit the joint owners and
users rather than the actual properties that form part of the building. Whilst
the traditional literature on this subject has raised no objections to this,
recent court decisions and legal writing have challenged the acceptability of
such services by reference to the restricted objectives set by the AJO
legislation.

Two recent legislative reforms outside the law governing apartments have served
to increase doubts concerning the limits to which the AJO’s activities are
subject. In the first instance, the distinction between civil and commercial
acts was abolished, and the enterprise principle replaced the trader principle.
So, what are now the implications of the circumstance that the AJO can no longer
become a “civil” real estate company? Secondly, the specialism principle
governing the status of the ordinary association was given a new scope in the
Companies and Associations Code. The former prohibition of any profit motive has
been replaced by the prohibition of any profit payment motive. Given that,
traditionally, AJOs were banned from having a profit motive, the same reaction
now arises in relation to the prohibition of any profit payment motive.

The provision of services can be organised in three possible ways – by
integration (in the form of a public utility, or of self-management within the
AJO), by contract (via a service provider outside the AJO) or through membership
of an associated legal person (which is a variant of the previous regime). This
paper examines each of these methods more closely.

Especially the integration method has given rise to legal uncertainty. However,
the fact that the legislation in question has assigned specific tasks to a legal
person does not mean that its statutorily-determined objectives need to be
regarded as strictly circumscribed – on the contrary, this paper highlights that
the AJO’s objectives are broad in scope. Moreover, it is clear from the
legislation governing apartments that the AJO’s powers transcend the distinction
between the privately-owned properties and the common areas. Accordingly, a more
suitable test resides in maintaining a balance between the joint owners’
individual and common interests as seen from the point of view of the purpose of
the building. From a thorough analysis of the AJO’s distinguishing features, and
from a comparative study of the relevant law in other countries, it emerges that
the provision of services to the joint owners, users and third parties within
certain limits is perfectly compatible with the AJO’s objectives. However, the
factor that creates legal uncertainty is the absence of legislation that
expressly regulates the allocation of the cost – or profits – resulting from the
provision of services in a jointly-owned property.

Based on precedents established under French law, the question also arises in a
Belgian context whether the integration model does not give rise to some awkward
conflicts of interest issues in relation to the joint property’s managers, and
whether the services in question should not therefore be exclusively provided
contractually by outside providers. The author of this contribution argues that
less far-reaching measures than the prohibition of integrated service provision
can be perfectly adequate for the purpose of giving suitable protection to the
owners’ and users’ interests. Moreover, this enables the General Meeting to
retain the right to choose the method of organising the provision of services.

In order to resolve the prevailing uncertainty on this issue, the current legal
literature proposes the creation of a separate legal person, membership of which
could be open to the joint owners, as well as to any users or third parties.
Such membership could, whether mandatorily or by choice, be linked to the status
of joint owner or the holder of a usership. Although this organisational method
definitely has its advantages, it is also subject to certain limitations imposed
by the law of property, the law of obligations and the right not to be a member
of an association. Particularly the last-named principle appears to be an
insurmountable obstacle when it comes to the ordinary association with legal
personality, because the law relating to apartments provides no legal basis
which meets the requirements of the legality principle.

Viewed from a broader perspective, the provision of services in a jointly-owned
property comes with certain opportunities and risks. The close proximity of this
provision to the property is particularly suitable for the realisation of
economies of scale, risk spreading and the local sharing economy. This enables
joint owner communities to apply, for example, certain technological innovations
in a fast-developing economy. However, the value of the property could be
reduced where the costs involved are so high that they could cause the building
to become unsaleable. However, a more significant factor here is the extent to
which the collective added value can be leveraged. Joint ownership influences
the broader economic, social and political environment of a country – but the
reverse also applies. Added value can only flourish by opening up the law
relating to apartments and by creating of a framework in which the public law
and the private law are tuned to each other. This is why the author concludes by
pinpointing various opportunities for the law governing apartments to grow as
derived from a comparative study on the subject.

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Abuse of Rights under Belgian and Dutch Law: Individual Freedom, Social
Diligence and Anti-Social Use of the Law

Rights and powers can be exercised in such a way as to be harmful to others.
Thus the law of property finds its limit in the rights of others. The notion of
abuse of rights can serve to limit the rights and powers conferred by national
lawmakers more restrictively. It can also serve as an instrument for shaping a
less individualistic and socially concerned society. Abuse of rights as a notion
is capable of converting moral rules into positive law. Both the courts and the
legal authors can play an important part here.

Under Belgian law, abuse of rights is only held to apply where someone acted
with a view to harming another. This was subsequently given a more objective
basis in the shape of a requirement that the person acted without a reasonable
interest. This criterion was subsequently in turn broadened towards the
requirement of a disproportionate balance of interests. In most cases, the
courts have applied this criterion. A key decision made in 1971 provided a
general formulation of abuse of rights – the latter consists in the exercising
of a right which clearly exceeds the way a diligent and careful person would
normally have exercised it. This rule has been applied not only under the law of
property; since 1983 it has also found application in the law of contracts,
based on the moderating effect of the bona fide principle. The general
formulation of abuse of rights as a concept was incorporated in the Civil Code
in 2022. For the purpose of giving further substance to this general and generic
criterion, several specific criteria are available. These to a large extent hark
back to those which had already been developed before 1971. Abuse of process can
cover both the fact of bringing proceedings and the manner in which they are
brought. Traditionally, abuse of process has been regarded as a key application
of the abuse of rights principle, although it has been argued that it
constitutes a separate type of abuse of rights, given that there are other
interests at stake than those of the parties involved in the proceedings only.
Abuse of process applies where one of the parties involved in the action starts
it without a reasonable or conclusive interest on the one hand, or in a way
which clearly exceeds the limits of the manner in which a diligent and careful
person would normally have exercised it on the other hand. Where abuse of
process is established, not only compensation, but also a fine may be imposed in
order to penalise those who disrupt the proper functioning of this public
service.

In the Netherlands, at first bringing proceedings without a reasonable interest
also represented the applicable criterion for abuse of rights. Later the
relevant criterion became the exclusive intention to cause harm to others, and
later still – in line with the Meijers philosophy – a considerable degree of
inequality between the interests of those who bring proceedings and those of
other persons to whom harm has been caused. The criteria developed by the courts
were incorporated in the Civil Code of 1992 – here, however, bringing
proceedings without a reasonable interest was not included as a separate
criterion. Those criteria which have been developed in the field of the law of
property are not being applied to the law of contracts because of the limited
part played by the principles of reasonableness and fairness in that field.
Abuse of process can be established where not only the right to bring court
proceedings, but also the relevant procedural remedies in the narrow sense are
being abused. According to the prevailing legal literature, we are dealing here
not only with the three types of abuse of rights specified in Article 3:13 of
the Civil Code, but also with the absence of a reasonable interest, the
circumstance where the plaintiff bases his action on (a) facts and circumstances
of which he knew, or should have known, (b) the fact that they were wrong, and
(c) where the action is based on grounds which should have been understood
beforehand as having no chance of success. In practice, the Supreme Court (Hoge
Raad) decision of 29/6/2007 appears to provide the leading guidance here, and
prompts the conclusion that abuse of process can only be established where, in
view of its obvious inadmissibility given the other party’s relevant interests,
the proceedings in question should never have been commenced. This can be the
case where the plaintiff bases his action on facts and circumstances which he
knew to be wrong – or of which he should have been aware to be wrong – or on
claims of which he should have known that they had no chance of succeeding.
However, the normally relevant criteria are, in practice, but seldom applied.

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Just How Many Parents May You Have, Are You Capable of Having, or Do You Wish to
Have?

In this article has as its central theme the question of how many parents a
child may have, is capable of having, or wishes to have. In the first instance,
the question arises as to how many parents a child may have in the eyes of the
law. In so doing, the author briefly examines the current position under Belgian
and Dutch law, as well as the proposals on multiple parentage currently on the
table in The Netherlands. However, the questions which currently surround the
issue of new types of family formation and artificial reproduction merely
scratch the surface of the complex issues arising from artificial reproduction
which await us. As matters stand at present, it is already possible, in relation
to serious genetic diseases which are only transmissible via the mother, to
effect nuclear transfers, whereby the nucleus from the mother’s ovum is
transferred to a donor’s ovum having a healthy mitochondrial DNA, from which the
nucleus has been removed. This gives rise to questions concerning the
significance of the donor’s DNA, and whether this should have any consequences –
e.g. whether a child has the right to know the identity of the person involved.
This technique has yet to be applied in Belgium or The Netherlands, but it has
been in England. A little further into the future one can anticipate the birth
of the first child from an artificial womb – however, any such development
already compels us to give fresh consideration to the central plank of our
current rules on filiation, to wit birth to a woman. Further still in the future
we may have to deal with children born as a result of in-vitro gametogenesis
(IVG). This technique enables skin cells to be reprogrammed in reproduction
cells (ova and sperm cells). Research performed thus far by experimenting with
mice indicates that men and women are capable of acquiring both types of
reproduction cells from their skin cells. This creates opportunities not only
for two men to acquire a child through an artificial womb, but also for four
prospective parents to have a child that is genetically related to all four. The
question arises as to how we will manage such new techniques. As matters stand
at present they are not allowable, but is this situation tenable? And should we
not adopt a proactive approach towards the implications this has for the law?
What lessons can we learn from science fiction literature regarding these future
developments? In most cases this medium deals with dystopia, but that is not to
deny that the issues it raises are capable of providing food for discussion. We
could regard these stories as thought experiments which can teach us about the
future – not as predictions of the future, but as a space for reflection on the
implications of future developments. Regarding the question as to how many
parents a child wishes to have, we should refer in the first instance to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and what this treaty requires from
legislators when issuing new legislation. Naturally this involves a thorough
analysis, from the perspective of children’s rights, of any proposed
legislation, and listening to children. However, it also means putting ourselves
in the our (future) children’s position. To this end, thought experiments such
as science fiction, as well as Rawls’s veil of ignorance, can be of considerable
assistance to us.

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Towards a Reformed Law of Paternity

Since the entry into effect of the 2006 Law on Filiation, the Constitutional
Court has ruled that a number of provisions contained in our paternity
legislation are unconstitutional. In so doing, the Court clearly has abandoned
the abstract notion of legislative balance and introduced a new concrete-based
approach. This contribution examines the existing key issues and attempts to
formulate a how these issues can be tackled by means of a reformed paternity
law.

To this end, Part One provides an overview of the current law governing
paternity. Following a brief introduction setting out the object and purpose of
this branch of the law, as well as a short aperçu regarding awareness of
biological derivation, the author analyses the rules concerning confirmation and
contestation of paternity as they currently stand, representing as they do a
complex interaction between the relevant legislation and the case law of the
Constitutional Court. This serves to bring to light the main issues involved –
i.e. possession of status and the time limit for the child’s claim.

The author concludes that, in the light of the case law of the Constitutional
Court, more scope should be given to a concrete-based assessment of paternity
issues, rather than merely applying the abstract rules contained in the relevant
legislation, and that greater importance should be given to the interests of the
child. All this points to an increasingly individualised approach, whereby the
general and abstract interests, as worded in the relevant legislation,
increasingly yield to a judicial approach based on considerations of context and
interests. Thus the law of paternity becomes increasingly “customised”.

In order to integrate this recent development into the framework of proposed
legislative reform, it is vital to take sufficient account of a number of
substantive and procedural guarantees – which represent the subject-matter of
Part Two of this contribution. These guarantees are crucial, both for the
law-making authority and for the courts.

In Part Three, the author makes a number of concrete proposals in order to
tackle the issues highlighted in Part One, taking into account the conclusions
reached under Part Two.

In the first instance, the author highlights the importance of achieving a
balance between biological and affective reality – giving priority to neither.
Given the desirability of stable bonds of filiation, and of responsibility for
procreation, the author advocates adhering to the principle that the bond of
paternity should coincide with biological reality. In order to protect existing
bonds of socially-related bonding in the event of a paternity-challenging legal
action, the author also advocates that the existing notion of possession of
status be abandoned. Instead, the emphasis should be on integrating those
factors which, when weighing up the interest involved, fundamentally indicate
the existence of a socially-based bonding relationship. This makes it possible
to assess biological and socially-based bonding against each other. It is also
proposed to introduce the new option of an action, unlimited in time, for the
determination of biological filiation. Thus both the child and the person who
procreated him/her will be in a position to discover his/her identity without
undermining any of the existing filiation relationships.

Next, this paper examines the interests of the child, which, for new
legislation, is an important factor when weighing up the relevant interests in
the event of an action in confirmation or contestation. The better to formulate
the substance of such legislation, the author proposes a checklist featuring the
most important issues involved.

When it comes to the relevant time limits, it is proposed, in the interests of
legal certainty, largely to retain the existing legislation – given a few
exceptions when it comes to the child’s interests. For the latter, the time
limit will only start to apply as from the moment at which its biological
authenticity becomes established. In the light of the judicial decisions on the
constitutional invalidity of various provisions, preference is given to enabling
the courts exceptionally to waive inadmissibility on grounds exceeding the time
limit, and to introduce the possibility of an action, unlimited in time, aimed
at establishing his or her biological filiation.

Finally, this contribution makes a number of proposals for modernising the law
relating to paternity, mainly in the child’s interest. Here, the author draws
inspiration from the Dutch and German proposals on a number of issues. Thus it
is proposed that the incest prohibition and the plea of rape be abandoned and
that application of the paternity rule be further extended. The author also
proposes the administrative removal of the automatic assumption of paternity,
coupled with acknowledgement by a third party, as well as enabling a child
having reached the age of majority to contest, in certain exceptional cases, to
contest his or her legally-established paternity.

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Mistake and the Consensualist Principle

Given the theory that the consensualist principle entails that agreements are
created when there is a meeting of intentions between the parties, Belgian law
is frequently said to be based on a corrected form of consensualism. This view
sees the binding force of an agreement as based on the true intention of the
parties to be bound by the agreement. In exceptional cases this is corrected by
the trust theory, which protects legitimately-held trust. This is more
particularly the case where one of the parties makes a statement without
actually intending to do so.

Given the crucial part played by the parties’ true intention, it seems perfectly
logical to protect it by applying the contractual concept of mistake. Where one
of the parties concluded an agreement based on a mistaken apprehension of the
truth, his/her true intention needs to be protected. However, closer scrutiny of
the notion of “mistake” indicates that this notion attaches but scant importance
to the true intention of the party making the mistake. This should not cause any
major surprise – the subjective apprehension on the part of a contracting party
cannot constitute a suitable legal basis, given that it cannot be known to
either the other party or to the court. Moreover, the travaux préparatoires to
the Civil Code of 1804 do not appear to provide many indications of support
given to the true intention of a contracting party. In addition, any reference
to the notion of “true intention” has an extremely contrived ring to it, given
that it is corrected only where it is actually relevant, i.e. where there is a
discrepancy between intention and statement. It is therefore legitimate trust,
rather than actual intention, which will be the decisive factor here. This does
not detract from the principle of consensualism, given that its implication is
that no formal requirements are needed of a statement of intent, rather than
that a subjective meeting of intentions suffices.

The findings above provide us with a simpler way of removing a number of
uncertainties regarding the notion of “mistake”. It would seem that the notion
of “mistake” protects the mistaken party’s legitimate trust rather than that
party’s true intention. Accordingly, the decisive factor here is not that which
the mistaken party desires, but whether that party had legitimately trusted a
different representation of the truth, and therefore committed an excusable
mistake. This also makes it clear that the question whether or not a mistake –
as a factor affecting consent – has occurred should not be assessed exclusively
at the subjective level of a party’s true intention. Mistake will also apply
where the meaning of a statement of intent has been falsely represented.

Moreover, by according a more central role to protecting legitimate trust, our
law of obligations is in a better position to face a number of present-day
challenges. Thus it would be difficult to describe the current rules concerning
the acceptance of general terms and conditions as an application of the
consensualist principle, albeit a corrected one. Where the question arises as to
whether the general terms and conditions of an agreement have been accepted,
Belgian law does not require the accepting party to have actual knowledge of
these terms and conditions, and therefore to have actually intended to comply
with them. On the other hand, it suffices that these terms and conditions were
reasonably accessible, which would make it acceptable to the party stipulating
these terms and conditions that the accepting party truly intended to agree to
them. Seen in this light, it is much more natural to acknowledge that this
amounts to a type of protection of legitimately-held trust.

The same considerations apply where autonomous processes are involved.
Artificial intelligence can induce from computerised systems results which are
unforeseeable by humans using this system. Where a contracting party operates
such a mechanism in order to conclude an agreement, the resulting agreement
could be regarded as unforeseeable. In order to assert that the user of the
system truly intended to conclude the resulting agreement, the “general
intention” theory is sometimes advanced – whereby the user had “truly” intended
to agree to all such results of applying the system as were reasonably
foreseeable. Here too, linking this to the true intention of the user comes
across as contrived. In this context also it is appropriate to give pride of
place to the protection of legitimate trust. In these conditions, logic dictates
that the user is bound by the statements of intent which emanate from the
mechanism in question, provided that third parties legitimately believed that
the user intended to make that statement.

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Rechtsvergelijkend colloquium 'Executie van zekerheidsrechten'

In deze bijdrage wordt verslag gedaan van het rechtsvergelijkende colloquium
over de executie van zekerheidsrechten dat op 17 september 2021 plaatsvond in
Nijmegen. De lezingen van de acht sprekers, allen als promovendus aan een
universiteit in Nederland of Vlaanderen verbonden, worden uitvoerig besproken.
Aan bod komen onder andere het recht van parate executie, partijautonomie,
arbitrage, debt for equity swaps, noodwetgeving, online executie, internationaal
privaatrecht en de aantasting van executie. Het verslag wordt afgesloten met een
korte samenvatting, waarin de grote lijnen van het colloquium worden
weergegeven.

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Movable Real Property – Exploring the Legal Architecture Surrounding Floating
Homes

Due to climate change, which is causing in a rise in sea levels, it is not
unlikely that that in the coming decades floating accommodation will no longer
be a luxury, but will instead become a dire necessity. In addition, the existing
building space is becoming gradually saturated as a result of a vast increase in
population growth. Multiple use of the available space in the shape of floating
homes, apartment blocks and even cities could become a new and sustainable
project. However, the question arises as to the extent to which this issue can
be given an appropriate legal framework – in other words, accommodated in the
legal architecture – under the current Belgian and Dutch law.

In the first instance, the question whether floating homes are to be regarded as
movable or immovable property is a crucial one when it comes to defining their
legal nature. Unlike the prevailing Dutch law, under which the courts qualify
water-based homes as movable objects, Belgian law seems to make it possible to
regard floating homes as real property through incorporation. The subjective
requirement for incorporation is sufficiently broad to accommodate water-based
homes, in spite of their fluctuating nature.

In addition, given the uniformity between the criteria for incorporation on the
one hand, and those for accession on the other hand, in relation to real
property, floating homes are deemed to be part of the underlying soil by
accession. Both the rules on immovables by incorporation and on accession
represent under Belgian law an application of component formation
(‘bestanddeelvorming) and, in a broader sense, of the principle of unity. Under
Dutch law, on the other hand, there is some doubt as to the applicability of the
uniform incorporation requirement – and therefore also as to the applicability
of or accession and component formation principles to water-based homes.

However, both the accession and component formation principles could give rise
to problems, given that, under both Belgian and Dutch law, the underlying bottom
area is part of the public domain. This would mean that the public authorities
would acquire ownership of all floating constructions attached to the ground,
which is not a desirable outcome. In order to avoid this, it is necessary to
split ownership between the floating home and the water section along horizontal
lines. In this contribution, the author examines the possibility of effecting
such a split by applying the rules on building rights, apartment rights and
volume ownership (as yet to be introduced). Under Belgian law, attributing
building rights to a water-based home could provide a possible solution. If the
conditions for the applicability of such rules were met, this could even create
a permanent system of split ownership. Under Dutch law it would also appear
possible to attribute permanent building rights to floating homes, in addition
to creating an extended form of tri-dimensional ownership.

It would therefore appear that, subject to a broad interpretation of the
incorporation requirement, the Belgian law of property is sufficiently flexible
to create this type of “legal architecture”. Under Dutch law, on the other hand,
in spite of the many proposals made by a number of authors, and given that the
courts qualify floating homes as movables, there has yet to appear a coherent
legal framework under the law of property for floating homes. The reformed
Belgian law of property provides a more solid legal basis for water-based homes.
With this paper, the author hopes to be able to contribute towards a set of
legal and practical solutions to the issues under discussion here.

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Public Interest Actions and the Civil Courts

In 1986, the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) recognised the public interest action as
part of the Dutch private law. Less than a decade later this type of action was
codified in the Civil Code. The public interest action has in the meantime
become a permanent fixture in Dutch law. The recent Urgenda decision, in which
the court ordered the State to be more active when it came to reducing CO2
emissions, as well as a recent judgment in which the Hague Court issued Shell
with a similar order, are telling examples of this.

Public interest actions have an interest which is not only social, but also
scientific. These actions represent a break with the traditional allocation of
roles between the citizen and the authorities in a democratic state governed by
the rule of law, and blurs the age-old dividing line between the public and the
private law. Public interest actions provide legal persons governed by the
private law the opportunity to award themselves, through their internal
constitutions, the right to defend the public interest before the civil courts
without having any democratic sanction or statutorily conferred powers, and
regardless of whether their own rights – economic or other – are thereby
affected. Moreover, having their action awarded is also capable of directly
affecting their fellow citizens’ legal position.

At the same time, public interest actions meet an understandable social need.
Legal rules are only capable of exercising their regulatory function if they are
observed. For many years this objective was guaranteed by civil actions brought
by individuals. In our view there are at least two interrelated reasons for
this. Firstly, the law now protects a much broader range of interests as a
result of, inter alia, recently-acquired scientific knowledge of various
dangers. In addition, following World War II the interests of minorities have
attracted increasing attention, and the realisation has dawned that the
authorities should endeavour to improve their lot. Both these developments
prompted an increase in rules, the violation of which does not invariably
involve the infringement of the rights of individuals. Secondly, these rules
frequently have long-term objectives. It is precisely such rules that confront
the directly-elected, democratically-legitimised, public offices with challenges
at a time when the latter frequently seek short-term solutions. Public interest
actions provide a means by which compliance with these rules by the authorities
can be improved. Our conclusion is that public interest actions contribute
towards maintaining the prevailing legal order, that they provide an additions
layer of checks and balances among the institutions of the state, and they
represent an effective modus operandi.

Nevertheless we take the view that there is some scope for enabling public
interest actions to sit more comfortably with some of the principles governing
the democratic state governed by the rule of law.

In the first instance, public interest actions carry the danger of creating
layer upon layer of similar actions. The fact that anyone is free to create a
legal person attracting some kind of public interest, the number of defendants
capable of being faced with a public interest action brought by any legal person
for whatever reason is in principle unlimited. This is why we feel that peace in
the legal order would be best maintained by enabling similar public interest
actions brought against the same defendant to be bundled, so that the latter
merely has to defend himself once. It should subsequently only be under the
rarest of circumstances that a new action could be brought on the same issue. In
our view, current legislation provides us with sufficient openings to draw up
rules which take this notion further.

Secondly, the procedural law that applies to public interest actions is
insufficiently tuned to dealing with such actions, the consequences of which
frequently affect society as a whole. This is because such actions are conducted
in accordance with the ordinary laws of civil procedure, a central feature of
which is two-party proceedings. It is our view that to introduce an amicus
curiae procedure to public interest actions could provide a solution to this
problem. A broad interpretation of the scope covered by the current amicus
curiae legislation could be the appropriate remedy here.

Thirdly, we are of the opinion that assessing the merits of a public interest
action requires a certain degree of navigational skill on the part of the
courts. The latter should not only ensure that the authorities observe the law,
but also be aware that in so doing they should avoid unnecessarily encroaching
on the territory occupied by the political offices. The extent to which the
currently applicable law contains adequate opportunities for awarding such
actions is an important factor here. We take the view that the courts will find
an adequate compromise between these two positions by making it their guiding
rule to award public interest actions which are based on sufficiently clear and
concrete legal rules – unless the defendants rely on a rule which gives them the
required freedom of action. What this entails is, inter alia, that the courts
should be extremely reluctant to award actions which are based on openly-stated
duties of care where their fulfilment is subject to a considerable degree of
social division.

Finally, the wording of any court order in this field also requires a good deal
of navigational skill on the part of the courts. In so doing, the courts will
need to respect such freedom of action and judgment as the defendant is entitled
to. Where the defendant is a public authority such reluctance will also find
justification in the separation of powers principle. Such reluctance should also
be desirable when deciding the amount of any financial penalty which the court
may attach to its order – at least where the public authorities are concerned.
It is not only the Civil Code, but also the existing public law which compels
this. This is because one of the basic principles of a system based on the rule
of law is that the citizen should, by exercising his right to vote, have some
control over the way in which public money is spent. Awarding astronomical
amounts by way of financial penalties could render such control – and with it
this fundamental principle – merely illusory.

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Civil actions against the State – Has the balance within the trias politica been
disrupted?

The citizen is increasingly inclined to challenge politically motivated
decisions by the authorities before the civil courts – as witness the many civil
actions brought against the so-called Covid measures. The absence of any action
by the public authorities in sensitive social areas such as climate change also
increasingly calls for attention by the civil courts. Where, in such cases, the
courts conclude that the authorities had acted unlawfully or negligently, and in
so doing order reparation, they are somewhat gratuitously dismissed as
“activist”. In legal terms, this would imply that the courts in such cases are
blatantly infringing the separation of powers principle, which represents one of
the basic foundations of our legal system.

The central issue underlying this contribution is the question whether this
separation of powers principle prompts a degree of reluctance on the part of the
courts when required to pronounce judgment on the actions performed by the
authorities and, where they do so, to what extent. The object of this
contribution is to obtain a clear picture as to how the courts have hitherto
approached the separation of powers principle – i.e. which forms of judicial
control are exercised over the law-making and executive authority, how
far-reaching is such control, and to what extent is judicial control allowed to
intervene in the public authorities’ actions? To what extent does judicial
control comply with the separation of powers principle? Are the civil courts
giving themselves too much power and are they undermining the separation of
powers principle? Alternatively, could the courts be expected to go further in
its invigilation, thus providing the citizen with greater levels of protection?

To be able to give the civil courts their appropriate role as part of the trias
politica, this contribution first of all outlines the manner in which the
separation of powers principle is approached under the Belgian constitutional
system. The author subsequently examines which forms of judicial control are
exercised over the other constitutional authorities. In so doing, the author
also describes the way in which this issue has developed in the existing case
law, and to what extent this complies with the separation of powers principle.
Closely related to this, the author examines how far-reaching is the judicial
control exercised over the other constitutional authorities, and what are the
limits the civil courts, in compliance with the separation of powers principle,
should observe when passing judgment on action taken by the public authorities.

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Private Law Aspects of Public Interest Actions Before the Civil Courts

Together with Aube Wirtgen’s paper featured elsewhere in this issue, this
contribution represents the Belgian preliminary report for the annual meeting of
the Association for Belgian/Dutch Comparative Law Research (Vereniging voor de
Vergelijkende Studie van het Recht in België en Nederland) on the subject of
public interest actions brought before the civil courts.

In the first instance, the author examines the notion of “interest”, which
occupies a central position, both in the doctrine which could form the basis of
a public interest action, and in the doctrine on the admissibility of such
actions before the civil courts. It is in the light of this approach that the
notions of collective and public interest are defined in this paper.

Here, it is emphasised that there is an essential difference between a public
interest and the public interest. This is because the latter does not constitute
an interest, but represents the outcome of the weighing of various interests, a
criterion which, where conflicting interests are involved, enables one to decide
which of these deserves precedence. Accordingly, the substantive law on that
subject can be regarded as a reflection of the way in which the relevant
authority – implicitly or explicitly – substantiates the public interest.

This means that public interest actions as such can cover two fields.

On the one hand, there are public interest actions in the broad sense of the
term. Here, we are dealing with actions which are brought for the protection of
a particular public interest. This action seeks to obtain that the court
protects the public interest the claimant seeks to defend in a way that can be
justified on the basis of the existing substantive law, i.e. to the extent that,
given the prevailing circumstances, the intervention sought serves the public
interest as determined and made operational under the existing law. The main
difference between these public interest actions and “ordinary” actions is the
relationship between the claimant and the interest for which protection is
sought. Whereas under an “ordinary” action the claimant only

seeks to protect his own interest or that of the person he represents, the
claimant bringing this type of public interest action seeks to defend an
interest common to all. The crucial question surrounding such actions is
whether, and to what extent, this particular claimant is entitled – has standing
– to bring this action, and thus to influence other people’s – and even
everyone’s – interests.

On the other hand there are the public interest actions in the strict sense of
the term. Here, the claimant seeks to obtain protection of a particular public
interest which, in the prevailing circumstances, has yet to be provided by the
substantive law which expresses the manner in which the public interest in
general is approached and interpreted. Essentially, this means that the claimant
disagrees with the outcome of a weighing up of interests which is implicitly
contained in a certain rule or a decision by the authorities. With this type of
action, therefore, the courts are requested to compel the relevant public
authority to approach the public interest – in the legal sense – differently,
i.e. in the manner sought by the claimant. For this type of public interest
action there arises – in addition to the question which applies to all public
interest actions in the broad sense – the delicate question as to whether the
courts, whilst remaining within the terms of the constitutional order, are
entitled to make the choices that are necessary in order to adjudicate in this
type of action.

As for the said constitutional issues surrounding public interest actions, these
are dealt with in the preliminary report on the public law aspects of this issue
by Aube Wirtgen, which is contained elsewhere in this issue. The contribution
featured here examines de most fundamental private law issues or obstacles
surrounding public interest actions from a doctrinal point of view.

In the first instance, the author examines whether the infringement of a
collective or public interest causes loss, in such a way that an action can be
brought based on the law of torts.

The second issue concerns the basis which the substantive law provides for
public interest actions which seek an outcome other than reparation of the loss
caused. On the basis of an analysis of the currently prevailing doctrine,
assessed in the light of the existing case law, the author examines whether the
existing law provides for the possibility of a court order prohibiting a person
– e.g. the authorities – from taking certain measures purely on the basis that
these are wrongful in the prevailing circumstances, or which orders a person to
take certain measures purely on the basis that they are reasonable in the
prevailing circumstances.

The third question examined in this paper concerns who is entitled to bring a
public interest action. To answer this question, the author examines who has the
procedural capacity and interest required in order to bring this type of action.

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Animal Rights: The Holy Grail for Animal Protection?

Under Belgian private law as it currently stands, animals are quasi-objects
lacking the capacity to bear rights (articles 1.3, 3.38 and 3.39 Civil Code). On
the other hand, some authors are of the opinion that, under the prevailing
public law, they are already legal subjects, deriving their rights from animal
welfare legislation. According to the author, this perspective gives rise to an
undesirable discontinuity between the spheres of private and public law. Also,
such “implicit” animal rights are, in practical terms, valueless so long as
no-one has the explicit legal power to exercise these rights, given that
animals, by definition, are legally incapable of so doing and they lack a legal
representative. When the law puts in place such a representative, it would, at
the same time, make the “implicit” rights of animals explicit.

Clearly, if lawmakers had intended to grant animals rights with the conception
of animal welfare legislation, they would have provided a solution for the legal
incapacity of animals to exercise those rights.

Is it best then to seek a constitutional or legal amendment which explicitly
upgrades animals to legal subjects? This contribution recognises the need for
stricter legal protection of animals, but questions whether legal subjectivity
for animals is the most suitable instrument. As a legal instrument, the status
of legal subject is entirely tailored to humans, not animals. Obviously, animals
‘deserve’ rights as much as humans, but the core question is whether these
rights would be of any use to them. Animals themselves attach no value
whatsoever to rights. What matters to them is their welfare, for which – rights
or not – they are inevitably dependent on humans. There is no reason to believe
that animal welfare will be better protected in the form of rights than in the
form of welfare legislation. Also, whether deliberately or not, even in the
animal rights discourse human preferences – and therefore inequalities between
animals – seem to seep in.

Animal rights are not necessary for better enforcement – private or not – of
animal welfare safeguards. This can be achieved just as effectively by giving
animal welfare organisations the broadest possible access to courts. Likewise,
lawmakers cannot wait for animal rights in order to give heavier legal weight to
the animal interest or improve the scientific quality of animal welfare law.
Under the current legal framework already, lawmakers are under the obligation to
better protect animals.

The author accordingly concludes with a plea for a sharper legal focus on what
it is already possible without granting animals rights: the (enforcement) of
higher quality animal welfare regulations in accordance with higher norms such
as article 13 TFEU and the principles of proper regulation.

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Sense or Non-Sense of the Rules on Unfair Terms in B2B Relations Following the
Reform of the General Law of Obligations

By enacting the Law of 4/4/2019, Parliament has inserted general legislation
governing B2B unfair terms and conditions into the Belgian legal order. The
legal literature has subjected this B2B set of rules, to an extensive critique,
advocating its review, nay total abolition, even before the reform of the law of
obligations. This reform now raises the specific question as to whether the
rules on B2B unfair terms and conditions retain their reason for existence. This
is because Book 5 of the Civil Code (CC) contains a general rule governing
unfair terms and conditions (Article 5.52) as well as expressly regulating a
number of clauses featured on B2B lists, such as escape clauses (Article 5.89)
and compensation clauses (Article 5.88). In order to find an answer to this
question, the author subjects the rules on B2B unfair terms and conditions to a
systematic comparison with the protection afforded by Book 5 of the Civil Code –
buttressed by a comparative analysis of the rules applying under the laws of
France, The Netherlands and Germany.

From an analysis and comparative study of the legal area in question, it emerges
in the first instance that virtually all situations protected under the rules on
B2B unfair terms and conditions also come within the scope of the general rules
governing this field. The main area where the general rules actually have a
narrower scope – to wit, a restriction covering terms and conditions which are
incapable of negotiation, is precisely the area where the rules on B2B unfair
terms and conditions are deemed to be too broad. All this leads the author to
conclude that, at least when it comes to the scope of the legislation in
question, there is no need to retain a separate set of rules on B2B unfair terms
and conditions.

When comparing the general rule contained in Article 5.52 CC and Article VI.91/3
of the Business Law Code, it emerges that the general rules contained in the
legislation on B2B unfair terms and conditions add but little value to the
general rules. Both sets of rules apply the same criteria, in both cases the
same type of marginal assessment applies, and the assessment criteria are also
largely the same. Accordingly, the general B2B rules does not appear to justify
their continued existence following the reformed law of obligations.

This is followed by an analysis and assessment of the list system – resulting in
a plea for its abolition in a B2B context. At the same time, this analysis
recognises that the question whether the list system should be retained or not
is essentially a political one. That is why the second part of the author’s
analysis starts from the notion that, should the ultimate decision –
politically-motivated or not – be that the list system is to be retained, it
would nevertheless remain necessary to review the current lists in order to
remove its shortcomings from a technical legal point of view, and to bring these
lists in line with the reformed law of obligations. To this end, the author
systematically assesses the lists on the basis of three cumulative criteria for
the justified retention of any of the terms in question – or any part of them.
This assessment prompts a proposal for a unitary blacklist – in the event of the
list system being retained.

Finally, from an analysis of the various remedy mechanisms, it would appear
that, whilst the voidance penalty is similar to that applying under the general
rules, the legislation on B2B unfair terms and conditions provides a number of
additional possible remedies. These accommodate the “fear factor”, i.e. the
reluctance on the part of weaker businesses to challenge unfair terms and
conditions for fear of endangering the business relationship in question. This
is why, even if the rules on B2B unfair terms and conditions were to be
abolished, these additional remedies should be retained – applying the general
rules on unfair terms and conditions for B2B transactions. This could be
achieved by a process of cross-referencing contained in the relevant provisions
of the Business Law Code.

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‘Common Core’, History and Different Meanings of an Expression. Also a
Contribution on the Relationship between Comparative Law and Legal Harmonisation

Over the past half century, the expression ‘common core’ has undoubtedly been a
pole of attraction for lawyers – at least for academic lawyers. As is frequently
the case with attractive figures of speech, this one has several layers to it.
In this contribution, I endeavour to bring a typology and classification to this
concept, and in so doing to examine the most interesting developments which have
occurred around this concept, especially in comparative law. At the same time,
this is a timely opportunity for airing a number of observations on comparative
law method, and on the relationship between comparative law and legal
harmonisation.

In Part II I discuss the early exponents of the common core project method, and
more particularly four exceptional 20th century legal scholars. Section A starts
with examining the origin of the ‘common core’ concept, with particular regard
to the French authors around the turn of that century, and further especially to
Rudolf Schlesinger, then analyses the factual method of comparative law as
developed by the latter. Section B focuses on Ernst Rabel, together with the
early history of the functional comparative law method, and its relationship
with private international law. Section C discusses the contribution made by
Gino Gorla, and, briefly, already touches on Rodolfo Sacco, whose work is
discussed more extensively later. The context in which this concept was
developed further, i.e. the period following World War II, is discussed in
Section D.

In Parts III and IV, I discuss the various types of Common Core projects,
attempting to draw comparisons between them in the light of the relationship
between comparative law and legal harmonisation. In Part III, I identify four
types. Section A features the search for functional equivalents. Section B
features the quest to discover a jus commune in the current case law. Section C
features the quest to discover common principles based on a ‘better law’
approach, and Section D the endeavours to identify a common tradition. In
Section E I add a number of critical observations with regard to the results of
the various endeavours described in previous sections. The object here is not to
discuss the issues surrounding legal harmonisation as such, or the question
whether such a harmonisation is desirable, or to assess the advantages and
disadvantages of the various methods involved, or to provide an assessment of
various harmonisation projects from this point of view. Nonetheless, this
contribution does contain a number of critical observations regarding the claims
made in certain projects concerning the existence of a common core. In fact,
Section E examines the question whether it makes sense to consider a restatement
of the private law in Europe – or at least within the European Union. My
conclusion is that the authors who have examined the notion of a common core
have ultimately failed to create a common core in the true sense, but in the
course of their endeavours have certainly enhanced and enriched comparative law
methods.

In Part IV I discuss the comparative law projects which do not seek to achieve
harmonisation, or at least do endeavour to acquire a better understanding of
both the differences and the similarities between the various European legal
systems – more particularly the Trento common core project (A). Following a
brief overview of other current work in this field in Section B, Section C
attempts to understand the particular significance and the additional value of
comparative law based on the Trento common core model, as it could emerge from
studying a broader spectrum of sources and factors (the ‘legal formants’ –
including a number of somewhat cryptic elements (the ‘cryptotypes’).

In the course of our research, we encountered two approaches to a common core,
on one hand the traditional harmonising common core approach, which in the first
place seeks to find solutions to similar problems which are essentially regarded
as similar, as expressing the same principles. The common core method embedded
in the Sacco doctrine, on the other hand, led to the revision of the theories
concerning legal sources as well as to other ways of identifying similarities
and differences. Here, we encountered an alternative approach of the common core
concept – an approach which also does attach importance to subtle
technicalities, peripheral considerations and cryptotypes in order thus to be
able to comprehend the long-term underlying structures which on the one hand can
reveal greater differences than current concrete solutions to individual cases,
but which, on the other hand, bring to light less obvious similarities by taking
into account not only the dominant, but also the non-dominant formants.

I can conclude that, where comparative law merely attempts to provide a true
picture of the currently applicable law under the reviewed systems, in most
cases a factual method provides one of the most suitable instruments, whereas
reducing the law to bare principles provides nothing like a true picture.
However, if it is also important to discover what could be the answer provided
by these systems in the future, all legal formants play an important part here –
and not only the actual concrete solutions to the practical cases involved. They
teach us how legal systems develop, and how the relevant solutions, which are
discovered at different stages and in different places, are frequently
functional equivalents in relation to the same problem, which do not represent
the sole possible solution, but on the other hand are frequently associated with
the legal system as a whole.

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What Do de facto Partners Quarrel About? An Empirical Study of a Broad
Cross-section of the Case Law on de facto Cohabitation

Together with some 150 Master students of family property law at the KU Leuven,
we analysed 778 recent court decisions on the economic implications of de facto
cohabitation. By assembling various empirical data on the litigation between
(former) de facto partners we intended to highlight the legal interests and
requirements of this group of people, and thus at the same time to indicate the
direction which legislation in the Civil Code could take. The relevant set of
data contains information on the de facto partners’ profiles, the type of
conflict that leads them to litigate, and the facts which serve as a basis for
the courts in reaching their decisions. This investigation yielded a number of
remarkable results.

The first one to note was that the courts do not apply a standard terminology
when ruling on de facto cohabitation. This is especially the case for the
Frenchspeaking lower courts, which appear to use a wide variety when it comes to
the terms used. Nevertheless, the dominant terminology applied by the courts
appears to be “feitelijke samenwoning” (Dutch) or “cohabitation de fait”
(French) – these terms having been used in almost 70 per cent of the relevant
decisions. This is why the relevant lawmakers would be best advised to use these
terms when drafting legislation on this subject.

The second noteworthy aspect is that hardly any of the parties’ specific
details, such as their age, income, whether or not there were any children, were
featured in these decisions – whereas one would have thought that such details
would play a prominent part in this context. Indeed, in the absence of any
specific legislation on the subject of de facto cohabitation, the courts apply
the ordinary rules in this area.

Thirdly, the investigation highlighted the key role played by the family home.
In the vast majority of cases, any litigation regarding property rights between
(former) de facto partners follows the same pattern – two de facto partners who
jointly bought a residence and fell into dispute on its allocation following the
break-up of their relationship. Any other legal issues have but a secondary role
here. This is why any future legislation governing de facto cohabitation should
contain rules on the protection and allocation of the family home following a
break-up in their relationship. It does however appear that the case law on
dissolving joint ownership provides a workable basis for solving this issue
based on the applicable ordinary rules.

Finally, the issue on which the ordinary law appears to be at its most deficient
is when it comes to conflicts regarding compensation for any investment in the
(former) partner’s property. Barring disputes on allocation of property, these
conflicts represent the most common cause of litigation, but only rarely reach a
satisfactory outcome. The relevant legal grounds – unjustified enrichment and
contribution to the expenses of the household – are the least successful among
the grounds relied upon. These legal grounds are, therefore, relied upon quite
frequently, but in most cases unsuccessfully, at least at first instance. The
success rate based on these legal grounds is higher on appeal – nevertheless the
success ratio achieved for such legal action remains small. It would therefore
appear that the lawmakers should regard an adequate system of rules governing
compensation for any investment made in the other partner’s property as a
priority area.

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Eternal Rights of Superficies as an Instrument for the Durable Use of Land: Some
Points of Interest in Terms of the Laws of Real Estate and Environmental Law

The modernised set of rules relating to rights of superficies under Belgian law
creates several opportunities for the advancement of space efficiency. Making it
possible to accumulate eternal rights of superficies provides the opportunity to
combine various spatial functions within the same building and to approach the
property in question from a tri-dimensional perspective. Thus, eternal rights of
superficies provide a possible solution for the problem of land scarcity and for
the durability challenges currently facing society. In this contribution, the
authors discuss the opportunities and restrictions involved in using eternal
rights of superficies as an instrument for ensuring the durable use of land. The
analysis consists of two parts – one dealing with the contractual aspects, the
other with the environmental law dimension.

If eternal rights of superficies are to become an effective instrument for the
durable use of land, it is appropriate, when it comes to the creation of such a
right, to approach its constituent elements using the purposive method of
interpretation. Any over-rigid interpretation of the requirements concerning
heterogeneity, complexity, self-standing elements, or the absence of common
areas should be avoided. By adopting this approach, eternal rights of
superficies, being the de facto volume ownership, can reach their full potential
and the durability objective becomes capable of realisation.

In terms of the relevant environmental law, a pragmatic approach is also
desirable when it comes to tri-dimensional accumulation of ownership – more
particularly in relation to the question whether an allotment permit is required
for the creation of volume ownership. In keeping with recent decisions by the
Board for Planning Permit Disputes (Raad voor Vergunningsbetwistingen) the
authors conclude that there is no allotment licence requirement for the erection
of residential volumes – at least where the splitting up occurs at the purely
horizontal level. Nevertheless, they have several observations to make in the
light of the rationale behind the allotment licence legislation. This is
because, even when it comes to the horizontal splitting up of property, quality
control as overseen by the public authorities needs to be ensured, as does the
ability on the part of the owner of the allotted part or volume to actually
build on it.

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A European Right to Compensation as a Basis for the Private Law Enforcement of
EU Competition Law

This contribution is focused on compensation rights as part of the enforcement,
at the private law level, of EU competition law as contained in Articles 101-102
TFEU. The traditional starting point here is that the right to compensation in
this area is based on the applicable law of torts at the national level. The
fault/unlawfulness requirement, for example, is interpreted in the light of the
infringement of competition law committed. However, in the light of the relevant
Court of Justice decisions, the author argues that the basis for such right to
compensation is directly contained in Articles 101-102 TFEU.

Thus, it can be seen from the landmark decisions on the private law enforcement
of EU competition law, i.e. the judgments in Courage v Crehan (2001) and
Manfredi (2006) that there is definitely an autonomous European set of rules
governing compensation. However, this does not necessarily mean that what we are
dealing with here is a fully elaborated European system of compensation rules –
which is why the national laws must supplement EU law on this subject. However,
the precise interaction between European and domestic law is a matter which has
given rise to much debate. Based on an extensive comparative study involving the
tort laws of the EU member states on the one hand, and that of the EU
institutions on the other, this paper argues that what we are dealing with here
is a one-dimensional, rather than a two-dimensional, system of compensation
laws.

This entails that components of a right to compensation law, both as to
substance and procedure, are essentially EU law components, but only to the
extent that EU rules on the subject are actually available. Such rules can be
found directly in Articles 101-102 TFEU – as can be seen from the Skanska (2019)
and Sumal (2021) decisions. As is the case with the tort laws of the EU member
states and institutions, these rules can also be gauged from the general
principles which are common to the legal systems of the EU member states.

In the absence of a – complete – set of EU laws, it is the applicable domestic
law of torts which, in accordance with the principle of national autonomy
enjoyed by the EU member states, will regulate the essential components of the
European right to compensation. Here, however, it is a requirement that the
domestic rules meet the equivalence and effectiveness criteria.

The Directive on the rules governing actions for damages (2014/194/EU) takes no
specific position on what should be the basis for the right to compensation.
Given that to a large extent the Directive has adopted the reasoning followed by
the Court of Justice, it implicitly recognises that there is an autonomous basis
for this in EU law.

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Private Enforcement of European Competition Law. A General Analysis of the
Incentives

Private enforcement of competition law has been a topic of interest for many
years. An important manifestation of this is Directive 2014/104/EU, which
stipulates several details about private cartel enforcement. This article
contains an analysis of a number of the Directive’s articles (and the national
legislation based on it) that generate some debatable behavioural incentives in
the context of private enforcement of competition law. To begin with, the
article outlines the economic foundation of the four most important damage
components that occur along a cartel’s supply chain, namely overcharge, pass-on,
volume effect and deadweight loss (DWL). Full compensation – the goal of the
European Directive – for these damage components for plaintiffs is unlikely with
the tools provided by the Directive. Their proof is not adequately facilitated.
The Directive mainly offers insufficient help for the damage components that are
particularly difficult to prove/calculate: volume effect and DWL. The following
extreme situation may occur: Defendants know that it becomes the more unlikely
that the passed-on overcharge is claimed, the lower down in the supply chain the
plaintiff is. This is most extreme with final consumers. Moreover, with the
current rules, there is also no real risk of final consumers suing for the DWL.
The passing-on defence is clearly enabled by the directive. This increases the
likelihood that it will be successfully alleged, and the proceedings reach the
final consumer level. Normally, an important reason why it would be less
attractive for defendants to pursue the passing-on defence is the fact that they
would then have to compensate each plaintiff (at each level of the supply chain
where the passing-on defence succeeds) for the volume effect. Again, there is no
such risk under current law. On the contrary, it seems likely that the volume
effect will not be claimed by anyone. And that means in the extreme that if the
defendant along the entire supply chain successfully pleads the passing-on
defence, no one claims the volume effect, and the final consumers sue neither
for the passed-on overcharge nor the DWL, the following situation arises:
instead of full compensation, the defendants end up paying no compensation at
all. The article ends with some thoughts on how collective actions, estimations
by judges and cooperation between economists and lawyers can improve the
situation.

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(On)zin van de b2b-onrechtmatige bedingenleer na de hervorming van het
verbintenissenrecht

Met de wet van 4 april 2019 introduceert de wetgever een b2b-onrechtmatige
bedingenleer met algemene draagwijdte in het Belgische recht. De rechtsleer
heeft deze b2b-onrechtmatige bedingenleer bijzonder kritisch onthaald en
formuleerde al vóór de hervorming van het verbintenissenrecht een pleidooi voor
herziening of zelfs volledige afschaffing. De hervorming van het
verbintenissenrecht doet nu evenwel in het bijzonder de vraag rijzen in welke
mate de b2b-onrechtmatige bedingenleer haar bestaansreden behoudt. Boek 5 BW
bevat immers een gemeenrechtelijke open norm over onrechtmatige bedingen (art.
5.52 BW) en regelt ook expliciet een aantal van de clausules die op de b2b
lijsten staan, zoals het bevrijdingsbeding (art. 5.89 BW) en het schadebeding
(art. 5.88 BW). Om op deze vraag een antwoord te vinden, wordt de
b2b-onrechtmatige bedingenleer op systematische wijze vergeleken met de
bescherming die Boek 5 BW biedt. Dit wordt ondersteund door een systematische
rechtsvergelijkende analyse van het Franse, Nederlandse en Duitse rechtsstelsel.

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Dierenrechten: de heilige graal?

Dierenrechten zijn een ‘hot topic’. Deze bijdrage uit enkele bedenkingen bij het
pleidooi voor de promotie van het dier tot rechtssubject. Een eerste deel
bespreekt de betekenis van impliciete en expliciete dierenrechten. Het tweede
deel evalueert de beweerde meerwaarde van rechtssubjectiviteit voor dieren. Het
betoog dat dieren nu al ‘impliciet’ rechten putten uit
dierenwelzijnsregelgeving, druist volgens de auteur in tegen de wil van de
wetgever, en heeft weinig praktisch nut voor dieren, waarvoor geen wettelijke
vertegenwoordiger is voorzien. Ook op de expliciete erkenning van hun
rechtssubjectiviteit zitten dieren niet te wachten. Rechtssubjectiviteit is een
zeer menselijk instrument, waar dieren zelf geen waarde aan (kunnen) hechten en
dat hun welzijn niet noodzakelijk verbetert. Ook zonder rechtssubjectiviteit is
versterkte handhaving en een striktere, meer wetenschappelijk onderbouwde,
juridische welzijnsbescherming mogelijk én (grondwettelijk) vereist. De strijd
over rechtssubjectiviteit leidt zo stilaan de aandacht af van de werkelijke
belangen van het dier.

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'Common core', geschiedenis en betekenissen van een uitdrukking. Tevens een
bijdrage over de verhouding tussen rechtsvergelijking en rechtseenmaking

De uitdrukking ‘common core’ heeft de voorbije halve eeuw ontegensprekelijk een
grote aantrekkingskracht uitgeoefend op juristen, althans de academici onder
hen. Zoals vaker bij een aantrekkelijke vlag, gaan daaronder velerlei ladingen
schuil. In deze bijdrage proberen we die te typeren en te klasseren en daarbij
vooral in te gaan op de interessantste ontwikkelingen die zich rond dat begrip
vooral in de rechtsvergelijking hebben voorgedaan. Dit is meteen een goede
aanleiding voor enkele beschouwingen over de methode van rechtsvergelijking en
de verhouding tussen rechtsvergelijking en rechtseenmaking.

In onze zoektocht vonden we onder meer een klassieke, harmoniserende opvatting
van common core die vooral op zoek gaat naar oplossingen voor gelijkaardige
problemen die in wezen gelijkaardig worden geacht, als uitdrukking van dezelfde
beginselen. We vonden ook een alternatieve opvatting die meer aandacht besteedt
aan perifere elementen en onderliggende structuren die de rechtsontwikkeling in
een langer tijdsperspectief bepalen.

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Waarover maken feitelijke samenwoners ruzie? Een empirische-juridische
dwarsdoorsnede van de rechtspraak feitelijke samenwoning

In 2018-2019 analyseerden wij samen met 150 masterstudenten Familiaal
vermogensrecht aan de KU Leuven 778 recente vonnissen en arresten inzake de
vermogensrechtelijke gevolgen van de feitelijke samenwoning. Het onderzoek
toonde ten eerste aan dat het merendeel van de gedingen tussen (voormalige)
feitelijk samenwonenden handelt over de verdeling van de gezinswoning na een
relatiebreuk. Andere rechtsvragen zijn daaraan accessoir. Ten tweede bleek het
gemeen recht het meest te kort te schieten bij conflicten over vergoedingen voor
investeringen in de goederen van de (ex-)partner. Dergelijke vorderingen
(doorgaans gebaseerd op de verrijking zonder oorzaak en de bijdrage in de
lasten) worden relatief vaak ingesteld, maar niet vaak toegewezen. Een
wettelijke regeling van de feitelijke samenwoning in het Burgerlijk Wetboek zou
prioriteit moeten geven aan deze twee rechtsvragen.

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Overzicht van rechtspraak. Medisch recht (2016-2022)

Dit Overzicht van Rechtspraak over medisch recht is het tweede dat wordt
gepubliceerd in het Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht1. Besloten werd om het
overzicht in principe te laten aanvangen in het jaar 2016. De derde editie van
mijn verhandeling in het kader van de Algemene Praktische Rechtsverzameling2
werd afgesloten op 29 februari 2016 zodat de lezer voor de rechtspraak die voor
2016 werd gepubliceerd, daar terecht kan.

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Duurzaam privaatrecht voor de 21ste eeuw: het leven van een
rechtswetenschappelijke subdiscipline

In 2022 zijn de termen duurzaamheid en duurzame ontwikkeling niet meer weg te
denken uit het brede maatschappelijke en het academische debat. Er is zeer veel
voor te zeggen om ook het privaatrecht te betrekken bij dit debat. Het
privaatrecht is namelijk een rechtsgebied dat kan helpen bij het behalen van de
duurzaamheidsdoelstellingen. Door niet alleen publiekrechtelijk af te dwingen of
prikkels te scheppen, maar vooral ook privaatrechtelijk te faciliteren, kan het
recht burgers en bedrijven ertoe aanzetten om zelf actie ondernemen. Nu zijn er
verschillende manieren om duurzaamheid in het privaatrecht te benaderen.
Afhankelijk van de definitie van duurzaamheid en het deelgebied van het
privaatrecht leidt dat tot verschillende uitkomsten. In deze bijdrage trachten
wij beide elementen te benoemen en onder een gezamenlijke begripsvorming en
methodologie te brengen. Zo creëren wij een basisonderzoeksagenda voor de
subdiscipline Privaatrecht en Duurzaamheid.

In een eerste beweging gaat onze aandacht uit naar de betekenis van het concept
‘duurzaamheid’. Daarbij zoeken wij aansluiting bij de algemeen bekende en
aanvaarde omschrijving die de Verenigde Naties hanteren. Die omschrijving
concretiseren wij vervolgens met het oog op privaatrechtelijk onderzoek.

In een tweede beweging ontwikkelen wij een normatieve en proactieve methodologie
voor Privaatrecht en Duurzaamheid. Daarbij bouwen wij in sterke mate voort op de
normatieve methode van Joseph Singer, om deze vervolgens in een zeer concrete
tweestapsmethode te gieten die rechtstreeks kan worden toegepast door elke
onderzoeker binnen Privaatrecht en Duurzaamheid. Deze methode wordt vervolgens
in verband gebracht met de rechtstheoretische traditie van de
Interessenjurisprudenz. Ten slotte illustreren wij onze methode aan de hand van
een aantal concrete toepassingsgevallen.

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Het eeuwigdurende opstalrecht als instrument voor duurzaam grondgebruik:
aandachtspunten vanuit het vastgoed- en omgevingsrecht

De creatie van ruimtelijk rendement, of anders gezegd, efficiënter omgaan met
het ruimtebeslag, is een van de middelen om het doel van een duurzamere
leefomgeving te bereiken. Het vernieuwde opstalrecht biedt belangrijke
opportuniteiten om hieraan bij te dragen. De stapeling van eeuwigdurende
opstalrechten maakt het immers mogelijk om verschillende functie-invullingen te
combineren en vastgoed op een driedimensionale manier te structureren. In deze
bijdrage wijzen de auteurs op de contractuele en omgevingsrechtelijke
aandachtspunten bij de vestiging van een eeuwigdurend opstalrecht. Wil het
eeuwigdurende opstalrecht een efficiënt instrument zijn voor duurzaam
grondgebruik, dan is het aangewezen de verschillende constitutieve bestanddelen
op een teleologische wijze te interpreteren. Ook wat het omgevingsrecht betreft,
en in het bijzonder de verplichting tot het verkrijgen van een
verkavelingsvergunning, is een zekere pragmatiek wenselijk.

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Europees recht op schadevergoeding als grondslag van privaatrechtelijke
handhaving van EU-mededingingsrecht

Deze bijdrage argumenteert dat de privaatrechtelijke handhaving van het
EUmededingingsrecht een Europees recht op schadevergoeding kent dat zijn
grondslag rechtstreeks in de artikelen 101 en 102 VWEU vindt. Wegens de
afwezigheid van een uitgewerkt Unierechtelijk kader krijgt de wisselwerking
tussen het Europese recht en het toepasselijke nationale aansprakelijkheidsrecht
vorm aan de hand van een eendelig schadevergoedingssysteem. Een vergelijking met
de leerstukken over de aansprakelijkheid van de EU-lidstaten en van de
EU-instellingen helpt invulling te geven aan dat systeem. Zo wordt het duidelijk
welke modaliteiten van het recht op schadevergoeding al een autonome
Unierechtelijke invulling (kunnen) kennen. Uit die vergelijking blijkt ook welke
modaliteiten het toepasselijke nationale recht nog bepaalt.

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Privaatrechtelijke handhaving van het Europees mededingingsrecht. Een
overkoepelende analyse van de werking van prikkels

De privaatrechtelijke handhaving van het mededingingsrecht is al jaren een
onderwerp van betekenis. Dit artikel bevat een analyse van een aantal artikelen
uit Richtlijn 2014/104/EU (en de daarop gebaseerde nationale wetgeving) die
enkele discutabele gedragsprikkels voor de privaatrechtelijke handhaving van het
mededingingsrecht voortbrengen. Volledige vergoeding – het doel van de Europese
richtlijn – is met de hulpmiddelen die de richtlijn biedt onwaarschijnlijk.
Aandacht ontbreekt vooral voor de schadecomponenten volume-effect en deadweight
loss, wat leidt tot verscheidene daaruit voortvloeiende problemen.

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De vergoeding van immateriële schade in Nederland en Italië: een
vergelijkend-rechtshistorische analyse

Deze bijdrage onderzoekt de opkomst en rol van onstoffelijke, of immateriële,
schade in het Nederlandse en Italiaanse schadevergoedingsrecht*. Tot vandaag is
over het Italiaanse recht op dit terrein nog nauwelijks gepubliceerd in de
Nederlandse taal – de onderhavige bijdrage vult die leemte aan de hand van een
studie van primaire bronnen. In de vergelijkend-rechtshistorische benadering
wordt specifiek aandacht gegeven aan de rol van codificaties, waaronder in beide
landen de invloed van de Franse Code civil, de wijze waarop rechters door de
tijd heen hebben getracht tegemoet te komen aan immateriële belangen van
benadeelden en de rol van de doctrine bij het duiden van dergelijke belangen.
Hierdoor wordt getoond hoe de grenzen van de toekenning van een vergoeding voor
onstoffelijke schade door de tijd heen zijn opgeschoven en de wijze waarop
emoties, pijn en smart een plaats hebben verworven bij de schadebeoordeling.

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Dienstverlening door de vereniging van mede-eigenaars

Toen de vereniging van mede-eigenaars (‘VME’) in 1994 werd ingevoerd, heeft de
wetgever haar specialiteit beperkt tot het “behoud en beheer van het gebouw”,
met als reden het vermijden van misbruiken en de bescherming van de
mede-eigenaars. Een beduidend deel van de Belgische rechtsleer en rechtspraak
lijkt actueel het padte zijn ingeslagen naar een strikte interpretatie van die
specialiteit. Toch vragende noden van sommige types van mede-eigendom meer dan
ooit een omgekeerdebeweging, in het bijzonder op het vlak van de mogelijkheid
voor de VME om diensten te verlenen aan mede-eigenaars en gebruikers van de
mede-eigendom. Een openingvan het appartementsrecht kan dan ook bijdragen tot
een grotere ontsluiting van de meerwaarde die in mede-eigendom is ingebed.
Gelijktijdig hebben recente hervormingen in het economisch recht en het
verenigingsrecht ook in het appartementsrecht voor een aardverschuiving in de
‘identiteit’ van de VME gezorgd. Die evoluties lijken daarom de uitgelezen kans
om het groeipotentieel van de VME en het appartementsrecht opnieuw onder de loep
te nemen.

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Rechtsmisbruik in het Belgische en Nederlandse recht: over individuele vrijheid,
maatschappelijke zorgvuldigheid en asociale rechtsuitoefening

Rechten en bevoegdheden kunnen worden uitgeoefend op een wijze die schadelijk is
voor anderen. Het concept rechtsmisbruik kan helpen rechten en bevoegdheden,
toegekend door nationale wetgevers, nader in te perken. Het kan een instrument
zijn voor een maatschappelijk betrokken, minder individualistische samenleving.
Deze bijdrage onderzoekt de rol van (het verbod op) rechtsmisbruik in België en
Nederland op de terreinen van het eigendomsrecht, contractenrecht en
procesrecht. Naast een comparatieve-rechtshistorische bestudering van de
ontwikkeling van rechtsmisbruik in de negentiende en twintigste eeuw bevat de
bijdrage een systematisch-juridische analyse van procesrechtmisbruik in het
Nederlandse recht, om zo te laten zien in hoeverre rechtsmisbruik een rol speelt
in de rechtspraktijk.

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Hoeveel ouders mag, kan en wil je hebben?

Voor het recht in brede zin en voor het familie- en jeugdrecht in het bijzonder,
is het van belang te weten wie onze ouders zijn, alleen al om aan de hand
daarvan vast te stellen wie onze verdere familie is, zussen en broers
bijvoorbeeld. Voor veel van ons zullen de personen die wie zelf als ouders zien
en de personen die het recht als onze ouders aanwijst dezelfde zijn, maar voor
een deel van ons waarschijnlijk niet. Neem bijvoorbeeld de beleving van
pleegkinderen die langdurig bij een pleeggezin opgroeien. Sommige van deze
kinderen hebben het gevoel dat ze twee paar ouders hebben, hun oorspronkelijke
ouders en hun pleegouders. Maar hoeveel van deze ouders mag je volgens het recht
ook daadwerkelijk ouder noemen en hoeveel zou je er ouder willen noemen? Dit
geldt ook voor kinderen die met behulp van kunstmatige voortplanting zijn
geboren. Terugkijken naar de ontwikkelingen die aan onze huidige visie op
ouderschap hebben bijgedragen, is zinvol, maar zeker niet voldoende. Er zijn
allerlei ontwikkelingen gaande en nog op komst die relevant zijn voor het
antwoord op de vraag wat ouders zijn en hoeveel je er mag, kan en wil hebben.

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Naar een hervormd vaderschapsrecht

De afgelopen jaren werd het wettelijk kader voor het juridisch vaderschap sterk
onder druk gezet door de rechtspraak van het Grondwettelijk Hof. In talrijke
arresten gaf het Grondwettelijk Hof de wetgever duidelijk te kennen dat dient te
worden afgestapt van de bestaande abstracte wettelijke principes, ten voordele
van een ruime rechterlijke in concreto-beoordelingsvrijheid. Tot hiertoe bleef
de noodzakelijke, allesomvattende wettelijke hervorming van het vaderschapsrecht
uit. In deze bijdrage wordt getracht om, na een schets van het bestaande kader,
aan de hand van een aantal materiële en procedurele waarborgen een voorstel tot
een hervormd vaderschapsrecht uit te werken. Hierbij wordt uitgegaan van een in
concreto-benadering zoals aangedragen door het Grondwettelijk Hof, met veel
aandacht voor een afweging van alle betrokken belangen.

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De dwaling van het consensualisme

Binnen het Belgische recht wordt vaak de rol van de werkelijke wil van de
contractpartijen benadrukt. Zo zou de bindende kracht van de overeenkomst
voortkomen uit de werkelijke wil van de partijen. Zo ook wordt het
consensualisme ingevuld door te stellen dat overeenkomsten ontstaan door de
subjectieve wilsovereenstemming tussen partijen.

In deze bijdrage proberen we deze stellingen te ontkrachten. Eerder dan door de
werkelijke wil, menen we dat partijen worden verbonden door het rechtmatige
vertrouwen dat anderen stellen in hun wilsverklaringen. We illustreren dit
uitgebreid aan de hand van de dwalingsfiguur, en ook beknopter aan de hand van
enkele moderne uitdagingen van het verbintenissenrecht, zoals de aanvaarding van
algemene voorwaarden en de inzet van autonome computersystemen.

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Rechtsvergelijkend colloquium 'Executie van zekerheidsrechten'

In deze bijdrage wordt verslag gedaan van het rechtsvergelijkende colloquium
over de executie van zekerheidsrechten dat op 17 september 2021 plaatsvond in
Nijmegen. De lezingen van de acht sprekers, allen als promovendus aan een
universiteit in Nederland of Vlaanderen verbonden, worden uitvoerig besproken.
Aan bod komen onder andere het recht van parate executie, partijautonomie,
arbitrage, debt for equity swaps, noodwetgeving, online executie, internationaal
privaatrecht en de aantasting van executie. Het verslag wordt afgesloten met een
korte samenvatting, waarin de grote lijnen van het colloquium worden
weergegeven.

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Beweegbare onroerende eigendom: over de juritectuur van drijvende woningen

In de zoektocht naar meer duurzame woonvormen is de ontwikkeling van drijvende
woningen een van de meest innovatieve denkpistes, aangepast aan de noden en
bekommernissen van de 21ste eeuw. Voornamelijk in Nederland bestaan er reeds
inspirerende projecten die gebaseerd zijn op een nieuwe vorm van
‘waterarchitectuur’. Deze drijvende woningen of kortweg ‘waterwoningen’ worden
gebouwd op een drijvend platform, verankerd in de onderliggende bodem met
beugels en palen. Deze bijdrage poogt de juridische vormgeving of ‘juritectuur’
van waterwoonvormen onder het huidige Belgische en Nederlandse recht te
exploreren. Daarbij worden de mogelijkheden die het (nieuwe) goederenrecht biedt
besproken, alsook de verschillende beperkingen of onduidelijkheden die reeds
bestaan. Verscheidene goederenrechtelijke concepten zoals onroerendmaking door
incorporatie, natrekking, bestanddeelvorming en, onderliggend, het
eenheidsbeginsel zullen fundamenteel blijken om de premature ondergang van
waterwoonvormen naar Belgisch recht te vermijden.

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Privaatrechtelijke facetten van algemeenbelangacties bij de justitiële rechter

Deze bijdrage, die samen met de in dit nummer opgenomen bijdrage van Aube
Wirtgen het Belgische preadvies vormt voor de jaarvergadering van de Vereniging
voor de Vergelijkende Studie van het Recht van België en Nederland, bestudeert
algemeenbelangacties vanuit een privaatrechtelijk perspectief. Inhoudelijk werd
gekozen om te focussen op twee facetten. Enerzijds wordt er gekeken naar een
belangrijke materieelrechtelijke rechtsbasis voor deze vorderingen, de
buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid, en de problemen die opduiken bij de
toepassing van de klassieke aansprakelijkheidsdoctrine in dergelijke vorderingen
en de ‘oplossingen’ die de Belgische rechters hiervoor hebben ontwikkeld
(Afdeling III en V). Anderzijds wordt gefocust op de procedurele
toelaatbaarheidsvereisten voor collectiefbelangvorderingen voor de justitiële
rechter, een regeling waarin recent wijzigingen zijn aangebracht specifiek met
het oog op het faciliteren van bepaalde soorten algemeenbelangacties (Afdeling
IV).

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De beoordeling van de wetgevende kaders in Europa, China en de Verenigde Staten
rond het gebruik van persoonsgegevens ter bestrijding van globale
gezondheidscrisissen. Lessen uit de COVID-19-pandemie

Tijdens de coronapandemie werd duidelijk dat de geldende wetgevende kaders niet
geschikt bleken voor het implementeren van maatregelen ter bestrijding van deze
pandemie. In deze bijdrage worden de verschillende wetgevende kaders in Europa,
de Verenigde Staten en China met betrekking tot het gebruik van persoonsgegevens
tijdens globale gezondheidscrisissen beoordeeld. In alle onderzochte regio’s
kwam eenzelfde spanning aan het licht tussen enerzijds de vraag of de bestaande
wetgeving de individuele persoonsgegevens voldoende beschermt en anderzijds de
vraag of de bestaande regelgeving voldoende flexibel is om een efficiënt gebruik
van persoonsgegevens mogelijk te maken tijdens een globale gezondheidscrisis.
Het proportionaliteitscriterium in Europa en gelijkaardige concepten in de
Verenigde Staten en China werden gebruikt om het evenwicht tussen het recht op
bescherming van persoonsgegevens en het recht op leven en gezondheid te
beoordelen. Zonder de effectiviteit van de verschillende maatregelen ter
bestrijding van de pandemie te beoordelen, bevat deze bijdrage ook een kritische
analyse van de contacttracing in dit kader en besluiten we met een ethische
reflectie en aanbevelingen voor de aanpak van toekomstige globale
gezondheidscrisissen. Of hoe een heel klein beetje China soms niet beter zou
kunnen zijn.

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De laatsten zullen de eersten zijn: over prioriteiten bij herstructurering

De idee dat de wettelijke en contractuele rangorde bij insolventieprocedures
wordt gerespecteerd, is bij de huidige Belgische reorganisatieprocedure door
collectief akkoord eerder een mythe dan realiteit. De achtergestelde
aandeelhouders behouden structureel hun positie in het kapitaal terwijl de
niet-gesecureerde schuldeisers afschrijvingen ondergaan. Het systematisch
niet-respecteren van een ex ante overeengekomen rang bij een herstructurering is
niet alleen vreemd vanuit juridisch oogpunt, maar heeft ook verstrekkende
economische implicaties die inefficiënt zijn.

De implementatie van de Europese Herstructureringsrichtlijn, die de lidstaten
oplegt om bij de richtlijnconforme herstructureringsprocedures de relative
priority rule (RPR) of de absolute priority rule (APR) te introduceren, stemt
tot nadenken. Op basis van rechtsvergelijkende en rechtseconomische inzichten
bepleiten we de introductie van een gerelativeerde APR. De gerelativeerde APR
heeft, net zoals de (gewone) APR, als uitgangspunt de wettelijke en contractuele
rangorde bij faillissement. Afwijken kan enkel mits de klasse wiens
pre-akkoordrechten niet worden gerespecteerd daarmee instemt. De gerelativeerde
APR verduidelijkt dat (i) de gesecureerde schuldeisers enkel een bevoorrechte
aanspraak hebben op de liquidatiewaarde van hun onderpand (gewaardeerd in een
stuksgewijze verkoop of in een verkoop in continuïteit), en niet op de
reorganisatiewaarde (d.i. gewaardeerd in de situatie dat het akkoord tot stand
komt, bv. via een discounted cash flow methode) (bifurcatie), en dat (ii)
aandeelhouders (een deel van) hun belang kunnen aanhouden als zij in ruil nieuwe
waarde (financiering) inbrengen in de onderneming of als zij daadwerkelijk
cruciaal zijn voor de onderneming en gedurende een redelijke termijn verbonden
blijven met de onderneming (te vergelijken met een inbreng in geld of in natura)
– een gelijkaardige redenering kan worden gemaakt voor strategische
schuldeisers. Tot slot argumenteren we dat de 20%-regel die we vandaag naar
Belgisch recht kennen eigenlijk niets meer is dan een verdelingsregel die
resoluut afwijkt van de door ons verdedigde (gerelativeerde) APR en botst met de
gekende rechtseconomisch inzichten.

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Eindelijk naar een directe beroepsrisicoverzekering in Nederland?

Deze bijdrage biedt inzicht in de vergoeding van slachtoffers van beroepsziekten
in Nederland. Reeds gedurende vele jaren wordt gepleit voor een wijziging van
het bestaande vergoedingsmodel (dat is gebaseerd op de aansprakelijkheid van de
werkgever). Een vergelijking met België wordt gemaakt en verschillende opties
voor wijziging worden besproken (ad hoc fondsen, beroepsziektenfonds,
zelfregulering) waarbij uiteindelijk gekozen wordt voor een directe verzekering
ten voordele van de slachtoffers voor beroepsziekten (zoals in België voor
arbeidsongevallen geldt). De verzekerbaarheid van het beroepsziektenrisico wordt
besproken evenals enkele implementatievragen.

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Een toekomst voor het subjectief plechtig contract? Het "model-De Decker"
getoetst aan het verbod op wetsontduiking

De koopovereenkomst komt in principe tot stand door overeenstemming over goed en
prijs (art. 1583 Oud BW). De consensuele aard van de koop is voor de
vastgoedpraktijk echter niet altijd wenselijk. Om tegemoet te komen aan de
negatieve gevolgen hiervan maken kandidaat-kopers en -verkopers onder andere
gebruik van een subjectieve plechtigheidsclausule. Dit betekent dat de partijen
overeenkomen dat de koop maar tot stand komt op het moment van het verlijden van
de notariële akte. Het bekendste voorbeeld is het zgn. model-De Decker. In deze
bijdrage gaan de auteurs na welke invulling aan het subjectief plechtig karakter
(van de koop) moet gegeven worden in het licht van het verbod op wetsontduiking.
Het model-De Decker fungeert hierbij als toepassingsgeval.

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De bebloede hand erft toch! Vergeving van de onwaardige erfgenaam

De hervorming van de Belgische reglementering inzake erfonwaardigheid in 2012
introduceerde het concept van vergeving in het strafrecht en het erfrecht. Dat
concept stelt de erflater in de mogelijkheid om de onwaardige erfgenaam alsnog
tot de nalatenschap toe te laten. Deze ontwikkeling in het Belgisch recht sluit
aan bij evoluties in andere rechtsstelsels en bevestigt de groeiende
(internationale) tendens naar autonomie binnen het erfrecht. Toch vat niet elk
rechtsstelsel de opheffing van erfonwaardigheid op een gelijke manier op. Zo
verwijst niet elk rechtsstelsel uitdrukkelijk naar vergeving. Het Belgisch
systeem van vergeving is formalistisch. Dat staat in schril contrast met het
informele systeem dat de Nederlandse wetgever uittekende. Beide systemen worden
in deze bijdrage met elkaar vergeleken. Vermits vergeving een sterke morele
connotatie heeft, zullen inzichten uit de (moraal)filosofie ook dienstig zijn
voor een analyse van deze juridische vorm van vergiffenis. Niet alleen leidt een
filosofische kijk tot een beter begrip van de regels met betrekking tot de
vergeving van de onwaardige erfgenaam, het laat ook toe om de impact van deze
reglementering op maatschappelijk niveau te belichten.

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De ambtshalve toepassing van bewijsregels, een taak voor de actieve rechter. Een
algemene, bijzondere en rechtsvergelijkende analyse van de taakverdeling tussen
rechter en partijen in het licht van de cassatierechtspraak en het nieuwe
bewijsrecht

Met de inwerkingtreding van het nieuwe bewijsrecht versterkt de wetgever opnieuw
de actieve rol van de rechter inzake bewijs. Naast diverse
onderzoeksbevoegdheden beschikt de rechter voortaan onder meer over de
mogelijkheid om in bijzondere omstandigheden de bewijslast om te keren. Hoewel
de lijdelijkheid van de rechter reeds lang voorbijgestreefd is, is noch de
rechtsleer, noch de rechtspraak van het Hof van Cassatie eenduidig over de vraag
of het algemeen rechtsbeginsel krachtens hetwelk de rechter gehouden is om, mits
hij het recht van verdediging eerbiedigt, de rechtsnorm te bepalen die van
toepassing is op de bij hem ingestelde eis en die regel toe te passen, ook
impliceert dat de rechter gehouden is het bewijsrecht ambtshalve toe te passen.
Vanuit de algemene principes omtrent de taakverdeling tussen rechter en partijen
en een bijzondere analyse toegespitst op het bewijs in een (tegensprekelijk)
burgerlijk proces, formuleert deze bijdrage argumenten om in het licht van de
hedendaagse rol van de rechter een antwoord te bieden op de vraag of de rechter
gehouden is ambtshalve de bewijsregels toe te passen.

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Anticipatie op de hervorming van het Burgerlijk Wetboek. Mogelijkheden en
grenzen inzake het buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheidsrecht

Deze bijdrage onderzoekt of en hoe Belgische rechters toepassing kunnen maken
van de hervormingsprojecten van het Burgerlijk Wetboek die zich nog niet in het
eindstadium van het wetgevende proces bevinden en daardoor nog niet zijn
goedgekeurd door de volksvertegenwoordigers. In welke mate is zo’n voornafname
een vorm van normale rechtsontwikkeling door de rechters in hun zoektocht naar
maatschappelijke consensus? Verzetten de rechtstatelijke principes van de
scheiding der machten en van de rechtszekerheid zich daartegen? Of komt zo’n
voorafname de rechtszekerheid net ten goede wanneer het huidige recht
onduidelijk of onvolledig is?

Om die vragen te kunnen beantwoorden, neemt de bijdrage het Nederlandse recht
onder de loep. Dat rechtsstelsel kent ‘anticipatie’ al beter. Nederlandse
rechters anticipeerden met name op de langdurige hervorming van het Nederlandse
Burgerlijk Wetboek. Ook het Belgische Burgerlijk Wetboek staat momenteel in de
steigers. De hervorming van het buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheidsrecht biedt
daarom een ideale gelegenheid om de mogelijkheden, maar vooral ook de grenzen
van Belgische anticipatie concreet af te tasten.

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Schade, causaliteit en objectieve aansprakelijkheden

Het moge van meet af aan duidelijk zijn: ik sluit volmondig aan bij de filosofie
van de Commissie van experten tot hervorming van het aansprakelijkheidsrecht(1),
te weten de verbetering van de situatie van schadelijders.

Dit neemt niet weg dat ik van mening kan verschillen over een aantal opties, die
door de Commissie werden weerhouden. Niemand zal het mij ten kwade duiden,
aangezien de opzet van dit themanummer erin bestaat de voorliggende
hervormingsopties(2) in een open en constructieve geest te bespreken.

Deze bijdrage behandelt daarbij, enerzijds, enkele aspecten rond het begrip
“schade” in het Ontwerp en, anderzijds, een aantal causaliteitsvragen bij
objectieve aansprakelijkheden.

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Causaliteit en medeaansprakelijkheid: een reflectie op het Nederlandse
aansprakelijkheids- en schadevergoedingsrecht en het Belgische ontwerp

Het ontwerp tot herziening van het Belgische BW (hierna: “Ontwerp”)
verduidelijkt of herziet het causaliteitsvereiste en verhaal in geval van
medeaansprakelijkheid. In vele delen van de toelichting daarop staat
rechtsvergelijkende informatie over de Nederlandse aanpak, waaraan in deze
bijdrage meer diepgang wordt gegeven. Het doel van deze bijdrage is om enkele
opvallende kwesties binnen de thema’s causaliteit en (doch minder uitgebreid)
verhaal bij medeaansprakelijkheid te bespreken, om daarmee, vanuit de Belgische
insteek, toch nog eens de eerder gemaakte keuzes in het Nederlandse
aansprakelijkheids- en schadevergoedingsrecht (hierna samenvattend met:
aansprakelijkheidsrecht) te kunnen overdenken. In het bijzonder is stilgestaan
bij secundaire aansprakelijkheid, verlies van een kans en proportionele
aansprakelijkheid, alternatieve causaliteit en juridische causaliteit.

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Grondslagen van het rechtspersonenrecht

Deze bijdrage peilt naar de grondslagen van het rechtspersonenrecht. De
rechtspersoon is een rechtssubject zoals de mens; hij geniet van dezelfde
rechts- en handelingsbekwaamheid. De orgaantheorie laat de rechtspersoon toe in
rechte op treden. Het lot van de rechtspersoon wordt bepaald door de
oprichtingshandeling die een eenzijdige handeling, een overeenkomst of een
overheidsbeslissing kan zijn. Daarin wordt gekozen voor een bepaalde rechtsvorm
en identiteit die zijn staat vormt. In de vennootschap en de vereniging zal deze
oprichtingshandeling de grondslag zijn van de contractuele ruimte waarin
vennoten respectievelijk leden onderling en met de rechtspersoon samenwerken.

De bepaling van de grondslagen van de rechtspersoon maakt het mogelijk het
juridische kader waarin de rechtspersoon is ingebed te omschrijven. Het helpt
lacunes in bijzondere wetgeving op te vullen en de wetgever aan te zetten tot
vervollediging

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Ontwikkelingen in het EVRM op het vlak van de bevrijdende verjaringsregels

De invloed van het EHRM op de bevrijdende verjaringsregels blijft toenemen. In
tegenstelling tot de oudere beslissingen van het EHRM, blijft de recente
rechtspraak van het EHRM onderbelicht (in het Belgische recht). Deze bijdrage
analyseert de recente beslissingen van het EHRM aan de hand van twee vragen. De
eerste vraag heeft betrekking op de verschillende rechtsgronden op basis waarvan
de nationale bevrijdende verjaringsregels voor het EHRM kunnen worden
aangevochten. Bij de rechtsgronden rijst de vraag naar de verhouding
(gelijkenissen en/of verschillen) tussen deze rechtsgronden. De tweede vraag
gaat na wat de minimumstandaarden zijn die het EHRM hanteert voor de
verschillende elementen van de (Belgische) bevrijdende verjaringsregels.

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Het nieuw goederenrecht rechtseconomisch gewikt en gewogen

Rechtseconomisch gezien is een efficiënt goederenrecht cruciaal voor welvaart en
welzijn in de samenleving. Het werkt pacificerend, zorgt voor goede marktwerking
en internalisering van externe effecten. Zoals de andere landen in Europa en
Noord-Amerika geniet België op dat vlak van een luxe die de minder ontwikkelde
landen ontberen. De meeste regelen in het nieuwe goederenrecht, al dan niet
gewijzigd, kunnen rechtseconomisch gezien ondersteund worden. Dit komt omdat het
privaatrecht steunt op een lange traditie van juridische ervaring, meestal
geleid door juiste economische intuïties. Dit geldt bijvoorbeeld voor de
duidelijke formulering van de numerus clausus, voor de mogelijkheid
gebruiksrechten vervallen te verklaren en erfdienstbaarheden af te schaffen, het
bezit te beschermen, de grensoverschrijdende bebouwing duidelijk te regelen, de
vinder te vergoeden, de mandeligheid duidelijker te regelen. Toch werden er,
rechtseconomisch gezien, een paar kansen gemist om verantwoorde innovaties door
te voeren. Waarom werden de archaïsch lange verjaringstermijnen behouden? Waarom
werd de appartementseigendom zo extreem betuttelend geregeld? Het valt te
betreuren dat vanuit de rechtseconomie niet meer input kon gegeven worden. Dat
had bijvoorbeeld gekund via de regelgevingsimpactanalyse (RIA), die in dit geval
een maat voor niets blijkt te zijn.

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De implementatie van de Richtlijn (EU) Digitale Inhoud en Digitale Diensten in
de Belgische rechtsorde

In het kader van een Europese digitale agenda werd de Richtlijn (EU) nr.
2019/770 goedgekeurd betreffende bepaalde aspecten van een overeenkomst voor de
levering van digitale inhoud en digitale diensten. Met het oog op een tijdige
omzetting van de richtlijn in de Belgische rechtsorde, legt deze bijdrage de
focus op de gevolgen van de implementatie voor het Belgisch recht. Zonder een
kritische evaluatie te maken van de richtlijn zelf, wordt de nadruk gelegd op de
nieuwe terminologie en beschermingsmechanismen die onder de richtlijn werden
geïntroduceerd. Telkens vertrekkende vanuit een bepaalde topic maakt deze
bijdrage een analyse van het Belgisch recht de lege lata, gevolgd door een
analyse de lege ferenda. Voorgenoemde bijdrage eindigt met enkele aanbevelingen
gericht naar de Belgische wetgever voor een correcte implementatie van de
richtlijn.

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De hervorming van het goederenrecht

Deze bijdrage geeft een algemeen overzicht van het nieuwe goederenrecht, zoals
goedgekeurd in de Wet van 4 februari 2020. Het goederenrecht was in Boek 2 van
het oude Burgerlijk Wetboek van 1804 veruit het meest archaïsche deel van het
Burgerlijk Wetboek, dat (op appartementsrecht na) niet hervormd was sinds 1804.
Het nieuwe goederenrecht bevat een aantal codificaties, een aantal evoluties en
een aantal innovaties. Onder die laatste is bijvoorbeeld te denken aan
overkoepelende bepalingen in verband met het goederenrecht, het opvullen van
lacunes inzake hypothecaire publiciteit, aandacht voor volume-stapelingen,
aandacht voor dieren in het vermogensrecht, een duidelijke articulatie van de
wilsautonomie in het goederenrecht.

Dit nieuwe goederenrecht zal ingevoegd worden in Boek 3 van het nieuwe
Burgerlijk Wetboek, waarvan Boek 8 (bewijsrecht) op 1 november 2020 als eerste
in werking is treden. Op die datum zal Boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek van
1804 afgeschaft worden, zij het dat de nieuwe bepalingen wel in principe
eerbiedigende werking hebben.

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De voorbije decennia werden tal van informatieplichten ingevoerd die de verkoper
van een onroerend goed moet naleven. Hierbij hielden de bevoegde
deelstaatwetgevers slechts in beperkte mate rekening met het gemeen
verbintenissenrecht. De verhouding van deze vereisten en de bijhorende sancties
tot dit gemeen recht is dus onduidelijk. Deze bijdrage gaat kort in op de
verschillende informatieplichten van de verkoper van een onroerend goed en
analyseert hoe (de invulling van) deze verhouding kan bijdragen tot een billijk
evenwicht tussen de bescherming van de koper en de rechtszekerheid van de
verkoper bij de totstandkoming, de geldigheid en de uitvoering van de
koopovereenkomst.

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Belangenconflicten in het Belgisch vennootschapsrecht: een kritische analyse van
het WVV na de omzetting van de tweede aandeelhoudersrichtlijn

Deze bijdrage analyseert de Belgische belangenconflictprocedures bij
vermogensrechtelijke belangenconflicten van bestuurders (artikel 7:96 WVV) en
bij transacties met verbonden partijen (artikel 7:97 WVV). De focus ligt hierbij
op de recente wijzigingen door de invoering van het WVV en de omzetting van de
Tweede Aandeelhoudersrichtlijn. De bijdrage analyseert de ratio en geschiedenis
van de belangenconflictprocedures en evalueert hoe ze de afweging maken tussen
de bescherming van aandeelhouders en de flexibiliteit in het besturen van de
vennootschap. De bijdrage concludeert dat de recente wijzigingen terecht hebben
gezorgd voor een sterkere aandeelhoudersbescherming, met vooral een breder
toepassingsgebied en een strengere procedure in artikel 7:97 WVV. De bijdrage
doet niettemin nog een aantal suggesties tot verbetering.

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Bedenktijd met contractuele zekerheid: een verkennend onderzoek naar huuropties

De sluiting van een huurovereenkomst, bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot een
woonst, moet het resultaat zijn van een weloverwogen beslissing. Wachten is
echter een risico daar de verhuurder het pand al aan een ander kan verhuren. De
kandidaat-huurder heeft dan ook nood aan zekerheid met behoud van flexibiliteit.
De optieovereenkomst komt aan beide noden tegemoet. Het geeft aan de optienemer,
eventueel tegen vergoeding, het recht om eenzijdig te beslissen een
huurovereenkomst tot stand te brengen. Ook voor de verhuurder kan de optie een
nuttig instrument zijn (zowel als optiegever als als optienemer). De bijdrage
gaat nader in op de huuroptieovereenkomst waarbij deze allereerst wordt
onderscheiden van andere opties zoals de handelshuurhernieuwingsoptie en de
verlengingsoptie. Hierna staat de bijdrage stil bij de totstandkoming
(geldigheid en algemene vereisten) en de modaliteiten (prijs en duurtijd) van
huuropties. Op deze wijze wordt meer duidelijkheid geboden over de (opstelling
van een) optieovereenkomst. Deze is immers slechts een nuttig instrument ter
verkrijging van flexibiliteit en zekerheid in zoverre ook over (de draagwijdte
en gevolgen van) de optieovereenkomst zelf zekerheid bestaat.

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De verkrijgende verjaring door de bezitter niet te goeder trouw. Een driespraak
tussen België, Nederland en Zuid-Afrika

De verkrijgende verjaring is intrinsiek een ethisch problematische
verkrijgingswijze.

Ze ontneemt aan een persoon zonder diens toestemming en (in beginsel) zonder
vergoeding diens eigendom. Bij een bezitter te goeder trouw kan men nog
begrijpen waarom hij de voorkeur krijgt boven de uittredende eigenaar, maar bij
de bezitter niet te goeder trouw (bezitter te kwader trouw) is dit
problematisch.

Kan – mag – hij wel aanspraak maken op een zo verregaande bescherming als de
verkrijgende verjaring? In België wordt dat traditioneel toegelaten, maar valt
op dat de rechtspraak toch vaak erg vijandig staat tegen de bezitter niet te
goeder trouw.

Het Nederlandse recht stond lange tijd uitermate vijandig tegen de bezitter niet
te goeder trouw, maar laat sinds 1992 toch de verkrijgende verjaring door een
bezitter niet te goeder trouw toe. Het Zuid-Afrikaanse recht staat dan weer
onverschillig tegenover de goede dan wel kwade trouw, hoewel de rechtspraak hier
toch rekening mee durft te houden. De voorliggende bijdrage contrasteert deze
oplossingen en probeert tot een evenwichtige oplossing te komen.

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Financiële overmacht: Een onderzoek naar de invulling van de overmachtsfiguur
bij verbintenissen tot betaling van een geldsom

In bepaalde omstandigheden zal de schuldenaar een hindernis ontmoeten om zijn
geldschulden te kunnen betalen, bijvoorbeeld door een tussenkomst van de
overheid of een gebrek aan geld. In zulke gevallen kan de schuldenaar zich onder
bepaalde vereisten beroepen op overmacht. Deze bijdrage onderzoekt de
overmachtsfiguur bij verbintenissen tot betaling van een geldsom. In het eerste
deel zullen de overmachtsfiguur, haar toepassingsvereisten en de gevolgen in het
gemeen recht besproken worden. De algemene principes uit het gemeen recht worden
daarna toegepast op verbintenissen tot betaling van een geldsom. Het tweede deel
van deze bijdrage zal kort enkele alternatieven voor de financiële overmacht
uiteenzetten, met name de imprevisieleer, de verhindering in het Weens
kooprecht, de matigende werking van de goede trouw, uitstel van betaling en de
ondersteuningsmaatregelen voor de Covid-19-crisis.

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Consumentenbescherming bij servitisation en product-dienst-systemen (PDS)

Onze economie wordt steeds meer een diensteneconomie. In toenemende mate worden
diensten toegevoegd aan de verkoop van goederen aan consumenten en steeds vaker
sluiten consumenten overeenkomsten waarbij ze nog slechts een gebruiksrecht
verkrijgen over een goed of waarbij hen zelfs enkel een bepaald functioneel
resultaat wordt gegarandeerd. De dienstverstrekker blijft eigenaar. Deze
bijdrage analyseert de gevolgen van deze evolutie voor de positie van de
consument.

De inleiding van deze bijdrage gaat kort in op de verschillende vormen van
‘product- dienst-systeem’ (‘PDS’) en de daaraan verbonden economische voor- en
nadelen. Ook de band met de circulaire economie komt aan bod. PDS blijkt immers
niet per se duurzamer.

De focus van deze bijdrage ligt echter op de uitdagingen die PDS meebrengt voor
de rechtspositie van de consument, zowel bij de totstandkoming als bij de
uitvoering van deze overeenkomsten. De rode draad doorheen deze bijdrage is dat
de consument bij PDS minder bescherming geniet dan bij een traditioneel
koopcontract waarbij hij eigendom verwerft.

Een uitgebreid wettelijk kader voor dienstencontracten ontbreekt immers
momenteel, en dwingende bepalingen voor B2C dienstencontracten zijn naar
Belgisch recht quasi onbestaand. Een kwalificatie als huur- of
aannemingsovereenkomst biedt de consument dan ook weinig bescherming.

De belangrijkste bescherming blijkt uiteindelijk voort te vloeien uit de
regeling inzake oneerlijke bedingen. Een kennelijk onevenwichtige contractuele
regeling van onder meer de gebruiksrechten, het risico, de opschortingsrechten,
enz. kan op deze basis worden aangevochten. Dit beschermingsmechanisme blijft
echter in essentie een negatief mechanisme, dat toelaat onevenwichtig clausules
nietig te verklaren, maar het garandeert geen minimum aan rechten en remedies
voor PDS-consumenten. Deze bijdrage gaat daarom ook in op enkele mogelijke
oplossingen voor het gebrek aan bescherming van de consument, zoals
standaardisering, standaardcontracten en het ontwikkelen van uitgebreider
wettelijk kader voor dienstencontracten.

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Bereiken deontologie, tuchtrecht en tuchtrechtspraak van de advocatuur hun doel?

Dit artikel biedt een ruim overzicht in vogelvlucht van het advocatenrecht. Een
recht waarvan men nogal eens vergeet dat het ook werkelijk recht is, en dat het
deel uitmaakt van een veel groter rechtssysteem. Een recht dat dan ook meer voor
dan door advocaten wordt gemaakt. Komen dus aan bod de deontologie, het
tuchtrecht en het tuchtprocesrecht van de advocaten. En dat in hun voornaamste
algemene beginselen, hun toepassingen en wijzigingen, deze laatste vooral in de
voorbije zes jaar. Het gaat dus om pot pourris, eerder dan om exhaustieve
beschrijvingen, waarvoor de materie te omvangrijk is. En ze leiden ons tot de
vragen: Bereiken deontologie, tuchtrecht & tuchtrechtspraak hun doel? En als dat
niet het geval is, hoe kan daaraan worden verholpen? Ik sluit mijn bijdrage af
met een wake up call en een aantal welgemeende aanbevelingen.

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De privaatrechtelijke positie van transgender personen in België

Deze bijdrage biedt een grondige analyse van alle specifieke regels van Belgisch
personen- en familierecht ten behoeve van transgender personen na de hervorming
van hun rechtspositie via de wet van 25 juni 2017 en de modernisering van de
burgerlijke stand met de wet van 18 juni 2018. Aanpassing van de
geslachtsregistratie is een recht voor meerderjarigen zonder fraudeoogmerk en
kan ook voor minderjarigen realiteit worden, na schrapping van de vroegere
medische voorwaarden. Het geslacht als element van de staat van de persoon is
beschikbaar geworden in een systeem van gecontroleerde zelfbeschikking na
voorlichting en met een wachttermijn. De regels inzake de voornaamsverandering
van transgender personen zijn verder versoepeld, bijzonder afstammingsrecht is
gecreëerd en privacybeschermende maatregelen werden genomen. De rechten van
genderfluïde personen nopen evenwel tot een nieuw en nog verdergaand wetgevend
ingrijpen, nu het Grondwettelijk Hof meerdere nieuwe regels heeft vernietigd.

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De niet-rivale goederen, onderzocht aan de hand van de verkrijgende functie van
het bezit bij de intellectuele eigendomsrechten

Intellectuele eigendomsrechten zijn eigensoortige goederen. In tegenstelling tot
lichamelijke goederen en zelfs vele onlichamelijke goederen zijn zij niet-rivale
goederen, wat betekent dat zij door meerdere personen tezelfdertijd gebruikt
kunnen worden zonder dat de gebruikers elkaar hierbij hinderen. De vraag rijst
dan of de verkrijgende verjaring van intellectuele eigendomsrechten en de
onmiddellijke verkrijging door de bezitter te goeder trouw mogelijk (en
opportuun) zijn. Dit wordt namelijk vaak ontkend, soms met verwijzing naar de
niet-rivale aard van de intellectuele eigendomsrechten, maar er zijn geen
wettelijke verboden. Het bezit van onlichamelijke goederen is mogelijk, zoals
thans aanvaard wordt, en het is niet zeker dat de niet-rivale aard inderdaad
(steeds) een hindernis is voor de deugdelijkheid van het bezit. Er zijn ook
praktische problemen – met name de vaak lange verkrijgende verjaringstermijnen
(hoewel het nieuwe goederenrecht dit probleem sterk vermindert, omdat de
tienjarige termijn de gemeenrechtelijke termijn wordt) –, maar die kunnen
bezwaarlijk een beginselmatig verbod op de verkrijgende verjaring inhouden. De
onmiddellijke verkrijging door de bezitter te goeder trouw doet wel problemen
rijzen, want een criterium voor deze verkrijgingswijze is een goed evenwicht met
de rechten van de uittredende eigenaar, die een voldoende kans moet hebben om
zijn goed tijdig te revindiceren. Dat ontbreekt: zelfs een gerechtigde die zijn
intellectueel eigendomsrecht actief uitoefent, kan geconfronteerd worden met een
verkrijger te goeder trouw wegens de mogelijkheid van nevenbezit.

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De onderschatte rol van wilsautonomie in het huidige en in het nieuwe
goederenrecht: kwalitatieve verbintenissen als proefstuk

Deze bijdrage vertrekt vanuit de vaststelling dat het goederenrecht lacunair is
en dat verschillende onvolkomenheden kunnen worden opgevangen door een
contractuele regeling. Dit wordt geïllustreerd aan de hand van kwalitatieve
verbintenissen, zoals de onderhoudsplicht opgelegd aan de eigenaar van een
lijdend erf in het kader van een erfdienstbaarheid en de canonverplichting van
een erfpachter.

Het eerste deel van deze bijdrage analyseert verschillende onvolkomenheden in
het goederenrecht die naar Belgisch recht nauwelijks besproken worden, maar
waarin het Nederlandse recht al verder ontwikkeld is. De modulering van
zakelijke rechten komt aan bod en met name de vraag of en in hoeverre partijen
bij de vestiging van een zakelijk recht rechten, verplichtingen en bevoegdheden
met zakelijke werking kunnen toevoegen. Ook de juridische gevolgen van de
overdracht en afstand van het zakelijk recht zijn niet afdoende geregeld. Zo is
het onduidelijk of en in welke mate de overdrager na de overdracht nog gehouden
is tot de verplichtingen verbonden aan het zakelijk recht. Naar Nederlands recht
zijn voor specifieke zakelijke rechten wel bepalingen die de aansprakelijkheid
na overdracht regelen en de Hervorming Goederenrecht voert ook voor het
Belgische recht een regeling in, zowel voor de juridische gevolgen na overdracht
als na afstand van het zakelijk recht.

In het tweede deel komt aan bod hoe partijen bij de vestiging of overdracht van
het zakelijk recht hun rechtspositie zo goed en volledig mogelijk kunnen
regelen, de besproken lacunes indachtig. Zelfs als de wet een regeling bevat,
willen partijen hier mogelijks van afwijken, in welk geval de suppletieve of
dwingende werking van de wettelijke bepalingen moet worden nagegaan. Uit deze
bijdrage blijkt dat partijen in grote mate het goederenrecht door middel van een
of meerdere contracten naar hun hand kunnen zetten, en in bepaalde gevallen
zelfs quasi-zakelijke werking kunnen verlenen aan louter persoonlijke bedingen,
zoals een kettingbeding of een beperking van de beschikkingsbevoegdheid.

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De onderschatte rol van wilsautonomie in het huidige en in het nieuwe
goederenrecht: kwalitatieve verbintenissen als proefstuk

Deze bijdrage vertrekt vanuit de vaststelling dat het goederenrecht lacunair is
en dat verschillende onvolkomenheden kunnen worden opgevangen door een
contractuele regeling. Dit wordt geïllustreerd aan de hand van kwalitatieve
verbintenissen, zoals de onderhoudsplicht opgelegd aan de eigenaar van een
lijdend erf in het kader van een erfdienstbaarheid en de canonverplichting van
een erfpachter.

Het eerste deel van deze bijdrage analyseert verschillende onvolkomenheden in
het goederenrecht die naar Belgisch recht nauwelijks besproken worden, maar
waarin het Nederlandse recht al verder ontwikkeld is. De modulering van
zakelijke rechten komt aan bod en met name de vraag of en in hoeverre partijen
bij de vestiging van een zakelijk recht rechten, verplichtingen en bevoegdheden
met zakelijke werking kunnen toevoegen. Ook de juridische gevolgen van de
overdracht en afstand van het zakelijk recht zijn niet afdoende geregeld. Zo is
het onduidelijk of en in welke mate de overdrager na de overdracht nog gehouden
is tot de verplichtingen verbonden aan het zakelijk recht. Naar Nederlands recht
zijn voor specifieke zakelijke rechten wel bepalingen die de aansprakelijkheid
na overdracht regelen en de Hervorming Goederenrecht voert ook voor het
Belgische recht een regeling in, zowel voor de juridische gevolgen na overdracht
als na afstand van het zakelijk recht.

In het tweede deel komt aan bod hoe partijen bij de vestiging of overdracht van
het zakelijk recht hun rechtspositie zo goed en volledig mogelijk kunnen
regelen, de besproken lacunes indachtig. Zelfs als de wet een regeling bevat,
willen partijen hier mogelijks van afwijken, in welk geval de suppletieve of
dwingende werking van de wettelijke bepalingen moet worden nagegaan. Uit deze
bijdrage blijkt dat partijen in grote mate het goederenrecht door middel van een
of meerdere contracten naar hun hand kunnen zetten, en in bepaalde gevallen
zelfs quasi-zakelijke werking kunnen verlenen aan louter persoonlijke bedingen,
zoals een kettingbeding of een beperking van de beschikkingsbevoegdheid.

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Impact van de B2B-wet op de wilsautonomie en de rechtszekerheid: een
rechtsvergelijkende analyse

Het Belgische verbintenissenrecht steunt op het beginsel van de wilsautonomie.
Dat behelst de vrijheid voor partijen om de inhoud van hun overeenkomsten zelf
te bepalen. De klassieke verantwoording voor dat beginsel luidt dat iedere
partij gelijkwaardig is en dus haar eigen belangen kan verdedigen. Blijkt één
van de partijen zich in werkelijkheid evenwel in een ondergeschikte
onderhandelingspositie te bevinden ten opzichte van de wederpartij, dan zijn
correcties wenselijk. De wetgever kan dan tussenkomen om partijen op hetzelfde
onderhandelingsniveau te tillen, met name door regels die contractpartijen
beschermen tegen onrechtmatige bedingen.

De wet van 4 april 2019 voert voor het eerst in België regels in die
ondernemingen moeten beschermen tegen onrechtmatige bedingen. De nieuwe regels
flankeren de bestaande bepalingen over onrechtmatige bedingen in overeenkomsten
met consumenten, maar wijken daarvan inhoudelijk af. De wetgever verantwoordt de
uitbreiding van B2C- naar B2B-verhoudingen met het argument dat ondergeschikte
onderhandelingsposities ook voorkomen bij partijen die handelen in het kader van
een beroepsactiviteit, zodat ook zij bescherming behoeven.

Deze bijdrage gaat na op welke punten de nieuwe B2B-wet de wilsautonomie kan
beperken en in welke mate de toegevoegde bescherming ten koste gaat van de
rechtszekerheid. Het onderzoek gaat daarbij in op de motieven van de wetgever en
maakt onder meer gebruik van een rechtsvergelijkende analyse waarin Duitsland,
Frankrijk, Nederland en Italië zijn betrokken. Het toepassingsgebied, de
beschermingstechnieken en de sancties kunnen rekenen op een kritische blik. Het
besluit is dat de mogelijke impact op de wilsautonomie en rechtszekerheid
aanzienlijk is en dat er voor die impact niet steeds een duidelijke
rechtvaardigingsgrond voorhanden is. Het is daarom wenselijk dat de rechtspraak
zich terughoudend opstelt bij de interpretatie van de nieuwe regels en dat de
wetgever zich beraadt over een aantal aanpassingen.

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Faillissement en lopende overeenkomsten. Een rechtsvergelijkende analyse van
artikel XX.139 WER

Deze bijdrage heeft tot doel de verwarring die in de rechtspraak en rechtsleer

bestaat met betrekking tot het lot van lopende overeenkomsten bij faillissement
in

kaart te brengen en vervolgens op te helderen. Het uitgangspunt betreft de
fundamentele

regel dat het enkele intreden van het faillissement in beginsel geen einde

maakt aan de lopende overeenkomsten waarbij de gefailleerde partij is. Het
begrip

‘lopende overeenkomst’ wordt geanalyseerd en gedefinieerd. Vervolgens wordt het

keuzerecht van de curator besproken. De curator kan opteren voor de uitvoering

van een lopende overeenkomst, waardoor de daaruit voortvloeiende verbintenissen

gekwalificeerd worden als boedelschulden. Daarnaast kan de curator beslissen om

de verbintenissen die op het moment van de opening van de
faillissementsprocedure

op de gefailleerde rusten niet uit te voeren. Een beslissing tot niet-uitvoering
kan niet

meer gevolgen ressorteren dan een wanprestatie van de gefailleerde vóór de
opening

van de faillissementsprocedure. Het keuzerecht van de curator wordt uitgesloten

ten aanzien van intuitu personae-overeenkomsten en overeenkomsten die een ipso

facto-clausule bevatten. Onder restrictieve voorwaarden kan de curator een
lopende

overeenkomst beëindigen. Deze bevoegdheid geeft de curator de mogelijkheid

om (1) verbintenissen die ongevoelig zijn voor een beslissing tot
niet-uitvoering te

frustreren, (2) een goed te zuiveren van tegenwerpelijke persoonlijke rechten en

(3) vermogensvoordelen te verschaffen aan de failliete boedel. De eenzijdige
beëindigingsbevoegdheid

betreft een toepassing van het paritas creditorum-beginsel en

verruimt, net als de faillissementspauliana, de verhaalsrechten van de
gezamenlijke

schuldeisers.

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Consumentenbescherming bij servitisation (Een Nederlandse focus op de trend
waarbij aanbieders steeds vaker diensten aanbieden naast of in de plaats van
producten)

Servitisation is de trend waarbij aanbieders steeds vaker diensten aanbieden
naast of in plaats van producten. In consumentenmarkten is de afgelopen jaren
een toename zichtbaar van dit type diensten, bijvoorbeeld bij Swapfietsen en bij
huishoudelijke apparatuur zoals wasmachines en koffiezetapparaten. Dit preadvies
onderzoekt de vraag wat servitisation betekent voor de bescherming van
consumenten in privaatrechtelijke verhoudingen met aanbieders. De nadruk ligt
daarbij op klassieke consumentencontracten, dat wil zeggen overeenkomsten waarin
de aanbieder handelt in de uitoefening van een bedrijf of beroep en de koper, de
consument, niet als zodanig. Daarnaast wordt voor een aantal aspecten, in het
bijzonder in het contracten- en aansprakelijkheidsrecht, bekeken welke
bescherming consumenten hebben indien zij een overeenkomst tot dienstverlening
aangaan met een andere particulier via een online platform. Geconcludeerd wordt
dat bepaalde aspecten van consumentenbescherming nog onvoldoende gewaarborgd
zijn als de trend richting dienstverlening in plaats van koop zich doorzet.
Transparantie van contractsvoorwaarden is bijvoorbeeld bij servitisation vaak
minder goed dan bij koop, onder andere omdat dienstenovereenkomsten veel
verscheidenheid vertonen. Verder gelden geen objectieve kwaliteitsstandaarden
zoals bij koop en kan onduidelijkheid bestaan over de beschikbaarheid van
remedies. Algemener kan worden gezien dat servitisation ongelijkheden in de
samenleving kan vergroten. Waar mondige, goed geïnformeerde en financieel
draagkrachtige consumenten kunnen profiteren van de mogelijkheden die
servitisation (incl. de opkomst van de platformeconomie) biedt, kunnen minder
draagkrachtige, kwetsbare consumenten hun sociaal-economische positie juist nog
wankeler maken. Deze conclusies vragen om een herbezinning van
consumentenbescherming in het hedendaagse privaatrecht.

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De openbare orde als ruggengraat van de juridische methode? Enkele bedenkingen
bij Ludo Cornelis' openbare orde

Met zijn meest recente boek ‘Openbare orde. Liber amicis’ streeft Ludo Cornelis
naar een ‘precieze en werkzame’ omschrijving van het begrip ‘openbare orde’. In
de zoektocht naar die omschrijving hanteert hij evenwel een visie op de bronnen
van het recht die niet strookt met de wijze waarop de maatschappelijke orde de
afgelopen 75 jaar is geëvolueerd. Een andere visie op de bronnen van het recht
dringt zich dan ook op. Die visie relativeert het technische belang van
begrippen zoals ‘openbare orde’. Maar ook in een dergelijke visie is het
besproken werk van grote waarde. Omdat het fundamentele belangen en beginselen
(‘essentiële samenlevingswaarden’) identificeert en concretiseert, vormt het
werk een interessante bijdrage aan de beoefening van het (privaat)recht.

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Billikheid en ongeregverdigde verryking

In die sivielregtelike tradisie word sekere remedies wat gemik is op die
restitusie of teruggawe van verryking beskryf as “billik” of “equitable”. Die
doel van hierdie bydrae is om hierdie beskrywing van nader te beskou, veral
binne die konteks van die ongekodifiseerde Suid-Afrikaanse verrykingsreg, ʼn
vertakking van die verbintenisreg, naas die kontraktereg en deliktereg, wat ʼn
aantal eise om restitusie onder hierdie banier verenig. Daar word aan die hand
gedoen dat verwysings na billikheid in die konteks van die verrykingsreg
minstens drie funksies kan vervul, naamlik i) om die toestaan van ʼn remedie te
regverdig of te legitimeer; ii) om aan te dui dat howe die diskresie geniet om
na gelang van die feite of omstandighede ʼn remedie te bied, en iii) om, soos
goeie trou in die kontraktereg, as ʼn soort katalisator te dien vir
regsontwikkeling. Hierdie drie funksies word krities evalueer en die
gevolgtrekking word bereik dat verwysings na billikheid in die verrykingsreg met
omsigtigheid hanteer moet word en oor die algemeen ʼn beperkte bydrae kan lewer
tot die toepassing van bestaande reg of tot die ontwikkeling van nuwe reg.

In de civielrechtelijke traditie worden bepaalde remedies die de restitutie of
teruggave van een verrijking viseren, beschreven als billijk of “equitable”. Het
doel van deze bijdrage is om die beschrijving nader te analyseren, vooral binnen
de context van het niet-gecodificeerde Zuid-Afrikaanse verrijkingsrecht, dat een
tak is van het verbintenissenrecht, naast het contractenrecht en onrechtmatige
daadsrecht. Dat stelt een aantal eisen om de restitutie op te leggen. Het zal
blijken dat verwijzingen naar billijkheid in de context van het verrijkingsrecht
drie functies kan vervullen, namelijk om (1) de toekenning van een remedie te
verdedigen of rechtvaardigen, (2) aan te duiden dat gerechtshoven een
beoordelingsvrijheid hebben om naargelang van de feiten of omstandigheden een
remedie toe te kennen en (3) zoals goede trouw in het contractenrecht, als een
soort katalysator te dienen voor de rechtsontwikkeling. Deze drie functies
worden kritisch geëvalueerd, waaruit wordt geconcludeerd dat verwijzingen naar
de billijkheid in het verrijkingsrecht met omzichtigheid moeten worden
gehanteerd en in het algemeen slechts een beperkte bijdrage kan leveren aan de
toepassing van het bestaande recht of ontwikkeling van het nieuwe recht.

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Verscheurd tussen koper en eigenaar - de kunst om de kloof in het goederenrecht
te dichten

Het vraagstuk wie bescherming verdient wanneer een bestolen eigenaar erin slaagt
zijn verloren goed terug te vinden in de handen van een bonafide koper, vormt
een waarachtig juridisch dilemma. Na het vraagstuk eerst op basis van het
Belgische goederenrecht te hebben geëxploreerd, zal deze bijdrage vervolgens
aantonen hoe continentaal-Europese (zgn. civil law-)jurisdicties eerder de
belangen van de bonafide koper genegen zijn, terwijl zgn. common
law-jurisdicties bovenal menen voorrang te moeten geven aan de bescherming van
de oorspronkelijke eigenaar. Aansluitend spitst deze bijdrage het klassieke
koper-eigenaar dilemma toe op de situatie waarin de diefstal roerende
cultuurgoederen behelst. Als dat het geval is blijken de traditionele
oplossingen frequent anders te liggen. Heel wat landen hebben in de voorbije
decennia wat betreft kunstvoorwerpen en cultureel erfgoed immers verregaande
restitutieverplichtingen in hun goederenrecht ingeschreven. Deze bijdrage zal
dan ook besluiten dat de theoretische kloof tussen het goederenrecht in civil
law- en common law-jurisdicties in de praktijk van het erfgoedrecht veel minder
groot is, aangezien dit het gemeen goederenrecht omwille van erfgoedbelangen op
een aantal vlakken heeft bijgestuurd.

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Wilsautonomie in het Belgische goederenrecht

“Het goederenrecht is van openbare orde”. Het is een vaak gehoorde boutade, die
vooral op rechtshistorische motieven is gesteund. Nog los van het feit dat een
gedegen rechtshistorische analyse de juistheid van dit uitgangspunt in vraag
stelt, beantwoordt ze niet aan het huidige recht. Het goederenrecht is in
belangrijke mate van aanvullend recht. Ook de voorstellen tot hervorming van het
goederenrecht gaan van deze gedachte uit. In deze bijdrage worden de grenzen van
de wilsautonomie in het Belgische goederenrecht afgetast, zowel vanuit
positivistisch oogpunt als vanuit de rechtsgeschiedenis, rechtsvergelijking en
rechtseconomie. Het blijkt dat de wilsautonomie veel groter is bij de zakelijke
gebruiksrechten dan bij de zakelijke zekerheidsrechten. Tegelijk wordt betoogd
dat de notie van exclusiviteit, die in belangrijke mate mede gestalte geeft aan
dat gesloten stelsel, in werkelijkheid zeer te nuanceren is.

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Partijautonomie in het Nederlandse goederenrecht

Het is gebruikelijk om het goederenrecht te karakteriseren als een rechtsgebied
dat bijna uitsluitend dwingendrechtelijke regels kent en slechts weinig ruimte
laat voor partijautonomie. Met een zekere graagte lijken goederenrecht en
contractenrecht als tegenpolen te worden gepresenteerd. In deze bijdrage wordt
dit beeld, voor het Nederlandse recht, sterk gerelativeerd. Het Nederlandse
goederenrecht is niet doof voor de maatschappelijke noden en de maatschappelijke
functie van rechtsfiguren en toont zijn flexibiliteit veelvuldig. Het voelt
bijna als een aanval op een open deur om te benadrukken dat de partijautonomie
in het Nederlandse goederenrecht een prominente plaats heeft. Hoewel niet als
uitgangspunt geldt dat goederenrecht van regelend recht is, is de partijwil bij
vrijwel geen enkel leerstuk te veronachtzamen. Zo wordt algemeen erkend dat de
partijen binnen de Nederlandse numerus clausus een ruime vrijheid hebben om de
inhoud van beperkte rechten vast te stellen. Door middel van een beheersregeling
kunnen deelgenoten hun (exclusieve) bevoegdheden in verregaande mate, met
derdenwerking, onderling afspreken. De partijautonomie laat zich ook buiten de
kaders van de invulling van de inhoud van goederenrechtelijke rechten gelden.
Omdat goederenrechtelijke rechten in beginsel geen exclusief, elkaar of
verbintenisrechtelijke alternatieven uitsluitend toepassingsgebied hebben,
kunnen partijen kiezen met behulp van welke rechtsfiguur zij hun
rechtsverhouding willen reguleren. Zo kan het vestigen van een opstalrecht een
alternatief zijn voor een appartementensplitsing. Er zijn ook onderdelen van het
goederenrecht waar de partijautonomie (nog) iets meer begrensd lijkt te zijn.
Het maken van afspraken die ook derden binden, aangaande de (exclusieve)
beschikkingsbevoegdheid van een niet-rechthebbende wordt bijvoorbeeld met een
zekere reserve bekeken. De partij-invloed bij de toepassing van leerstukken als
natrekking en zaakvorming lijkt uitermate gering te zijn. Maar ook aan die poort
wordt gerammeld, met het oog op de noden van de circulaire economie.

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Omgaan met omgaan. Een kwalitatief empirisch onderzoek naar de omkeringen in de
cassatierechtspraak

Deze bijdrage analyseert de kenbaarheid en motieven van twintig
rechtspraakwijzigingen van het Hof van Cassatie. Het hoogste rechtscollege geeft
door de bank genomen weinig tot geen ruchtbaarheid aan de wijzigingen in zijn
vaste rechtspraak. Doorgaans maakt een nevenproduct, zoals de conclusie van de
advocaat-generaal of het jaarverslag, de ommekeer kenbaar. De voornaamste
kenbron van omkeringen zijn echter rechtsgeleerde annotaties. Die bekendmaking
is gebrekkig want ze geschiedt met vertraging en is niet authentiek. Bovendien
verplicht de rechtspraak van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens tot
een uitdrukkelijke motivering van rechtspraakwijzigingen. De manier waarop zijn
Nederlandse en Franse evenknieën rechtspraakwijzigingen kenbaar maken, toont aan
dat er bij het Belgische Hof van Cassatie ruimte is voor verbetering.

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Toekomst van de circulaire vastgoedeconomie [in Belgisch en Nederlands recht]

De circulaire economie is momenteel een van de veelbelovendste denkpistes om
onze economie duurzamer te maken. Een van de uitwerkingen van de circulaire
economie staat bekend als het dienstenmodel: in plaats van een goed te verkopen
aan de consument biedt de producent van deze goederen de consument het gebruik
van dit goed aan, zonder dat de eigendom van dit goed wordt overgedragen. Ook in
de vastgoedsector worden steeds meer circulaire initiatieven uitgerold, maar men
stuit daarbij op bepaalde goederenrechtelijke grenzen. Deze bijdrage analyseert
de verschillende manieren waarop deze initiatieven vorm kunnen krijgen onder het
huidige Belgische en Nederlandse recht. Daarbij worden tevens de verschillende
beperkingen blootgelegd, doch ook de mogelijke oplossingen voor deze
beperkingen, onder meer gebaseerd op een hedendaagse interpretatie van de
verschillende aan het goederenrecht ten grondslag liggende beginselen, worden
besproken.

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Eigendom van data? 'Reculer pour mieux sauter' [in onder meer Nederland en
België]

De afgelopen jaren werd heel wat gepubliceerd over eigendom van data, in het
bijzonder in Duitsland, de Verenigde Staten en op het niveau van de Europese
Unie. Nu het onderzoek naar dit onderwerp ook in Nederland en, in mindere mate,
België op gang komt, formuleert de auteur vijf aanbevelingen voor toekomstig
onderzoek. Samengevat houden die aanbevelingen in dat men bij het doen van
onderzoek duidelijk moet zijn omtrent wat men precies onder ‘eigendom’ en ‘data’
verstaat, dat er nauw moet worden samengewerkt met informatici, dat bij het
beantwoorden van de vraag of eigendom van data mogelijk zou moeten zijn ook naar
het recht zelf moet worden gekeken en dat naast datasubjecten en industriële
spelers ook schuldeisers als belanghebbenden bij (het antwoord op) de voornoemde
vraag moeten worden beschouwd.

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De rol van de rechtsvergelijking in de rechtspraak van het Hof van Cassatie [in
de periode 2002-2017]

De rechtsvergelijking speelt in een kleine jurisdictie als de onze een
belangrijke rol. Is dit onomstreden in onderwijs, onderzoek en wetgeving, dan
wordt dit door velen problematisch geacht voor de rechtspraak. Kan men aan onze
rechtzoekenden antwoorden opdringen die geïnspireerd zijn door buitenlandse
juridische informatie? Nochtans blijkt dat binnen Europa de hoogste
gerechtshoven steeds meer kennis nemen van elkaars rechtspraak. In deze bijdrage
wordt gezocht naar een verklaring voor deze ontwikkeling. Verder wordt gepeild
naar de praktijk van het Hof van Cassatie. Aan de hand van een onderzoek van de
rechtspraak over de periode 2002-2017 wordt getracht een beeld te geven van de
materies, het soort zaken en van de rechtstelsels waarmee wordt vergeleken en
gepeild naar de betekenis hiervan voor de rechtsvinding.

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De inplanting van onshore windturbines in het Vlaamse Gewest vanuit
privaatrechtelijk perspectief

Wie ‘windturbines’ zegt, denkt vaak aan problemen zoals geluidsoverlast en
slagschaduw, of aan te realiseren doelstellingen op vlak van hernieuwbare
energie. Nochtans is het niet al administratief recht en energierecht wat de
klok slaat in de (juridische) wereld van de windturbines.

In deze bijdrage wordt de niet onbelangrijke rol van het privaatrecht voor de
aanleg en exploitatie van onshore windturbines toegelicht. Naast een klassiek
juridisch-dogmatisch onderzoek werd een kwalitatieve documentenanalyse verricht
en werden interviews afgenomen bij respondenten met uiteenlopende profielen. De
inplanting van windturbines vergt een optimale interactie tussen energierecht,
administratief recht en privaatrecht. Een analyse van de resultaten van de
afgenomen interviews heeft uitgewezen dat de weg naar dergelijke optimale
interactie bezaaid ligt met tal van juridische obstakels. Deze bijdrage ambieert
geen exhaustief overzicht te bieden van alle mogelijke problemen en oplossingen
bij de inplanting van windturbines. Wel worden enkele voor de praktijk relevante
juridische obstakels uitgelicht en geanalyseerd.

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Duurzaam goederenrecht: naar een herijking van ons goederenrechtelijk stelsel?
[Inspiratie uit onder meer Nederland]

Met toenemende klimaatverandering, de eindigheid van fossiele brandstoffen en
toenemende ongelijkheid in de (westerse) wereld, alsook de verplichtingen die de
landen zijn aangegaan in het kader van het bereiken van de 17
VN-duurzaamheidsdoelstellingen, is het nodig om het goederenrecht te herijken,
d.w.z. van nieuwe waarden te voorzien.

Het herijken van ons goederenrecht vereist het inzicht dat het goederenrecht
gevormd is door liberaal en neoliberaal filosofisch en economisch gedachtegoed.
Hierbij valt te denken aan aardbevingen veroorzaakt door gaswinning in Groningen
en hypotheken verstrekt aan klanten waarvan bij voorbaat duidelijk is dat zij
niet in staat zullen zijn om hun schuld te betalen. Door een andere filosofische
grondslag te kiezen, kan het goederenrecht een nieuwe weg inslaan die niet
alleen gericht is op groei, maar op het gebruikmaken van onze middelen voor
onszelf en voor de generaties die na ons komen.

Er is voor de ontwikkeling van een duurzaam goederenrecht, een set regels nodig
op basis waarvan problemen kunnen worden opgelost (een algoritme), waarbij een
positieve duurzaamheidsverplichting in het eigendomsrecht wordt gelezen en
waarbij publiekrecht en privaatrecht samen bezien worden om het recht verder te
ontwikkelen. Op basis van dit algoritme kunnen we besluiten op welke wijze we
onze huidige regels interpreteren en besluiten of onze regels nog kunnen blijven
bestaan in hun huidige vorm. Ook kan dit algoritme gebruikt worden om nieuwe
goederenrechtelijke regels te maken. Ons hele goederenrechtelijk stelsel, het
eigendomsrecht én de beperkte rechten, alsook onze procedurele regels, moet
daarvoor onder handen genomen worden.

Het idee duurzaamheid te bereiken door alles in de vorm van
dienstverleningsovereenkomsten te gieten, is niet de juiste weg. Herijking, dat
wil zeggen, het integreren in ons systeem van nieuwe waarden, in dit geval het
welzijn, door het conceptualiseren van een overeenkomstige goederenrechtelijke
verplichting, brengt het goederenrecht naar de voorgrond. Daarmee leveren we de
bouwstenen om samen te werken aan een duurzame economie waarin naast welzijn,
economische groei voor iedereen en verdere ontwikkeling van nieuwe initiatieven
centraal staan.

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De verjaring van buitencontractuele rechtsvorderingen tot schadevergoeding
wegens kartelinbreuken: een intrigerend drieluik

Voor rechtsvorderingen tot schadevergoeding wegens mededingingsinbreuken voerde
de wet van 6 juni 2017 ter omzetting van de richtlijn 2014/104/EU specifieke
verjaringsregels in. In dat kader rijst de vraag welke verjaringsregels van
toepassing zijn op buitencontractuele rechtsvorderingen tot schadevergoeding
wegens kartelinbreuken die een aanvang namen of plaatsvonden vóór de
inwerkingtreding van de nieuwe regels inzake verjaring. Bij die vraag is er in
elk geval met drie zaken rekening te houden: (1) de verjaringsregels van artikel
2262bis § 1, tweede en derde lid BW, (2) het arrest van het Grondwettelijk Hof
van 10 maart 2016 en (3) de nieuwe specifieke verjaringsregels ter omzetting van
de richtlijn 2014/104/ EU. In het licht van dat drieluik wordt een
stappenredenering aangereikt om te bepalen of een rechtsvordering tot
schadevergoeding wegens een kartelinbreuk al dan niet is verjaard.

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De milieu-erfdienstbaarheid of milieugrondlast: een nuttig zakenrechtelijk
instrument voor de milieubescherming?

Traditioneel wordt het milieu beschermd door publiekrechtelijke instrumenten
(emissiestandaarden, erfdienstbaarheden van openbaar nut, …). Het privaatrecht
kan echter ook een bijdrage leveren aan de bescherming van het milieu. Één
voorbeeld hiervan is de zogenaamde milieu-erfdienstbaarheid (of
milieugrondlast). Het betreft een beperkt zakelijk recht – niet noodzakelijk een
erfdienstbaarheid in de zin van artikel 637 BW – dat aan de eigenaar van het
bezwaarde erf bepaalde verplichtingen oplegt in het belang van het milieu.
Gedacht kan worden aan een verbod om waardevolle planten, hagen of bossen te
rooien, om bepaalde schadelijke producten te gebruiken, of ook nog aan een gebod
om biologische landbouw te beoefenen. De onderhavige bijdrage gaat na wat de
milieu-erfdienstbaarheid exact is, waarom men een milieu-erfdienstbaarheid zou
willen gebruiken, welke rechtsvorm(en) ze kan aannemen naar Belgisch recht
(waarbij zal blijken dat er verhoudingsgewijs weinig ruimte is) en eindigt met
beschouwingen die de wetgever kunnen leiden indien hij de
milieu-erfdienstbaarheid sterker in de wetgeving wenst te verankeren.

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Privaatrechtelijke bescherming van de stem in commerciële context

De stem heeft een vaste plaats verworven in de commerciële realiteit.
Stemacteurs spreken radiocommercials in, zangers vertolken auteurswerken en
stemimitatoren imiteren de stem van publieke personen voor publicitaire
doeleinden. De opkomst van een lucratieve markt rond de stem heeft geleid tot
een toenemend aantal misbruiken. Deze bijdrage biedt een overzicht van de
verschillende commerciële toepassingen van de stem en bespreekt de
privaatrechtelijke beschermingsregimes, afhankelijk van het concrete
stemgebruik: als spreekbuis voor de creatieve geest (het auteursrecht) en het
privéleven (recht op eerbiediging van het privéleven); als zuiver commercieel
goed (mededingingsrecht en merkenrecht) of als attribuut van de persoonlijkheid
– los van de eventuele inhoud die zij overdraagt (persoonlijkheidsrecht op
stem).

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De inpassing van digitale producten in het Belgisch privaatrecht

In deze bijdrage onderzoekt de auteur of welbepaalde juridische vraagstukken die
naar aanleiding van digitale producten rijzen of kunnen rijzen, opgelost kunnen
worden aan de hand van het bestaande Belgisch privaatrecht. Het eerste hoofdstuk
gaat over de vraag of en hoe digitale data naar huidig recht verpand en in
beslag genomen kunnen worden. Niet alleen stelt de auteur vast dat er zich
problemen voordoen, ook doet hij enkele aanbevelingen de lege ferenda. In het
tweede hoofdstuk wordt onderzocht in welke mate de verkoop van onroerende
goederen via digitale weg kan geschieden. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat de
laatste stap van een dergelijke verkoop, zijnde de notariële fase, nog niet via
digitale weg kan worden gezet. In het derde en laatste hoofdstuk staat de
aansprakelijkheid voor schade veroorzaakt door (autonome) robots centraal.
Inzake contractuele aansprakelijkheid ligt de focus op robots die worden ingezet
in de gezondheidszorg, terwijl de zelfrijdende auto het werkvoorbeeld vormt bij
de bespreking van de buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid.

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Digitalisering en het Nederlands Burgerlijk Wetboek

In deze bijdrage wordt ingegaan op privaatrechtelijke vraagstukken rondom
digitalisering en digitale producten. De nadruk ligt op de behandeling van de
beginselen van identificatie & authenticatie, integriteit, confidentialiteit en
onweerlegbaarheid, en de elektronische handtekening. Bovendien wordt ingegaan op
digitale producten zoals computerprogrammatuur en databestanden die vooralsnog
goederenrechtelijk ongrijpbaar lijken. Tot slot wordt kort het autonome systeem
aangestipt.

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Structuur, praktijk en theorie van rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek

In dit artikel worden de stappen die meestal worden gezet in rechtsvergelijkend
onderzoek, geïdentificeerd en geanalyseerd. Naar aanleiding daarvan komen een
aantal specifieke methodische vragen en uitdagingen aan de orde. Hoe formuleer
je een onderzoeksvraag? Welke rechtssystemen wil je in je vergelijking
betrekken? Wanneer is er sprake van vergelijkbaarheid, en wat is daarbij de rol
van het tertium comparationis? Waarin verschilt het bestuderen van buitenlands
recht van daadwerkelijk vergelijken? Wat is de betekenis van neutraliteit bij
rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek? Op basis van welke terminologie doe je juist
verslag over je onderzoeksbevindingen, en wat toont dat over de specifieke aard
van de rechtsvergelijking? Welke opvattingen over rechtsbronnen doet dit alles
rijzen? Wat betekent interdisciplinariteit in dezen? Bij het behandelen van deze
vragen wordt de rechtsvergelijkende theorie verbonden met concrete voorbeelden.
De verwachting daarbij is dat de wisselwerking tussen structuur, praktijk en
theorie, inzicht in het verrichten van rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek kan
bevorderen.

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De productaansprakelijkheid voor zelfrijdende motorrijtuigen

Zelfrijdende motorrijtuigen gaan in de (al dan niet nabije) toekomst onze wegen
domineren. Gelet op het wegvallen van het menselijke gedrag als voornaamste
oorzaak van verkeersongevallen – en bijhorende schade – wordt verwacht dat
andere aansprakelijkheidssystemen proportioneel aan belang zullen winnen. Een
potentiële kandidaat om in deze context de koninginnenrol die vandaag bij de
klassieke foutaansprakelijkheid rust op te vangen, is de
productaansprakelijkheid. Wanneer echter wordt stilgestaan bij de toepassing
daarvan op schade veroorzaakt door zelfrijdende motorrijtuigen, steken al gauw
toepassingsproblemen de kop op. In voorliggende bijdrage worden deze problemen
geïdentificeerd, en worden voorstellen gedaan om eraan tegemoet te komen, in de
hoop tot een beter toepasbare productaansprakelijkheid te komen.

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Het vennootschaps- en boedelbelang in de queeste van dionysos: naar nieuwe wijn
in oude zakken?

In wiens belang dient het bestuur van een vennootschap/boedel te handelen? Die
ogenschijnlijke tweeledige vraag houdt menig jurist reeds ettelijke jaren bezig.
Deze bijdrage doet een poging om die vraag te beantwoorden aan de hand van één
moderne theorie, gedistilleerd uit de verscheidende theorieën zoals ze in de
huidige juridische en (rechts)economische vennootschaps- en insolventiedoctrine
bestaan. Na de vaststelling dat de juridisch-technische theorieën aan vervanging
toe zijn, komen we via een normatieve en positieve rechtseconomische analyse tot
een (nieuwe) dynamische uniforme theorie. Onderweg wordt ook een aanzet tot
antwoord gegeven op de gerelateerde vraag wie zeggenschap dient te verkrijgen
over het bestuur van de vennootschap/boedel.

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Bestaat de bevrijdende verjaring of is ze slechts een vorm van de verkrijgende
verjaring? Een onderzoek naar de verjaring als monistisch of dualistisch concept

Traditioneel worden de verkrijgende en de bevrijdende verjaring beschouwd als
twee fundamenteel verschillende rechtsfiguren, die slechts het verstrijken van
de tijd met elkaar gemeen hebben. Recent hebben enkele auteurs deze stelling in
twijfel getrokken. Zij menen dat de bevrijdende verjaring essentieel te
herleiden is tot de verkrijgende verjaring (‘sterk monisme’). De schuldenaar, zo
zeggen zij, bezit de schuldvordering die tegen hem bestaat door niet te betalen.
Na verloop van tijd verkrijgt hij de schuldvordering en gaat deze door
vermenging teniet. Er zijn een aantal historische en positiefrechtelijke
aanwijzingen in deze richting, maar ze worden op talrijke punten tegengesproken
door tegengestelde aanwijzingen. Het is de bedoeling van deze bijdrage om te
onderzoeken hoe de bevrijdende en de verkrijgende verjaring zich verhouden.
Hierbij blijkt dat de bevrijdende en de verkrijgende verjaring naar Belgisch
recht niet tot elkaar herleid kunnen worden (zij zijn dus verschillend), maar
tegelijkertijd wel tot dezelfde juridische categorie behoren (‘conceptueel
monisme’). De opvatting dat de bevrijdende en de verkrijgende verjaring dermate
van elkaar verschillen dat ze niet redelijkerwijs gezegd kunnen worden tot
dezelfde juridische categorie te behoren (‘dualisme’) is te verwerpen.

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Loyaliteitsplicht van meerderheidsaandeelhouders. Aard en misbruik van stemrecht
herbekeken

Het meerderheidsbeginsel creëert het risico dat meerderheidsaandeelhouders zich
verrijken ten koste van de vennootschap. Het vereiste van goede trouw in de
uitvoering van contracten verzacht dit agent-principaal probleem. De precieze
gedragsnorm die de goede trouw aan aandeelhouders oplegt, wordt bepaald door de
kwalificatie van het stemrecht. Deze bijdrage argumenteert dat het stemrecht een
doelgebonden bevoegdheid is, die steeds in het vennootschapsbelang moet worden
uitgeoefend. Aandeelhouders hebben bijgevolg een loyaliteitsplicht. Dat betekent
dat zij hun eigen belang ondergeschikt moeten maken aan het vennootschapsbelang
van zodra deze belangen met elkaar in conflict komen. In tegenstelling tot wat
algemeen wordt aangenomen, verloopt een rechterlijke controle op de naleving van
die plicht niet marginaal.

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De overmachts- en de imprevisieleer: één gespleten persoonlijkheid?

In het contractenrecht onderscheidt overmacht zich qua toepassingsvereisten van
de imprevisieleer doordat voor overmacht is vereist dat een schuldenaar
onmogelijk zijn verbintenis kan uitvoeren door een ontoerekenbare wijziging van
omstandigheden die zich na de contractsluiting voordeed, terwijl een beroep op
de imprevisieleer klassiek wordt voorbehouden voor het geval dat de schuldenaar
het door een dergelijke wijziging van omstandigheden ernstig moeilijk krijgt om
zijn verbintenis uit te voeren. Het onderscheid tussen de onmogelijkheid en de
ernstige bemoeilijking staat centraal in deze bijdrage. Uit onder andere een
doorgedreven rechtspraakonderzoek en een rechtsvergelijkende blik zal blijken
dat dit onderscheid onbestaande is. Bijgevolg zal worden vastgesteld dat er geen
nood bestaat om een van de overmachtsleer onderscheiden imprevisieleer in het
Belgische recht in te voeren, aangezien de overmachts- en de imprevisieleer
dezelfde situaties dekken.

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Bescheiden toezichter of bemiddelaar? De plaats van de rechter in reorganisatie
en faillissement vanuit rechtshistorisch perspectief

De plaats van de rechter in de Belgische gerechtelijke reorganisatie is thans
beperkt door een uitgebreid initiatiefrecht van de debiteur en omwille van het
overwicht van het oordeel van de schuldeisers over het herstel- en
reorganisatieplan. De opschorting van betaling, die eenvoudig en grotendeels
eenzijdig wordt toegekend, vormt een restant van een benadering uit het ancien
régime. Deze methode werd door de Napoleontische codificaties geschrapt, maar
werd niettemin – eerst onder het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, later in
België – opnieuw ingevoerd. Dat gebeurde echter met behoud van vele regels uit
de Franse wetboeken. Mede daardoor bleef de rol van de rechter bescheidener dan
vóór de Franse Revolutie. Het Belgische faillissements- en reorganisatierecht
van de negentiende, twintigste en eenentwintigste eeuw bracht op dit vlak weinig
vernieuwing. Niettegenstaande regels van reorganisatierecht steeds meer als een
uitzondering op gemeen privaaten procesrecht worden beschouwd, blijven
wettelijke beperkingen gelden die een overblijfsel zijn van de historische band
met faillissement en van de beperkt economisch-bedrijfsmatige interpretatie van
reorganisatie in het verleden. Ze maken dat de rechtbank van koophandel niet ten
volle als een forum voor informatieuitwisseling, onderhandeling en bemiddeling
kan worden opgevat. Een confrontatie met het recht en de praktijken van de
zestiende, zeventiende en achttiende eeuw, zowel in Frankrijk als in de
Nederlanden, laat toe de Belgische juridische traditie inzake reorganisatie
anders te bekijken.

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In de nasleep van de herdenkingen rond de Eerste Wereldoorlog, hield de rechts-
historiografie zich enigszins afzijdig en, in tegenstelling tot het onderzoek in
de ons omringende landen, bleven de gevolgen van de oorlog van 1914-1918 op het
Belgische privaatrecht onderbelicht. Nochtans rapporteerden juristen toen al
over de onmiskenbare impact van de oorlog en de bezetting op verschillende
rechtstakken zoals het overeenkomstenrecht of het personen- en familierecht.

Deze bijdrage biedt op basis van wetgevende en parlementaire documenten en doc-
trinale werken een overzicht van de veranderingen die het nationale privaatrecht
zowel tijdens als na de bezettingsjaren doormaakte. Aldus worden de
verschillende lacunes binnen de rechtshistoriografie blootgelegd. Aanvankelijk
tijdelijke maat- regelen kregen doorheen de oorlogsjaren een permanent karakter,
terwijl andere maatregelen een “loodgieterspolitiek” verraden om de kwalijke
gevolgen van de oorlog te milderen. Uiteindelijk beëindigde de Eerste
Wereldoorlog de 19de-eeuw- se nachtwakersstaat. Het idee dat in de juridische
relaties tussen burgers geen staatsinterventie wenselijk was, bleek in 1918
volledig achterhaald. Solidariteit en “rechtvaardigheid” werden voortaan de
norm.

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De grote oorlog en het Nederlandse overeenkomstenrecht – 'neutraliteit',
'weerstand' en 'responsiviteit'

Om niet vertrapt te raken tussen de centrale mogendheden en de geallieerde
legers hield het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog
vast aan zijn neutraliteitspolitiek. Hoewel Nederland er in slaagde om op die
wijze buiten de gevechtshandelingen te blijven, liet de oorlog wel sporen na op
de Nederlandse sociaal-economische verhoudingen. In deze bijdrage staat centraal
wat de directe en indirecte invloed van de Grote Oorlog is geweest op het
overeenkomstenrecht. Sinds de invoering in 1838 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek was
er nog niet een zo ontwrichtend internationaal conflict uitgebroken als deze
oorlog bleek te zijn. In zekere zin was de Grote Oorlog dus ook een ‘stresstest’
van de houdbaarheid van de centrale leerstukken van het overeenkomstenrecht
zoals het leerstuk van overmacht en onmogelijkheid.

In de literatuur is wel gesteld dat de Eerste We- reldoorlog wat dit betreft
niet heel anders was dan andere, minder verstorende gebeurtenissen. Drie
ontwikkelingen spreken dit standpunt schijnbaar tegen. Allereerst zien we dat de
neutraliteitspolitiek als het ware doorwerkt in de civiele rechtspraak, met
onverbiddelijke gevolgtrekkingen voor partijen die zich via de rechter wensten
te bevrijden van hun contractsverplichtingen. In de tweede plaats kan de Eerste
Wereldoorlog ook worden gezien als het definitieve einde van de laissez-faire
gedachte in de regulering van markten, en dus ook het contracten- recht. Ten
derde kan, met de kennis van nu, de Eerste Wereldoorlog ook als een van de
factoren worden gezien die de uiteindelijke introductie van de leer van de
onvoorziene omstandigheden en de latere opmars van de goede trouw verklaren.

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Incoherentie verenigd. Privaatrechtelijke concepten onder druk van Europees
financieel recht

De Europese post-crisis wetgeving werkt nog indringender in op de nationale
rechtsordes dan eerder het geval was. Dit heeft ook consequenties voor het
nationale privaatrecht. Sterker nog, het recente Europees financieel recht zet
alle klassieke privaatrechtelijke deelterreinen kernconcepten onder druk. Te
denken valt bijvoorbeeld aan de kernconcepten “overeenkomst” en “normschending”.
De Europese regelgever noopt zelfs tot her-denking van de begrippen “eigendom”
en “paritas creditorum”. Het valt bovendien te verwachten dat de gevolgen van
Europees financieel recht voor het nationaal privaatrecht niet zullen eindigen
op vandaag. Een minder coherent, maar meer geharmoniseerd, nationaal
privaatrecht van Europese origine is en zal het gevolg zijn. “Incoherentie
verenigd” dus.

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Schadevergoeding bij ontbinding: terechte suprematie van het positieve belang

Vergoeding van schade bij ontbinding krijgt terecht steeds meer aandacht in de
rechtsleer. Ons Burgerlijk Wetboek hult zich immers in stilzwijgen over de
strekking van die ontbindingsaanvullende schadevergoeding. Tien jaar geleden
verduidelijkte het Hof van Cassatie wel dat die schadevergoeding beoogt de
schuldeiser te verplaatsen naar de toestand waarin hij zich zou hebben bevonden
indien de schuldenaar zijn verbintenissen was nagekomen. Intussen wint echter
ook de stelling aanhang dat de wanprestant dan niet instaat voor dat zogeheten
positieve belang. De schuldenaar zou zijn contractpartner enkel hoeven te
verplaatsen naar de positie waarin hij zou hebben verkeerd indien de
overeenkomst nooit tot stand was gekomen. Die opvatting heeft een aanzienlijke
vergoedingsrechtelijke impact. Deze bijdrage geeft aan waarom die ontwikkeling
nefast is voor ons contractenrecht en het hoogste rechtscollege absoluut moet
blijven oordelen dat het positieve belang vooropstaat bij ontbinding.

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Verstorend procesgedrag: doeltreffend sanctioneren voor een efficiënte
procesvoering

Sinds 1 januari 2017 kunnen de nutteloze proceskosten ten laste gelegd worden
van de partij die ze foutief heeft veroorzaakt. Het doel is partijen te
responsabiliseren in het inschakelen van het gerecht. Deze bijdrage stelt vast
dat noch die bepaling noch het bestaande kader op een doeltreffende wijze het
beoogde objectief kan bereiken. De verschillende tekortkomingen verantwoorden de
ontwikkeling van een sanctiemechanisme dat op de eigenheid van de burgerlijke
procesvoering is afgestemd en zo wél – minstens beter – een zorgvuldig beroep op
het gerecht garandeert.

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Excuseer?! Afgedwongen excuses in het aansprakelijkheidsrecht

Naar geldend Belgisch buitencontractueel aansprakelijkheidsrecht is de
afdwinging van excuses, anders dan in het verleden, een onbekende remedie.
Andere rechtsstelsels erkennen de afdwinging van excuses bij wijze van
aansprakelijkheidsremedie uitdrukkelijk bij wet of in de rechtspraak. In het
bijzonder voor schendingen van de identiteit of de krenking van de waardigheid
van een persoon (zoals bij discriminatie, schending van sommige
persoonlijkheidsrechten of onrechtmatig ontslag), is er buitenlandse rechtspraak
die de aansprakelijke veroordeelt om zich (publiekelijk) tegenover de benadeelde
te excuseren. Dit kan een antwoord bieden op de emotionele behoeften van de
benadeelde en de verwerking van persoonlijk leed. Ook naar Belgisch
buitencontractueel aansprakelijkheidsrecht is daar plaats voor. Herstel in
natura als gemeenrechtelijk leerstuk voor vergoeding van morele schade is
daarvoor de perfecte juridische grondslag.

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Recht in balans. Pleidooi voor een meer holistisch (proces)recht

Het gaat niet goed met het gerechtelijk apparaat. Het traditionele medicijn is
het bijspijkeren van de regels van het civiel procesrecht of het inzetten op
alternatieve vormen van geschillenbeslechting en -oplossing. Dit zijn oude
technologieën. In deze bijdrage, die de schriftelijke weerslag vormt van een
rede gehouden ter gelegenheid van de aanvaarding van de TPR-wisselleerstoel
2016-17 aan de Universiteit Utrecht, worden een aantal nieuwe technologieën
besproken (de buitengerechtelijke beslechting van consumentengeschillen en
rechtsherstel aangeboden of aangemoedigd door publieke toezichthouders of
regulatoren). De vraag rijst hoe die oude en nieuwe technologieën met elkaar
verbonden kunnen worden. Er wordt gepleit voor interconnectie, interactie en
integratie. Een meergelaagd kader van geschillenbeslechting en -oplossing moet
het nieuwe streefdoel zijn.

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Juridische aspecten van blockhain en smart contracts

Twee hedendaagse fenomenen zijn de blockchain en smart contracts. Deze kunnen
mogelijk van grote betekenis worden voor de rechtspraktijk. Blockchain is een
technologie die betrouwbare, objectieve registers mogelijk maakt zonder centrale
autoriteit, op basis van een gedistribueerd netwerk van computers. Dit vormt de
basis van bitcoin. Door aanpassing van bitcoin is het mogelijk om programma’s te
vervaardigen die automatisch bij bepaalde gebeurtenissen transacties verrichten
(‘smart contracts’). In de literatuur wordt verdedigd dat zulke smart contracts
de gewone juridische contracten zouden uitrangeren en dat ook het
contractenrecht daarmee buiten spel zou komen te staan. Een nadere juridische
analyse laat zien dat deze claims niet geheel correct zijn, maar dat
blockchaintechnologie en smart contracts wel tot juridische complicaties kunnen
leiden. Daarnaast bieden smart contracts de mogelijkheid om het contractenrecht
aan een externe, formele analyse te onderwerpen, wat additionele kennis over het
contractenrecht zou kunnen opleveren.

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Die soepelheid van die eiendomsbegrip in die trustreg

In deze bijdrage wordt het gebruik van het eigendomsrecht in de context van de
trust onderzocht. Met het Zuid-Afrikaanse recht als perspectief wordt
geargumenteerd dat dit gebruik een zekere soepelheid of pragmatisme vergt. Om
dit te illustreren, worden drie voorbeelden aangehaald: in de eerste plaats het
eigendomsrecht van de trustee ten behoeve van twee verschillende boedels (de
trust-boedel en het persoonlijke vermogen van de trustee). Ten tweede het feit
dat in een beheerstrust de inkomsten eigendom zijn van de begunstigde van de
trust en niet van de trustee (wat nieuwe mogelijkheden creëert voor de trust).
En ten derde de wijze waarop het mede-eigendomsrecht van de verschillende
mede-trustees wordt geconcipieerd en hoe dit de eigendomsovergang tussen de
trustees bij bv. het overlijden van een trustee verklaart.

Hier wordt betoogd dat die soepelheid of dat pragmatisme ingegeven is door een
bijzondere benadering van het eigendomsrecht, die als on-wezenlijk kan worden
aangemerkt. Dit kenmerk van het Zuid-Afrikaanse recht houdt verband met de wijze
waarop de Engelse trust aanvankelijk wel in het Zuid-Afrikaanse recht is
gerecipieerd, maar vervolgens door de rechtspraak op pragmatische wijze met
bekende rechtsfiguren in lijn is gebracht.

In hierdie bydrae word die hantering van die eiendomsbegrip in die konteks van
die trustreg ondersoek. Spesifiek met die Suid-Afrikaanse reg as uitgangspunt
word geargumenteer dat hierdie hantering deur ’n besondere soepelheid of
pragmatisme gekenmerk word. Ten einde dít te illustreer, word na drie spesifieke
voorbeelde verwys: eerstens die hantering van die trustee se eiendomsreg in
bates in twee afsondelike boedels (die trustboedel en die trustee se persoonlike
boedel); tweedens die feit dat in die bewind trust nie die trustee nie, maar die
trustbegunstigde die eienaar van die trustbates is (en die nuwe
aanwendingsmoontlikhede vir die trust wat dit skep); en derdens die wyse waarop
mede-trustees se mede-eiendomsreg hanteer word en hoe dit die oorgang van
eiendomsreg tussen trustees by byvoorbeeld die dood van een trustee verklaar.

Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat hierdie soepelheid of pragmatisme ingegee word
deur ‘n besondere benadering tot eiendomsreg, wat as “anti-konseptueel”
(anti-conceptual) of “reël-brekend” (rule-breaking) beskryf kan word. Hierdie
kenmerk van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg hou waarskynlik verband met die wyse waarop
die Engelse (dus common-law) trust aanvanklik wel in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg
geresipieer is, maar later op ‘n pragmatiese wyse deur die howe in
ooreenstemming met bekende sivielregtelike instellings getransformeer is.

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Relatieve beëindiging van onroerende beperkte zakelijke rechten

In deze bijdrage bespreek ik grondig het concept ‘relatieve beëindigingsgronden
van beperkte zakelijke rechten’. Dergelijke beëindigingsgronden werken enkel
tussen partijen, maar kunnen geen nadeel toebrengen aan derden. In de huidige
rechtsleer komen zij terloops aan bod, maar een omvattende bespreking wordt tot
dusver niet geboden. Hieronder worden eerst de algemene principes van de
relatieve werking van bepaalde ongewone beëindigingsgronden geschetst. Daarna
analyseren we eerst kort de beëindigingsgronden zonder relatieve werking,
aangezien deze de standaardsituatie uitmaken, en de zakelijke subrogatie als
oplossing. Vervolgens wordt nagegaan welke beëindigingsgronden worden geacht
relatieve werking te hebben. Daarbij komen achtereenvolgens aan bod: afstand,
minnelijke beëindiging, opzegging, vermenging, vervallenverklaring, de opheffing
wegens gewijzigde omstandigheden (enkel in het Nederlandse recht) en, ten
slotte, de ontbinding wegens wanprestatie. Ten slotte formuleer ik een
alternatief verklaringsmodel voor de relatieve werking van bepaalde
beëindigingsgronden. Bij dit alles wordt gebruik gemaakt van een geïntegreerd
rechtsvergelijkend perspectief op het Franse en Nederlandse recht.

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De gewoonte in het Nederlands en Belgisch economisch privaatrecht (19de-21ste
eeuw)

In de historisch-dogmatische ontwikkeling van het Belgische en Nederlandse
economisch privaatrecht kunnen drie vormen van handelsgebruiken of -gewoonten
worden onderscheiden. Usages-règle (rechtsgebruiken) zijn gewoonten in de zin
van gedragingen die herhaald worden op grond van een rechtsovertuiging. De
usage-présomption (of usage conventionnel) verwijst naar handelsgebruiken die
dienen om afspraken tussen contractanten te verduidelijken of aan te vullen.
Usages-principe zijn open normen die door de rechter kunnen worden ingevuld. De
drie vermelde concepten van handelsgewoonte ontstonden op verschillende
tijdstippen. De handelsgewoonte als usage-règle werd in de vroege negentiende
eeuw voorgestaan door de Historische School. Voordien werden handelsgewoonten
vaak begrepen als usages-principes: ze werden geacht nauw verbonden te zijn met
beginselen die met de “gangbare handelspraktijk” overeenstemden en die in
allerlei bronnen van recht konden worden gevonden. Vanaf het einde van de
negentiende eeuw werd de benadering van handelsgebruiken als usages-présomption
dominant in Frankrijk en België, terwijl in Nederland de handelsgewoonte in
contractuele verhoudingen minder belangrijk werd. Dat laatste hield verband met
een beperkt onderscheid tussen handelsgebruiken en de redelijkheid en de
billijkheid, die open gedragsnormen vormen. In België, waar handelsgebruiken
sinds lang strikt naast de goede trouw en wilsovereenstemming worden geplaatst,
is de nood aan een rechtsdogmatische benadering van handelsgewoonten bijgevolg –
nog steeds – veel groter dan in Nederland. Niettegenstaande sterke tendensen
naar objectivering in de toepassing van handelsgebruiken in beide landen,
blijven de vermelde tradities overeind.

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Rechterlijke handelshuurprijsherziening en -bepaling "naar billijkheid": een
exploratieve casestudy

Nu en dan geeft de wetgever aan rechters uitdrukkelijk de bevoegdheid om
uitspraak te doen naar billijkheid. Een dergelijke billijkheidsbevoegdheid lokt
vanuit een behoefte aan voorspelbaarheid van rechterlijke beslissingen de vraag
uit hoe en in welke mate rechters die bevoegdheid uitoefenen. De auteurs van
deze bijdrage vroegen zich af of empirisch onderzoek toelaat om daarin meer
inzicht te verwerven. Ze hebben de vraag losgelaten op twee specifieke
bepalingen van de handelshuurwet op grond waarvan de rechter naar billijkheid
uitspraak kan doen bij de vastlegging van de prijs in een
handelshuurovereenkomst.

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Weg met De Page? Leve Laurent? Een pleidooi voor een andere kijk op de recente
geschiedenis van het Belgische privaatrecht

François Laurent was de grootste Belgische jurist van de negentiende eeuw, Henri
De Page van de twintigste eeuw. Van Laurent blijft een negatief beeld hangen
wegens zijn overdreven antiklerikalisme, terwijl De Page veel minder kritiek
krijgt. Beide visies dienen gerelativeerd te worden. Laurent verdient een
grotere waardering omdat hij soms, en dan zeker in het familierecht, ver voorop
liep op zijn tijd. Omgekeerd, had De Page zijn kleine kantjes als tegenstander
van o.a. vrouwenrechten en het algemeen stemrecht, zij het dat dit niet
uitzonderlijk was voor behoudsgezinde juristen van zijn generatie. Kortom, zowel
Laurent als De Page verdienen onze kritiek én bewondering voor hun werk.

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Hiërarchie der remedies in de consumentenkoop: EU vs. VS

De opstellers van de Europese Richtlijn inzake consumentenkoop 1999/44/EC hebben
resoluut gekozen voor een hiërarchie tussen de consumentenremedies, waarbij
voorrang wordt gegeven aan de uitvoering van de koopovereenkomst in de vorm van
herstel en vervanging. Deze keuze leidt niet noodzakelijk tot de meest
consumentvriendelijke oplossingen. De consument is immers vaak slecht
geïnformeerd over zijn rechten en kiest al wel eens de verkeerde remedie. In de
Verenigde Staten woedt dan weer een debat over de regel dat schadevergoeding
juist voorrang krijgt ten aanzien van de uitvoering van de overeenkomst. Op het
eerste gezicht lijken beide systemen uit te gaan van tegenovergestelde
premissen. De vraag die rijst, is wat de meest consumentvriendelijke regeling
zou zijn.

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De bescherming van de consument door het Hof van Justitie: een brug te ver?

Het is genoegzaam bekend dat de Europese wetgever de voorbije decennia de
rechten van de consument aanzienlijk heeft versterkt. De doelstelling van deze
bijdrage bestaat er in om, na een beknopte analyse van het consumentenbegrip, na
te gaan welke rol het Hof van Justitie ter zake van de bescherming van de
consument heeft gespeeld. Aan de hand van de rechtspraak van het Hof van
Justitie wordt getracht om aan te tonen dat het Hof niet enkel regelen van
consumentenrecht consumentvriendelijk interpreteert, doch tevens het nationaal
proces- en privaatrecht aanzienlijk beïnvloedt. Het Hof deinst er niet voor
terug om via een teleologische interpretatie van regelen van materieel
consumentenrecht, het gelijkwaardigheids- en doeltreffendheidsprincipe, alsook
het gelijkheidsbeginsel verplichtingen te creëren die in de Europese wetgeving
niet (uitdrukkelijk) vervat liggen, dit zowel voor ondernemingen als voor
nationale rechters. Het Hof voert duidelijk een eigen beleid dat erop gericht is
de consument een daadwerkelijke bescherming te verlenen, dit vertrekkend vanuit
de gedachte dat de consument zich in een ondergeschikte positie bevindt
tegenover de onderneming. Dat het Hof aldus bijdraagt tot het in het Verdrag
betreffende de werking van de EU bepaalde vereiste van een hoog niveau van
consumentenbescherming staat vast. Evenzeer staat evenwel vast dat het Hof,
minstens in bepaalde gevallen, zich te veel wetgever waant. Of moet men durven
stellen: het Hof remedieert waar de wetgever tekort schiet?

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Transparantie en algemene voorwaarden. Nood aan hervorming?

In contracten met consumenten moeten de algemene voorwaarden duidelijk en
begrijpelijk zijn opgesteld. Dit volgt uit de transparantieverplichting van de
Richtlijn oneerlijke bedingen. De draagwijdte en de sanctionering van deze
verplichting blijkt echter niet zo duidelijk te zijn. De uiteenlopende
toepassing van deze verplichting in verschillende lidstaten illustreert dit.
Deze bijdrage analyseert de huidige Europese reglementering van de
transparantieverplichting en de rechtspraak en legt de knelpunten in de
toepassing van deze verplichting bloot. De auteur doet suggesties voor een
aanpassing van de richtlijn die de effectiviteit van de
transparantieverplichting kunnen versterken en gaat op zoek naar concretere
criteria voor de invulling van de transparantieverplichting. Alternatieve
definities van transparantie in jurisdicties buiten de EU bieden hier
inspiratie. De auteur heeft ook aandacht voor inzichten uit de
gedragswetenschappen die weliswaar leren dat transparantie alleen geen voldoende
bescherming biedt tegen oneerlijke bedingen en dat inhoudelijke controle dus
noodzakelijk blijft, maar eenvoudigere algemene voorwaarden dragen wel degelijk
bij tot de begrijpelijkheid van algemene voorwaarden.

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Bevoegdheden als categorie van subjectieve rechten: afbakening, kenmerken en
juridisch regime

In deze bijdrage worden de bevoegdheden (naar Nederlands recht ook ‘wilsrechten’
genoemd) als categorie van subjectieve rechten bestudeerd. Het betreft de
subjectieve rechten die de titularis de macht geven om eenzijdig in te grijpen
in een bepaalde rechtssituatie. In het eerste deel wordt grondig ingegaan op het
begrip en de kenmerken van de bevoegdheden en de plaats die zij innemen in de
indeling van de subjectieve rechten. De nadruk ligt hier voornamelijk op het
onderscheid met de aanspraken (zakelijke rechten, de intellectuele
eigendomsrechten, de persoonlijke rechten en de persoonlijkheidsrechten). In een
tweede deel wordt het juridisch regime van de bevoegdheden geanalyseerd. Hier
komen het ontstaan, de uitoefening, de afdwingbaarheid en het tenietgaan van de
bevoegdheden aan bod.

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[Nederland] Schadebegroting en tijdsverloop. Over schade als veranderlijk
verschijnsel en wat dit betekent voor het schadevergoedingsrecht

In deze bijdrage verkennen de auteurs de betekenis van tijdsverloop bij de
begroting van schade. Schade kan in de tijd bezien als een bewegend verschijnsel
worden gezien: de nadelige gevolgen van een gebeurtenis ontvouwen zich immers
met het verstrijken van de tijd, waardoor het feitelijke schadebeeld kan
veranderen. De schadebegroting lijkt niet goed mogelijk zonder een ‘ijkpunt’ in
de tijd, waardoor het resultaat in zekere zin telkens als een momentopname kan
worden gezien. Welk tijdsmoment voor de schadevaststelling het beslissende is,
kan op verschillende manieren worden bepaald. De auteurs hanteren het
onderscheid tussen ex ante en ex post benaderingen van schadevaststelling, maken
daarmee een rondgang langs diverse schadevergoedingsrechtelijke figuren en laten
zo zien hoe het verstrijken van tijd van invloed is op het
schade(vergoedings)debat en welke (rechts)vragen op dit vlak spelen.

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Tijdsverloop en schadevergoeding

Deze bijdrage onderzoekt de invloed van het tijdsverloop op de raming van
schade. Uitgangspunt vormen enkele fundamentele beginselen van het
schadevergoedingsrecht. Vervolgens wordt stilgestaan bij het ogenblik waarop de
rechter zich moet plaatsen om schade te ramen en de gevolgen van het onderscheid
tussen schade uit het verleden en toekomstige schade. Verder kunnen tal van
gebeurtenissen die zich tegelijk met of na het schadegeval voordoen, de schade
doen toenemen of verminderen. Aldus wordt nagaan met welke gebeurtenissen de
rechter bij de raming van schade rekening moet houden. De rechter moet verder de
vergoeding bepalen voor zowel de schade die zich op het tijdstip van de raming
reeds gerealiseerd heeft, als degene die zich nog in de toekomst zal voordoen.
Voor de toekomstige schade die zich uitstrekt na het tijdstip van de raming,
wordt de rechter geconfronteerd met tal van onzekerheden. Er moet dus in
meerdere of mindere mate abstractie gemaakt worden van deze onzekerheden. Bij
gebrek aan duidelijke regelgeving speelt voor het onderzoek van deze
tijdsgerelateerde problemen bij de raming van schade de rechtspraak van het Hof
van Cassatie een determinerende rol. Vooral deze rechtspraak vormt de basis van
de bijdrage.

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De schenking over verschillende generaties heen: het Napoleontisch wantrouwen
voorbijgestreefd? Een kritische vergelijking tussen de Belgische erfstelling
over de hand bij schenking, de Franse donation graduelle en de Zuid-Afrikaanse
fideicommissary donation

Sinds meer dan 200 jaar kent het Belgische recht een verbod op erfstellingen
over de hand. Doordat de begunstigde van een erfstelling over de hand verplicht
is het geschonken goed te bewaren, om het bij zijn overlijden in natura door te
geven aan een tweede begunstigde, ging deze figuur immers in tegen het principe
van de vrije handel dat sinds de Franse Revolutie zo cruciaal werd geacht. De
Belgische rechtspraktijk doet vandaag daarom beroep op andere rechtsfiguren
zoals het fideicommis de residuo, dat werkt volgens dezelfde
tweetrapsredenering, maar geen expliciete bewaarplicht omvat. De vraag rijst
echter of het initiële verbod op erfstellingen over de hand vandaag nog stand
kan houden in een wereld waar vermogensplanning steeds belangrijker wordt. Deze
bijdrage zal daarvoor een rechtsvergelijkende analyse met Frankrijk en
Zuid‑Afrika doorvoeren, zich daarbij toespitsend op de erfstellingen over de
hand bij schenking (‘transgenerationele schenkingen’).

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Pauliaanse vordering en nietigheidsvordering tegen vennootschapsbesluiten met
externe werking: aan elkaar gewaagd

De nietigheidsvordering tegen vennootschapsbesluiten met externe werking is voor
een aandeelhouder wat de pauliaanse vordering is voor een schuldeiser. Beide
actiemogelijkheden hebben wezenlijk dezelfde functie: ze controleren de wijze
waarop een bevoegdheid, waarvan de eiser de economische begunstigde is, wordt
aangewend. Bovendien gaat het resultaat in dezelfde richting. Deze bijdrage
verklaart niet alleen de verschillen tussen beide vorderingen, maar argumenteert
ook dat de derde-wederpartij een gelijkwaardige bescherming moet krijgen. Zoals
de pauliana een krachtig middel is in handen van een schuldeiser ter bekamping
van collusie tussen zijn schuldenaar en derden, is de nietigheidsvordering voor
de aandeelhouder een potent actiemiddel tegen besluiten met externe werking bij
kwade trouw van de derde-wederpartij. Onderweg wordt ook een antwoord gegeven op
de gerelateerde vraag of schuldeisers de nietigverklaring van een besluit kunnen
vorderen.

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Het kredieteigendomsvoorbehoud

In deze bijdrage wordt de mogelijkheid onderzocht van een eigendomsvoorbehoud
dat meer waarborgt dan de rechtstreekse tegenprestatie voor de geleverde zaak,
namelijk de betaling van de prijs en haar toebehoren. De uitbreiding van de
zekerheidsfunctie van het eigendomsvoorbehoud naar andere schuldvorderingen werd
in het Belgische recht steeds van de hand gedaan. De nieuwe Belgische Pandwet
breidt het toepassingsdomein van het eigendomsvoorbehoud op verschillende
vlakken uit en doet de vraag rijzen of er daardoor ruimte is ontstaan voor een
‘verruimd’ eigendomsvoorbehoud. Naar Nederlands recht is er reeds een draagvlak
aanwezig voor het kredieteigendomsvoorbehoud, al bestaat daarover veel
discussie. Ook het Duitse en Engelse recht, waar het verruimd
eigendomsvoorbehoud wel algemeen wordt erkend, bieden inspiratie voor het
uitwerken van een toekomstig regime naar Belgisch recht voor het
kredieteigendomsvoorbehoud.

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Procesvoering zonder raadsman in het burgerlijk geding. Wat je zelf doet, doe je
beter?

Ook wie zonder advocaat procedeert, heeft recht op een effectieve toegang tot de
rechter en op een behoorlijke rechtsbedeling. De vraag rijst of het Belgische
procesrecht daartoe voldoende waarborgen biedt, zeker nu het systeem van
juridische bijstand, waarbij de Staat tussenkomt in de kostprijs van een
advocaat, meer en meer onder druk komt te staan. Deze bijdrage gaat na in welke
mate de burgerlijke rechtspleging aangepast is aan procespartijen zonder
raadsman, en of dat volstaat in het licht van art. 6 § 1 EVRM. Daarbij wordt
ook, ter vergelijking en inspiratie, gekeken naar de manier waarop men in
Nederland en Engeland omgaat met procespartijen zonder raadsman. Het Europees
burgerlijk procesrecht wordt eveneens in het onderzoek betrokken.

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[Vervoer en transportschade] E-commerce en schade bij bezorging

E-commerce is de laatste jaren enorm gegroeid. Hoewel het gemak van een levering
aan huis zeker bijdraagt tot dit succes, is de keerzijde hiervan dat de pakjes
tijdens het vervoer naar de consument frequent verloren raken, schade oplopen of
dat de aflevering ervan veel te laat gebeurt. De consument kan zich in dat geval
tegen de webshop keren. Die webshop verzorgt de bezorging echter vaak niet zelf,
maar doet daarvoor een beroep op een vervoerder. De aansprakelijkheid van deze
vervoerder wordt veelal op dwingende wijze geregeld, vaak door internationale
verdragen. De vraag rijst of dit dwingend vervoerrecht de webshop toelaat om een
integrale vergoeding te bekomen van de schade resulterend uit de slechte
uitvoering van de vervoerovereenkomst, dan wel of de webshop hiervoor alleen
moet instaan en zo geconfronteerd wordt met een aansprakelijkheidsblootstelling.

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Overheidscontracten in het Belgische recht: besturen op de snijlijn van privaat-
en publiekrecht

Het overheidsoptreden wordt traditioneel geassocieerd met de uitoefening van
eenzijdige rechtshandelingen met individueel of reglementair karakter. Deze
omschrijving van het overheidsgebeuren doet de realiteit geen recht. Naast deze
gezagsuitoefening maakt de overheid immers steeds vaker gebruik van
privaatrechtelijke instrumenten om het algemeen belang te behartigen. Onze
aandacht gaat hierbij i.h.b. naar de door de overheid gesloten contracten. Deze
bijdrage gaat voorbij aan de (uiteenlopende) redenen van deze evolutie en
concentreert zich op de juridische probleemstelling. Deze praktijk stelt de
wetgever en de rechter immers voor een uitdagende opdracht. Binnen welke grenzen
mag het bestuur de privaatrechtelijke weg bewandelen en welke regels beheersen
deze privaatrechtelijke verhoudingen: is het privaatrecht erop van toepassing of
geldt een publiekrechtelijke regeling? Deze bijdrage meandert over de oude
breuklijn tussen publiek- en privaatrecht en bespreekt op welke wijze regels en
beginselen van beide zijden het algemeen belang dienen.

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Nietigheid op maat: proportionaliteit en werkzaamheid bij partiële nietigheid,
reductie en conversie

In deze bijdrage worden de bevoegdheden (naar Nederlands recht ook ‘wilsrechten’
genoemd) als categorie van subjectieve rechten bestudeerd. Het betreft de
subjectieve rechten die de titularis de macht geven om eenzijdig in te grijpen
in een bepaalde rechtssituatie. In het eerste deel wordt grondig ingegaan op het
begrip en de kenmerken van de bevoegdheden en de plaats die zij innemen in de
indeling van de subjectieve rechten. De nadruk ligt hier voornamelijk op het
onderscheid met de aanspraken (zakelijke rechten, de intellectuele
eigendomsrechten, de persoonlijke rechten en de persoonlijkheidsrechten). In een
tweede deel wordt het juridisch regime van de bevoegdheden geanalyseerd. Hier
komen het ontstaan, de uitoefening, de afdwingbaarheid en het tenietgaan van de
bevoegdheden aan bod.

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Nietigheid en 'meest gunstige interpretatie': de remedies bij onrechtmatige
bedingen in consumentenovereenkomsten in het licht van de rechtspraak van het
Hof van Justitie

Onrechtmatige bedingen in overeenkomsten met consumenten zijn nietig. Bij
twijfel over een onduidelijk beding, prevaleert de interpretatie die het meest
gunstig is voor de consument. Deze individuele ‘remedies’ voor consumenten
lijken op het eerste zicht erg eenvoudig, maar het tegendeel is waar. Door hun
Europese oorsprong moet immers rekening worden gehouden met de wildgroei aan
rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie. Deze bijdrage probeert de fragmentarisch
beslechte vraagstukken over de remedies systematisch weer te geven en te
becommentariëren. Bovenal moet worden vastgesteld dat onze klassieke nietigheid
niet is aangepast om de nagestreefde maatschappelijk-preventieve doelstellingen
uit het leerstuk na te streven.

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Wat is ouderschap?

Ouderschap is de verwerving, de uitoefening en het verlies van het geheel van
rechten en plichten van personen, in het bijzonder verwanten, ten opzichte van
kinderen. De Belgische wetgever organiseert ouderschap via twee onderscheiden
containercategorieën: afstamming en adoptie. Die rechtsinstellingen staan onder
grote druk door de rechtspraak van het Grondwettelijk Hof, die in deze bijdrage
grondig wordt ontleed. Het Grondwettelijk Hof wil afstappen van strikte
wettelijke keurslijven van ouderschap, ten voordele van een belangenafweging in
concreto. Deze benadering sluit aan bij de evolutie van ouderschap, van een
solide verhouding van staat, naar fluïde assemblages. In deze bijdrage wordt
verdedigd dat die evolutie positief is en in de wet moet worden verankerd. Op
die manier zijn rechters beter toegerust om families als kwetsbare gehelen
preventief en positief te ondersteunen. Ouderschap dient te worden gegrond in
een verantwoordelijk ouderschapsproject veeleer dan in de biologische of sociale
werkelijkheid. De mater semper certa est-regel kan daarom worden afgezwakt.
Afstamming en adoptie kunnen als packagedeals blijven bestaan, maar kunnen beter
worden geïntegreerd. Daarnaast kan de wetgever families tegemoet treden door ook
de juridische verankering te regelen van andere relaties van bijzondere
betekenis voor het kind, met de personen die het hebben voortgebracht, het
grootbrengen of het opvoeden. De noodzakelijk pluralistische benadering van het
voorgaande impliceert dat ouderschap volledig wordt losgekoppeld van de
partnerrelatie tussen de ouders, ook wat betreft de pater is est-regel en bij
echtscheiding. De noodzakelijk aanvullende benadering impliceert dat nieuwe
ouderschappen het eerdere ouderschap niet hoeven uit te schakelen, maar kunnen
aanvullen in meervoudig ouderschap. Enkel een reflectie op ouderschap buiten de
geijkte denkkaders kan zodoende leiden tot een noodzakelijke hervorming

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Het Hof van Cassatie op het kruispunt van publieke en private belangen: pleidooi
voor een versterking van de cassatierechtspraak

Het Hof van Cassatie vervult een belangrijke rol door eenheid te brengen in de
rechtspraak en de rechtsontwikkeling te sturen en te begeleiden. Daarnaast biedt
de hoogste instantie van de rechterlijke orde ook rechtsbescherming aan de
rechtzoekende. Tussen het publieke en private belang dat met een
cassatievoorziening gemoeid is, bestaat een gespannen verhouding, en de
onbeperkte toegang tot het Hof leidt tot een hoge werklast waardoor de publieke
functie op het achterplan verdwijnt. Beperking van de toegang tot het Hof dringt
zich op, en daartoe worden in deze bijdrage voorstellen geformuleerd naar
Nederlands en Frans voorbeeld, die een evenwicht proberen te vinden tussen de
publieke en de private dimensie van de cassatievoorziening, en tegelijkertijd de
cassatierechtspraak kunnen versterken.

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Het nutsvereiste bij erfdienstbaarheden: one of a kind?

Erfdienstbaarheden moeten van nut zijn voor het heersend erf. Dit wordt het
nutsvereiste genoemd. Tussen het nutsvereiste en het Amerikaanse touch and
concernvereiste bestaan, zo is gebleken, meerdere interessante gelijkenissen. Zo
spelen beide vereisten een belangrijke rol bij de uitrusting van rechten met een
volgrecht, hebben beide vereisten een beschermende functie, vertonen zij beide
een belangrijke interactie met het intentievereiste en hebben zij doorheen de
jaren een opmerkelijk gelijkaardige evolutie doorgemaakt. Naast gelijkenissen,
bestaan er tussen de genoemde vereisten echter ook verschillen. Eén daarvan
heeft betrekking op het feit dat het nutsvereiste voor erfdienstbaarheden en het
touch and concern-vereiste voor real covenants geldt en die figuren elkaar niet
volledig overlappen. De gelijkenissen en verschillen tussen beide vereisten
worden in deze bijdrage uitgebreid besproken. Tevens worden het nutsvereiste en
het touch and concern-vereiste met enkele ‘problematische’ verbintenissen uit de
praktijk geconfronteerd en wordt in het laatste hoofdstuk de stelling verdedigd
dat de afschaffing van die vereisten tot een uitholling van het numerus
clausus-beginsel zou leiden.

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Kerngedagtes oor Kredietversuimswaps

In deze bijdrage wordt de rechtsfiguur van de kredietverzuimswap onderzocht
vanuit het perspectief van de vertrouwde leerstukken van het privaatrecht zoals
kansovereenkomsten, verzekering, garanties en borgtocht. De auteur concludeert
dat voor de kredietverzuimswap in zijn oorspronkelijke vorm er geen behoefte is
aan een nieuwe categorie, gezien de overeenkomsten met die bestaande
rechtsfiguren. Kredietverzuimswaps word vandaag echter grotendeels niet in hun
klassieke vorm gebruikt maar primair voor speculatie. In dat perspectief gaat
het duidelijk om een kanscontract dat nietig ware geweest indien de wetgever
niet had ingegrepen. Wat de geldigheid van contracten van spel en weddenschap
betreft is er evenwel al jaren geen lijn meer te trekken in het beleid, waardoor
de situatie toch op gespannen voet staat met de bescherming van de openbare
orde.

In die bydrae word die regsfiguur van kredietversuimswaps vanuit die perspektief
van bestaande privaatregtelike leerstukke en –konstruksies soos kanskontrakte,
versekering, garansies, en borgstelling ondersoek. Die outeur kom tot die
gevolgtrekking dat aangesien die kredietversuimswap in beginsel vele
ooreenkomste met die genoemde konstruksies vertoon, daar nie werklik ’n behoefte
bestaan aan ’n nuwe regsfiguur indien die kredietversuimswap in sy klassieke
vorm aangewend word nie. Kredietversuimswaps word egter grotendeels nie in sy
klassieke vorm aangewend nie, maar primêr vir spekulasiedoeleindes benut. Vanuit
daardie perspektief word bevind dat die regsfiguur niks anders as ’n kanskontrak
is nie en met ongeldigheid geraak sou wees as dit nie vir wetgewende ingryping
was nie. Die openbare beleid het egter deur die jare reeds wat die geldigheid
van weddenskappe- en dobbelooreenkomste betref wipplank gery en die huidige
situasie is nie noodwendig meer in ooreenstemming met die openbare beleid nie.

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Een analyse van catastrofe-obligaties. Een geheel in drie delen

Bedrijven en financiële instellingen zoeken naar alternatieven voor de
traditionele (her)verzekering om zich in te dekken voor risico’s die moeilijk of
niet kunnen worden verzekerd, zoals bijvoorbeeld extreem weer, natuurrampen of
terrorisme. Een van die alternatieven is het overdragen van dit risico naar de
kapitaalmarkten door het creëren van effecten die gekoppeld zijn aan deze
risico’s. Dit kan onder meer met catastrofe-obligaties (catastrophe bonds,
CAT-bonds, CAT’s). Ze worden meestal uitgegeven door een projectvennootschap, en
worden slechts aan de investeerders terugbetaald indien de gebeurtenis die ze
dekt zich niet voordoet tijdens de looptijd van de obligatie. In het andere
geval keert de projectvennootschap de door de uitgifte van obligaties verzamelde
gelden uit aan de vennootschap die door de ‘catastrofe’ wordt getroffen.

Deze bijdrage onderzoekt de aard van catastrofe-obligatietransactie als
verzekerings- dan wel financieringsproduct. Daartoe wordt een analyse gemaakt
van de positie van een basis-catastrofe-obligatie binnen het financieel recht en
van de instrumenten waaruit ze bestaat (optie en obligatie). Vervolgens worden
de voornaamste kenmerken van een verzekering besproken. Tot slot worden deze
kenmerken met elkaar vergeleken.

Catastrofe-obligaties worden ontleed als een driehoeksverhouding, met enerzijds
(i) de overeenkomst sponsor-projectvennootschap, die vanuit juridisch
perspectief mogelijks als (her)verzekering kan worden beschouwd (doch dat vanuit
economisch perspectief niet is) en anderzijds (ii) de overeenkomst
projectvennootschapinvesteerder, die als een financiële overeenkomst moet worden
gezien. Weliswaar geldt dit enkel voor de basiscase, en kan er door in te werken
op de factoren en risicoverdeling in de bijdrage aangehaald – vooral het
mutualiteitsbeginsel – relatief eenvoudig een ander statuut worden aangenomen.
Cruciaal is echter om dit statuut steeds vanuit een driehoeksverhouding te
analyseren, in plaats van vanuit de traditionele holistische aanpak – die door
het negeren van de aard van catastrofe-obligaties er immers niet in slaagt tot
een eenduidige kwalificatie te leiden.

Er wordt besloten dat het verkeerd is catastrofe-obligaties in hun geheel als
het een of het ander te bestempelen, omdat het kredietrisico, het morele risico
en de (verdubbeling van) het kanselement beïnvloed worden door (i) de
projectvennootschap tussen de sponsor en de investeerders en (ii) het werken met
triggers.

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Vergoeding van schade bij rampen in België en Nederland

Met het toenemend aantal technologische en natuurrampen staat de vraag op welke
wijze slachtoffers op adequate wijze kunnen worden vergoed volop in de
belangstelling, zowel in België als in Nederland. De oplossingen die ter zake in
beide rechtsstelsels gekozen zijn lopen nogal uiteen, hetgeen een vergelijking
tussen beide landen interessant maakt. Eerst wordt een theoretisch kader
geschetst waarin zowel ten aanzien van technologische rampen als ten aanzien van
natuurrampen wordt aangegeven hoe, ook vanuit een rechtseconomisch perspectief,
vergoeding aan slachtoffers van rampen zou dienen te worden gestructureerd
wanneer niet alleen adequate compensatie aan slachtoffers, maar ook prikkels tot
preventie dienen te worden geboden. Daarnaast wordt, op basis van het
theoretisch kader, geschetst hoe de schade veroorzaakt door technologische
rampen in België en in Nederland wordt vergoed. Vervolgens wordt de vergoeding
van schade veroorzaakt door natuurrampen in België en Nederland besproken. De
bijdrage eindigt met een vergelijking tussen beide stelsels in het licht van de
eerder geschetste theoretische uitgangspunten.

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De “Europese markt voor vennootschapsrecht”: een (her)evaluatie van het
vennootschapsrechtelijke harmonisatieprogramma

De goede werking van de Europese interne markt veronderstelt dat vennootschappen
over de grenzen heen economisch actief kunnen zijn, zonder daarbij onnodig te
worden gehinderd door verschillen in het vennootschapsrecht van de lidstaten.
Dit inzicht zette de Europese wetgever ertoe aan een poging te ondernemen om
zoveel als mogelijk het vennootschapsrecht van de lidstaten te harmoniseren. Na
een goede start wordt thans echter nauwelijks nog vooruitgang geboekt op het
vlak van die harmonisering. Daartegenover staat dat het Hof van Justitie steeds
minder ruimte geeft aan lidstaten om hun eigen vennootschapsrecht op te dringen
aan buitenlandse EU-vennootschappen. Rekening houdende met deze rechtspraak
onderzoekt deze bijdrage de verdere richting waarin het vennootschapsrechtelijk
harmonisatieprogramma zou moeten gaan.

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Het privaatrecht van de toekomst

In het privaatrecht bestaat geen gebrek aan uitdagingen. Toenemende
Europeanisering en globalisering, technologische vooruitgang en een groeiend
besef dat het recht meer moet worden ingericht voor de lange termijn doen de
vraag rijzen hoe het privaatrecht van de toekomst er uit zal zien. In deze
bijdrage, die de schriftelijke weerslag vormt van een rede gehouden ter
gelegenheid van de aanvaarding van de TPR-wisselleerstoel 2014, wordt
gespeculeerd op die toekomst. Nagegaan wordt hoe de rol van diverse actoren
betrokken bij de rechtsvorming (wetgevers, rechters, rechtsgeleerden en private
actoren) mogelijk zal veranderen als gevolg van internationalisering. Bovendien
wordt de vraag gesteld of niet ook de plaats van het privaatrecht zelf door
internationalisering wordt beïnvloed met als gevolg dat andere
ordeningsinstrumenten de rol van het recht overnemen.

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Alle omstandigheden van het geval. Een vergelijkende studie van de
omstandigheden die de werking van de (Nederlandse) redelijkheid en billijkheid
en de (Belgische) objectieve goede trouw beïnvloeden

De Nederlandse redelijkheid en billijkheid en de Belgische goede trouw maken
rechtvaardige oplossingen mogelijk in concrete situaties. Tussen deze normen
bestaan verschillen. Toch vervullen zij hun functie in grote lijnen op dezelfde
manier. De werking van beide open normen is afhankelijk van de concrete
omstandigheden van het geval. Een adequate vergelijking van de normen onderzoekt
daarom welke omstandigheden van belang zijn. Dit artikel laat zien dat er grote
overeenkomsten bestaan op het gebied van de omstandigheden die deze normen
beïnvloeden. Iedere omstandigheid die de werking van de redelijkheid en
billijkheid beïnvloedt, is ook relevant bij ten minste een werking van de
Belgische goede trouw of een ander leerstuk dat in het Nederlandse recht door de
redelijkheid en billijkheid wordt beheerst. De rol van de omstandigheden komt
bovendien in grote mate overeen.

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Het lot van postcontractuele verbintenissen na ontbinding wegens wanprestatie

In deze bijdrage gaan we na of postcontractuele verbintenissen kunnen overleven
na ontbinding van het contract waaruit ze resulteren. De overleving van deze
verbintenissen kan vooreerst volgen uit een wettelijke bepaling. Is hun lot niet
wettelijk geregeld, dan kan een beroep worden gedaan op de materiële partiële
ontbinding. De ontbinding beëindigt enkel de gebrekkig uitgevoerde verbintenis,
de verbintenis tot het leveren van de tegenprestatie(s) voor deze verbintenis en
de andere verbintenissen die daardoor hun economisch nut verliezen. Partijen
kunnen zich uitdrukkelijk uitspreken over het nut van hun postcontractuele
verbintenissen na ontbinding. Gebeurt dat niet, dan kan worden aangenomen dat
postcontractuele verbintenissen principieel hun nut behouden en dus overleven,
tenzij ze de teruggave of de vernietiging beogen van goederen die reeds in
uitvoering van de restitutieverplichtingen terugkeren.

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Eigendomsvoorbehoud en onroerende incorporatie volgens de nieuwe pandwet: welk
nieuws onder de zon?

In deze bijdrage wordt dieper ingegaan op de gevolgen van de nieuwe Pandwet voor
de werking van het eigendomsvoorbehoud. De nieuwe wet versterkt de
zekerheidsfunctie van het eigendomsvoorbehoud, zowel qua uitwerking als qua
toepassingsgebied. De auteurs reflecteren bovendien over de wisselwerking tussen
een eigendomsvoorbehoud en onroerende incorporatie van het bezwaarde goed.
Terwijl een eigendomsrecht traditioneel teniet ging door de werking van de
onroerende natrekking, kan het onder de nieuwe Pandwet onroerendmaking
overleven. De praktische implicaties daarvan worden hier onderzocht. Ook de
omgekeerde vraagstelling, nl. de impact van een eigendomsvoorbehoud op een
onroerende kwalificatie na incorporatie, wordt onderzocht. Voor beide
vraagstellingen wordt een rechtsvergelijkende analyse met het Franse, het
Nederlandse en het ZuidAfrikaanse recht gehanteerd.

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De toetsing van de verscheidenheid van bijzondere aansprakelijkheidsregimes aan
het gelijkheidsbeginsel

Het buitencontractueel aansprakelijkheidsrecht en de rechten van de mens leken
lange tijd gebieden van het recht te zijn die weinig met elkaar te maken hebben.
Vandaag is dit beeld echter voorbijgestreefd. Meer en meer wordt duidelijk dat
mensenrechten ook relevant zijn voor het privaatrecht en dus ook voor het
buitencontractueel-aansprakelijkheidsrecht. Deze bijdrage onderzoekt in deze
context de toetsing van de verscheidenheid van bijzondere
aansprakelijkheidsregimes aan het gelijkheidsbeginsel en het recht op toegang
tot een rechter. De bijdrage schetst op deze manier het mensenrechtelijk kader
waaraan de bestaanbaarheid en de begrenzingen van de verschillende bijzondere
aansprakelijkheidsregimes getoetst kunnen worden.

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De uitdrukking ‘common core’ heeft de voorbije halve eeuw ontegensprekelijk een
grote aantrekkingskracht uitgeoefend op juristen, althans de academici onder
hen. Zoals vaker bij een aantrekkelijke vlag, gaan daaronder velerlei ladingen
schuil. In deze bijdrage proberen we die te typeren en te klasseren en daarbij
vooral in te gaan op de interessantste ontwikkelingen die zich rond dat begrip
vooral in de rechtsvergelijking hebben voorgedaan. Dit is meteen een goede
aanleiding voor enkele beschouwingen over de methode van rechtsvergelijking en
de verhouding tussen rechtsvergelijking en rechtseenmaking.

In onze zoektocht vonden we onder meer een klassieke, harmoniserende opvatting
van common core die vooral op zoek gaat naar oplossingen voor gelijkaardige
problemen die in wezen gelijkaardig worden geacht, als uitdrukking van dezelfde
beginselen. We vonden ook een alternatieve opvatting die meer aandacht besteedt
aan perifere elementen en onderliggende structuren die de rechtsontwikkeling in
een langer tijdsperspectief bepalen.

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