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FortiGuard Labs Threat Research


BURNING ZERO DAYS: SUSPECTED NATION-STATE ADVERSARY TARGETS IVANTI CSA

By Faisal Abdul Malik Qureshi, John Simmons, Jared Betts, Luca Pugliese, Trent
Healy, Ken Evans and Robert Reyes | October 11, 2024
 * Article Contents
 * Background
 * Vulnerabilities Overview and Disclosure
 * Vulnerabilities Details
 * Other Findings
 * Conclusion
   Fortinet ProtectionsMITRE Mapping
 * IOCs
   Network Based IndicatorsHost Based Indicators

By Faisal Abdul Malik Qureshi, John Simmons, Jared Betts, Luca Pugliese, Trent
Healy, Ken Evans and Robert Reyes | October 11, 2024

Affected Platforms: Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance version 4.6 and prior
Impacted Users: Any organization
Impact: Remote attackers gain control of the vulnerable systems
Severity Level: Critical

Today FortiGuard Labs is releasing this blog post about a case where an advanced
adversary was observed exploiting three vulnerabilities affecting the Ivanti
Cloud Services Appliance (CSA). At the time of our investigation, two out of the
three identified vulnerabilities were not publicly known. This incident is a
prime example of how threat actors chain zero-day vulnerabilities to gain
initial access to a victim’s network.


BACKGROUND

In a recent incident response engagement, FortiGuard Incident Response (FGIR)
services were engaged by a customer to investigate malicious communication
originating from their network. During the investigation, FGIR came across an
adversary who had gained access to the customer’s network by exploiting the
CVE-2024-8190 and two previously unknown vulnerabilities affecting the PHP front
end of the Ivanti CSA appliance.

The incident was detected by the customer on September 9, 2024, when some of its
internal systems were found to be communicating to a malicious IP address,
206[.]189[.]156[.]69. FGIR was engaged the next day.


VULNERABILITIES OVERVIEW AND DISCLOSURE

During the IR investigation, FGIR observed that the threat actor exploited the
vulnerability CVE-2024-8190 in conjunction with the following two previously
publicly unknown vulnerabilities:

 * A publicly unknown path traversal vulnerability on the resource
   /client/index.php, to gain unauthorized access to other resources like
   users.php, reports.php etc. (CVE-2024-8963, disclosed September 19)
 * A publicly unknown command injection vulnerability affecting the resource
   reports.php. (CVE-2024-9380, disclosed October 8)
   

These resources are located under the root folder of the PHP web front, which
serves as the management console of the CSA.

On September 19, 2024, FGIR disclosed to Ivanti’s security team the discovery of
the two new vulnerabilities. During the meeting, the Ivanti team claimed that
they were aware and tracking the two publicly unknown exploited vulnerabilities.

On September 19, Ivanti published the advisory for CVE-2024-8963, which
addressed the path traversal vulnerability.


VULNERABILITIES DETAILS

On September 10, 2024, at 14:00:02, Ivanti published the security advisory
CVE-2024-8190 on their forum. The advisory informed about the discovery of an
authenticated command injection vulnerability in the DateTimeTab.php resource,
affecting CSA 4.6 with patch 518 and earlier versions.

On September 13, 2024, the CVE-2024-8190 vulnerability was added to the CISA’s
Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list. On the same date, Ivanti updated their
security advisory to mention that, following public disclosure of the September
10th, exploitation of the command injection vulnerability had been observed in
the wild.

On September 16, 2024, the research team at Horizon3.ai published the details
related to the CVE-2024-8190 vulnerability and also released a proof of concept
exploit code.

PATH TRAVERSAL VULNERABILITY – /CLIENT/INDEX.PHP

During the incident response investigation, FGIR observed that the threat actor
exploited a path traversal vulnerability on the resource /client/index.php to
gain unauthorized authenticated access to the resource /gsb/users.php by sending
the following web request:



The first of such requests was sent by the threat actor on September 4, 2024, at
06:53:14 UTC, right before the exploitation of the command injection
vulnerability, affecting the resource /gsb/reports.php.

The resource /client/index.php on the PHP web front of the Ivanti CSA appliance
can be accessed by unauthenticated users to download the “LANDESK Remote
Assistance Client” software package.

The following picture shows how the resource /client/index.php looks when opened
in a browser:


Figure 1: GUI to download LANDESK Remote assistance client

Upon inspecting the /client/index.php’s code, FGIR discovered that, by clicking
the “Install now” button present on it, the user is redirected to a resource
called /client/download.php:


Figure 2: Redirection to Download.php

The resource /client/download.php redirects the user to the page OnDemand.php
via the header function.


Figure 3: Redirection to OnDemand.php

The resource /client/OnDemand.php contains the code to open a local file called
LDSupport.exe, using the php function popen. The local file is served to the
user via the php echo command.


Figure 4: Code vulnerable to path traversal

The threat actor sent a malformed URL to the resource /client/index.php, by
inserting %3F.php at the end of the URI, and appended the URL with the location
of the php resource to be accessed through path traversal. Using this technique,
the threat actor managed to access the resource /gsb/users.php.



The appended resource, /gsb/users.php, was assigned to the variable $filename in
the /client/OnDemand.php code, which led to the path traversal vulnerability,
allowing the threat actor to view the list of users configured in the CSA
appliance. FGIR simulated the exploitation of this vulnerability in its lab
environment to understand what information could be acquired with it and the
figure below shows the resulting output, which includes the list of users
configured on the test appliance:


Figure 5: Path traversal to users.php

The threat actor exploited this vulnerability several times over the course of
their intrusion to access other resources as well, with connections originating
from various IP addresses. As seen in the screenshot below, which has all times
expressed using the timezone UTC-007, the threat actor used the same
vulnerability to access the resource /gsb/datetime.php as well.


Figure 6: Path traversal vulnerability exploitations

FGIR states with medium confidence that the threat actor exploited this path
traversal vulnerability to gain access to the resource /gsb/users.php not only
to list users, but also to attempt to create rogue users and gain authenticated
access to the CSA web front end.

The messages logs contain evidence of the threat actor creating two users:
aiadmin and services, using the CSA utility called dbtool. This was likely
performed to maintain persistent, authenticated access to the CSA management
console.



CVE-2024-8190 VULNERABILITY EXPLOITATION - /GSB/DATETIMETAB.PHP

After the threat actor exploited the path traversal vulnerability and enumerated
users configured on the CSA appliance, they exploited CVE-2024-8190, the command
injection vulnerability affecting the resource /gsb/DateTimeTab.php, to attempt
to access the credentials of those users.

FGIR observed evidence of this exploitation in Ivanti’s broker logs, as seen in
the snippet below. FGIR has high confidence that the threat actor exploited this
vulnerability to gain access to the user, admin’s credentials and use these
privileged credentials to carry out the authenticated exploitation of the
command injection vulnerability in /clients/reports.php resource.


Figure 7: SQLi vulnerability exploitation

FGIR found the text “rewritten with new timezone” within the function
setPhpTimeZone($timezoneinfo) of the resource DateTimeTab.php.


Figure 8: Setting timezone value in php.ini

From the above systemLog function call, it is clear that the value of the
variable, $timezone was the one that was manipulated by the threat actor.
Tracing back the value of this variable shows that it was deduced from the
parameter $timezoneinfo, which was passed to the function setPhpTimeZone.


Figure 9: Vulnerable function setPhpTimeZone

Tracing back where the setPhpTimeZone was called, FGIR found that this happened
within the function handleDateTimeSubmit(&$msg). This function is responsible
for handling change submissions when the “Save” button is clicked, as depicted
in the screenshot below.


Figure 10: Time zone change submission

The value of a global variable, $TIMEZONE, which was passed as a variable to the
function setPhpTimeZone, was received from the POST request variable TIMEZONE.
This implies that the threat actor crafted and sent a malicious POST request to
DateTimeTab.php, with the malicious command passed in the POST request variable
TIMEZONE.


Figure 11: POST variable TIMEZONE contained the malicious command

Going back to the malicious command injected by the threat actor, FGIR decoded
the base64 blob, which resulted in the following Python code:


Figure 12: Decoded base64 blob

The script extracts the password of the user gsbadmin from the file
/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf and assigns its value to the environment
variable PGPASSWORD.


Figure 13: broker.conf contents

The code targets the latest backup file in the /backups directory and iterates
through this directory to find the latest backup file. If it finds one, then it
connects to the Postgres database using the gsbadmin credentials, extracts the
password of the user admin from the table user_info, and assigns it to the
environment variable PGPASSWORD.

The script then decompresses the latest backup file, and then iterates through
the files to search for a filename that satisfies the regular expression
php\w{6}, basically looking for a filename containing the string php followed by
six characters (letters or numbers only). In case it finds such a file, it
changes the permissions of the file so that everyone has the right to read,
write, and execute it. The script then reads the private key from the backup
file of the user root, encodes it using base64, and then assigns the resultant
value to the column organization in the Postgres database table, user_info.


Figure 14: Root user’s private key accessed

While assessing the backend Postgres database logs, FGIR found confirmation of
successful exploitation of this command injection vulnerability, as seen in the
screenshot below:


Figure 15: Postgres database error

COMMAND INJECTION VULNERABILITY – /GSB/REPORTS.PHP

Once the threat actor extracted the credentials of the users gsbadmin, admin,
and the private key of the user root, they used the stolen credentials to
perform authenticated exploitation of the publicly unknown command injection
vulnerability affecting the resource /gsb/reports.php. Some of the threat actor
requests can be seen in the messages and audit logs below:


Figure 16: Command injection vulnerability exploitations

Command injection was found to be exploited in the following format, where a php
script /subin/tripwire was executed with the parameter –update, followed by a
semicolon and a malicious command.



The first malicious command injected by the threat actor was used to create a
web shell called help.php in the CSA webroot folder under the /gsb directory.


Figure 17: Command injected to create a webshell

FGIR looked at the code of the resource reports.php and identified the
vulnerability in the line highlighted below in yellow. The script accepts the
value of the POST parameter TW_ID and passes it as a parameter to the script
/subin/tripwire, without sanitization.


Figure 18: Code vulnerable to command injection

The resource /sbin/tripwire is a PHP wrapper for the binary /usr/sbin/tripwire,
which is used to create security reports, when initiated through the
gsb/reports.php resource. This is a legitimate functionality of the Ivanti CSA
portal.

FGIR inspected the tripwire PHP wrapper script and found the function update
which passes the command directly to the installed tripwire binary without
sanitization. Since the tripwire PHP wrapper runs with sudo privileges, the
injected command also runs with elevated privileges.


Figure 19: Update function in Tripwire's php wrapper

FGIR acquired the patch for CVE-2024-8190, and while analyzing the functionality
of the patch, FGIR assessed that the file, reports.php was not in the patch
script, nor was it listed as a file in the patch folder, leading FGIR to
conclude that the command injection vulnerability found in the resource
/gsb/reports.php was not addressed in that patch.


Figure 20: Files in the patch for CVE-2024-8190




Figure 21: Patch script for CVE-2024-8190

THREAT ACTOR PATCHING VULNERABILITIES

On September 10, 2024, when the advisory for CVE-2024-8190 was published by
Ivanti, the threat actor, still active in the customer’s network, “patched” the
command injection vulnerabilities in the resources /gsb/DateTimeTab.php, and
/gsb/reports.php, making them unexploitable.

In the past, threat actors have been observed to patch vulnerabilities after
having exploited them, and gained foothold into the victim’s network, to stop
any other intruder from gaining access to the vulnerable asset(s), and
potentially interfering with their attack operations.

In this case, the threat actor downloaded the patched version of the two
vulnerable resources from temp[.]sh and saved them as /tmp/1 on disk, before
moving them to the webroot folder and overwriting the vulnerable version of the
files with them. Below are the relevant commands:



The modified timestamps of the resources reports.php, and DateTimeTab.php were
September 10, 2024, at 12:37:23 UTC and 13:06:10 UTC, respectively, as seen in
the screenshots below.


Figure 22: Patch timestamp of reports.php




Figure 23: Patch timestamp of DateTimeTab.php

Comparing the original vulnerable version of reports.php to the version patched
by the threat actor, shows that the threat actor added a piece of code to
replace the semicolon with an underscore in the POST parameter TW_ID, so that
command injection using the semicolon is not possible anymore.


Figure 24: Comparison of original and threat actor's patched code

FGIR tested the patching in a lab environment and confirmed that the
modification by the threat actor does indeed make the resource reports.php
unexploitable after the patch. The screenshot below shows the directory
testwithoutfix was successfully created by exploiting the command injection
vulnerability on the original vulnerable version of reports.php. When the fix is
applied to the reports.php file and the command injection is exploited again,
the directory testwithfix is not created.


Figure 25: Exploitation testing of the original and the threat actor’s patched
version

The threat actor also patched the file DateTimeTab.php using the same
str_replace function to replace any semicolon in the POST parameter TIMEZONE,
with an underscore, rendering the command injection vulnerability using this
parameter ineffective.


Figure 26: Testing command injection using the orignial and patched versions of
DateTimeTab.php


OTHER FINDINGS

LATERAL MOVEMENT

After compromising the internet-facing Ivanti CSA appliance, the threat actor
exploited the CVE-2024-29824 SQL Injection vulnerability on Ivanti’s backend SQL
database server (SQLS). Sample malicious POST requests exploiting this
vulnerability are depicted below.



The threat actor enabled the xp_cmdshell stored procedure via the exploitation
and used this stored procedure to attain remote code execution on the SQLS
system.



The threat actor created an account called mssqlsvc on the compromised system
SQLS and turned off the host firewall.


Table 1: Threat actor's commands

FGIR also observed that the threat actor ran some basic reconnaissance commands
on the SQLS system and attempted to exfiltrate the reconnaissance output using
the following PowerShell command:



This is a technique used to exfiltrate data over the DNS protocol. The technique
is also known as DNS tunneling. See below for the content of the file that the
threat actor tried to exfiltrate:


Figure 27: Content of 1.log

THREAT ACTOR COMMANDS

FGIR discovered more tactics and techniques used by the threat actor during
their intrusion. FGIR extracted and decoded some interesting commands executed
by the threat actor from the Linux audit logs and other sources. A sample of
those commands are shown in the table below:


Table 2: Threat actor commands

WEB SHELLS

During the course of their operations, the threat actor created several
webshells. They also modified the legitimate resource, syslog.php, and appended
malicious code to it, to use it as a web shell. Some of the web shells found are
shown in the table below.


Table 3: Web shells

BRUTE FORCE ATTACK

On September 11, at 04:12:00 UTC, the threat actor started an authentication
brute force attack against the customer’s internal network assets, using a
dictionary attack.

FGIR discovered that the threat actor downloaded a tar file called u from a
temp[.]sh URL. This tar file contained three files: brokes, passdic.txt, and
u.txt.


Figure 28: Brute force tooling

The file brokes is a Linux ELF binary, which was used to perform the brute force
attack on customer’s network assets. It is likely that brokes used as parameters
the list of customer’s users, possibly harvested during a different campaign, in
the form of the file u.txt and the password file passdic.txt.

The threat actor downloaded an unknown file called target from temp[.]sh,
however this one was not found on the disk.

The threat actor also downloaded a shell script called s.sh, from the temp[.]sh
site. This script was used to execute the bruteforce binary brokes and anonymous
logins were attempted on LDAP’s port TCP 389 of the attacked assets with several
passwords.


Figure 29: Content of s.sh

REVERSESOCKS PROXY TOOL

During the memory analysis of the CSA appliance, FGIR discovered traces of the
use of an open-source go-based proxy tool called ReverseSocks5, which was
downloaded and used by the threat actor to perform scanning and brute force
attacks on the customer’s internal network, while proxying the traffic through
the CSA appliance. The string, which was created in the memory due to an error
thrown by the tool, can be seen in the below snippet.



Some other suspicious strings found during the analysis of the memory included
some PHP variables found to be populated with suspicious values:



ZjmgmXsB.php was a webshell, which the threat actor was interacting with, while
accessing it from the IP address 208[.]105[.]190[.]170.

ROOT KIT DISCOVERY AND ANALYSIS

During the investigation, FGIR discovered that on September 7, 2024, at 03:26:17
UTC, the threat actor attempted to deploy a rootkit in the form of a Linux
kernel object (KO) module on the CSA appliance. This attempt was found in the
audit logs as seen in the snippet below:



The likely motive behind this was for the threat actor to maintain kernel-level
persistence on the CSA device, which may survive even a factory reset. This
activity is in line with the public reporting on the compromise of Ivanti CSA
appliances, which is available here and here. FGIR decoded the hex string
contained in the snippet above and obtained a base64 encoded blob. The initial
part of the resultant base64 encoded blob indicates that this is a compressed
archive file.



Decompressing the tar file results in the following two files.


Figure 30: Malicious tar file content

The file install.sh is a malicious bash script that installs a malicious kernel
object called sysinitd.ko. The compressed archive file was corrupted and only
the file install.sh could be retrieved successfully in its entirety, while the
file sysinitd was truncated, and the file sysinitd.ko was missing.

FGIR pivoted to the disk image of the CSA appliance and found the sysinitd and
sysinitd.ko files in the location /usr/share/empty/init/.


Figure 31: Rootkit files

ANALYSIS OF INSTALL.SH

The script install.sh was meant to install the malicious rootkit sysinitd.ko on
the affected system. The following variables were hard-coded in the script
install.sh:



The script starts with the following function call, which reads two parameters:



The first parameter is the INSTALL_NAME string, which is used to rename the two
files sysinitd and sysinitd.ko to INSTALL_NAME and INSTALL_NAME.ko respectively.

The second parameter is the path where the script copies the renamed version of
sysinitd and sysinitd.ko to. In this case, the threat actor did not supply
either of the two parameters. Therefore, the default names sysinitd and
sysinitd.ko were used by the script.

The following snippet of code checks if the install path exists and if not, then
it creates it:



The script then removes any installed kernel object with the name
INSTALL_NAME.ko, using the command rmmod, and then installs the malicious
INSTALL_NAME.ko using the command insmod.


Figure 32: Installation of malicious kernel object (rootkit)

The bash script install.sh installs a persistence mechanism using the technique
of adding an entry to install the malicious kernel object in the rc.local and
rc.d/rc.local files, if the malicious kernel object file is present on disk.


Figure 33: Establishing rootkit persistence




Figure 34: Rootkit persistence via RC script

ANALYSIS OF THE SYSINITD AND SYSINITD.KO

FGIR aims to analyze the rootkit in detail and publish the findings in a
follow-up blog post.


CONCLUSION

The advanced adversaries were observed exploiting and chaining zero-day
vulnerabilities to establish beachhead access in the victim’s network. You can
read more about the Ivanti CSA zero-day attack in our Threat Signal Report:
https://www.fortiguard.com/threat-signal-report/5556.


FORTINET PROTECTIONS

The malware described in this report is detected and blocked by FortiGuard
Antivirus as:

BASH/Agent.030E!tr
ELF/Agent.69A0!tr 
ELF/Agent.7E02!tr 
ELF/Agent.BD!tr

FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR support the FortiGuard Antivirus
service. The FortiGuard antivirus engine is a part of each of those solutions.
As a result, customers who have these products with up-to-date protections are
protected.

Fortinet has also released the following IPS signatures to protect our customers
from the threats contained in the report.

CVE-2024-8190; https://www.fortiguard.com/encyclopedia/ips/56651

The interactsh related URLs are rated as “Malicious Websites” and “Malicious
Activities Found” by the FortiGuard Web Filtering service.

FortiGuard IP Reputation and Anti-Botnet Security Service proactively blocks
these attacks by aggregating malicious source IP data from the Fortinet
distributed network of threat sensors, CERTs, MITRE, cooperative competitors,
and other global sources that collaborate to provide up-to-date threat
intelligence about hostile sources.

If you believe this or any other cybersecurity threat has impacted your
organization, please contact our Global FortiGuard Incident Response Team.


MITRE MAPPING

The MITRE ATT&CK framework has been used to refer to the various tactics and
techniques used by the threat actor.


Table 4: MITRE Mapping


IOCS


NETWORK BASED INDICATORS

Network Indicator

Protocol

Port

Notes

apiv5[.]serverbks[.]xyz

 

443

Domain associated with IP 156[.]234[.]193[.]18

74[.]62[.]81[.]162

 

57532

Threat actor’s C2

189f31ed7d[.]ipv6[.]bypass[.]eu[.]org

   

Seen in encoded PowerShell used by the threat actor

iowxuintgredogzgblrsmr2cx2e471bor.oast[.]fun

   

Seen in encoded PowerShell used by the threat actor

o.lencr[.]org

   

Let's Encrypt domain name

c67f045c2f.ipv6.1433.eu[.]org

   

Seen in encoded PowerShell used by the threat actor

206[.]189[.]156[.]69

   

oast[.]fun domain IP

51[.]91[.]79[.]17

   

temp[.]sh domain IP

156[.]234[.]193[.]18

   

C2 IP found in the python reverse shell

208[.]105[.]190[.]170

   

Threat actor IP interacting with webshell

http://temp[.]sh/khkzg/DateTimeTab.php

HTTP

80

Patched version of DateTimeTab.php downloaded by the threat actor from this URL
to overwrite the vulnerable version.

http://temp[.]sh/vQuoW/reports.php

HTTP

80

Patched version reports.php downloaded by the threat actor from this URL to
overwrite the vulnerable version.

http://l8u6aolk4ejfsl9zeq6321zvwm2eq3[.]burpcollaborator.net

HTTP

80

Accessed by the threat actor

54[.]77[.]139[.]23

   

oastify[.].com subdomains

34[.]250[.]195[.]30

   

portswigger[.]net domain IP, web app security & testing

216[.]131[.]75[.]52

   

Threat actor IP interacting with webshell

24[.]166[.]100[.]255

   

Threat actor IP interacting with webshell

67[.]217[.]228[.]92

   

Threat actor IP interacting with webshell

69[.]49[.]88[.]235

   

Threat actor IP interacting with webshell

45[.]61[.]136[.]189

   

Threat actor IP interacting with webshell

3[.]248[.]33[.]252

   

Threat actor IP interacting with webshell

38[.]207[.]159[.]76

   

Threat actor IP interacting with webshell

193[.]189[.]100[.]197

   

Threat actor IP interacting with webshell

23[.]236[.]66[.]97

   

Threat actor IP interacting with webshell


HOST BASED INDICATORS

PATH

FILE NAME

SHA1 HASH

NOTES

\Device\HarddiskVolume2\ProgramData\1.log

1.log

 

Reconnaissance output

\Device\HarddiskVolume2\ProgramData\bakeup.bat

bakeup.bat

 

Unknown batch file

\Device\HarddiskVolume2\ProgramData\output

output

 

Reconnaissance output

\Device\HarddiskVolume2\ProgramData\sess010981

sess010981

 

Reconnaissance output

C:\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\read.txt

read.txt

 

Unknown text file

https://10.10.11.31/client/site.php

site.php

 

Web shell on CSA appliance

c:\programdata\output.hex

output.hex

 

Encoded reconnaissance output

brokes

brokes

beb723a5f20a1a2c4375f9aa250d968d55155689

Bruteforcer binary

passdic.txt

passdic.txt

 

List of passwords

u.txt

u.txt

 

List of harvested usernames

/tmp/1

1

 

Files downloaded on the device are created as /tmp/1 on the CSA disk

/tmp/systemd-private-2e4a6ea82da94a9b9fec37fe91c9b820-broker.service-asZTdm/tmp/.br/broke

broke

64efc1aad330ea9d98c0c705e16cd4b3af7e74f8

Linux brute force binary

/client/site.php

site.php

 

Web shell on CSA appliance

/gsb/client.php

client.php

 

Web shell on CSA appliance

/gsb/firewall.php

firewall.php

 

Web shell on CSA appliance

/gsb/reports.php

reports.php

 

Web shell on CSA appliance

/gsb/style.php

style.php

 

Web shell on CSA appliance

/gsb/syslog.php?a=phpinfo();

syslog.php

 

Web shell on CSA appliance

/gsb/users.php

users.php

 

Web shell on CSA appliance

/gsb/uSxhmgm.php

uSxhmgm.php

 

Web shell on CSA appliance

/gsb/ZjmgmXsB.php

ZjmgmXsB.php

 

Web shell on CSA appliance

install.sh

install.sh

8d016d02f8fbe25dce76481a90dd0b48630ce9e74e8c31ba007cf133e48b8526

Rootkit installation script

/usr/share/empty/init/sysinitd.ko

sysinitd.ko

6edd7b3123de985846a805931ca8ee5f6f7ed7b160144aa0e066967bc7c0423a

Rootkit – Kernel Object Module

/usr/share/empty/init/sysinitd

sysinitd

d57a2cac394a778e19ce9b926f2e0a71936510798f30d20f207f2a49b49ce7b1

Malicious Linux binary


Tags:

zero-day vulnerability


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