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PICKING FLOWERS, MAKING HONEY.

Alex Joske @ASPI_ICPC


PICKING FLOWERS, MAKING HONEY.

Submitted by jerrycashman@a… on Fri, 10/26/2018 - 12:51
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The Chinese military’s collaboration with foreign universities.


WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is expanding its research collaboration
with universities outside of China. Since 2007, the PLA has sponsored more than
2,500 military scientists and engineers to study abroad and has developed
relationships with researchers and institutions across the globe.1

This collaboration is highest in the Five Eyes countries, Germany and Singapore,
and is often unintentionally supported by taxpayer funds.2 Australia has been
engaged in the highest level of PLA collaboration among Five Eyes countries per
capita, at six times the level in the US. Nearly all PLA scientists sent abroad
are Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members who return to China on time.

Dozens of PLA scientists have obscured their military affiliations to travel to
Five Eyes countries and the European Union, including at least 17 to Australia,
where they work in areas such as hypersonic missiles and navigation technology.
Those countries don’t count China as a security ally but rather treat it as one
of their main intelligence adversaries.3

The activities discussed in this paper, described by the PLA as a process of
‘picking flowers in foreign lands to make honey in China’ (异国采花，中华酿蜜), risk
harming the West’s strategic advantage.4

Helping a rival military develop its expertise and technology isn’t in the
national interest, yet it’s not clear that Western universities and governments
are fully aware of this phenomenon.5 Some universities have failed to respond to
legitimate security concerns in their engagement with China. Current policies by
governments and universities have not fully addressed issues like the transfer
of knowledge and technology through collaboration with the PLA. Clear government
policy towards universities working with the PLA is also lacking.6


WHAT’S THE SOLUTION?

Understanding and responding to PLA collaboration will require closer engagement
between governments and universities. While universities haven’t self-regulated
on this issue and haven’t controlled the associated security risks, universities
and researchers will not effectively limit the risks of PLA collaboration on
their own until governments develop clear policies on it.

Governments need to explore a wider range of tools for limiting technology
transfer, including better scrutiny of visa applications by Chinese military
scientists and further legislation targeting military end users.

Governments should also consider increasing funding to strategic science and
technology fields, while actively limiting problematic foreign investment in
those fields. Universities must recognise the risks of such collaboration and
seek to learn the extent and nature of their collaboration with the PLA by
actively working with government, civil society and security professionals.


INTRODUCTION

In 2017, the head of the American Association for the Advancement of Science
said that ‘Scientific progress depends on openness, transparency and the free
flow of ideas.’7 This collaborative and open spirit, including collaboration
with Chinese scientists, has led to some of the great scientific achievements of
recent times.8

While countries such as Australia and the US pride themselves on their
scientific achievements, their universities and research institutes face limited
or declining domestic funding.9 To address these issues, many universities have
turned to China—an emerging scientific powerhouse that has sought to build ties
to scientific communities around the world.10 This collaboration has generally
been a productive and welcome part of the Australia–China relationship. 

The Chinese military has also ridden this wave of research collaboration,
sponsoring more than 2,500 scientists to travel to universities in
technologically advanced countries such as Australia as students or visiting
scholars over the past decade.11 The volume of peer-reviewed literature produced
by PLA scientists in collaboration with foreign scientists each year has grown
steadily since 2008, following increases in the number of PLA scientists sent
abroad (Figure 1).12 Those scientists work in strategic and emerging technology
sectors such as quantum physics, signal processing, cryptography, navigation
technology and autonomous vehicles.

The PLA’s program of sending scientists abroad is different from standard
military exchanges, in which military officers visit each other’s institutions.
Those open exchanges build understanding, communication and relationships
between militaries.

Figure 1: PLA collaboration, as measured by the number of peer-reviewed articles
co-authored by PLA scientists with overseas scientists, 2006 to 2017



In contrast, the PLA National University of Defense Technology (NUDT,
解放军国防科学技术大学) appears to conceive of its military exchanges separately from its
international research ties, which are concentrated in foreign universities and
not military institutions.13 Scientists sent abroad by the PLA have minimal or
no interaction with military personnel in their host countries. Some of those
travelling overseas have actively used cover to disguise their military
affiliations, claiming to be from non-existent academic institutions.

Around half of those sent abroad are PhD scholars who either complete their
doctorates overseas or spend up to two years as visiting PhD scholars and who
can usually be identified by searching peer-reviewed literature. While most come
from NUDT, the Army Engineering University is another major source.14 The
remaining half are sent overseas for short-term trips, spending up to a year as
visiting scholars. Few of those scientists have left online traces of their time
overseas.

While foreign universities’ ties with the PLA have grown, it isn’t clear that
universities have developed an understanding of the PLA and how their
collaboration with it differs from familiar forms of scientific collaboration.
To date, there’s been no significant public discussion on why universities
should be directly contributing to the technology of a non-allied military.
Importantly, there’s also little evidence that universities are making any
meaningful distinction between collaboration with the Chinese military and the
rest of their collaboration with China.

A handful of universities have strongly defended their collaboration with the
PLA. Among universities in Five Eyes countries, the University of New South
Wales (UNSW) has published the most peer-reviewed literature in collaboration
with PLA scientists. After attracting scrutiny for this collaboration, the
university’s deputy vice-chancellor wrote, ‘Any fears that our intellectual
property or security is undermined through our work with international partners
are entirely unfounded.’15

Australia’s Curtin University has described its collaboration with the PLA in
similar terms, insisting that work by its scientists with PLA experts on
explosions and projectiles doesn’t violate any laws and is civilian research.16

Government research agencies have also engaged in collaboration with the PLA.
For example, researchers at the Australian Government’s Commonwealth Scientific
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) have collaborated with NUDT
scientists on cloud computing technology.

Those same NUDT scientists were using cloud computing technology for combat
simulations.17 Large sums of government funds have been used for collaboration
with PLA scientists. One professor at UNSW, for instance, worked with PLA
scientists using Australian Research Council grants worth $2.3 million.18
Internationally, defence funding has also been used for research with PLA
scientists; for example, a paper written by University of Manchester scientists
with a visiting student from NUDT lists US Air Force and Navy grants as funding
sources.19


INTERNATIONAL MILITARY–CIVIL FUSION

In China, the PLA’s overseas research collaboration is described in frank terms.
The PLA Daily uses the saying ‘Picking flowers in foreign lands to make honey in
China’ to explain how it seeks to leverage overseas expertise, research and
training to develop better military technology.20

This is one aspect of what China calls ‘military–civil fusion’ (军民融合). The term
refers to China’s efforts to improve its military’s ability to take advantage of
the creativity of the civilian sector and develop its own indigenous
military–industrial complex. Described by PLA experts as a ‘cornerstone of PRC
national defense reform’, military–civil fusion is helping to drive the
modernisation of the PLA.21

So important is military–civil fusion to President Xi Jinping’s military reforms
that he described it earlier this year as a prerequisite for building strategic
capabilities and a strong military.22

Illustrating the benefits that the PLA obtains from its overseas research
collaboration, a publication run by China’s Ministry of Education stated that
NUDT’s collaboration with the University of Cambridge to train visiting PLA
students will ‘greatly raise the nation’s power in the fields of national
defence, communications, anti-jamming for imaging and high-precision
navigation’.23 Likewise, before travelling to Sweden for doctoral studies in
quantum physics, an NUDT scientist was told by his supervisor, ‘Without
breakthroughs in physics, how can there be rapid developments in weaponry?’24

Figure 2: Lieutenant General Yang Xuejun (2nd from right) and Xi Jinping,
chairman of the Central Military Commission, in July 2017



Lieutenant-General Yang Xuejun (杨学军, Figure 2), who oversaw a substantial rise
in NUDT’s overseas links when he was its president from 2011 to 2017, appears to
be one of the key figures behind this phenomenon. NUDT, as the Chinese
military’s largest science and technology university, can be seen as
representative of broader initiatives in this area. The university is the main
source of PLA scientists studying abroad and by 2013 had reportedly sent more
than 1,600 scientists overseas as students or visiting scholars, including
roughly a third of its PhD scholars.25 An article written by NUDT scholars
claims that the university received 300m renminbi ($A60m) from the Chinese
government to send 765 graduate students to study abroad.26 According to General
Yang, who has implied that NUDT’s overseas ties are a form of military–civil
fusion, the university ‘has already reaped great benefits from going down the
open university path and the military–civil fusion road’.27

General Yang’s recent promotion to membership of the 205-member 19th CCP Central
Committee and to leadership of the Academy of Military Sciences, the PLA’s
premier research institution, reflects Xi Jinping’s emphasis on ‘rejuvenating
the military with science and technology’.28 It was probably also a recognition
of the success with which Yang developed NUDT’s international ties.

Yang, himself a supercomputer expert, has collaborated extensively with UNSW and
ran the program to develop the Tianhe-1A supercomputer, once ranked as the
world’s fastest supercomputer.29 The NUDT supercomputer program’s role in
nuclear weapons testing led to NUDT being placed on the US Government’s Entity
List in 2015, meaning that the university faces stricter export controls, yet
substantial numbers of NUDT scientists continue to train outside China,
including in the US, the UK and Australia.30

The PLA encourages scientists to work on areas of interest to the military while
they’re overseas. For example, a 2016 article by NUDT specialists in graduate
student education recommends that, in choosing where to study overseas,
students’ first priority should be the relevance of the research direction of an
overseas institution to their work in China, as they ‘must comprehensively
consider the continuity of their research work when in China with that when they
are studying overseas’.31 When students are overseas, the report adds, they
should ‘fully take advantage of the cutting-edge research conditions and
environment abroad’ and ‘map out the arrangements of their overseas research and
their plans for research after returning to China’. This alignment of domestic
and overseas work indicates that the cases of PLA scientists gaining skills
while in Australia that they then use for military projects aren’t outliers;
they’re representative examples.32


SOURCES OF AND DESTINATIONS FOR PLA SCIENTISTS

PLA scientists come from a wide range of institutions and disciplines within the
Chinese military. Analysing peer-reviewed publications co-authored by PLA
scientists and overseas scientists indicates that the US, the UK, Canada,
Australia and Germany were, in that order, the top five countries engaged in
research collaboration with the PLA in 2017 (Figure 3). Those countries appear
to be the primary destinations for PLA scientists sent abroad.

Figure 3: The top 10 countries for PLA collaboration, as measured by
peer-reviewed literature co-authored by PLA scientists, 2006 to 2017



PLA scientists sent abroad as visiting scholars came from institutions such as:

 * the Northwestern Institute of Nuclear Technology (西北核技术研究所), which works on
   nuclear and high-power microwave weapons
 * the Chemical Defense Institute of the Academy of Military Sciences
   (军事科学院防化研究院), which specialises in chemical weapons research and has sent a
   sarin gas expert overseas
 * the Navy Submarine Academy (海军潜艇学院) in Qingdao
 * the Armored Forces Engineering Academy (装甲兵工程学院) in Beijing, which works on
   tank technology
 * the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center (中国空气动力研究与发展中心), which
   has sent scramjet researchers to study overseas
 * the Rocket Force Engineering University (火箭军工程大学), which conducts research
   for China’s missile programs
 * the Academy of Equipment Command and Technology (装备指挥技术学院), which in 2007
   sent a specialist in antisatellite weaponry to the University of Michigan
   using civilian cover.33

The volume of peer-reviewed literature co-authored by PLA researchers and
overseas researchers is a rough indicator of the level of PLA collaboration at
each university. Figure 3 shows that the leading countries for PLA collaboration
by this measure for 2017 were, in order, the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and
Germany, indicating that they’re likely to be the main destinations for PLA
scientists studying abroad. Singapore, Sweden and the Netherlands are other
major destinations for PLA scientists. Over the past decade, Australia has been
engaged in the highest level of this collaboration among the Five Eyes countries
per capita, at six times the level in the US.

It’s also possible to estimate the number of PLA scientists sent to each country
since 2007, based on the above findings.34 Approximately 500 Chinese military
scientists were sent to each of the UK and the US, roughly 300 each to Australia
and Canada and more than 100 each to Germany and Singapore. Hundreds more have
been sent to other countries, including the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan and
France.

Figure 4, using the same dataset, shows the top 10 universities outside China
for PLA collaboration. Nanyang Technological University in Singapore has the
highest level of PLA collaboration, followed closely by UNSW in Australia. Other
universities in Canada, Australia, the UK and the Netherlands also engage in
high levels of collaboration with the PLA.35

Figure 4: The top 10 universities outside of China for PLA collaboration, as
measured by the number of peer-reviewed publications, 2006 to 2017



The PLA’s links to universities across the world go beyond student admissions.
The Chinese military, through its own universities and research institutions,
has worked to build relationships with overseas universities and leading
overseas researchers. A 2014 document published by NUDT claimed that the
university had recruited 20 foreign nationals as teachers and ‘established
academic relationships with over 100 universities and research units in over 50
countries and regions’.36

Scientists from Australia, the UK and the US are listed as potential doctoral
supervisors for NUDT students in 2018.37

NUDT has also built ties with overseas universities at the institutional level.
For example, NUDT’s Quantum Information Interdisciplinary Talent Training
Program cooperates with the University of Cambridge’s Cavendish Laboratory.38
The People’s Daily claimed that, in addition to agreements with Oxford and
Cambridge, NUDT has established ‘overseas study bases’ at institutions including
Harvard University.39 New Zealand’s Massey University also signed a memorandum
of understanding with NUDT in 2008.40


MAINTAINING LOYALTY TO THE CCP

The PLA, as the armed wing of the CCP, insists that all overseas party members
strictly abide by ‘external exchange discipline standards’.41 According to the
PLA Daily, ‘the openness of internationally expanding talent cultivation does
not represent a “relaxation”, and we certainly cannot “let go”.’42 General Yang
Xuejun has also specifically warned of the need to carefully manage military
secrets while increasing the university’s openness.43

Those permitted to study overseas go through intensive training prior to their
departure and are ‘all budding shoots with good grades and strong potential for
innovation’.44 Alongside academic credentials, political credentials are also of
key importance for military scientists hoping to study abroad. The PLA Daily
warns that, if students sent overseas ‘develop issues with their politics and
ideology, the consequences would be inconceivable (后果不堪设想)’.45 NUDT therefore
appears to sponsor only CCP members for overseas study and works hard to
maintain their loyalty to the party and negate ‘all kinds of harmful
ideologies’.46 Reportedly, all 200 students and researchers from NUDT who were
studying or visiting overseas in 2013 were party members.47

The People’s Daily claimed in 2013 that students sent overseas by NUDT had
established eight party branches overseas and organised events for party
members, so that ‘personnel studying abroad would keep their convictions
rock-solid’ (坚守信念如磐).48 Another report from 2015 claimed that NUDT’s College of
Optoelectric Science and Engineering alone had established 10 overseas party
branches.49 More recent reports hint that such branches are still being
established. For example, party media reported in October 2017 that students
from one of NUDT’s colleges had established a WeChat group for the college’s
more than 30 students overseas to study the 19th Party Congress.50 ‘Their red
hearts,’ the report concluded, ‘look to the party.’

Party branches have also been used to coerce overseas Chinese scholars. An
investigation by Foreign Policy found that some visiting students from Chinese
universities who formed party branches abroad were asked to report on any
subversive opinions held by their classmates.51 It’s probable that similar kinds
of pressure are exerted on overseas PLA researchers.

Online communication forms an important part of PLA efforts to maintain
discipline among overseas personnel and is complemented by in-person contact.
One report stated that students from NUDT’s College of Optoelectric Science and
Engineering ‘regularly chat with College leaders by video call and exchange
emails with NUDT academic supervisors and student cadres to discuss their
thoughts, exchange ideas on academic matters, and clarify points of interest’.52
Regulations on the political education of overseas students by the same NUDT
college include provisions for ‘overseas inspection’ and for students to return
to China in the middle of their study for ‘remedial education’.

One NUDT professor used a trip to an overseas conference as an opportunity to
meet eight NUDT scientists studying in the region to ‘pass on the greetings and
requests of party organisations’. The regulations also include provisions for
‘joint education and interaction with families’, which may imply that pressure
on the family members of overseas PLA scientists is used to maintain
discipline.53

The close watch that the PLA keeps on its overseas scientists helps ensure that
all those sent abroad return to the Chinese military. NUDT, for example,
requires that those applying to study abroad show their intent to return to
‘serve the construction of the nation, national defence and the military’.54

The PLA Daily claimed in 2013 that all the students whom NUDT had sent abroad in
recent years returned on time to ‘become key forces in their work units’.55


INSTITUTES THAT DON’T EXIST: DECEPTION BY PLA SCIENTISTS

While most scientists sent abroad by the PLA appear to be open about which
institutions they come from, this report has identified two dozen new cases of
PLA scientists travelling abroad using cover to obscure their military
affiliations. In at least 17 of these cases, PLA scientists used cover to travel
to Australia. These scientists use various kinds of cover, ranging from the use
of misleading historical names for their institutions to the use of names of
non-existent institutions.


FEATURES OF DECEPTION BY THE PLA

An article from 2002 on the website of a Chinese overseas study agency offers
insights into the use of cover. In response to a question asking whether having
graduated from a military institution would affect one’s ability to get an
overseas visa, the company responded: 

Many military colleges and military units externally have common names (民间称呼)
that don’t reveal their military characteristics. NUDT, for example, is
externally known as Changsha Institute of Technology. This is the best way [to
avoid having your visa application rejected].56

The Changsha Institute of Technology was a PLA institution subsumed by NUDT in
1975.57 While the quote above doesn’t come from an official source, it at least
indicates how these unsophisticated but nonetheless effective covers are
understood as tools for hiding one’s military background.

Besides using non-existent institutions with innocuous-sounding names as cover,
PLA members also claim to be from real civilian institutions in the same regions
as their military units. New Zealand MP Yang Jian, for example, who taught
intelligence officers at the PLA Foreign Languages Institute in Luoyang, claimed
in his New Zealand residency application to have worked at Luoyang University.58
Before moving to New Zealand in 1999, Yang received an Australian Government aid
scholarship to study at the Australian National University, earning a master’s
degree and doctorate in international relations. During that period, he interned
at the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, and
headed the Canberra Chinese Students and Scholars Association, which retains
intimate ties to the Chinese Embassy to this day.59 Yang told media, ‘the system
asked me to use the partner university,’ referring to Luoyang University.60

A number of PLA scientists using cover to travel abroad have created LinkedIn
profiles using their cover institutions, which may have been used to shore up
their claimed affiliations while overseas.61

The use of cover appears to be managed differently by each institution, some of
which use cover far more often than others.62 Cover is also not used
consistently within each institution. As described below, PLA Information
Engineering University (PLAIEU) researchers have both used cover and openly
stated their affiliation at the same conferences. It’s unclear whether this
indicates that the use of cover is up to the discretion of each researcher or
perhaps that it relates to the sensitivity of a researcher’s work or position in
the PLA.

NUDT appears to no longer use the ‘Changsha Institute of Technology’ as cover,
but it engages in a different kind of deception. A document published by NUDT
for students hoping to study abroad advises them that, when providing
documentation in their applications to foreign institutions, ‘military and
political courses can be excluded’ from their academic records.63 This appears
designed to mislead overseas authorities, universities and researchers by
downplaying the extent to which NUDT is a military institution and to which
these students are military scientists.


THE XI’AN RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY

Scientists from the PLA Rocket Force Engineering University (RFEU, 火箭军工程大学)64, a
key research base for the PLA Rocket Force, claim to be from the ‘Xi’an Research
Institute of High Technology’ (西安高技术研究所), which appears to only exist on paper.

At least five RFEU scientists claiming to be from the Xi’an Research Institute
have travelled overseas as visiting scholars, including one of the PLA’s leading
missile experts, Major General Hu Changhua (胡昌华), and three of his close
associates at RFEU. General Hu (Figure 5), who heads RFEU’s Missile Testing and
Control Simulation Experimental Teaching Centre, visited the University of
Duisburg–Essen in Germany for four months in 2008.65 It’s unclear what he worked
on in Germany, as he didn’t publish any papers while there, but his work for the
PLA focuses on flight control systems and fault diagnosis for missiles.66

Two RFEU scientists who frequently publish with Hu, Zhou Zhijie (周志杰)67 and Wang
Zhaoqiang (王兆强),68 were visiting scholars at universities in England; they claim
in their English publications to be from the Xi’an Research Institute.69

Figure 5: Major General Hu Changhua, profiled by China Central Television’s
military affairs channel in 2016:

‘Right now I’m a professor at RFEU and head of the Military Key Lab on Missile
Testing and Control Technology.’ 

Figure 5: Major General Hu Changhua, profiled by China Central Television’s
military affairs channel in 2016: ‘Right now I’m a professor at RFEU and head of
the Military Key Lab on Missile Testing and Control Technology.’


Source: CCTV, 28 October 2016, YouTube.


HU XIAOXIANG: A CASE STUDY

Identifying the Xi’an Research Institute of High Technology as a cover institute
helps shed light on the January 2015 expulsion from Norway of a Chinese
scientist and his supervisor, a dual citizen of Germany and Iran. The expulsion
came after Norwegian authorities determined that the work of the Chinese
scientist, later named in court as Hu Xiaoxiang (扈晓翔), could be used to develop
hypersonic cruise missiles (Figure 6).70

Figure 6: Hu Xiaoxiang

Hu wrote five papers with his supervisor at the University of Agder, all of
which listed the Xi’an Research Institute as his affiliation. The papers focused
on air-breathing hypersonic vehicles, which travel at over five times the speed
of sound and ‘can carry more payload than ordinary flight vehicles’.71 Hu’s work
was supported by a Norwegian Government grant for offshore wind energy
research.72

Besides his affiliation with the Xi’an Research Institute, there’s a large body
of evidence tying Hu to RFEU. The website of RFEU’s missile research centre
states that Hu Xiaoxiang won an award in 2014 for his PhD thesis on hypersonic
aircraft, supervised by General Hu Changhua.73 The website also says that in
2014 he received 250,000 renminbi (A$50,000) from the Chinese Government for a
three-year research project on hypersonic aircraft (Figure 7).74 In 2016, he was
described as a lecturer at the centre, which received 14 awards for missile
research between 2010 and 2014.75 In some publications, Hu also listed the
Harbin Institute of Technology, a civilian university heavily engaged in
military research, as a second affiliation.76

Relations between China and Norway were put on ice when the Nobel Peace Prize
was awarded to Chinese democracy activist Liu Xiaobo in 2010, and the Chinese
Government was quick to attack Norway for Hu’s expulsion.77 Only in December
2016 did the two countries ‘normalise’ diplomatic relations. Public statements
by Norwegian authorities didn’t explain the Chinese scientist’s military
affiliation or mention the Xi’an Research Institute, as the information was
likely classified.

Figure 7: A paper published by Hu Xiaoxiang shortly after his expulsion from
Norway, stating an affiliation with RFEU in the Chinese version of the abstract
but the Xi’an Research Institute in the English version.



A few months later, in September 2015, a court overturned the expulsions. Hu’s
lawyer stated after the trial that ‘there is no evidence in the case that my
client is part of research collaboration on missiles and weapons with China.’78
The University of Agder lauded the decision as a win for academic freedom.

The Norwegian Government later successfully appealed the overturning of Hu’s
supervisor’s expulsion. However, it’s unclear whether any appeal was made in
Hu’s own case, which hasn’t been made publicly available.79 Neither the Xi’an
Research Institute, Hu Changhua nor RFEU was mentioned in the judge’s ruling on
the German-Iranian supervisor’s case or any coverage of the expulsions.


THE ZHENGZHOU INSTITUTE OF SURVEYING AND MAPPING

Among the 40 Chinese military scientists listed as presenting papers at the 9th
International Symposium on Mobile Mapping Technology, nine claimed to be from an
institution with no apparent military affiliation.80 Most of the other 30
military scientists at the conference, hosted by UNSW in December 2015, were
openly from NUDT and a research institute of China North Industries Group
Corporation (also known as Norinco Group), China’s largest arms manufacturer;
the rest came mainly from the PLA Information Engineering University.

The nine claimed to be from the Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping.
This institute, which was officially known as the PLA Institute of Surveying and
Mapping, no longer exists, having been subsumed in 1999 by PLAIEU—itself a major
player in cyber operations and a key training ground for signals intelligence
officers.81 The Zhengzhou Institute appears to live on as cover for PLA
scientists interacting with foreigners. Nearly 300 peer-reviewed papers have
been published by authors claiming to be from the institute.82

The use of the Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping as cover doesn’t
stop at international conferences. Numerous examples of visiting scholars
claiming to be from there have been uncovered for this report. They include Zhu
Xinhui (朱新慧), a lecturer at PLAIEU specialising in navigation technology, who
visited UNSW from 2015 to 2016.83 In numerous journal articles and in the
program of the mobile mapping conference mentioned above, however, she is
described as being from the Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping.84

Guo Jianfeng (郭建锋), an associate professor at PLAIEU, visited Curtin University
for a year in 2014. A specialist on navigation system data processing, Guo was
described on the website of Curtin University’s Global Navigation Satellite
Systems Research Centre as being on ‘sabbatical leave from the Department of
Geodesy of the Institute of Surveying and Mapping, Zhengzhou, China’.85


THE ZHENGZHOU INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE

Another cover institute, the Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology
Institute (ZISTI), which appears to exist only on paper, has also been widely
used by PLAIEU scientists to publish research and travel overseas. More than
1,300 pieces of peer-reviewed literature have been authored by individuals
claiming to be from ZISTI.86

One paper in a Chinese-language journal by a PLAIEU researcher, which includes
an English version of the abstract and author information, clearly shows that
ZISTI is a cover institute (Figure 8). The paper’s Chinese text describes the
first author as affiliated with PLAIEU, but the English version describes the
same author as affiliated with ZISTI.87 Nearly all of the authors sampled who
claimed an affiliation with ZISTI could be shown to be working at PLAIEU.

Figure 8: Chinese and English versions of a paper published by a PLAIEU
scientist, demonstrating the use of the Zhengzhou Information Science and
Technology Institute as cover.



Scientists claiming to be from ZISTI have attended international conferences
both inside and outside China. For example, seven researchers affiliated with
ZISTI are listed in the program of a conference on signal processing at the Gold
Coast in Australia in 2014. Experts from American, Australian and Korean
defence research agencies were also in attendance.88

As with the Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping, ZISTI has been used as
cover for PLA scientists travelling overseas as visiting scholars. For example,
Zhu Yijun (朱义君) is an associate professor at PLAIEU specialising in signals
engineering.89 Claiming to be from ZISTI, in 2011 he visited Canada’s McMaster
University, where he worked on wireless communications technology with
wide-ranging military applications.90

PLAIEU scientists claiming to be from ZISTI have also travelled to the US as
visiting scholars and for conferences.91


ESPIONAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT

In addition to their overt activities, PLA researchers, especially those who
haven’t been forthcoming about their military affiliations, may engage in
espionage or steal intellectual property while overseas. The PLA engages in such
high levels of espionage that in 2014 the US Government took the unusual step of
publicly indicting five Chinese military hackers.92 Military scientists abroad
who regularly communicate with superiors in China, receive visits by superiors
while overseas and return home in the middle of their time abroad for ‘remedial
education’, as described in the examples outlined above, offer safe and
convenient channels for Chinese intelligence agencies to access sensitive
information from overseas.93

Amateur collectors with STEM expertise have been implicated in a high proportion
of intellectual property theft and espionage cases involving China.94 Scientists
and engineers involved in military research projects, while they might not have
received formal training as spies, are uniquely qualified to identify and
exfiltrate valuable information to overcome specific hurdles in the development
of new technologies.


SHOULD UNIVERSITIES COLLABORATE WITH THE PLA?

Assessing the costs and benefits of research collaboration with the PLA shows
that it comes with significant security risks while offering unclear benefits.
It isn’t in the national interest of most of the countries examined in this
report to help build the capabilities of a rival military. Other forms of
cooperation with the Chinese military, such as joint exercises and exchanges
that build understanding and communication, are largely beneficial but distinct
from the kinds of research collaboration addressed in this report.

The benefits of research collaboration with the Chinese military are difficult
to measure, but could include the following:

 * Training PLA scientists and working with them leads to scientific
   developments and published research while attracting some funding. 
 * A small proportion of collaboration with the PLA appears sufficiently
   transparent and falls into areas of fundamental research such that the
   benefits may outweigh security risks. One possible example is cooperation
   between the American and Chinese governments on the multinational Daya Bay
   Reactor Neutrino Experiment, which involves NUDT.

A number of benefits usually associated with research collaboration with
militaries and foreign countries haven’t been observed in PLA collaboration:

 * PLA collaboration doesn’t lead to long-term improvement in the talent of
   institutions and countries accepting PLA scientists, as the PLA claims that
   100 per cent of scientists sent abroad by NUDT in the years before 2013
   returned to China on time.95 
 * The forms of PLA collaboration studied in this report don’t promote
   understanding and relationships between militaries, as they aren’t military
   exchanges and often aren’t overt.
 * While overseas, PLA scientists remain under the close watch of the CCP, which
   works to ensure that they remain loyal and aren’t influenced by their
   experience living in free societies. 
 * It’s improbable that PLA scientists working with overseas civilian
   researchers would share with or disclose to those researchers any significant
   research breakthroughs of military value.

There are many risks and costs associated with current approaches to training
and collaborating with PLA scientists:

 * Training PLA scientists improves the scientific talent and knowledge of a
   military treated by many as a strategic competitor.96
 * PLA scientists often engage in deception in their interactions with foreign
   institutions and their staff, making it difficult for those collaborating
   with them to take appropriate security precautions.
 * PLA scientists could gather intelligence and steal technology while they’re
   overseas, especially if they’re hiding their military affiliations.
 * Failures to address concerns about PLA collaboration and to develop policies
   differentiating it from wider engagement with China risk tarring all research
   ties with China with the same brush.
 * Research collaboration with the PLA contributes to technology that may be
   used against Australia and its partners in a conflict or for intelligence
   collection.
 * Universities with ties to the PLA risk eroding trust between themselves and
   funders of research, such as defence research agencies, scientific agencies
   and industry.
 * Universities risk reputational damage by collaborating with a non-allied
   military.
 * Public funding worth millions of dollars is being used for collaboration with
   a non-allied military, with little to no input from taxpayers.


CURRENT POLICY AND LEGISLATION ARE INADEQUATE

Export controls are the primary mechanism by which countries seek to manage the
supply of sensitive technology and goods to overseas entities. However, the
ability of export control laws to effectively manage the risks posed by PLA
research collaboration is limited. In Australia, few cases of research or
cooperation contrary to our national interests are believed to have been
prevented through the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012.97 The current review of
the Act offers an opportunity to address some of these limitations.

There are a few reasons for these difficulties. First, intangible transfer of
technology—the primary form of technology transfer taking place through the
kinds of collaboration studied in this paper— is extremely difficult to control
in practice because it doesn’t involve the export of physical goods.98 Second,
the Act doesn’t regulate the supply of controlled technology, which includes
instruction and training, to individuals in Australia even if they’re PLA
members. Third, some of this collaboration covers emerging technologies, such as
quantum physics, that are important but not included in the Defence and
Strategic Goods List, as their applications aren’t yet fully known. Export
control lists tend to be slow to incorporate emerging technologies, so
regulatory power can come well after issues become apparent. Fourth, the Act
doesn’t regulate the supply of controlled technology by Australians when they’re
outside of Australia, such as training given to PLA members by Australian
academics visiting China.
 


RECOMMENDATIONS

The PLA’s collaboration with foreign universities is growing and the expansion
of international ties remains one of NUDT’s priorities.99 The developments
outlined in this report warrant more attention and different approaches from
those currently employed by most governments and universities. Responses to PLA
collaboration need to be informed by clear government policies and move beyond
export controls, using the full range of tools available to governments and
universities. The Australian Government, for example, can do more to work in
partnership with our research sector to advance scientific progress while
protecting national security and ensuring that relevant research doesn’t advance
the Chinese military’s capabilities.

Based on the findings of this report, it is recommended that governments pursue
the following measures:


DEEPEN DISCUSSIONS WITHIN GOVERNMENT ON PLA COLLABORATION TO DETERMINE HOW IT
RELATES TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST

 * Determine what kinds of collaboration with the PLA should be further
   controlled or even prohibited and establish clear policy on engagement with
   PLA research organisations and personnel.
 * Foster international discussions on PLA collaboration to develop multilateral
   responses.
 * Develop interagency responses to PLA collaboration to ensure better
   integration of efforts by defence and export control agencies, intelligence
   agencies and immigration agencies.
 * Share information about cases and trends in PLA collaboration, particularly
   cases of deception by PLA scientists, with partners across the globe.


INCREASE COMMUNICATION AND OUTREACH TO UNIVERSITIES, COMPANIES AND PUBLICS

 * Establish a committee bringing together members of the national security
   community and university leaders. This committee could serve as a forum to
   share key information and foster a more cooperative working environment while
   also providing a space for the university sector and national security
   community to better understand each other’s perspectives. The US Federal
   Bureau of Investigation’s National Security Higher Education Advisory Board
   is a useful model to emulate.100
 * Ensure that companies funding research at universities are aware of any PLA
   collaboration and understand future measures to control such collaboration.
 * Politicians and senior public servants should better articulate what’s in the
   national interest and publicly explain why advancing China’s military
   capabilities isn’t in the national interest.101


IMPROVE THE SCRUTINY OF VISA APPLICATIONS BY FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL

 * Enhance and better coordinate efforts by government agencies such as
   Australia’s Department of Home Affairs, Department of Defence and Australian
   Security Intelligence Organisation to ensure that military scientists
   applying for visas are identified and properly vetted.102
 * Create a list of Chinese and other non-allied military and military-linked
   research institutions, including civilian universities heavily engaged in
   military research, for use by immigration officials.


RE-EXAMINE EXPORT CONTROLS

 * The Australian Government should consider further controlling technology
   transfer to certain end users. Transfers of controlled technology to PLA
   members and civilians heavily engaged in military research should be
   restricted regardless of their geographical location.
 * The Australian Government should create a list of entities posing national
   security risks that are subject to special export licence requirements,
   modelled on the US’s Entity List.
 * The government should help universities train and provide resources for staff
   with export control compliance duties.
 * Work continuously with experienced scientists in emerging technology fields
   to determine whether and how emerging technologies should be controlled.
 * Ensure that universities are fully complying with controls relating to the
   intangible transfer of technology in their collaboration with the PLA.


REGULATE SCIENTIFIC TRAINING GIVEN TO FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL

 * Introduce legislation that draws on the US Code of Federal Regulations’ rules
   on defence services, which require those offering training to foreign
   military personnel to first receive a waiver from the US Department of
   Defense.103 This could take the form of an expansion of the Defence Trade
   Controls Act that restricts technology transfer to members of certain
   governments and organisations.


REGULATE THE USE OF GOVERNMENT RESOURCES IN COLLABORATION WITH THE CHINESE
MILITARY AND OTHER NON-ALLIED MILITARIES

 * Update internal policies in government research institutions such as CSIRO to
   limit or ban collaboration with non-allied militaries, particularly in
   dual-use areas.
 * Funding bodies such as the Australian Research Council should prohibit
   funding in some areas from being used in collaboration with non-allied
   militaries.
 * Carefully evaluate any collaboration with PLA scientists on government-funded
   projects, particularly defence projects.


INCREASE GOVERNMENT AND OTHER FUNDING FOR RESEARCH IN STRATEGIC RESEARCH AREAS

 * Fields such as artificial intelligence and quantum physics should receive
   more government funding to ensure that talent and ideas stay in Australia.
 * Universities working in strategic research areas should be encouraged to
   collaborate with allied military and defence countries rather than non-allied
   militaries.


LIMIT PROBLEMATIC FORMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN STRATEGIC RESEARCH AREAS

 * Investment by Chinese defence companies such as China Electronics Technology
   Group Corporation into strategically important fields should be
   prohibited.104

Universities should also pursue the following measures:


BUILD UNDERSTANDING OF PLA COLLABORATION

 * Produce credible and thorough assessments of the extent of PLA collaboration
   on campuses.
 * Develop processes for managing PLA collaboration so that security risks can
   be identified and resolved


RAISE AWARENESS AMONG EMPLOYEES

 * Ensure that those interacting with members of non-allied militaries take
   appropriate security precautions.


EXERCISE GREATER OVERSIGHT OF VISITING SCHOLAR AND STUDENT APPLICATION


DEVELOP INTERNAL POLICIES ON COLLABORATION WITH FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL

 * Require employees to receive approval before collaborating with or training
   members of non-allied militaries.

30 Oct 2018

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CONTENTS

 * What’s the problem?
 * What’s the solution?
 * Introduction
 * International military–civil fusion
 * Sources of and destinations for PLA scientists
 * Maintaining loyalty to the CCP
 * Institutes that don’t exist: deception by PLA scientists
   * Features of deception by the PLA
   * The Xi’an Research Institute of High Technology
   * Hu Xiaoxiang: a case study
   * The Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping
   * The Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute
   * Espionage and intellectual property theft
 * Should universities collaborate with the PLA?
 * Current policy and legislation are inadequate
 * Recommendations
   * Deepen discussions within government on PLA collaboration to determine how
     it relates to the national interest
   * Increase communication and outreach to universities, companies and publics
   * Improve the scrutiny of visa applications by foreign military personnel
   * Re-examine export controls
   * Regulate scientific training given to foreign military personnel
   * Regulate the use of government resources in collaboration with the Chinese
     military and other non-allied militaries
   * Increase government and other funding for research in strategic research
     areas
   * Limit problematic forms of foreign investment in strategic research areas
   * Build understanding of PLA collaboration
   * Raise awareness among employees
   * Exercise greater oversight of visiting scholar and student application
   * Develop internal policies on collaboration with foreign military personnel

References
1
This estimate has sought to exclude PLA medical scientists and doctors by not
counting those affiliated with PLA medical institutions. Media reports, many of
which are cited in this report, were one important source for determining the
number of PLA scientists sent abroad. Feng Chunmei 冯春梅, Cai Weibin 蔡渭滨, Li Zhi
李治, ‘Guofang keji daxue shixiang weilai zhanzheng de rencai hangmu’ 国防科技大学 驶向未来
战争的人才航母 [NUDT—An aircraft carrier of talent steering towards future wars],
Renmin Ribao 人民日报, 8 August 2013, online, claims that NUDT had sent 1,600
scientists overseas as students or visiting scholars ‘in recent years’. Assuming
the 1,600 figure describes the number of NUDT scientists sent abroad between
2007, when the PLA substantially increased the number of scientists it sent
overseas, and 2013, this gives roughly 230 NUDT scientists sent overseas each
year. Conservatively, this indicates that well over 2,000 NUDT scientists have
been sent abroad since 2007. Accounting for the fact that NUDT is responsible
for approximately 80% of publications written by PLA scientists with overseas
scientists and assuming that represents the proportion of PLA scientists
overseas who are from NUDT, this means that more than 2,500 PLA scientists have
been sent overseas since 2007. This estimate was also supported by a second set
of open-source data which, to prevent the information from being removed, has
not been revealed.
2
New Zealand is not counted here, despite being a Five Eyes country. It has high
levels of PLA collaboration, especially relative to its population, but is not
among the top countries for collaboration more generally.
3
9news.com.au
C Uhlmann, ‘China an “extreme” threat to Australia: ASIO’, 9 News, 31 January
2018, online; Bill Gertz, ‘FBI director warns China is America’s most
significant intelligence threat’, The Washington Free Beacon, 19 July 2018,
online; ‘German intelligence unmasks alleged covert Chinese social media
profiles’, Reuters, 10 December 2017. For a discussion of the case of Huang Jing
in Singapore, see John Garnaut, ‘Australia’s China reset’, The Monthly, August
2018.
4
81.cn
Wang Wowen 王握文, ‘Zouchu guomen, dang zuzhi shenghuo “bu diaoxian”’,
走出国门，党组织生活’不掉线’ [Exiting the country, they stay connected with the life of party
organisations], Jiefangjunbao 解放军报, 1 July 2015.
5
aspi.org.au
One of the only papers to address research collaboration with the PLA is Elsa
Kania, Technological entanglement, ASPI, Canberra, 28 June 2018
6
Section 1286 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2019 offers an important starting point for policies on scientific
engagement with China and the PLA, seeking to protect scientists from undue
foreign influence, safeguard important information and support the growth of
domestic talent.
7
amazonaws.com
Richard Holt, AAAS statement on White House proclamation on immigration and
visas, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 25 September 2017
8
foreignpolicy.com
See Yangyang Cheng, ‘The future of particle physics will live and die in China’,
Foreign Policy, 2 November 2017, for an eye-opening discussion of the level of
political involvement in China’s scientific research, even research into
particle physics.
9
news.com.au
DJ Howard, FN Laird, ‘The new normal in funding university science’, Issues in
Science and Technology, 2013, 30(1), online; M Clarke, ‘Federal government
university budget leaves 10,000 places unfunded, Universities Australia says’,
ABC News, 18 January 2018, online; N Whigham, ‘Medical and scientific research
at a crossroads in Australia as funding stagnates’, News.com.au, 7 November 2016
10
newsroom.unsw.edu.au
UNSW, for example, has partnered with the Chinese Government’s Torch Program,
attracting tens of millions of dollars in R&D funding from Chinese companies.
See ‘UNSW celebrates first anniversary of Torch partnership with China’, UNSW
Media, 28 March 2017
11
archive.is
It appears that most of those sent abroad are PLA ‘civilian cadres’ (文职干部),
rather than ranking military officers. While they’re counted as members of the
PLA, civilian cadres aren’t combat personnel and often work in technical areas,
such as scientific research. See information about civilian cadres at the
following link.
12
Peer-reviewed literature is the most accessible but not the only measure of PLA
collaboration. Other facets of PLA collaboration include visiting and lecturing
at PLA institutions, supervising PLA students and visiting scholars, which are
correlated with but distinct from the level of peer-reviewed literature.
Findings on peer-reviewed literature by PLA scientists with foreign researchers
are based on searches in Scopus, the largest database of peer-reviewed
literature, covering 16 PLA institutions and aliases. Hong Kong wasn’t counted
together with the PRC mainland. Note that publications by PLA scientists from
medical institutions have been excluded. The following institutions and aliases
were included in the search: National University of Defense Technology, National
Key Laboratory for Parallel and Distributed Processing, PLA University of
Science and Technology, PLA Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou
Information Science and Technology Institute, Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying
and Mapping, Air Force Engineering University, Second Artillery Engineering
College, Xi’an Research Institute of High Technology, Academy of Armored Force
Engineering, Academy of Equipment Command and Technology, National Digital
Switching System Engineering and Technological Research Center, Northwest
Institute of Nuclear Technology, China Aerodynamics Research and Development
Center, Naval University of Engineering and PLA Electronic Engineering
Institute.
13
81.cn
See the section on international ties, which discusses sending students abroad
and building academic ties separately from military exchanges, in Liu Hang
(ed.), 2015 National University of Defence Technology admissions guide.
14
thepaper.cn
The Army Engineering University was formed in August 2017 through the merger of
the PLA University of Science and Technology and a number of other army
colleges. See Anonymous, ‘Lujun gongcheng daxue jiepai, you gongchengbing
xueyuan deng 5 suo yuanxiao heping zujian’ 陆 军工程大学揭牌，由工程兵学院等5所院校合并组建 [The Army
Engineering University is unveiled, formed by the merger of the Engineering
College and five other institutions], Pengpai 澎湃, 3 August 2017
15
afr.com
Brian Boyle, ‘Chinese partnerships are vital for universities and global
research’, Financial Review, 29 October 2017.
16
smh.com.au
Clive Hamilton, Alex Joske, ‘Australian universities are helping China’s
military surpass the United States’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 October 2017
17
Clive Hamilton, Silent Invasion, Hardy Grant Books, 2018, 190–193.
18
Hamilton & Joske, ‘Australian universities are helping China’s military surpass
the United States’.
19
pubs.rsc.org
Mengjian Zhu, Moshe Ben Shalom, Artem Mishchsenko, Vladimir Falko, Kostya
Novoselov, Andre Geim, ‘Supercurrent and multiple Andreev reflections in
micrometer-long ballistic graphene Josephson junctions’, Nanoscale, 2018, issue
6
20
Wang Wowen 王握文, ‘Zouchu guomen, dang zuzhi shenghuo “bu diaoxian”’,
走出国门，党组织生活’不掉线’ [Exiting the country, they stay connected with the life of party
organisations].
21
squarespace.com
Greg Levesque, Mark Stokes, Blurred lines: military–civil fusion and the ‘going
out’ of China’s defense industry, Pointe Bello, December 2016
22
jamestown.org
Zhou Xin (ed.), ‘Xi calls for deepened military–civilian integration’,
Xinhuanet, 12 March 2018, online; Lorand Laskai, ‘Civil–military fusion and the
PLA’s pursuit of dominance in emerging technologies’, China Brief, Jamestown
Foundation, 9 April 2018
23
gesie.org
Yu Yang 杨宇, ‘Guojia gongpai liuxue xinmoshi’ 国家公派留学新模式 [A new model of
government-sponsored overseas study], Shenzhou xueren 神州学人, 2017, 9:14–17
24
xy.nudt.edu.cn
Wang Wowen 王握文, Jia Chaoxing 贾朝星, ‘Ba “nan chucai” de jichu yanjiu zuo jingcai,
Zhang Chaofan de “bu pingfan zhi lu”’ 把“难出彩”的基 础研究做精彩，张超凡的“不平凡之路” [Bringing out
the colour of fundamental research—the extraordinary story of Zhang Chaofan],
xy.nudt. edu.cn, 10 June 2017
25
Feng et al., ‘Guofang keji daxue shixiang weilai zhanzheng de rencai hangmu’
国防科技大学 驶向未来战争的人才航母 [NUDT—An aircraft carrier of talent steering towards future
wars]. NUDT admitted roughly 260 military PhD scholars in 2016, sending around
100 PhD scholars to study overseas in the same year. This indicates that roughly
40% of PhD scholars spend time overseas as part of their studies. Similar
figures apply for other years, online. Wang Wowen 王握文, ‘Zouchu guomen, dang
zuzhi shenghuo “bu diaoxian”’, also claims that 26% of teachers at one of NUDT’s
colleges spent time studying abroad
26
Yang Jungang 杨俊刚, Li Jun 李骏, An Wei 安玮, ‘Guoji lianhe peiyang boshi yanjiusheng
moshi tansuo’ 国际联合培养博士研究生模式探索 [An exploration of models of international joint
training of doctoral students], Zhongguo Kexue Zongheng 中国科学纵横, 2016, 8:255–256.
27
Zhong Hua 钟华, ‘Yang Xuejun yuanshi: junmin ronghe shixian jundui daxue de
kaifangxing’, 杨学军院士：军民融合实现军队大学的开放性 [Academician Yang Xuejun: military–civil
fusion is the realisation of the openness of military universities], Zhongguo
kexuebao中国科学报, 24 October 2012.
28
James Mulvenon, Bates Gill, ‘Chinese military-related think tanks and research
institutions’, The China Quarterly, September 2002, 171:622–623.
29
Hamilton & Joske, ‘Australian universities are helping China’s military surpass
the United States’.
30
federalregister.gov
US Government, ‘Addition of certain persons to the entity list; and removal of
person from the entity list based on a removal request’, Federal Register, 18
February 2015
31
Yang Jungang 杨俊刚, Li Jun 李骏, An Wei 安玮, ‘Guoji lianhe peiyang boshi yanjiusheng
moshi tansuo’ 国际联合培养博士研究生模式探索 [An exploration of models of international joint
training of doctoral students].
32
The cases of Guan Naiyang and Chang Lei, discussed in Hamilton & Joske,
‘Australian universities are helping China’s military surpass the United
States’.
33
For example, the Chinese Academy of Sciences was used as cover by PLA
anti-satellite weaponry expert Yu Xiaohong to travel to the University of
Michigan. For further information, see Daniel Golden, Spy schools: how the CIA,
FBI, and foreign intelligence agencies secretly exploit America’s universities,
Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2017, 36.
34
Given that an estimated 2,500 PLA scientists have been sent abroad since 2007,
that figure can be weighted using the proportion of peer-reviewed literature
co-authored by scientists from each country with PLA researchers. For example,
roughly 21% of papers co-authored by PLA scientists and overseas scientists
between 2007 and 2017 include a UK-based scientist as an author. Multiplying
0.21 (the estimated proportion of PLA scientists sent to the UK) by 2,500 (the
median estimate of the number of PLA scientists sent abroad) gives 525 PLA
scientists sent to the UK since 2007. Note that one major shortcoming of this
methodology is that publications may be counted twice if they include authors
from China and two other countries.
35
Notably, no American institution was among these universities, despite the US
being one of the primary destinations for PLA scientists. This may indicate that
PLA collaboration in American universities is spread more broadly between
institutions, rather than being concentrated in a handful. It may also be a
reflection of the limitations of relying on collaboration on peer-reviewed
literature as a measure of PLA collaboration.
36
81.cn
Liu Hang 刘航,‘2015 nian guofang kexue jishu daxue zhaosheng jianzhang’ 2015
年国防科学技术大学招生简章 [2015 NUDT student recruitment guide], Zhongguo Junwang 中国军网, 13
May 2015
37
yjszs.nudt.edu.cn
Kai Bongs, Leonard J Pietrafosa, Xue Jingling and Tao Dacheng, as named in NUDT
2018 doctoral student recruitment guide, NUDT, August 2017, online. New Zealand
Scientist Gao Wei (高维) was also listed as an NUDT supervisor in 2017.
38
gesie.org
Yang Yu 杨宇, ‘Guojia gongpai liuxue xin moshi’ 国家公派留学新模式 [A new model of
government-sponsored overseas study], Shenzhou Xueren 神州学人, 2017, 9:14–17
39
Feng et al., ‘Guofang keji daxue shixiang weilai zhanzheng de rencai hangmu’
国防科技大学 驶向未来战争的人才航母 [NUDT—An aircraft carrier of talent steering towards future
wars].
40
massey.ac.nz
‘MoU with China’, media release, Massey Univiersity, New Zealand, 19 May 2008
41
Wang 王握文, ‘Zouchu guomen, dang zuzhi shenghuo “bu diaoxian”’, 走出国门，党组织生活’不掉线’
[Exiting the country, they stay connected with the life of party organisations].
42
Wang 王握文, ‘Zouchu guomen, dang zuzhi shenghuo “bu diaoxian”’, 走出国门，党组织生活’不掉线’
[Exiting the country, they stay connected with the life of party organisations].
43
Zhong 钟华, ‘Yang Xuejun yuanshi: junmin ronghe shixian jundui daxue de
kaifangxing’, 杨学军院士：军民融合实现军队大学的开放性 [Academician Yang Xuejun: military–civil
fusion is the realisation of the openness of military universities]
44
Zhong 钟华, ‘Yang Xuejun yuanshi: junmin ronghe shixian jundui daxue de
kaifangxing’, 杨学军院士：军民融合实现军队大学的开放性 [Academician Yang Xuejun: military-civil
fusion is the realisation of the openness of military universities].
45
Zhong 钟华, ‘Yang Xuejun yuanshi: junmin ronghe shixian jundui daxue de
kaifangxing’, 杨学军院士：军民融合实现军队大学的开放性 [Academician Yang Xuejun: military–civil
fusion is the realisation of the openness of military universities].
46
Zhong 钟华, ‘Yang Xuejun yuanshi: junmin ronghe shixian jundui daxue de
kaifangxing’, 杨学军院士：军民融合实现军队大学的开放性 [Academician Yang Xuejun: military-civil
fusion is the realisation of the openness of military universities].
47
military.china.com.cn
Wang Wowen 王握文, ‘Guofang keda haiwai jian 8 ge dang zhibu liuxuesheng quanbu wei
dangyuan’ 国防科大海外建8个党支部 留学生全部为 党员 [NUDT has established 8 overseas party
branches, all overseas students are party members], Jiefangjun Bao 解放军报, 21
January 2013
48
yz.chsi.com.cn
Feng Chunmei 冯春梅, Cai Weibin 蔡渭滨, Li Zhi 李治, ‘Guofang keda dazao xinxing junshi
rencai 10 nian taotai 152 ming boshisheng’ 国防科 大打造新型军事人才 10 年淘汰152名博士生 [NUDT
creating a new model of military talent, weeds out 152 doctoral students in ten
years], Renminwang 人民网, 9 October 2013
49
Wang 王握文, ‘Zouchu guomen, dang zuzhi shenghuo “bu diaoxian”’ 走出国门，党组织生活’不掉线’
[Exiting the country, they stay connected with the life of party organisations].
50
archive.org
Wang Wowen 王握文, Chen Ming 陈明, ‘Guofang keda haiwai liuxuesheng tongbu xuexi dang
de shijiuda baogao’ 国防科大海外留学生同步学 习党的十九大报告 [Overseas NUDT students study the 19th
Party Congress report], Huasheng Zaixian 华声在线, 20 October 2017
51
foreignpolicy.com
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, ‘The Chinese Communist Party is setting up cells at
universities across America’, Foreign Policy, 18 April 2018
52
xy.nudt.edu.cn
Yang Yanqing 杨彦青, Xie Qi 谢琦, ‘“Weixin qun” zhuli haiwai xuezi jianding xinnian’
微信群”助理海外学子鉴定信念 [WeChat groups help overseas students stick firmly to their
faith], Guangming Ribao 光明日报, 19 November 2015
53
Wang 王握文, ‘Zouchu guomen, dang zuzhi shenghuo “bu diaoxian”’, 走出国门，党组织生活’不掉线’
[Exiting the country, they stay connected with the life of party organisations]
54
archive.org
2015 graduate study abroad policy, National University of Defense Technology, 18
November 2014
55
mil.news.sina.com.cn
Anonymous, ‘Guofang keda jinnian zhichi 600 duo ren chuguo shenzao 100% anshi
huiguo’ 国防科大近年支持600多人出国深造 100%按时回 国 [NUDT sent over 600 overseas for development
in recent years—100 per cent returned on time], Jiefangjunbao 解放军报, 27 August
2013
56
chuguo.cn
‘Will military school graduation affect visas?’, 23 May 2002
57
dangshi.people.com.cn
Wen Wang, ‘The beginning and end of Deng Xiaoping and the National University of
Defense Technology (4), People.cn, 16 January 2012
58
Mark Jennings, Sam Sachdeva, ‘Papers shed light on Yang’s past’, Newsroom, 20
October 2017, online. See Anne-Marie Brady, Magic weapons: China’s political
influence activities under Xi Jinping, Wilson Center, September 2017, for a more
detailed discussion of Yang Jian with important context on the CCP’s influence
in New Zealand.
59
openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au
Matt Nippert, ‘OIA documents confirm National MP Jian Yang did not disclose
military intelligence links’, NZ Herald, 19 October 2017, online; Li Jingwei,
‘Do everything you do; chances come to you’, GP Global People, 2013, online;
Alex Joske, ‘Incident at university pharmacy highlights a divided Chinese
community’, Woroni, 26 August 2016, online. Yang Jiang’s PhD thesis is
available.
60
Jennings & Sachdeva, ‘Papers shed light on Yang’s past’
61
linkedin.com
See, for example, LinkedIn profiles here
62
Between 2000 and 2015, English-language publications from a cover institute for
the Rocket Force Engineering University, the Xi’an Research Institute of High
Technology, outnumbered those published openly by the Rocket Force Engineering
University.
63
yjszs.nudt.edu.cn
‘留学对象证明材料办理注意事项’, ‘Items to note regarding the management of materials for study
abroad partners’, NUDT, 14 November 2014
64
xinhuanet.com
RFEU was known as the 2nd Artillery Engineering University until the PLA 2nd
Artillery was reformed as the PLA Rocket Force on 31 December 2015. See
‘陆军领导机构火箭军战略支援部队成立大会在京举行’, ‘The inaugural meeting of the Army’s leading agency
Rocket Army Strategic Support Force was held in Beijing. Xi Jinping awarded the
flag to the PLA’s Rocket Army Strategic Support Force and gave a speech’,
Xinhua, 1 January 2016
65
See the biography of General Hu in Xiaoxiang Hu, Ligang Wu, Changhua Hu,
Zhaoqiang Wang, Huijun Gao, ‘Dynamic output feedback control of a flexible
air-breathing hypersonic vehicle via T–S fuzzy approach’, International Journal
of Systems Science, 2014, 45(8):1740–1756, doi: 10.1080/00207721.2012.749547
66
patents.google.com
‘The Second Artillery Engineering University 2014 Masters admissions guide’,
Rocket Forces Engineering University, 2014, online; Hu Changhua, Cai Gaungbin,
He Huafeng, Zhou Tao, Ma Qingliang, Hu Xiaoxiang, ‘A tangent linearization
method for flight control system non-linear tracking control device design,
Rocket Force Engineering University, 30 Auguest 2013
67
sciencedirect.com
Zhou Zhi-Jie, Hu Changhua, Xu Dong-Ling, Chen Mao-Yin, Zhou Dong-Hua, ‘A model
for real-time failure prognosis based on hidden Markov model and belief rule
base’, European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 207:269–283, online; Hang
Wei, Guan-Yu Hu, Zhi-Jie Zhou, Pei-Li Qiao, Zhi-Guo Zhou, You-Min Zhang, ‘A new
BRB model for security-state assessment of cloud computing based on the impact
of external and internal environments’, ScienceDirect, March 2018j, 73:207–218
68
sciencedirect.com
Zhaoqiang Wang, Changhua Hu, Wenbin Wang, Zhijie Zhou, Xiaosheng Si, ‘A case
study of remaining storage life prediction using stochastic filtering with the
influence of condition monitoring’, ScienceDirect, December 2014, 132:186–195
69
archive.org
Evidence that they’re from RFEU is here
70
sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com
Bree Feng, ‘Chinese student to contest expulsion from Norway, lawyer says’, New
York Times, 6 February 2015
71
semanticscholar.org
Hu Xiaoxiang, Hamid Reza Karimi, Zhang Yan, ‘MPC-based tracking control for
air-breathing hypersonic vehicles with input constraints’, Proceedings of the
32nd Chinese Control Conference, 2013
72
Xiaoxiang Hu et al., ‘Model predictive control-based non-linear fault tolerant
control for air-breathing hypersonic vehicles’, IET Control Theory and
Applications, 2014, 8(13):1146–1153.
73
demo.shendu.org
‘Central achievement’, Rocket Force University of Engineering (RFUE), no date
74
demo.shendu.org
'Scientific projects undertaken (national level projects)’, RFUE, no date
75
demo.shendu.org
‘Teachers team’, RFUE, no date, online; ‘Research awards’, RFUE, no date,
76
Hu X, H Karimi, Zhang D, Gao D, ‘Non-fragile sliding mode control for flexible
air-breathing hypersonic vehicles’, Proceedings of the 2012 7th IEEE Conference
on Industrial Electronics and Applications, 2012, 906–911.
77
chinadaily.com.cn
‘Norway’s expulsion of Chinese academic old trick to defame China’, China Daily
Europe, 6 February 2015, online; ‘Norway’s accusation against expelled scholar
“groundless”’, China Daily, 4 February 20015
78
pahoyden.no
Tove Lie, Eva Tonnessen, ‘Agder-forskere vant mot PST’, Pa Hoyden, 17 September
2015
79
udiregelverk.no
Lars Gunnar Eie, ‘UiA-forskere utvist på grunn av fare for rikets sikkerhet’,
NRK, 31 January 2015, online; ‘Immigration law. Expulsion. Export controls.
Immigration Act section 122. Immigration Regulations section 19–29. EMC Article
3’, UDI udiregelverk.no, 22 June 2016
80
mmt2015.org
‘MMT2015 Technical Program’, 9th International Symposium on Mobile Mapping
Technology (MMT2015), 9–11 December 2015, Sydney, Australia
81
mil.news.sina.com.cn
Song Hailong 宋海龙, Wang Jinfu 王金福, ‘Jiefangjun xinxi gongcheng daxue yinru dianzi
zhengzhi jiaoyuan’ 解放军信息工程大学引入电子政 治教员 [PLAIEU introduces electronic political
educators], Guangming ribao 光明日报, 14 December 2004
82
A Scopus search for ‘Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping’ and
‘Zhengzhou Inst. Of Surv. And Mapping’ on 27 August 2018 found 285 papers,
excluding years prior to 2000.
83
doc88.com
UNSW Sydney, Civil and Engineering annual report 2016, online . See Zhu Xinhui
朱新慧, ‘Xiandai diqiao yundong cankao jizhun de yanjiu’ 现代 地壳运动参考基准的研究 [Study on
datum of modern crustal motion], PhD thesis submitted to the PLA Information
Engineering University, October 2012, 142
84
See, for example, Zhu Xinhui, et al., ‘A Unified Global Reference Frame of
Vertical Crustal Movements by Satellite Laser Ranging’, Sensors 2016, 16, 225.
85
Global Navigation Satellite Systems Research Centre, Visitors and guest
researchers, Curtin University, 15 June 2016, online. For an example of Guo’s
research, see Guo Jianfeng 郭建锋, Zhao Jun 赵俊, ‘Cucha tance yu shibie tongji
jianyanliang de bijiao fenxi’ 粗差探测与识别统计 检验量的比较分析 [Comparative analysis of
statistical tests used for detection and identification of outliers], Cehui
Xuebao 测绘学报, 2012, 41(1):14–18.
86
A Scopus search for the ‘Zhengzhou Information Science Technology Institute’,
‘Zhengzhou Institute of Information Science and Technology’ and ‘Zhengzhou
Information Science and Technology Institute’ on 3 October 2018 found 1,317
papers.
87
Zhang Xiyong 张习勇, Guo Hua 郭华, Teng Jihong 滕吉红, ‘Ni Bent hanshu de gouzao’
拟Bent函数的构造 [Constructions of quasi-Bent functions], Gongcheng Shuxue Xuebao
工程数学学报, 2010 (05).
88
dspcs-witsp.com
‘Conference program’, 8th International Conference on Signal Processing and
Communication Systems, 15–17 December 2014, Gold Coast, Australia,
89
Zhu Yijun et al., ‘Low complexity adaptive spatial modulation for visible light
communication’, Journal of Jilin University (Engineering and Technology
Edition), 2015, 6:2080–2084.
90
Dr Jian-Kang Zhang, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, McMaster
University, Biography, online; Yijun Zhu, Jiankang Zhang, Hongyi Yu, ‘Linear
receivers for full-diversity training space-time block codes’, IEEE Transactions
on Vehicular Technology, July 2012, 61(6):2884–2889.
91
No further details have been provided in this report owing to potential
confusion with other individuals’ names.
92
justice.gov
US Department of Justice, ‘US charges five Chinese military hackers for cyber
espionage against US corporations and a labor organization for commercial
advantage’, media release, US Government, 19 May 2014
93
Similar activities have been mentioned in N Eftimiades, Chinese intelligence
operations, Frank Cass, Ilford, 1994, 61–66, which describes a Chinese student
with a background in hard sciences who was recruited by the Ministry of State
Security as a long-term agent before he went to study in US. He was advised not
to contact Chinese authorities at all while abroad but to make sure to return to
China at least once every two years for debriefing. The emergency contact number
he was given was that of a provincial office of COSTIND, a Chinese Government
agency responsible for coordinating the defence industry.
94
See the recent arrest of a Chinese electrical engineer in the US, US Department
of Justice, ‘Chinese national arrested for allegedly acting within the United
States as an unregistered agent of the People’s Republic of China’, media
release, US Government, 25 September 2018, online. See also the cases of Greg
Chung and Chi Mak in Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, ‘How the FBI cracked a Chinese spy
ring’, The New Yorker, 12 May 2014, online. For a compilation of industrial
espionage cases in the US involving China, see the appendix to William C Hannas,
James Mulvenon, Anna B Puglisi, Chinese industrial espionage: technology
acquisition and military modernisation, Asian Security Studies, Routledge, 2013.
95
Anonymous, ‘Guofang keda jinnian zhichi 600 duo ren chuguo shenzao 100% anshi
huiguo’ 国防科大近年支持600多人出国深造 100%按时回 国 [NUDT sent over 600 overseas for development
in recent years—100 per cent returned on time].
96
whitehouse.gov
US Government, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The
White House, December 2017
97
defence.gov.au
Michael Shoebridge, ‘Submission to the Review of the Defence Controls Act 2012’,
25 July 2018
98
Defence Trade Controls Act 2012
99
nudt.edu.cn
‘Guofang keji daxue shijie yiliu daxue jianshe fangan’ 国防科技大学世界刘大学建设方案 [NUDT
plan for building a world-class university], NUDT, August 2018
100
science.house.gov
The board was unexpectedly disbanded in 2018 for unclear reasons. House Science,
Space, and Technology Committee, ‘SST Committee questions FBI’s disbanding of
National Security Higher Education Board’, media release, US Congress, 26 April
2018
101
aspistrategist.org.au
For example, Michael Shoebridge, ‘It’s time to get things straight with China’,
The Strategist, 20 September 2018
102
See more detailed recommendations on improvements to visa screening in Vicente
Garrido Rebolledo, ‘Intangible transfers of technology and visa screening in the
European Union’, Non-Proliferation Papers, March 2012.
103
law.cornell.edu
Legal Information Institute, 124.1 Manufacturing license agreements and
technical assistance agreements, Cornell University, 3 June 2016
104
theguardian.com
For details on the China Electronics Technology Group’s investment in the
University of Technology Sydney, see Danielle Cave, Brendan Thomas-Noone, ‘CSIRO
cooperation with Chinese defence contractor should raise questions’, The
Guardian, 3 June 2017



AUTHOR

ALEX JOSKE

Previous Staff

Full bio


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First published October 2018

Cyber, Technology & Security


TOPICS

Asia & the Pacific
China
Foreign policy
National Security
Cyber
Open Source Intelligence
China tech
Foreign Interference
Critical & Emerging Technology
Cyber, Technology & Security


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