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Year: 2023
* 2023
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* Score heatmaps
* Rankings
* Thematic areas
* Criminal markets
* Human trafficking
* Human smuggling
* Extortion & protection racketeering
* Arms trafficking
* Trade in counterfeit goods
* Illicit trade in excisable goods
* Flora crimes
* Fauna crimes
* Non-renewable resource crimes
* Heroin trade
* Cocaine trade
* Cannabis trade
* Synthetic drug trade
* Cyber-dependent crimes
* Financial crimes
* Criminal actor
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A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during
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Korea, DPR
x
* Continent/Region
* Africa
* Central Africa
* East Africa
* North Africa
* Southern Africa
* West Africa
* Americas
* Caribbean
* Central America
* North America
* South America
* Asia
* Central Asia and the Caucasus
* Eastern Asia
* South-Eastern Asia
* Southern Asia
* Western Asia
* Europe
* Central & Eastern Europe
* Northern Europe
* Southern Europe
* Western Europe
* Oceania
* Australia and New Zealand
* Melanesia
* Micronesia
* Polynesia
* Countries
* Afghanistan
* Albania
* Algeria
* Andorra
* Angola
* Antigua and Barbuda
* Argentina
* Armenia
* Australia
* Austria
* Azerbaijan
* Bahamas
* Bahrain
* Bangladesh
* Barbados
* Belarus
* Belgium
* Belize
* Benin
* Bhutan
* Bolivia
* Bosnia and Herzegovina
* Botswana
* Brazil
* Brunei
* Bulgaria
* Burkina Faso
* Burundi
* Cabo Verde
* Cambodia
* Cameroon
* Canada
* Central African Republic
* Chad
* Chile
* China
* Colombia
* Comoros
* Congo, Dem. Rep.
* Congo, Rep.
* Costa Rica
* Côte d'Ivoire
* Croatia
* Cuba
* Cyprus
* Czech Republic
* Denmark
* Djibouti
* Dominica
* Dominican Republic
* Ecuador
* Egypt
* El Salvador
* Equatorial Guinea
* Eritrea
* Estonia
* Eswatini
* Ethiopia
* Fiji
* Finland
* France
* Gabon
* Gambia
* Georgia
* Germany
* Ghana
* Greece
* Grenada
* Guatemala
* Guinea
* Guinea-Bissau
* Guyana
* Haiti
* Honduras
* Hungary
* Iceland
* India
* Indonesia
* Iran
* Iraq
* Ireland
* Israel
* Italy
* Jamaica
* Japan
* Jordan
* Kazakhstan
* Kenya
* Kiribati
* Korea, DPR
* Korea, Rep.
* Kuwait
* Kyrgyzstan
* Laos
* Latvia
* Lebanon
* Lesotho
* Liberia
* Libya
* Liechtenstein
* Lithuania
* Luxembourg
* Madagascar
* Malawi
* Malaysia
* Maldives
* Mali
* Malta
* Marshall Islands
* Mauritania
* Mauritius
* Mexico
* Micronesia (Federated States of)
* Moldova
* Monaco
* Mongolia
* Montenegro
* Morocco
* Mozambique
* Myanmar
* Namibia
* Nauru
* Nepal
* Netherlands
* New Zealand
* Nicaragua
* Niger
* Nigeria
* North Macedonia
* Norway
* Oman
* Pakistan
* Palau
* Panama
* Papua New Guinea
* Paraguay
* Peru
* Philippines
* Poland
* Portugal
* Qatar
* Romania
* Russia
* Rwanda
* Samoa
* San Marino
* Sao Tome and Principe
* Saudi Arabia
* Senegal
* Serbia
* Seychelles
* Sierra Leone
* Singapore
* Slovakia
* Slovenia
* Solomon Islands
* Somalia
* South Africa
* South Sudan
* Spain
* Sri Lanka
* St. Kitts and Nevis
* St. Lucia
* St. Vincent and the Grenadines
* Sudan
* Suriname
* Sweden
* Switzerland
* Syria
* Tajikistan
* Tanzania
* Thailand
* Timor-Leste
* Togo
* Tonga
* Trinidad and Tobago
* Tunisia
* Turkey
* Turkmenistan
* Tuvalu
* Uganda
* Ukraine
* United Arab Emirates
* United Kingdom
* United States
* Uruguay
* Uzbekistan
* Vanuatu
* Venezuela
* Vietnam
* Yemen
* Zambia
* Zimbabwe
PROFILE
KOREA, DPR
CAPITAL
PYONGYANG
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP)
NO DATA
INCOME GROUP
LOW INCOME
POPULATION
25,971,909
AREA
120,540 KM²
GEOGRAPHY TYPE
COASTAL
4.820.04
CRIMINALITY SCORE
2021202305104.784.82
111TH OF 193 COUNTRIES -6
32ND OF 46 COUNTRIES IN ASIA-1
2ND OF 5 COUNTRIES IN EASTERN ASIA1
Criminal markets
5.730.43
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific
crime type.
2021202305105.305.73
Human trafficking
8.500.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the
purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
2021202305108.008.50
Human smuggling
6.500.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or
residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
2021202305106.506.50
Extortion & protection racketeering
1.50 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a
mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Arms trafficking
9.000.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and
ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
2021202305109.009.00
Trade in counterfeit goods
7.50 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently
mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Illicit trade in excisable goods
4.00 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban
or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Flora crimes
3.002.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and
other species protected under national law.
2021202305101.003.00
Fauna crimes
3.000.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and
other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
2021202305103.003.00
Non-renewable resource crimes
7.500.50
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural
resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
2021202305107.007.50
Heroin trade
4.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is
considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
2021202305103.504.00
Cocaine trade
1.50-0.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives.
Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
2021202305102.001.50
Cannabis trade
5.00-1.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or
leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
2021202305106.005.00
Synthetic drug trade
8.001.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is
considered in determining the reach of the market.
2021202305107.008.00
Cyber-dependent crimes
9.00 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology
with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Financial crimes
8.00 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud,
embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Criminal actors
3.90-0.35
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on
society.
2021202305104.253.90
Mafia-style groups
1.000.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined
leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
2021202305101.001.00
Criminal networks
3.001.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail
to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
2021202305102.003.00
State-embedded actors
10.000.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s
apparatus.
20212023051010.0010.00
Foreign actors
4.500.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country.
Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
2021202305104.004.50
Private sector actors
1.00 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy
free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
1.79-0.17
RESILIENCE SCORE
2021202305101.961.79
187TH OF 193 COUNTRIES 0
43RD OF 46 COUNTRIES IN ASIA2
5TH OF 5 COUNTRIES IN EASTERN ASIA0
Political leadership & governance
3.00-0.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong
political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
2021202305103.503.00
Government transparency and accountability
1.000.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure
against state collusion in illicit activities.
2021202305101.001.00
International cooperation
2.000.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making
and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
2021202305102.002.00
National policies and laws
2.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized
crime.
2021202305102.002.00
Judicial system and detention
1.00-0.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce
judgments on organized crime-related cases.
2021202305101.501.00
Law enforcement
1.500.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce
adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
2021202305101.501.50
Territorial integrity
6.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber
territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
2021202305106.006.00
Anti-money laundering
1.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other
related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
2021202305101.001.00
Economic regulatory capacity
1.00-0.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national
and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
2021202305101.501.00
Victim and witness support
1.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including
initiatives such as witness protection programs.
2021202305101.001.00
Prevention
1.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes
and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
2021202305101.001.00
Non-state actors
1.00-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their
roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
2021202305101.501.00
1.79 3.90 5.73 1.79 3.90 5.73
1.79-0.17
RESILIENCE SCORE
2021202305101.961.79
187TH OF 193 COUNTRIES 0
43RD OF 46 COUNTRIES IN ASIA2
5TH OF 5 COUNTRIES IN EASTERN ASIA0
Political leadership & governance
3.00-0.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong
political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
2021202305103.503.00
Government transparency and accountability
1.000.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure
against state collusion in illicit activities.
2021202305101.001.00
International cooperation
2.000.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making
and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
2021202305102.002.00
National policies and laws
2.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized
crime.
2021202305102.002.00
Judicial system and detention
1.00-0.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce
judgments on organized crime-related cases.
2021202305101.501.00
Law enforcement
1.500.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce
adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
2021202305101.501.50
Territorial integrity
6.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber
territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
2021202305106.006.00
Anti-money laundering
1.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other
related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
2021202305101.001.00
Economic regulatory capacity
1.00-0.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national
and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
2021202305101.501.00
Victim and witness support
1.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including
initiatives such as witness protection programs.
2021202305101.001.00
Prevention
1.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes
and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
2021202305101.001.00
Non-state actors
1.00-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their
roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
2021202305101.501.00
ANALYSIS
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PEOPLE
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a source country for human
trafficking involving sexual exploitation and forced labour. There are two
primary human trafficking structures in the country: the trafficking of women
and girls to China and adjacent countries by various criminal actors, and forced
labour perpetuated by the government on its citizens through domestic labour
camps or by sending citizens abroad under bilateral agreements. North Korean
citizens who attempt to leave the country are vulnerable to human trafficking by
loosely organized criminal groups in neighbouring China, with North Korean women
often willingly choosing trafficking as an escape route despite the dangers this
poses. Children of North Koreans born outside of the DPRK are especially
vulnerable to exploitation since they are usually not registered at birth and
are therefore stateless.
Human smuggling is active in the DPRK, with many smuggled people ending up in
China or the Republic of Korea (South Korea). This is because the human rights
violations in the country compel people to seek refuge elsewhere. The COVID-19
pandemic has drastically reduced the number of defectors, with human smugglers
now preferring to export drugs as it is more profitable and less risky. Despite
this, human smuggling remains a significant source of human trafficking because
of the vulnerability of North Korean people. Extortion crimes exist in the
country, but they do not seem to be linked to organized crime groups.
TRADE
The DPRK is a significant source and destination country in the global arms
trafficking market. Despite international sanctions, the regime engages in arms
trafficking operations to obtain foreign currency, and it has been known to
collaborate with foreign mafia networks. The DPRK exports arms to countries and
groups worldwide, and it uses diplomatic missions, intelligence officers, and
overseas workers to smuggle arms in and out of the country, making it difficult
to track these illicit operations. Typical destinations for North Korean arms
include friendly states such as Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Malaysia, and several
African countries. Although most of these deals are between states, some weapons
end up in black markets.
Counterfeit goods, including pharmaceuticals, textile products, shoes and
perfumery are pervasive in the DPRK. Counterfeited luxury items that are
reportedly produced in the country are openly displayed and sold in North Korean
department stores. The smuggling of excise goods also occurs in the DPRK, but
information about who controls the market and how large and violent it is
remains scarce. Previous reports have revealed that the DPRK’s embassies were
organized like multinational criminal enterprises, with state officials
travelling the world carrying alcohol and cigarettes, manufactured in the DPRK
for smuggling. Moreover, criminal groups from China and other countries are
believed to supply tobacco leaves and buy back the finished cigarette products,
making it one of the primary sources of illicit income for the regime. Factories
producing counterfeit cigarettes are owned and operated by the North Korean
military, and the country is considered a major exporter of these products to
countries such as Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Belize. Although the
government is suspected of being involved in the production of counterfeit goods
and illegal transactions, the exact percentage and role of counterfeiting in the
regime’s criminal enterprises remain unclear.
ENVIRONMENT
Illegal logging is an issue in the DPRK and is the most common organized crime
related to flora. Over the last few decades, tree cover has sharply declined due
to the informal trade in wood and wood products with China. This trade is
carried out by North Korean army officers and provincial bureaucrats who seek to
boost their salaries or fund their factories near the Chinese border. It is
estimated that almost all wood trade between the two countries is illicit.
As the DPRK government struggles for foreign currency, it has established
sophisticated transnational smuggling networks to collect it, participating in a
variety of criminal markets. In line with this, diplomats from the DPRK have
reportedly been smuggling rhino horn and ivory under the cover of diplomatic
immunity, with most of these commodities sold in China and some sold within the
country.
Illegal fuel smuggling is increasingly prevalent in the DPRK, with the
government engaging in state-led smuggling activities to circumvent
international sanctions. China provides oil products on a limited basis, and the
volume of illicit oil shipped to the DPRK decreased sharply in early 2021 as a
result of the North Korean regime’s efforts to curb the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, after restrictions were lifted, there was a significant increase in
these activities, suggesting that illicit trade is rebounding. Investigations
have revealed that vessels from other countries in East Asia, primarily China,
Taiwan, and Singapore, carry out illicit oil smuggling operations using
sophisticated tactics such as ship-to-ship transfers and vessel-identity
laundering. Additionally, China has been accused of accepting sanctioned coal
from the DPRK in exchange for aid cargos.
DRUGS
The DPRK government has been involved in the production and trade of heroin for
decades. There is evidence to suggest that the regime participates in opium
cultivation and heroin manufacturing. The production and smuggling of heroin are
ways for the regime to obtain foreign currency, despite the severe penalties for
drug-related crimes. Private heroin use persists, often for medical purposes.
The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the import of raw materials for synthetic drugs,
leading to a spike in opium and heroin use among residents. Conversely, the
domestic cocaine market is limited due to the drug’s high price and there is no
evidence of North Korean actors being involved in the cocaine trade. Even though
cannabis is not a widely preferred substance in the country, the government is
known to be involved in the cannabis trade abroad to accumulate foreign
currency. The production, distribution, and sale of synthetic drugs, especially
methamphetamine, is a significant source of revenue for the regime. High-profile
defectors have confirmed that government-sanctioned drug production and
trafficking have increased in recent years. The regime produces drugs
domestically at an industrial level through pharmaceutical companies and
traffics them through embassy networks and diplomats. Methamphetamine use is
socially accepted and equated to energy drinks, but the North Korean government
adopted an anti-drug strategy because of concerns about the drug epidemic.
Despite authorities increasing the level of punishment for illegal drug
production and smuggling in the last two decades, drug distribution and use
still appear to be rampant in the country.
CYBER CRIMES
The DPRK is heavily involved in cybercrime, hosting notable groups responsible
for attacks worldwide. They have used various techniques to obtain funds from
organizations, such as code exploits and malware. Despite the denial of
governmental involvement in these activities, ransomware attacks have been
largely linked to the North Korean military, mainly targeting the Asia-Pacific
region, global banks, and blockchain providers and users from the Republic of
Korea. In fact, the Republic of Korea suffers millions of cyber-attack attempts
daily by North Korean hackers. In recent years, North Korean hackers have been
involved in operations that have stolen hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth
of cryptocurrency worldwide. Despite international efforts to curb their
activities, the DPRK’s cybercrime operations continue to pose a significant
threat to global security.
FINANCIAL CRIMES
There have been reports of financial criminal activities, particularly financial
fraud, originating from within the DPRK but targeting people and places outside
the country through cyber-enabled activities, including spear phishing and ATM
cash-out thefts. These groups are said to have the support of the government and
are known as a cyber army. The illicit profits generated from these
cyber-enabled activities are believed to have become the DPRK’s primary source
of income, possibly surpassing the value of sales from weapons and military
services. Concerning tax evasion, the DPRK officially claims to be a tax-free
country and the only tax-exempt nation globally. Although evidence suggests that
embezzlement activities occur, they do not seem to be connected to organized
crime groups.
CRIMINAL ACTORS
The DPRK government is widely believed to function as a criminal organization
that controls most criminal markets within the country. It is difficult to
differentiate state-embedded actors involved in criminal activities from
government-authorized criminal activities. In fact, the government leads the
primary trafficking structure within the country, and border guards and
officials are often bribed to maintain secrecy. The DPRK is the only country
whose government conducts criminal hacking for monetary gain. Intelligence
reports indicate that the country has dedicated military units for this purpose,
as well as separate cybercrime groups believed to be affiliated with the regime.
As the government controls all aspects of society, including the economy, there
is no private sector activity in the DPRK.
The DPRK government collaborates with foreign actors, including those from
China, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South East Asian countries, to evade
international sanctions and engage in organized criminal activities for
financial gain. These activities include drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and
smuggling of contraband cigarettes. Investigations have shown that foreign
vessels owned by companies in China, Taiwan, and Singapore were involved in oil
smuggling operations to the DPRK. Chinese traders and brokers are involved in
human smuggling and trafficking operations, as well as illicit timber trade
activities on the China-DPRK border. In the past, some groups carried out money
laundering schemes using shell companies with the help of Chinese firms, which
are allegedly organized and backed by government authorities.
The North Korean state controls most of the country’s society and individuals,
leaving no room for the existence of mafia-style organizations. However,
criminal networks linked to government officials and military personnel do
exist, and they are involved in smuggling and human trafficking, among other
activities. Recent studies suggest that the DPRK’s organized crime landscape is
changing, particularly in the drug market. Although the government’s influence
on these criminal activities remains strong, it is difficult to estimate the
structure and influence of criminal groups. Reports suggest that human smuggling
brokers and informal trading groups for wood and wood products may operate as
loosely organized criminal groups, but their composition is not fully known.
LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE
The DPRK is a totalitarian, one-party state that lacks democratic process and
political freedom. The government’s stance against organized crime is opaque and
vague. In fact, the North Korean government is known to be involved in various
criminal markets, including drug and arms trafficking, human trafficking, money
laundering, and cybercrime. The population lives under a repressive regime where
they must comply strictly with laws or face severe penalties such as
imprisonment, forced labour, or even execution. In fact, the DPRK is one of the
most repressive countries globally, where the government suppresses its people
using fear, threats, and coercion. Corruption, including bribery, is prevalent,
and the country is considered one of the most corrupt in the world by several
international anti-corruption organizations. Corruption has become a part of the
daily life with no accountability, but especially low-level corruption may
benefit the population as it helps people survive the humanitarian crisis and
famine in the country.
The DPRK has only ratified five of the 10 international treaties and conventions
on organized crime, indicating a low level of compliance with these agreements.
The regime claims to welcome international cooperation but remains afraid of
being influenced by the international community. There is no systematic
information on which countries have extradition agreements with the DPRK, but
Russia and China are known to have such agreements. The COVID-19 pandemic has
further isolated the DPRK from the international community, affecting
humanitarian aid and military cooperation. Although the DPRK’s legal codes are
based on German, Japanese, and Soviet Russian traditions, in practice, it is the
Workers’ Party of Korea that makes the rules.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SECURITY
The DPRK lacks specific units dedicated to fighting organized crime in its
judicial system, with the police handling ordinary crimes. Although a formal
legal system exists, it is widely corrupt and incapable of guaranteeing due
process. Arbitrary arrests and unjustified detentions are commonplace, with
punishments including torture, deportation to labour camps, and execution. The
State Security Department has significant influence over the judicial system and
detention, and there is ample evidence that people, whether guilty or not, are
often arrested and punished without any legal proceedings. The DPRK has some of
the world’s most inhumane prisons, and tens of thousands of forced labourers are
detained in extensive labour camps maintained by the government. The government
allegedly controls these camps by threatening the prisoners’ families with
detention. The North Korean penal system lacks any international oversight, and
the evidence collected shows systemic and far-reaching violence and inhumane
conditions.
The DPRK does not have a specific law enforcement unit dedicated to organized
crime, but its extensive surveillance system and two principal law enforcement
agencies suggest a high level of control over the population and the ability to
detect and deter illicit activities. The State Security Department is a secret
intelligence entity that reports directly to the leader and is assumed to handle
monitoring of North Korean society for possible dissent, counterintelligence,
and any threats against the regime.
The DPRK shares borders with Russia, China, and the Republic of Korea. The
border with the Republic of Korea is heavily monitored and policed, making it
difficult to cross. The DPRK-China border is considered porous, with most
defectors from the DPRK crossing into China, and most illicit goods being
smuggled through that border. However, the Chinese government recently passed a
new land border law to protect its territorial sovereignty and land border
security, which could potentially obstruct human smuggling and trafficking
activities. The DPRK-Russia border is only 17 kms long and is considered remote
and difficult to cross. The DPRK may lack sufficient resources to monitor its
borders for illicit goods, and customs officials and border guards are known to
be susceptible to taking bribes or being involved in smuggling and trafficking
because of low salaries. The DPRK’s cyber-capabilities are also increasing in
scope and sophistication.
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT
The DPRK relies heavily on foreign currency earned through criminal activities,
and despite alleging to cooperate with international organizations to combat
money laundering, the regime does not actively engage in such efforts. In 2021,
international organizations urged the DPRK to address finance-related
deficiencies, warning of the risks posed by its illicit activities related to
financing weapons of mass destruction through money laundering. Organizations
and governments have been warned to adapt their regulations to better reflect
designated non-financial businesses and professions because of the DPRK’s
increasing risk of evading targeted sanctions.
The economic environment in the DPRK is severely inhibited because almost all
property belongs to the state, and there is an absence of a functioning
judiciary and weak rule of law. The government controls all companies earning
foreign currency as well as production quotas for all products, and has a large
military spend, which reduces the economy’s reinvestment capacity. Economic
regulation is only defined by the leader and the control of citizens and
companies is prioritized over a developed market, resulting in the DPRK being
the least economically free country in the world. Sanctions and limited foreign
trading partners have further impeded economic freedom, resulting in the North
Korean economy shrinking, and being at constant risk of famine and malnutrition
among its citizens.
CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION
There is no evidence to suggest that the DPRK devotes resources to victim
protection or that civil society organizations dedicated to this purpose exist,
because the regime prohibits any assembly outside of government control. Even
though drug addiction is common in the country, there are no drug treatment
programmes offered. Prevention strategies targeting organized crime are probably
not in place, as the DPRK claims that there is no crime in its society.
Although international NGOs are present in the DPRK, there is no evidence to
suggest that they work towards countering organized crime or supporting victims
of organized crime. The few NGOs operating in the DPRK mainly focus on reducing
suffering from famine and harsh conditions faced by the population. The
government exerts extensive control over the internet and communications in the
country, with virtually unlimited jurisdiction to arrest and punish citizens
without legal proceedings. The DPRK is considered one of the worst countries in
the world for freedom of expression, which is punished by imprisonment, forced
labour, torture, or execution. The government maintains a system of prison camps
for political prisoners and commits widespread and systematic human rights
abuses.
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GLOBAL ORGANIZED CRIME INDEX
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