blog.cyberwar.nl Open in urlscan Pro
149.210.129.7  Public Scan

Form analysis
1 forms found in the DOM

GET https://blog.cyberwar.nl/

<form role="search" method="get" class="search-form" action="https://blog.cyberwar.nl/">
  <label>
    <span class="screen-reader-text">Search for:</span>
    <input type="search" class="search-field" placeholder="Search" value="" name="s" title="Search for:">
  </label>
  <input type="submit" class="fa search-submit" value="">
</form>

Text Content

MENU

Skip to content
 * Home
 * List of all posts on this blog


MATTHIJS R. KOOT'S NOTEBOOK


PERSONAL BLOG. HOBBIES: IT, SECURITY, PRIVACY, DEMOCRACY.


DUTCH GENERAL INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY SERVICE (AIVD) DISRUPTS ACTIVITIES OF
RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TARGETING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Posted on 2022-06-162022-06-16 by mrkoot

On June 16, the Dutch General Intelligence & Security Service (AIVD) announced
that they prevented a Russian military intelligence officer from gaining access
as an intern to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. The ICC is
of interest to the GRU because it investigates possible war crimes committed by
Russia in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine.

The GRU officer traveled from Brazil to the Netherlands in April 2022 using a
cover identity, making him a so-called “illegal”. He planned to start an
internship with the ICC, which would have given him access to the ICC’s building
and systems. This would have enabled the GRU to collect intelligence, spot and
recruit sources, and possibly influence criminal proceedings.

On his arrival at Schiphol Airport, the AIVD informed the Immigration &
Naturalization Service (IND), after which the officer was refused entry to the
Netherlands and put on the first plane back to Brazil as persona non grata.

The AIVD assessed the officer as a “potentially very serious” threat to both
national security and the security of the ICC as well as, due to the outlook of
him acquiring access to the ICC, allies.

In a first-ever for the AIVD, it also released translations of a partially
redacted 4-page document that describes the “extensive and complex” cover
identity of the officer. It was originally written in Portuguese, “probably
created around mid-2010” and “likely written” by the officer himself, and
according to the AIVD provides insight into his modus operandi. The cover
identity hid any and all links between him and Russia. According to the AIVD,
the construction of this kind of cover identity “generally takes years to
complete”.

In the note accompanying the document, the AIVD says that Russian intelligence
services “spend years” on the construction of cover identities for illegals, to
which end they “collect information on how other countries register and store
personal data”, or illegally procure or forge identity documents. Information in
the cover identity “can therefore be traceable to one or more actual persons,
living or dead” as well as to (fake) individuals “who only exist on paper or in
registries of local authorities”.




EU MEMBER STATES EXPEL >120 RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS IN AN APPARENT COORDINATED EFFORT
TO REDUCE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE IN THE EU

Posted on 2022-04-012022-04-01 by mrkoot

A week after Poland announced it expels 45 Russian diplomats, the foreign
ministries of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Ireland and the Netherlands announced
on March 29, 2022 that they too will expel Russian diplomats. A day later,
Slovakia followed up by announcing expulsion of another 35 Russian diplomats.

The Czech Republic, who in 2021 called on EU and NATO to expel Russian diplomats
in solidarity against Moscow, expels one diplomat from the embassy in Prague on
a 72-hour notice. In a tweet the Czech ministry of foreign affairs stated that
“Together with our Allies, we are reducing the Russian intelligence presence in
the EU.”

Belgium expels 21 diplomats from the embassy in Brussels and consulate in
Antwerp. Minister Sophie Wilmès stated the measure is taken to protect national
security and is unrelated to the war in Ukraine. “Diplomatic channels with
Russia remain open, the Russian embassy can continue to operate and we continue
to advocate dialogue”, Wilmès said.

The Netherlands expels 17 diplomats from the embassy in The Hague. According to
minister Wopke Hoekstra they are secretly active as intelligence officers.
Hoekstra bases this on information from Dutch intelligence & security services
AIVD and MIVD. The embassy in the Hague has 75 registered diplomats, of which 58
will remain. Hoekstra says the decision was taken with “a number of like-minded
countries”, based on grounds of national security. Like his Belgian colleague,
Hoekstra adds he wants diplomatic channels with Russia to remain open.

Ireland expels 4 “senior officials” from the embassy in Dublin for engaging in
activities “not […] in accordance with international standards of diplomatic
behavior”. They were suspected of being undercover military officers of the GRU
and were already on the radar of Garda Síochána, the Irish national police and
security service, for some time.

Furthermore, Slovakia announced it will “reduce the staff of the Russian embassy
in Bratislava by 35”, after already having expelled three diplomats earlier in
March, and charging two people with espionage for Russia. The official statement
of the Slovakian government does not mention specifics beyond the statement that
“we regret to note that […] the Russian diplomatic mission has not shown any
interest in operating correctly on our territory.”

Dutch intelligence scholar Ben de Jong points out in NRC Handelsblad that the
absence of France and Germany limits the strength of the political signal that
is sent to Russia. Based on its own sources, NRC writes that the expelled
diplomats in the Netherlands “presumably” were active in collecting secret
information about weapon deliveries to Ukraine, political and military
decision-making in NATO and the EU, and discussion about new sanctions.

De Jong also points out that besides the use of diplomatic covers and illegals,
Russian secret services likely have representatives in companies such as Gazprom
and Aeroflot who are not affected by the expulsion and can continue their
operations, albeit without the protection of a diplomatic cover. Another
intelligence scholar points out that new diplomats will eventually be
registered.

The Belgian and Dutch ministers cite national security as ground for the
expulsion rather than the expulsions being a sanction over the war in Ukraine.
The apparent coordinated effort is however seen as a joint political statement
to the Russian government.

Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told AFP that “responses
will be provided on the basis of the principle of reciprocity.”




RUSSIAN AND CHINESE SERVICES USE LINKEDIN TO TARGET & RECRUIT PERSONS TO SPY ON
DUTCH COMPANIES, SAYS GENERAL INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY SERVICE (AIVD)

Posted on 2022-02-072022-02-15 by mrkoot
 * This is an English translation of a piece in Dutch by Johan Leupen and Jan
   Fred van Wijnen published in Dutch newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad (FD) on
   7 February 2022. (Please reference that paper, not my blog.)
 * Takeaways:
   * The AIVD observed an increase in the scope and frequency in targeting and
     recruitment attempts by Chinese and Russian intelligence services focusing
     on Dutch high-tech companies.
   * The AIVD launches an awareness campaign (more) with examples of fictitious
     but realistic example cases, which is intended to inform the public and
     increase societal resilience.
 * Other reads:
   * 2022-02-15: Dutch intelligence service warns public about online
     recruitment by foreign spies (IntelNews)
   * 2022-02-10: Foreign spies target Australians on dating websites, messaging
     apps, report warns (IntelNews)

Thousands of employees at Dutch high-tech companies are systematically being
approached by secret services from China and Russia who are trying to steal
company secrets. This is done through fake accounts on LinkedIn, the largest
business network in the world. The spies pose as fellow scientists or engineers.
They also impersonate consultants or recruiters.

Dutch and other Western secret services are shocked by the number of successful
contact attempts, in which people have ultimately been made to share sensitive
information through blackmail or bribery. After the first contact via LinkedIn,
the relationship is quickly made more “personal,” says Director Erik Akerboom of
the General Intelligence and Security Service AIVD. The new contact acts
flattering about your knowledge and expertise. ‘You get a request to translate
something. After that, personal contact may follow at a conference.’


AWARENESS CAMPAIGN

The scale and clout of the Russian and Chinese infiltration attempts have
reached such proportions that the AIVD is sounding the alarm. Later this week,
the service will launch a warning campaign via social media to make Dutch
employees and officials aware of the dangers.

Last year, the Netherlands expelled two Russian spies from the country. They had
enticed employees of several Dutch high-tech companies to sell information. The
first contacts were made through LinkedIn, AIVD chief Erik Akerboom says to the
FD. One of the Russians, who is an intelligence officer with the secret service
SVR, created fake identities as a scientist, consultant and recruiter for this
purpose. The AIVD would not say which companies were involved.

For years, China and Russia have been purposefully trying to get advanced
technology into Western countries, including the Netherlands. This is done
through company takeovers, but also through cyber attacks and classic espionage.
The AIVD has previously warned that such attempts undermine the Dutch economy.


NO BAN

Dutch high-tech companies do not prohibit their employees from creating a
profile on LinkedIn. ‘We do have protocols for the information people share on
social networks,’ said a spokesperson for chip manufacturer NXP. ‘Everything an
employee posts is legally checked.’ ASML, which is not allowed to sell its
advanced chip machines to China because of an American boycott, does not
prohibit activity on LinkedIn or other networks either. The company does make
its employees aware of the risks.

Intelligence work by the AIVD shows that China and Russia are operating
systematically, says Akerboom. Social networks like LinkedIn or Instagram are
constantly being copied and stored in databases. They analyze them to get their
sights on targets. They are dealing with people who have access to special
technological knowledge. The data is combined with information acquired from
outright hacks in their organization, looking for specific personal data.’

Potential targets are ‘ranked’, says the AIVD chief. The non-friendly services
then look at the level of influence the potential targets have within their own
organization, their position within a business network, and their access to
important information. ‘The rankings determine which people they prioritize for
their recruitment efforts.’


FAKE RECRUITMENT AGENCY

British and American intelligence agencies have previously warned against this
type of espionage. Sometimes fake recruiting agencies are created. After initial
contact via LinkedIn, a target is persuaded to drop by for an interview about a
new job. By sharing confidential information about their current employer, the
victim becomes vulnerable to blackmail. The Chinese secret service is said to
focus mainly on expats who still have family in China. This makes them extra
sensitive to pressure to share information.

The targeted spying via LinkedIn began in 2009, according to Cody Barrow,
director of threat analysis at cybersecurity firm EclecticIQ in Amsterdam.
Previously, he worked in the US as a ‘senior intelligence officer’ at the
Department of Defense and the National Security Agency (NSA). ‘In that year I
myself received my first LinkedIn request from an attractive woman I didn’t
know. Once the spies become friends, and can read your full profile, they check
if you use certain keywords. Or code words for software programs you work with.’

For example, if a spy were to read that an NSA employee works with the program
Wrangler, the contact immediately becomes a higher priority for the spy. This is
because it means that the employee is involved in gathering and analyzing
information via satellite imagery.


INVITES ACCEPTED CARELESSLY

Barrow estimates that over the past ten years “many thousands of Dutch people”
have received LinkedIn requests from Chinese spies. Requests are often accepted
uncritically, especially if the requester already appears to share various
contacts with the target. Moreover, many people are susceptible to flattering
remarks. AIVD chief Akerboom says he is “not surprised” by the estimate of
several thousand. Barrow thinks that half of these have also accepted a request.

Warning of such practices is a good thing in itself, but the AIVD itself should
take much more proactive action against them, cyber security expert Ronald Prins
believes. For example, the services could issue preventive warnings about an
ongoing offensive. Or break into state-led hacker groups and share more
knowledge. ‘So far, the service only comes into action when military
applications are at stake. When are they going to make an effort for the
economic security of the Netherlands?’

The AIVD has already expressed to the House of Representatives its desire for a
broader mandate, to also defend commercial companies and ‘the earning capacity
of the Netherlands’. The cabinet that took office last month allocated an extra
€300 million for the security services in the coalition agreement, but there are
no concrete plans yet about how this will be spent.


RESPONSE FROM LINKEDIN

‘We actively look for signs of state-sponsored activity(s) on the platform and
take swift action against actors with malicious intent to protect our members.
We do not wait for requests for removal, our Threat Intelligence Team removes
fake accounts using information we discover and information obtained from
various sources, including government agencies. Creating a fake account or
fraudulent activity with the intent to lie to or mislead our members is a
violation of our terms of service.’




DUTCH GOVT EXPELS TWO RUSSIANS USING DIPLOMATIC COVER TO COMMIT ESPIONAGE ON
BEHALF OF RUSSIA’S CIVIL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SVR; PURSUED INFORMATION ON
AI, SEMICONDUCTORS & NANO TECH

Posted on 2020-12-102020-12-21 by mrkoot

UPDATE: 2020-12-14 09:00 UTC: small guest contribution to IntelNews: Holland
expels two Russian diplomats, summons Kremlin envoy to issue protest.

UPDATE: 2020-12-13 11:05 UTC: the AIVD released bits of recorded video of one
contact moment between the SVR officer and one of his assets in NL. It was shown
today on national TV during “WNL op Zondag”, where Akerboom was present to
explain and annotate the recent developments. The episode, in Dutch, can be
watched here (skip to ~32m30s). Here’s a screenshot I took from that episode
(SVR officer is at the left; his source at the right):

UPDATE 2020-12-10 18:49 UTC: reportedly, AIVD director Erik Akerboom (Twitter:
@dg_akerboom) said that the AIVD detected “relatively intensive” contact between
the SVR officer and sources in the Dutch high-tech sector “in at least ten
cases”, indicating that the SVR officer had at least ten sources.

On 10 December 2020, the Dutch minister of the Interior, Kajsa Ollongren, sent a
letter (in Dutch) to the House of Representatives to inform the parliament about
the disruption of a Russian espionage operation.

Two Russians using a diplomatic cover to commit espionage on behalf of the
Russian civil foreign intelligence agency SVR have been expelled from the
Netherlands. Both were accredited as diplomat at the Russian embassy in The
Hague. The minister says the SVR intelligence officer built a “substantial”
network of sources (i.e., he was a case officer) working in the Dutch high-tech
sector. He pursued information about AI, semiconductors and nano technology;
knowledge that has both civil and military applications. In some cases the
sources got paid for their cooperation.

The Dutch civil intelligence & security service AIVD disrupted the operation. On
9 December 2020, the Russian ambassador to the Netherlands was summoned by the
Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Russian ambassador was told that the two
Russians have been designated as Persona Non Grata (PNG), i.e., they are
expelled from the Netherlands.

This case involves multiple companies and one educational institute, whose
identities are not revealed. The minister states that the espionage “has very
likely caused damage to the organizations where the sources are or were active,
and thereby to the Dutch economy and national security.”

The minister states that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) will
take legal action against one source on the basis of immigration law.

The minister also announces the Dutch administration will look into
possibilities to criminalize the act of cooperating with a foreign intelligence
service. Currently, that act on and by itself is not a punishable offense. Legal
possibilities do already exist regarding violation of confidentiality of
official secrets and company secrets, however. For related developments at the
EU level, check out the Trade secrets page of the European Commission.

Finally, the minister points out that this case shows “that threats from foreign
states against the Netherlands are real”, and that a broader follow-up will take
place of the parliamentary letters “Countering foreign state threats” of 18
April 2019 and “Knowledge security in higher education and science” of 27
November 2020.

Three side notes:

 * For a brief peek into one aspect of the work life of case officers (and their
   occasional supporting officers), see Physical Counter Surveillance – Dry
   Cleaning and Evading Capture (September 2019).
 * For (self-)protection, see New brochure on espionage from the Dutch General
   Intelligence & Security Service (AIVD) – unofficial English translation (May
   2020).
   * For further (background) reading, check out the website of the U.S.
     National Counterintelligence and Security Center, part of the U.S. Office
     of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI); it has a lot of good
     training & reading material.
   * For even further (background) reading, notably the aspect of humans and
     susceptibility/vulnerability to being recruited as spies/sources, I
     recommend the Selected Reports page of the U.S. DOD Defense Human Resources
     Activity website. And search Google for “MICE” and “RASCLS”.
 * Also for (self-)protection, Dutch readers may want to inform themselves about
   in the appendix of the parliamentary letter of 18 April 2019 that the
   minister refers to: Nederlandse aanpak tegengaan statelijke dreigingen (April
   2019).

If you’re at an organization that has a need for insight into protection against
insider threats, I recommend checking out Signpost Six. It was founded by
@Elsine_van_Os, who formerly worked at the Dutch military intelligence &
security service MIVD.

The remainder of this post is a translation of the main body of the minister’s
letter on the disrupted espionage operation.

> […]
> Disruption
> As mentioned in the annual reports of the AIVD, the Netherlands is a target of
> Russian intelligence services who covertly collect information that is
> valuable to Russia, including economic & scientific information.
> 
> The AIVD recently ended operations of a Russian intelligence officer of the
> civil foreign intelligence service SVR. The Russian national, who was employed
> at the Russian embassy as an accredited diplomat, was involved in espionage on
> technology and science. He built a substantial network of sources, all of whom
> are or were employed in the Dutch high-tech sector. The intelligence officer
> was interested in information about, among others, artificial intelligence,
> semiconductors, and nano technology. Much of this technology is of use both
> for civil and military applications.
> 
> The Russian intelligence officer made contact with persons who have access to
> sensitive information within the high-tech sector, and in some cases paid for
> that. A second Russian SVR officer, also accredited as diplomat, fulfilled a
> supporting role.
> 
> Companies and educational institute have been informed
> The high-tech sector in the Netherlands holds high-quality and unique
> knowledge. The espionage has very likely caused damage to the organizations
> where the sources are or were active, and thereby to the Dutch economy and
> national security.
> 
> The sources of the Russian intelligence officer have been contacted by the
> AIVD to disrupt their activities. In a number of cases, the AIVD has submitted
> an official notification to the companies and educational institute involved
> such that they can take measures. In one case, an official notification was
> sent to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND). The IND will take
> legal measures against one source. The AIVD is investigating whether further
> official notifications can be sent to the IND.
> 
> No comments can be made about the identities of the sources and which
> companies and educational institute are involved.
> 
> Persona Non Grata
> As a result of the detected espionage activities, the Russian ambassador has
> been summoned by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9 December 2020, and
> has been told that the intelligence officer, as well as the supporting SVR
> worker, have been designated as Persona Non Grata (PNG).
> 
> Criminalization of espionage
> Due to the increased vulnerability of the Netherlands for espionage, the Dutch
> administration has examined the added value of criminalization of espionage.
> Criminal law already provides legal possibilities to act against crimes
> involving violation of confidentiality of official secrets and company
> secrets. However, espionage in the sense of persons covertly collaborating
> with a foreign intelligence service is currently not a punishable office. The
> administration has established that additional criminalization is desirable
> and will examine how that can been pursued, and then initiate a legislative
> process.
> 
> Follow-up
> This case shows, again, that threats from foreign states against the
> Netherlands are real. We will further inform you about the broader approach in
> follow-up to the Parliamentary Letters “Countering foreign state threats” of
> 18 April 2019 and “Knowledge security in higher education and science” of 27
> November 2020.
> 
> Awareness
> The AIVD is committed to raising awareness about espionage risks and, where
> possible, explains to companies, governments and educational institutes how
> they can prevent this, both now and in the future.

 * 1 Comment


SUBMARINE COMMUNICATION CABLES AND THE NETHERLANDS: TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM
THE DUTCH STATE SECRETARY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND CLIMATE POLICY

Posted on 2020-10-302020-10-30 by mrkoot

On 23 October 2020, the Dutch state secretary for Economic Affairs and Climate
Policy, Mona Keijzer, sent a letter (in Dutch) about submarine communication
cables to our House of Representatives. This post provides an English
translation of that letter.

Takeaways:

 * Distinction must be made between intercontinental cables and
   non-intercontinental cables. Only the former require underseas
   repeaters/amplifiers to carry the signal over a (very) long distance.
 * Risks related to the economic end-of-life being reached generally are about
   intercontinental cables — such as TAT-14. that directly connects the U.S. and
   the Netherlands. TAT-14 became operational in 2001 and will be disconnected
   in the nearby future. The state secretary says that this does not affect the
   Dutch, as most communication between the Netherlands and the U.S. is already
   transported via other countries.
 * A new submarine cable between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom will be
   laid in 2021, which can also be used for direct communication between the
   Netherlands and the U.S.
 * The state secretary explicitly recognizes the added value of laying new
   submarine cables, and promises to explore options to help facilitate that
   through, among others, licensing for landing stations. This is a follow-up to
   a request made by market parties, who also indicated that it would be
   desirable that the Dutch government plays a stronger role. The state
   secretary also points out that co-financing from the EU is possible for
   laying new cables.

The text below this line is the translation of the letter. Note: hyperlinks and
parts in square []-brackets were added by me.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

> During the General Consultation on Digitization of 11 March 2020, I promised
> MP Verhoeven of the D66 fraction to give an overview of the problems,
> research, and actions in the field of submarine cables. Subsequently, during
> the General Consultation on Telecommunications of 11 June 2020, I promised MP
> Van den Berg of the CDA fraction to write a letter to your House about the
> outcome of the discussions with the sector about the investments in submarine
> cables. With this letter I fulfill this commitment and cover the valuable
> conversations I have had with market parties.
> 
> It is important to emphasize that the Netherlands has very good digital
> connections, both on land, at sea, and in the air. Both our mobile and fixed
> connections are among the best in the world [reference:
> https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-26643-547.html]. For example, many
> submarine cables come ashore in the Netherlands, as can be seen on the picture
> elsewhere in this letter. This digital infrastructure is important for our
> economy and society and it is therefore important to maintain and expand this
> world-class digital infrastructure.
> 
> For a good understanding of submarine communication cables, a distinction must
> be made between submarine cables running between continents (intercontinental
> cables) and submarine cables within Europe. European submarine cables do not
> need active amplifiers on the ocean floor, because of the short distance they
> span. Intercontinental cables span a longer distance and therefore require
> such equipment. This makes it relatively easy to increase the capacity of
> existing cables to the United Kingdom or Denmark. Only the active equipment
> ashore needs to be renewed.
> 
> Increasing the capacity on intercontinental cables is more difficult, because
> in some cases the underwater amplifiers also need to be replaced. Therefore,
> when parties talk about risks around the lifetime of submarine cables [e.g. 25
> years] they generally refer to these intercontinental cables. The research
> report by Stratix, about which MP Amhaouch of the CDA fraction asked questions
> during the General Consultation on Digitization of 11 March 2020, addresses
> whether there is a problem due to submarine cables being at the end of their
> economic life and whether new cables are expected to be laid soon. This
> research report can be found on the site of the national government.
> 
> 
> 
> Submarine cables in North-West Europe (source)
> 
> Stratix’ quick scan, as well as earlier research conducted in 2018, shows that
> cables can be active beyond the end of their economic life. However, because
> the equipment is outdated, the cable’s capacity will not increase in the long
> run. According to Stratix, the conclusion of the submarine cable industry was
> that there is no reason to assume that problems will arise in the short term.
> In addition, it was indicated that there currently is no demand for more
> capacity via a (new) transatlantic submarine cables to the Netherlands. If
> such demand arises, the new international submarine cables to Denmark, the
> United Kingdom, Ireland and France can be used, because of the good land and
> submarine connections we have with those countries. For example, there already
> are submarine cables to the United Kingdom and Denmark that can be used for
> this purpose. The most important conclusion of the Stratix study therefore is
> that there is sufficient submarine cable capacity to and around the
> Netherlands, and that market parties do not expect a shortage in the short or
> long term.
> 
> An important development for the longer term is that the market for submarine
> cable connections is changing. Where previously consortia of telecom
> companies, such as KPN, were laying a submarine cable, this is increasingly
> being done by individual non-telecom companies and mostly digital platforms,
> such as Google and Facebook and Microsoft. Furthermore, it has become clear
> that a transatlantic cable, the TAT-14 cable, which was laid in the past by a
> consortium and landed in the Netherlands, will be disconnected. A lot of
> traffic from the Netherlands already is transported to the U.S. via other
> countries, however. Given our geographical position, this is not illogical.
> 
> As I promised to your House, I have spoken to market parties about these
> developments, also on the basis of the letter that various parties have
> addressed to me on this subject [those parties were Stichting Digitale
> Infrastructuur Nederland, Dutch Data Center Association, Fiber Carrier
> Association and SURF]. From these discussions and the round table I organized
> on 29 September 2020, various insights have emerged. First of all, it is nice
> to be able to report that next year a new submarine cable will be laid between
> the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which will also be connected to
> Ireland. Data traffic can be carried to the U.S. directly via this cable.
> Secondly, it appears that there is a diffuse picture about the added value of
> direct intercontinental connections over connections via other countries.
> Parties that have large data centers in the Netherlands, for example, indicate
> that they do not see any problem in this in the future. During the round table
> discussion I organized, it was also emphasized that the disappearance of
> cables generally has no consequences for Dutch users, but it is desirable for
> the Netherlands to be easily accessible, and therefore direct cables can be of
> added value.
> 
> I also see that submarine cables add value to the Dutch digital
> infrastructure. I want to explicitly express my positive opinion about the
> added value of laying new submarine cables. Therefore, if market parties or
> consortia of parties are considering laying a new submarine cable to the
> Netherlands, I am willing to facilitate this, for example in the licensing
> process.
> 
> This was also requested during the round table held with market parties. It
> was also indicated that it would be desirable that the Dutch government plays
> a stronger role. It was explicitly stated that this is not about paying for
> these cables, but about facilitating the landing. I will look at the laws and
> practical objections that might stand in the way of this. For example, parties
> have indicated that laying cables in the North Sea could be difficult in the
> future. I recognize this, and it is inherent in an intensively used North Sea.
> I feel it is important to leave room for new submarine cables, and this has
> been included in the National Environmental Vision [in Dutch: “Nationale
> Omgevingsvisie” aka NOVI] sent to your House by the Minister of the Interior
> and Kingdom Relations. As mentioned in this vision, this aspect will be
> further elaborated in the North Sea program. With regard to both the licensing
> and the North Sea program, I will contact other governments and ministries,
> including the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
> 
> A good investment climate for the installation of these cables is desirable.
> If a submarine cable lands in the Netherlands, this can stimulate business
> activity surrounding it. The Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency (NFIA) can
> play an acquiring or facilitating role where possible. In addition, European
> funds are also available for the construction of submarine cables. If market
> parties wish to lay these cables, co-financing from the EU is possible. I will
> also bring these funds to the attention of market parties.
> 
> Over the past few months, various discussions have taken place with market
> parties and a round table has been convened. Sea cables continue to have my
> attention as part of the digital infrastructure and in addition to the
> aforementioned actions I will continue to actively monitor developments in the
> coming period.




POSTS NAVIGATION

← Older posts
Search for:


Twitter: @mrkoot
LinkedIn: my profile
E-mail: koot at cyberwar dot nl
PGP key: 51F9 8FC9 C92A 1165 (verified via Keybase.io)



Employed at Secura B.V.

MSc in OS3 System & Network Engineering (2005-2006) and PhD in data anonymity
(2007-2011) from University of Amsterdam.

Many posts on this blog are scraps of information, published for posterity and
reference. Posts prior to Q2/2012 were submitted while I was employed at the
University of Amsterdam.


LINKS

Critical thinking
 * Master List of Logical Fallacies
 * Taxonomy of Logical Fallacies
 * Your Logical Fallacy Is
 * Understanding Uncertainty
 * A Skeptical Manifesto

Other
 * The 20% Statistician (Daniël Lakens)
 * Adam Shostack
 * Albert Benschop (UvA)
 * Alessandro Acquisti's The Economics of Privacy
 * Amsterdam Platform for Privacy Research (UvA-APPR)
 * Archive of Privacy/Security/Hacking Videos
 * Arno Reuser's OSINT resources
 * Bits of Freedom
 * IEEE Cipher S&P Calendar
 * Cryptome
   Cyber CoE (US Army) DCAF DefenceTalk Didier Stevens Electronic Frontier
   Foundation Electrospaces (Peter Koop) Eric Rescorla Harvard National Security
   Journal IEEE Information Theory Society Inlichtingendiensten.nl IntelNews.org
   Intelligence & Information Intelligence and National Security Alliance
   Jaap-Henk Hoepman Jeroen van der Ham Jesus Oquendo Krypt3ia Light Blue
   Touchpaper MIT OpenCourseWare Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association
   (NISA) Open & Free Tech Community Pew Research Center Privacy International
   Privacy by Design Signal Identification Guide Richard Bejtlich Ross
   Anderson's Economics and Security Resource Page Simon Davies Social
   Engineering Sources And Methods The Potomac Institute Cyber Center
   Transparency International Defence Video lectures of mathematics contagio
   malware dump


RECENT POSTS

 * Dutch General Intelligence & Security Service (AIVD) disrupts activities of
   Russian intelligence officer targeting the International Criminal Court
 * EU Member States expel >120 Russian diplomats in an apparent coordinated
   effort to reduce Russian intelligence presence in the EU
 * Russian and Chinese services use LinkedIn to target & recruit persons to spy
   on Dutch companies, says General Intelligence & Security Service (AIVD)
 * Dutch govt expels two Russians using diplomatic cover to commit espionage on
   behalf of Russia’s civil foreign intelligence agency SVR; pursued information
   on AI, semiconductors & nano tech
 * Submarine communication cables and the Netherlands: translation of a letter
   from the Dutch state secretary of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy


RECENT COMMENTS

 * Germany’s data retention bill requires metadata to be kept in the country –
   TechGoor on Dutch telecom data retention law ruled invalid by court in The
   Hague
 * The foreign intel angle on Spygate: What probably didn’t happen, and what
   probably did – The Optimistic Conservative on June 15th 2014: Dutch Joint
   Sigint Cyber Unit (JSCU) officially started
 * Cryptome – My Blog on Dutch govt expels two Russians using diplomatic cover
   to commit espionage on behalf of Russia’s civil foreign intelligence agency
   SVR; pursued information on AI, semiconductors & nano tech
 * Resetting the privacy discussion - Kris Joseph on The many interpretations
   and perspectives of privacy
 * Por qué el proyecto de ley de propiedad intelectual amenaza a la industria
   tecnológica del Reino Unido on Full translation of the Dutch government’s
   statement on encryption


ARCHIVES

 * June 2022
 * April 2022
 * February 2022
 * December 2020
 * October 2020
 * June 2020
 * May 2020
 * April 2020
 * December 2019
 * September 2019
 * July 2019
 * June 2019
 * May 2019
 * April 2019
 * November 2018
 * October 2018
 * September 2018
 * June 2018
 * October 2017
 * September 2017
 * June 2017
 * May 2017
 * April 2017
 * August 2016
 * May 2016
 * April 2016
 * March 2016
 * February 2016
 * January 2016
 * December 2015
 * November 2015
 * October 2015
 * September 2015
 * August 2015
 * July 2015
 * June 2015
 * May 2015
 * April 2015
 * March 2015
 * February 2015
 * January 2015
 * December 2014
 * November 2014
 * October 2014
 * September 2014
 * August 2014
 * July 2014
 * June 2014
 * May 2014
 * March 2014
 * February 2014
 * January 2014
 * December 2013
 * November 2013
 * October 2013
 * September 2013
 * August 2013
 * July 2013
 * June 2013
 * April 2013
 * March 2013
 * January 2013
 * December 2012
 * October 2012
 * September 2012
 * August 2012
 * July 2012
 * June 2012
 * May 2012
 * April 2012
 * February 2012
 * January 2012
 * December 2011
 * November 2011
 * September 2011
 * August 2011
 * July 2011
 * June 2011
 * May 2011
 * April 2011
 * March 2011
 * February 2011

Powered by GovPress.