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APT & Targeted Attacks
SPOT THE DIFFERENCE: EARTH KASHA'S NEW LODEINFO CAMPAIGN AND THE CORRELATION
ANALYSIS WITH THE APT10 UMBRELLA
LODEINFO is a malware used in attacks targeting mainly Japan since 2019. Trend
Micro has been tracking the group as Earth Kasha. We have identified a new
campaign connected to this group with significant updates to their strategy,
tactics, and arsenals.
By: Hara Hiroaki November 19, 2024 Read time: 19 min (5210 words)
Save to Folio
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This blog is based on a presentation by the authors at Virus Bulletin 2024.
INTRODUCTION
LODEINFO is a malware used in attacks targeting mainly Japan since 2019. Trend
Micro has been tracking the group as Earth Kasha. While some vendors suspect
that the actor using LODEINFO might be APT10, we don’t have enough evidence to
fully support this speculation. Currently, we view APT10 and Earth Kasha as
different entities, although they might be related. To avoid confusion caused by
names, we use a new term “APT10 Umbrella," which represents a group of intrusion
sets related to APT10 (including APT10 itself).
Earth Kasha has been known to have targeted public institutions and academics
with spear-phishing emails since their emergence. From early 2023 to early 2024,
however, we identified a new campaign with significant updates to their
strategy, tactics, and arsenals.
Figure 1. An overview of relationships of Earth Kasha
download
LODEINFO Since 2023
In the new campaign starting in early 2023, Earth Kasha expanded their targets
into Japan, Taiwan, and India. Based on the bias of the incident amount, while
we believe that Japan is still the main target of Earth Kasha, we observed that
a few high-profile organizations in Taiwan and India were targeted. The observed
industries under attack are organizations related to advanced technology and
government agencies.
Earth Kasha has also employed different Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(TTPs) in the Initial Access phase, which now exploits public-facing
applications such as SSL-VPN and file storage services. We observed that
vulnerabilities of enterprise products, such as Array AG (CVE-2023-28461),
Proself (CVE-2023-45727) and FortiOS/FortiProxy (CVE-2023-27997), were abused in
the wild. Earth Kasha was changing these vulnerabilities to abuse from time to
time. After gaining access, they deployed several backdoors in the victim's
network to achieve persistence. These include Cobalt Strike, LODEINFO, and the
newly discovered NOOPDOOR, which we will describe later.
OBSERVED TTPS IN POST-EXPLOITATION
Our comprehensive analysis of the activities in the Post-Exploitation phase has
revealed that the primary motivation behind the attack was the theft of the
victim’s information and data. Earth Kasha first discovered Active Directory
configuration and domain user information to achieve this goal using legitimate
Microsoft tools, such as csvde.exe, nltest.exe and quser.exe. The following are
actual commands used by the adversary.
* csvde.exe -f all.csv –u
* nltest.exe /domain_trusts
* quser.exe
They then accessed the file server and tried to find documents related to the
system information of the customer's network by simply using "dir" commands
recursively. Interestingly, upon checking on their activity, the operator might
check the content of the documents manually. The stolen information may help the
adversary find the next valuable target.
Earth Kasha then performs several techniques to acquire credentials. One method
uses their custom malware, MirrorStealer, to dump stored credentials in
applications. MirrorStealer (originally reported by ESET) is a credential dumper
targeting multiple applications such as browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Edge and
Internet Explorer), email clients (Outlook, Thunderbird, Becky, and Live Mail),
Group Policy Preferences and SQL Server Management Studio.
Since MirrorStealer may be designed to dump credentials on client machines,
Earth Kasha used another way to dump OS credentials. We observed that the
adversary abused vssadmin to copy registry hives and ntds.dit in the Active
Directory server from volume shadow copy. The SAM registry hive contains the
NTLM hash of local machine users, while ntds.dit contains the NTLM hash of all
the domain users. The following are commands the adversary uses after creating a
volume shadow copy.
* copy \\<AD_SERVER_IP>\c$\windows\temp\ntds.dit .
* copy \\<AD_SERVER_IP>\c$\windows\temp\system .
* copy \\<AD_SERVER_IP>\c$\windows\temp\sam .
While we couldn’t figure out the actual method they abused, we have observed
that Earth Kasha successfully compromised domain admin in most cases. After
compromising domain admin, they deployed backdoors (LODEINFO or NOOPDOOR) to
several machines by copying components over SMB and abusing schetasks.exe or
sc.exe to achieve lateral movement. The following are the adversary's actual
commands to deploy malicious components over admin shares.
* copy SfsDllSample.exe \\<IP>\c$\windows\temp\SfsDllSample.exe
* copy SfsDll32.dll \\<IP>\c$\windows\temp\SfsDll32.dll
* copy mssitlb.xml \\<IP>\C$\Windows\system32\UIAnimation.xml
* copy ShiftJIS.dat
\\<IP>\C$\Windows\system32\ComputerToastIcon.contrast-white.dat
Once the intrusion progressed, Earth Kasha started to exfiltrate the stolen
information. The adversary gathered data, including ntds.dit, SYSTEM, SAM
registry hives and other interesting files on a single victim machine and
compressed these files into a single archive using the makecab command. While we
couldn’t confirm how these data would be exfiltrated, it might be over the
backdoor channel. Earth Kasha also exfiltrated interesting files in the victim
network over the RDP session. They copied interesting files to the RDP source
host over SMB (“tsclient” is an RDP source host).
* \\tsclient\C\aaa\All PC List.xlsx
* \\tsclient\C\aaa\All IP List.xlsx
* \\tsclient\C\aaa\Network Diagram.xlsx
MALWARE ANALYSIS
In the previous campaign by Earth Kasha, LODEINFO has been their primary
backdoor of choice. In the new campaign, however, we have observed several
backdoors, such as Cobalt Strike, LODEINFO and previously undocumented NOOPDOOR.
These backdoors were selectively used for each incident.
Figure 2. Observed malware in each incident
download
Possible Cracked Version of Cobalt Strike
In the early incidents above, Earth Kasha also used Cobalt Strike. Like other
adversaries, Cobalt Strike is designed to be executed only in memory. In this
case, Earth Kasha used a shellcode loader written in Go, which we dubbed
GOSICLOADER. GOSICLOADER is intended to be loaded via DLL side-loading and
simply decrypts the embedded payload in the data section using Based64+AES.
Figure 3. Execution flow of GOSICLOADER
download
Upon checking the configuration of the Cobalt Strike beacon, we noticed it could
be a cracked version of the Cobalt Strike, known as CSAgent, shared among the
Chinese-speaking hacking community. According to the developer of Cobalt Strike,
Cobalt Strike beacon embeds watermark and watermark hash to make it difficult to
tamper with authorization. CSAgent modifies the watermark to include "666666" by
default and uses a watermark hash that matches the one embedded in the observed
Cobalt Strike beacon for this campaign. Since the watermark and its hash can be
easily tampered with if the adversary knows the algorithm, this modification
could be a false flag, but it is still noteworthy.
Figure 4. Watermark and watermark hash in configuration
download
Figure 5. Watermark and its hash in CSAgent
download
LODEINFO
LODEINFO is a backdoor exclusively used by Earth Kasha since 2019, serving as
their primary backdoor. In this new campaign, however, it is just one option
among several, showing its adaptability. Since its introduction, LODEINFO has
gone through continuous updates, as indicated by its version numbers. In this
campaign, we have observed versions v0.6.9, v0.7.1, v0.7.2, and v0.7.3
Figure 6. Version number history of LODEINFO
download
With the incrementing version number, Earth Kasha has also been updating a
procedure to execute LODEINFO. In this new campaign, they deployed three
components in the victim machine. They registered the legitimate application
(SfsDllSample.exe in Figure 7) as a scheduled task, which will trigger DLL
Side-Loading of malicious DLL (SfsDll32.dll in Figure 7).
Figure 7. Execution sequence of LODEINFO
download
This malicious DLL, which we dubbed LODEINFOLDR (aka FaceLoader by ESET),
extracts an encrypted payload embedded in the digital signature of the loaded
process and decrypts it by RC4 or XOR. The encrypted payload is embedded in the
legitimate digital signature by abusing MS13-098/CVE-2013-3900.
Figure 8. Embedded encrypted payload and RC4 in digital signature
download
We distinguish this LODEINFOLDR in the new campaign from the ones we had seen in
the previous campaign, and we call this new loader LODEINFOLDR Type 2. At first
glance, we thought LODEINFOLDR Type 2 was their new loader developed for the new
campaign. Still, after further investigation, we identified that LODEINFOLDR
Type 2 looks the same as the loader of LODEINFO used in the LiberalFace campaign
in 2022, disclosed by ESET3. This may infer that the same entity has used the
same malware since the previous campaign.
Regarding LODEINFO, several backdoor commands were newly supported. “pkill”,
“ps”, “keylog”, and “autorun” were added in v0.6.9, and “runas” was newly added
in v0.7.1. The backdoor commands supported in v0.6.9 differed from the old ones
since these commands were initially added in the previous version, removed in
v0.6.3 and added again in v0.6.9. On the other hand, “runas” supported in v0.7.1
is a new one that enables running the processes as a specific user. Since
v0.7.2, the "config" command, which is just used to display “Not Available.”,
has been fully implemented.
v0.6.9 v0.7.1 v0.7.2 and v0.7.3 command
ls
rm
mv
cp
cat
mkdir
send
recv
memory
kill
cd
ver
print
ransom (not implemented)
comc
config
pkill
ps
keylog
autorun command
ls
rm
mv
cp
cat
mkdir
send
recv
memory
kill
cd
ver
print
ransom (not implemented)
comc
config
pkill
ps
keylog
autorun
runas command
ls
rm
mv
cp
cat
mkdir
send
recv
memory
kill
cd
ver
print
ransom (not implemented)
comc
config
pkill
ps
keylog
autorun
runas
Table 1. Backdoor commands supported by LODEINFO, newly added commands in
italics
All the LODEINFO we observed in the new campaign were slightly different in the
backdoor command process compared to the LODEINFO in the previous campaign. This
LODEINFO type supports running DLL or shellcode in memory without backdoor
command processing. After further investigation, we concluded that this type of
LODEINF we observed in the new campaign should be the same as the one that ESET
calls “The 2nd stage LODEINFO” observed in the LiberalFace campaign. As Figure 9
and Figure 10 show, the LODEINFO in the new campaign directly supports running
DLL or shellcode in memory without processing backdoor commands. This evidence
may also infer that the same group has been using the same malware since the
previous campaign.
Figure 9. C&C server response processing of the LODEINFO in the previous
campaign
download
Figure 10. C&C server response processing of the 2nd stage LODEINFO
download
NOOPLDR
During our investigation, we encountered two different shellcode loaders; one is
XML containing C#, and the other is DLL. These two types of shellcode loaders
are completely different in the implementation perspective. However, a payload
of both is a previously undocumented backdoor that we call NOOPDOOR, which we
will describe later. Both loaders adopt a similar strategy to decrypt and store
the encrypted payload using the machine's device ID. Based on these
similarities, we categorized both as the same variant, which we dubbed NOOPLDR.
We distinguish the former XML/C# one as “NOOPLDR Type 1” and DLL one as “NOOPLDR
Type 2," respectively. NOOPLDR Type 1 is designed to be executed by Windows'
trusted utility tool, MSBuild, as shown in Figure 11.
Figure 11. Execution flow of NOOPLDR Type 1 (XML)
download
In most cases, MSBuild and the target XML file are registered as a Scheduled
Task for persistence. MSBuild compiles the inclined C# in XML project on
runtime, a key component of NOOPLDR Type 1. The inclined C# code is typically
concealed as follows.
Figure 12. Example of NOOPLDR
download
NOOPLDR Type 1 changes its behavior depending on whether it’s the first-time
execution or otherwise. If it’s the first execution, NOOPLDR Type 1 tries to
find encrypted data from a hardcoded file path, which differs for each NOOPLDR
sample. If it exists, NOOPLDR Type 1 deletes the file after reading the content.
The encrypted data consists of a header for checksum, AES key materials and an
encrypted body. NOOPLDR Type 1 reads the first 32 bytes, computes the SHA256
hash of the following encrypted body, and then compares the hash with the header
to verify if the data is an expected structure. After completing verification,
NOOPLDR Type 1 calculates the SHA384 hash of the AES key material following
behind the checksum header. The first 32 bytes are used as the AES key, and the
later 16 as IV. Finally, NOOPLDR Type 1 decrypts the encrypted payload by
AES256-CBC.
Figure 13. Structure of the encrypted data of NOOPLDR Type 1
download
The decrypted data has a header containing a 64-bit flag, the payload size, an
offset to the payload and the payload data in the following structure.
Figure 14. Structure of the decrypted data of NOOPLDR Type 1
download
Once the decryption succeeds, NOOPLDR Type 1 tries to store the payload in the
registry for stealthy persistence. The encryption algorithm is still AES256-CBC,
but the AES key and IV are generated based on a machine’s Device ID and a
hostname. The device ID is retrieved from the registry key
“HKLM\Software\Microsoft\SQMClient\MachineId," which contains the machine's
unique GUID. NOOPLDR Type 1 calculates the SHA384 hash of the concatenated
Device ID and hostname and follows the same procedure in the decryption routine,
splitting the hash value into chunks of 32 bytes and 16 bytes for AES key and IV
respectively.
NOOPLDR Type 1 then prepends the SHA256 hash of the encrypted payload and stores
it in the registry "(HKLM|HKCU)\Software\License\{HEX}”, which “HEX” is a hex
string of the last 16 bytes of the SHA256 hash of the hostname. Since this
encryption procedure uses a unique value for each infected machine, we need to
preserve additional info and data, such as registry hive and hostname, to
smoothly decrypt the payload. If NOOPLDR Type 1 successfully stores the payload
in the registry, it deletes the encrypted file on a disk. Therefore, in the
second and subsequent execution time, NOOPLDR Type 1 reads the registry key and
decrypts the payload in the same procedure as the encryption routine.
Figure 15. Procedure to store an encrypted payload in the registry by NOOPLDR
Type 1
download
In the final step, NOOPLDR Type 1 injects and runs the decrypted payload into a
legitimate application, such as rdrleakdiag.exe and tabcal.exe. If NOOPLDR Type
1 fails to store the payload in the registry, it writes the encrypted payload
into a disk again and overwrites it with the same timestamp as the built-in
kernel32.dll.
Another type of NOOPLDR in the form of a DLL, which we call NOOPLDR Type 2,
adopts a similar strategy to Type 1 but implements more stealthy techniques. As
Figure 16 illustrates, during the first execution, NOOPLDR Type 2 also decrypts
the encrypted payload from a file and stores the encrypted payload in the
registry. It injects the decrypted payload into the legitimate application.
Figure 16. Execution flow of NOOPLDR Type 2 (DLL)
download
One of the notable features of NOOPLDR Type 2 is the use of multiple
anti-analysis techniques. For instance, it is heavily obfuscated by control flow
obfuscation and junk codes, as shown in Figure 17. Earth Kasha has already
applied this type of obfuscation technique in the previous campaign, but even
before that, it’s been popular among China-nexus adversaries, such as APT10 and
Twisted Panda.
Figure 17. Control Flow Obfuscation (Left) and Junk Code (Right)
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For the additional anti-analysis technique, most strings are simply encoded by
XOR, which is decoded on runtime.
Figure 18. String decoding routine by XOR
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NOOPLDR Type 2 is designed to be executed via DLL Side-Loading. NOOPLDR Type 2
supports self-installation as Windows Service by running with the "-install"
parameter. During the first execution, it loads an encrypted payload named
“<LOADER_PROCESS_NAME>_config” in the current working directory, which will be
deleted after installation. For instance, if the loader process name is
“symstore.exe," the encrypted file would be "symstore.exe_config." The encrypted
blob structure is like the Type 1 but slightly different. It doesn’t have a
checksum section; it simply has 32-byte AES key materials followed by an
encrypted payload, as Figure 19 shows. The encrypted payload is encrypted by
AES256-CBC. The AES key is generated based on the SHA1 of the first 32 bytes,
and IV is the first 16 bytes.
Figure 19. Structure of the encrypted data of NOOPLDR Type 2
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Like the NOOPLDR Type 1, the decrypted data has a 0x14 bytes header containing
several values used to verify if it’s an expected structure, as Figure 20 shows.
Figure 20. Structure of the decrypted data of NOOPLDR Type 2
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After verification, NOOPLDR Type 2 encrypts the decrypted data again with
AES256-CBC but with a different key, which consists of a Device ID string,
hardcoded key material in the code section and randomly generated 8-byte hex
string and stores it in “HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\COM3\<RANDOM_HEX_STRTING>," as
Figure 21 shows.
Figure 21. Procedure to store an encrypted payload in the registry by NOOPLDR
Type 2
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In the second and subsequent execution time, NOOPLDR Type 2 will be executed
without the "-install" parameter. Therefore, it skips self-installation and
proceeds to the payload decryption routine from the registry. It searches
registry data in the registry (HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\COM3), and if found, it
decrypts the encrypted data by the same method in Figure 21 but using the HEX
string in the registry key as a part of AES key material.
At last, NOOPLDR Type 2 injects the decrypted payload into legitimate
applications, such as wuauclt.exe. This process injection technique is classic,
but leverages direct Syscall using NtProtectVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory
and NtCreateThreadEx. Since Syscall ID can be different on running OS versions,
Syscall ID is calculated on runtime.
Figure 22. Example of usage of NtWriteVirtualMemory
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NOOPDOOR
Now, let’s step into the final payload, NOOPDOOR. NOOPDOOR (aka HiddenFace by
ESET) is a sophisticated and complex backdoor with the following
characteristics:
* Fully position independent code
* Supporting active and passive mode communication
* C&C domain changed daily by a DGA (by default)
* Proxy-aware TCP communication during working time
* RSA + multiple symmetric cipher to encrypt the entire C&C communication
* Supporting build-in functions + additional modules for backdoor capabilities
* Evading in-memory detection by encrypting/decrypting specific functions on
runtime
* Anti-analysis
Due to its complexity, NOOPDOOR should be designed as another backdoor choice,
especially for a high-profile target. Based on our records, NOOPDOOR was first
observed as a second-stage payload of LODEINFO in 2021, but only in limited
cases. And we have not encountered NOOPDOOR until 2023. One of the interesting
features of NOOPDOOR is that it supports two channels to communicate with the
C&C server, which we call the active and passive modes.
Figure 23. Overview architecture of NOOPDOOR
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Figure 23 shows that NOOPDOOR in active mode communicates over TCP/443 by
polling the C&C server. NOOPDOOR in passive mode listens on TCP/47000 to receive
commands from remote adversaries. Interestingly, the active and passive modes
use different encryption algorithms and backdoor commands, respectively, which
means that both channels are incompatible and independent methods of
communication from each other. The active mode is executed in a primary thread
of NOOPDOOR. Before starting communications with the C&C server, NOOPDOOR checks
if the specific analysis tools listed in Appendix A are running in the current
machine. If any are found, NOOPDOOR will terminate itself. NOOPDOOR then
generates the C&C server's domain using a custom Domain Generation Algorithm
(DGA). NOOPDOOR has template URLs like “http://$j[].srmbr\.com/#180” (defanged)
that are used to generate the domain, and NOOPDOOR embeds a randomly generated
string based on the runtime date into the template URLs. Therefore, a domain can
be changed daily (by default, but the lifespan of domains can be changed based
on the option). A detailed DGA logic is as follows.
Figure 24. Detailed logic of DGA
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We have also observed a few samples of NOOPDOOR that embed slightly different
types of URLs. The placeholder “$<KEY>," which is a single letter (such as “j”)
in most cases, can be a "word." In the case we observed, the template URL was
like “hxxp://$earth[.]hopto[.]org:443/”, in which the "$earth" part is the
placeholder. In such a case, the generated domain will be as follows:
Figure 25. DGA generation using “word” as the placeholder
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With the generated domain, NOOPDOOR initiates C&C communication. NOOPDOOR
supports HTTP proxy in the victim’s environment during business hours
(8:30~19:30 from Monday to Friday). C&C communication in the active mode is
fully encrypted by a combination of RSA-2048 and symmetric cipher. On
initializing a session, NOOPDOOR sends a challenge and randomly selected
symmetric cipher ID to the C&C server with encryption by RSA-2048 to negotiate a
key for encrypting packets during the following module/command processing.
Supported ciphers are DES, 3DES, 2-key 3DES, AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC,
AES-256-CBC, RC2, and RC4. After key negotiation, it starts to receive commands
and sends a result with encryption by the selected cipher.
Figure 26. C&C communication flow of NOOPDOOR
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The NOOPDOOR operator can execute a loaded module or built-in function through
backdoor commands in active mode. The built-in functions that are currently
supported are as follows:
ID (active mode) Action 3B27D4EEFBC6137C23BD612DC7C4A817 Run program
9AA5BB92E9D1CD212EFB0A5E9149B7E5 Download a file (received from the C&C server)
3C7660B04EE979FDC29CD7BBFDD05F23 Upload a file (sending to the C&C server)
12E2FC6C22B38788D8C1CC2768BD2C76 Read specific file
(%SystemRoot%\System32\msra.tlb) 2D3D5C19A771A3606019C8ED1CD47FB5 Change the
timestamp of the specified file
On the other hand, C&C communication in passive mode is much simpler. NOOPDOOR
creates a new thread for passive mode communication and prepares an incoming
connection. NOOPDOOR initially tries to add a new Windows Firewall rule named
“Cortana” to allow inbound connection to TCP/470000. C&C communication in
passive mode is encrypted by AES-128-CBC with key and IV generated based on the
current running datetime. Backdoor commands are also different from the ones in
active mode as follows.
ID (passive mode) Action 3049 (0x0BE9) Keep alive 9049 (0x2359) Run program 9050
(0x235A) Upload a file (sending to the C&C server) 9051 (0x235B) Download a file
(received from the C&C server) 9052 (0x235C) Change working directory 9053
(0x235D) Run shellcode else Returns a message “This function is not supported by
server!”
However, it should be noted that the passive mode may be useless in most cases
since the operator can’t directly access the listening instance of NOOPDOOR due
to a firewall or other network devices in a modern network. The passive mode
might be designed for NOOPDOOR being placed in a publicly exposed server
(although all the NOOPDOOR have been observed only in a local network so far) or
just for testing purposes. In fact, we have observed a few samples of NOOPDOOR
that do not implement the passive mode.
As another feature of NOOPDOOR, it supports loading modules from a disk. During
initialization, NOOPDOOR looks for a file like "%temp%\{HEX}.tmp," in which the
"{HEX}" part is generated from a portion of the SHA256 hash of a combination of
the current computer name and username (in UTF-16le). This file contains the
modules encrypted by AES-256-CBC. Module blobs consist of metadata, such as
information for scheduling, module ID, parameters, and module payload. Due to
this feature, NOOPDOOR allows them to execute additional functions at various
times (on demand or regularly).
MirrorStealer
MirrorStealer, originally documented by ESET3, is a multi-purpose credential
stealer. It is often used in conjunction with NOOPDOOR in cyberattacks. We have
observed MirrorStealer in the recent campaign as well. Currently targeted
applications are the following.
* Stored credentials in browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, InternetExplorer)
* Stored credentials in email clients (Outlook, Thunderbird, Becky, Live Mail)
* Stored credentials in Group Policy Preferences
* Recently accessed server and stored credentials
* in SQL Server Management Studio (mru.dat, SqlStudio.bin)
All the results of stolen credentials are stored in %temp%\31558.TXT as plain
text. We observed that the adversary manually checked the outputs using the
"touch” command and deleted them with the “del” command via cmd.exe.
ATTRIBUTION
As mentioned earlier, we assess the spear-phishing campaign from 2023 to early
2024 to be attributed to Earth Kasha with medium confidence. To explain the
reasoning behind our conclusion, we will analyze several campaigns.
LODEINFO Campaign #1 and #2
The following image illustrates the Diamond Model of two campaigns by Earth
Kasha. For convenience, we call the campaign being conducted in 2019 to 2023
using spear-phishing as “LODEINFO Campaign #1” and the campaign being conducted
since 2023 targeting public-facing applications as “LODEINFO Campaign #2”. The
Diamond Model highlights the overlaps between the LODEINFO Campaign #1 and #2,
leading us to speculate that these campaigns are operated by the same group
because exclusive malware was used in both campaigns. There are no major
contradictions in victimology and some parts of TTP.
Figure 27. Comparison between the LODEINFO Campaign #1 and #2 by using the
Diamond Model
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On the other hand, there are several differences between the LODEINFO Campaign
#1 and #2, especially in Initial Access methods, which are completely updated.
In Campaign #1, they were using spear-phishing for Initial Access, but in
Campaign #2, they were exploiting public-facing applications for Initial Access.
Regarding victimology, there are some differences in the targeted industry. The
public sector, individuals associated with international affairs, politicians,
and researchers in the academic sector were targeted in Campaign #1. However,
the private sector, including manufacturing and aviation, hi-tech-related
organizations, and government agencies, were targeted in Campaign #2.
A41APT Campaign and LODEINFO Campaign #2
We analyzed another campaign, known as “A41APT Campaign” by Earth Tengshe, which
is also believed to be related to APT10. This group conducted a campaign
targeting several countries, including Japan and Taiwan. The following image
uses the Diamond Model to highlight the overlaps between the A41APT Campaign and
the LODEINFO Campaign #2.
Figure 28 Comparison between the A41APT Campaign and the LODEINFO Campaign #1 by
using the Diamond Model
Interestingly, the A41APT Campaign has a lot of overlaps, especially in TTPs of
the Post-Exploitation phase. As the presentation on the A41APT Campaign in
JSAC2021 shows, there are similar TTPs in both campaigns, such as exploiting
SSL-VPN for Initial Access, schedule task abuse for Persistence, RDP by domain
admin account for Lateral Movement, abusing csvde.exe to collect Active
Directory account information, and dumping registry hives for Credential Access.
Figure 29. Highlighting the overlapped TTPs from the presentation “A41APT Case”
in JSAC2021 10
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The major difference in these campaigns is the toolsets. Earth Tengshe used
custom malware, such as SigLoader, SodaMaster, P8RAT, FYAnti, and Jackpot, which
completely differ from Earth Kasha's use in LODEINFO Campaign #2.
Considering that Earth Tengshe and Earth Kasha are believed to be associated
with APT10, both groups may have relationships in TTPs or may share operator
resources. Here is a summary of the comparison between the A41APT Campaign, the
LODEINFO Campaign #1 and #2.
A41APT Campaign LODEINFO Campaign #1 LODEINFO Campaign #2 Attribution Earth
Tengshe Earth Kasha Earth Kasha Timeline 2020 - 2021 2019 – present 2023 –
present Region Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States (but the main
target is the entity in Japan) Japan Japan, Taiwan, and India Industry private
sector, including electronics, energy, automotive, and defense industries public
sector, individuals associated with international affairs, politicians and
researchers in the academic sector - private sector, including manufacturing and
aviation
- Hi-tech related organizations
- government agencies TTPs - Exploit public-facing application
- DLL Side-Loading
- MS13-098/CVE-2013-3900 to embed encrypted payload - Spear-phishing email
- DLL Side-Loading
- MS13-098/CVE-2013-3900 to embed encrypted payload - Exploit public-facing
application
- DLL Side-Loading
- MS13-098/CVE-2013-3900 to embed encrypted payload Tools - SigLoader
- HUI Loader
- SodaMaster
- P8Rat
- FYAnti
- Cobalt Strike
- Jackpot - LODEINFO
- NOOPDOOR
- DOWNIISSA
- Lilim RAT
- MirrorStealer - LODEINFO
- NOOPDOOR
- Cobalt Strike
- MirrorStealer
Other Campaigns
Adding to these campaigns, we have observed a few other campaigns that slightly
show some overlaps with the LODEINFO Campaign #2.
Our first observation in 2023 shows that the Initial Access and Target methods
resemble those of the LODEINFO Campaign #2. This unclustered campaign targeted
mainly Japan and abused an exploitation against public-facing applications for
Initial Access. Additionally, we confirmed that both campaigns used the same IPs
as the origin of exploitation. On the other hand, we didn’t observe any malware
or hacking tools during this unclustered campaign. The adversary employed
LOLBins in Post-Exploitation, not malware.
Figure 30. Infrastructure overlap with the unclustered campaign
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Furthermore, Volt Typhoon, which is a state-sponsored actor based in China
documented by Microsoft, was reportedly carrying out the exploit against
FortiOS/FortiProxy (CVE-2023-27997), which was also used in the LODEINFO
Campaign #2 in 2023. However, TTPs and toolsets in Post-Exploitation were
totally different between Volt Typhoon and Earth Kasha (instead, the previously
mentioned unclustered campaign looks similar, but no commonalities have been
confirmed so far). The vulnerability of CVE-2023-27997 was 0-day at the time of
usage in both campaigns by Volt Typhoon and Earth Kasha, leading us to the
assumption that the 0-day vulnerability was possibly shared or there might be a
third-party entity, such as access brokers, specialized in facilitating Initial
Access. This is not the only case indicating the possibility of 0-day
vulnerability sharing.
LAC reported the multiple campaigns, abusing Array AG (CVE-2023-28461) and
Citrix (CVE-2023-3466, CVE-2023-3467, CVE-2023-3519), which were abused in the
LODEINFO Campaign #2 in 2023 as well. Besides the vulnerabilities, however,
there are no overlaps in malware and TTPs in Post-Exploitation between the
LODEINFO Campaign #2 and these campaigns. This case suggests the possibility of
0-day sharing or the presence of an access broker, indicating that Earth Kasha
may be part of such an ecosystem.
TREND MICRO VISION ONE THREAT INTELLIGENCE
To stay ahead of evolving threats, Trend Micro customers can access a range of
Intelligence Reports and Threat Insights within Trend Micro Vision One. Threat
Insights helps customers stay ahead of cyber threats before they happen and
better prepared for emerging threats. It offers comprehensive information on
threat actors, their malicious activities, and the techniques they use. By
leveraging this intelligence, customers can proactively protect their
environments, mitigate risks, and respond effectively to threats.
Trend Micro Vision One Intelligence Reports App [IOC Sweeping]
* Spot the difference: Earth Kasha's new LODEINFO campaign and the correlation
analysis with the APT10 umbrella
Trend Micro Vision One Threat Insights App
* Threat Actors:
* Earth Kasha
* Earth Tengshe
* Emerging Threats: Spot the difference: Earth Kasha's new LODEINFO campaign
and the correlation analysis with the APT10 umbrella
HUNTING QUERIES
Trend Micro Vision One Search App
Trend Micro Vision Once Customers can use the Search App to match or hunt the
malicious indicators mentioned in this blog post with data in their
environment.
Malware Detection Associated with Earth Kasha
eventName:MALWARE_DETECTION AND malName:(*NOOPLDR* OR *NOOPDOOR* OR *LODEINFO*)
More hunting queries are available for Vision One customers with Threat Insights
Entitlement enabled.
CONCLUSION
We have revealed the new campaign by Earth Kasha and provided an in-depth
analysis of LODEINFO, NOOPDOOR and other malware. Additionally, we have analyzed
several campaigns in the past and present, suggesting a connection with the
previous LODEINFO campaign (LODEINFO Campaign #1) and interesting overlaps with
the A41APT Campaign by Earth Tengshe, which is also believed to belong to APT10
Umbrella. These findings lead us to conclude that the same group that conducted
the previous LODEINFO campaign also conducted the recent LODEINFO campaign
(LODEINFO Campaign #2) with significant TTPs updates. The group may be
incorporating or sharing TTPs and tools with Earth Tengshe. Furthermore, our
correlational analysis of several campaigns, including the ones by the Volt
Typhoon and other unclustered groups, suggested that the 0-day vulnerabilities
may be shared among China-nexus actors, or there may be third-party access
brokers.
Our research on the recent activity by Earth Kasha highlighted the current
complex situation and potential cooperative relationships among China-nexus
threat actors. Such a situation will likely continue because it’s beneficial for
the adversaries on effective operation and hard for threat intelligence analysts
on the attribution. We all need to understand the current complex background and
carefully work on the attribution process.
* Appendix A: Checked Applications for Anti-Analysis by NOOPDOOR
* x32dbg**.exe
* x64dbg**.exe
* llydbg**.exe
* windbg**.exe
* ida*.exe
* idaq*.exe
* ImmunityDebugger*.exe
* ProcessHacker*.exe
* Stud_PE*.exe
* pexplorer*.exe
* Autoruns*.exe
* procexp*.exe
* Procmon*.exe
* Tcpview*.exe
* 010Editor*.exe
* WinHex*.exe
* Wireshark*.exe
* zenmap*.exe
* ProcessHacker*.exe
* vmmap*.exe
* load_sc*.exe
* HttpAnalyzerStd*.exe
* Fiddler*.exe
APPENDIX B: INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOCS)
The indicators of compromise can be found here:
Tags
APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research | Articles, News, Reports
AUTHORS
* Hara Hiroaki
Customer Technology Specialist
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