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> Lecture 02 - Social Psych
> 
> Attitudes
> 
>  
> 
> (Adapted from Liska; Handbook of Social Psychology [The cognitive
> perspective]; Michener et al; Myers; Social Psychology, edited by Arnold Kahn;
> "A new look at dissonance theory"; Ajzen and Fishbein piece in Contemporary
> Issues in Social Psychology; Rich Williams's dissertation)
> 
> 
> 
> I. Overview.
> 
> 
> 
> 1. Definition. Attitude = a favorable or unfavorable evaluative reaction
> toward something or someone, exhibited in ones beliefs, feelings, or intended
> behavior (Myers, p. 36). It is a social orientation - an underlying
> inclination to respond to something either favorably or unfavorably.
> 
> 
> 
> 2. Components of attitudes.
> 
> a. Cognitive - our thoughts, beliefs, and ideas about something. When a human
> being is the object of an attitude, the cognitive component is frequently a
> stereotype, e.g. "welfare recipients are lazy"
> 
> b. Affective - feelings or emotions that something evokes. e.g. fear,
> sympathy, hate. May dislike welfare recipients.
> 
> c. Conative, or behavioral - tendency or disposition to act in certain ways
> toward something. Might want to keep welfare recipients out of our
> neighborhood. Emphasis is on the tendency to act, not the actual acting; what
> we intend and what we do may be quite different.
> 
> 
> 
> II. Theories of attitude formation and change.
> 
> 
> 
> 1. Functionalist theory. Daniel Katz proposed a functionalist theory of
> attitudes. He takes the view that attitudes are determined by the functions
> they serve for us. People hold given attitudes because these attitudes help
> them achieve their basic goals. Katz distinguishes four types of psychological
> functions that attitudes meet.
> 
> A. Instrumental - we develop favorable attitudes towards things that aid or
> reward us. We want to maximize rewards and minimize penalties. Katz says we
> develop attitudes that help us meet this goal. We favor political parties that
> will advance our economic lot - if we are in business, we favor the party that
> will keep our taxes low, if unemployed we favor one that will increase social
> welfare benefits. We are more likely to change our attitudes if doing so
> allows us to fulfill our goals or avoid undesirable consequences.
> 
> B. Knowledge - attitudes provide meaningful, structured environment. In life
> we seek some degree of order, clarity, and stability in our personal frame of
> reference. Attitudes help supply us with standards of evaluation. Via such
> attitudes as stereotypes, we can bring order and clarity to the complexities
> of human life.
> 
> C. Value-expressive - Express basic values, reinforce self-image. EX: if you
> view yourself as a Catholic, you can reinforce that image by adopting Catholic
> beliefs and values. EX: We may have a self-image of ourselves as an
> enlightened conservative or a militant radical, and we therefore cultivate
> attitudes that we believe indicate such a core value.
> 
> D. Ego-defensive - Some attitudes serve to protect us from acknowledging basic
> truths about ourselves or the harsh realities of life. They serve as defense
> mechanisms. EX: Those with feelings of inferiority may develop attitude of
> superiority.
> 
> Katz's functionalist theory also offers an explanation as to why attitudes
> change. According to Katz, an attitude changes when it no longer serves its
> function and the individual feels blocked or frustrated. That is, according to
> Katz, attitude change is achieved not so much by changing a person's
> information or perception about an object, but rather by changing the person's
> underlying motivational and personality needs.
> 
> EX: As your social status increases, your attitudes toward your old car may
> change - you need something that better reflects your new status. (For that
> matter, your attitudes toward your old friends may change as well).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 2. Learning theory (which stresses attitude formation). There are several
> means by which we learn attitudes.
> 
> a. Classical conditioning. EX: A father angrily denounces the latest increase
> in income taxes. A mother happily announces the election of a candidate she
> worked for. These parents are expressing opinions, but they are also
> displaying nonverbal behavior that expresses their emotions. For a child
> watching the parents, the association between the topic and the nonverbal
> behavior will become obvious if repeated often enough. And the nonverbal
> behavior will trigger emotional responses in the child: the child feels upset
> and disturbed when listening to the father and happy when listening to the
> mother.
> 
> This is an example of classical conditioning: when two stimuli are repeatedly
> associated, the child learns to respond to them with a similar emotional
> reaction. In this case, the stimuli are the attitude topic and the parental
> emotion. Through repeated association, a formerly neutral stimulus (the
> attitude topic - taxes or politicians) begins to elicit an emotional reaction
> (the response) that was previously solicited only by another stimulus (the
> parental emotion). Whenever tax increases are mentioned, the child feels an
> unpleasant emotion; when the elected official is mentioned, the child feels a
> pleasant emotion.
> 
> EX: Pavlov's dogs. Bell was rung when dogs received food. Food made dogs
> salivate. Then whenever a bell was rung, dogs salivated even when food was not
> present.
> 
> EX: When you were a child, parents may have cheered for N.D. football. You may
> not have even known what N.D. football was, but you liked your parents happy
> attitude. Now N.D. football evokes that same response in you.
> 
> EX: Men with bow ties. Meet a bad man who wears bow ties, and you may come to
> hate all bow ties.
> 
> COMMENT: This explains why behaviors can persist even after reinforcement is
> withdrawn. Also helps explain self-reinforcement.
> 
> 
> 
> b. Instrumental, or operant, conditioning. Behaviors or attitudes that are
> followed by positive consequences are reinforced and are more likely to be
> repeated than are behaviors and attitudes that are followed by negative
> consequences.
> 
> EX: People agree with your opinion.
> 
> 
> 
> c. Observational learning. Children watch the behavior of people around them
> and imitate what they see. EX: If a young girl hears her mother denounce all
> elected officials as crooks, she may repeat that opinion in class the next
> day. Whether she continues to repeat that opinion depends on the responses of
> her classmates, teacher, and parents. That is, observations determine the
> responses we learn, but reinforcement determines the responses we express.
> 
> 
> 
> 3. Cognitive dissonance theory - stresses attitude change - and that behaviors
> can determine attitudes.
> 
> A. Defn: Cognition = individuals perception of own attitudes, beliefs,
> behaviors. Cognitive dissonance = feelings of tension that arise when one is
> simultaneously aware of two inconsistent cognitions. For example, when we act
> contrary to our attitudes; or, when we make a decision favoring one
> alternative despite reasons favoring another.
> 
> B. Consistency theories hypothesize that, should inconsistencies develop among
> cognitions, people are motivated to restore harmony.
> 
> C. Key propositions of dissonance theory
> 
> 1. Dissonance theory says relationships among two cognitions can be either
> consonant, dissonant, irrelevant
> 
> 2. Cognitive dissonance is a noxious state. It produces unpleasant physical
> arousal.
> 
> 3. Individual will attempt to reduce or eliminate dissonance - and will try to
> avoid things that increase dissonance.
> 
> EX: Selective observation.
> 
> 4. Cognitive dissonance can be reduced or eliminated only by (a) adding new
> cognitions, or (b) changing existing ones.
> 
> EX: Can change our minds. Decide we were wrong.
> 
> EX: Can "make up" information, as in the "When prophesy fails" example.
> 
> EX: We may seek new information that can restore consonance.
> 
> EX: Try to discredit source of dissonance in some way - either by making up
> info or seeking counter-evidence.
> 
> 
> 
> D. Sources of dissonance
> 
> 1. Informational inconsistency. Receive information that contradicts what they
> already know or believe.
> 
> EX: Suppose you believe George Bush did not know about Iran-Contra - and then
> suppose Oliver North testified that he was the mastermind behind it. (Real
> life example: some Iranians are said to believe George Bush did head up
> Iran-Contra, since he used to be head of the CIA and they think the CIA runs
> the country.)
> 
> 
> 
> 2. Disconfirmed expectations. People prepare themselves for an event that
> never occurs - or even worse, an event whose opposite occurs. EX: You expect
> to do well on an exam, and you don't.
> 
> EX: When prophesy fails. In 1955, Marian Keech predicted that a great flood
> was going to destroy the Western Hemisphere on Dec. 21. She said she got her
> information from the planet Clarion. She attracted a band of followers, and
> received further messages about how the faithful could save themselves.
> Midnight of the big day came and passed, and nothing happened. At 4:45 a.m.,
> they received a Christmas message informing them that because of their
> commitment and faithfulness, the earth had been spared.
> 
> Q: How did the followers behave, both before and after the event?
> 
> Prior to the big day, they were very secretive, and shunned publicity. After
> the big day, they called the media, sent out press releases, and recruited new
> followers. Why?
> 
> Many of these people had quit their jobs, and broken up with their spouses and
> friends, based on a belief that had been disconfirmed. This produced
> dissonance. They couldn't deny their past beliefs - they couldn't say the
> flood had occurred - they couldn't deny they had quit their jobs. They could
> have decided they were mistaken, but that would create dissonance with other
> cognitions, such as their being intelligent people. hence, they convinced
> themselves they were right all along, and their faithfulness had saved the
> world. Further, if they could convince others to adopt their views, this would
> affirm their sense that their views were correct.
> 
> 
> 
> 3. Insufficient justification for behavior. People do things which they lack
> justification for.
> 
> EX: In a classic Festinger experiment, subjects were given a peg board and
> told to carefully turn each peg 1/4 turn. Then, after doing all the pegs, they
> were told to turn them another 1/4 turn. Later they had to carefully remove
> each peg, and then put them all back. After an hour, they were told they were
> done. The experimenter then said "We are comparing the performance of subjects
> who are briefed in advance with those who are not briefed in advance. You did
> not receive a briefing. The next subject is supposed to be briefed, but my
> assistance who usually does this couldn't come to work today." Subjects were
> then asked to tell the next student the task was fun and exciting, and were
> offered either $1 or $20 for doing so. Those who only got paid a $1 were more
> likely to report they thought the task was interesting, because they lacked a
> strong justification for their actions.
> 
> 
> 
> 4. Postdecision dissonance - after every decision, you feel dissonance because
> you have rejected some good things and accepted some bad. We tend to become
> more certain of decisions afterwards.
> 
> EX: Bettors approached after they had placed bets at the racetrack were more
> sure of their choices than those approached before placing bets.
> 
> NOTE: This does not mean we never regret a decision. Disconfirmed
> expectations, new information, or whatever may cause us feel we made a
> mistake. However, until these new events/information or whatever comes along,
> we will tend to feel more confident about our decision. Obviously, in the case
> of the racetrack example, people may have felt more confident after they
> placed their bets, but after the race was run a lot of them probably didn't
> feel so confident anymore!
> 
> 
> 
> E. Not all inconsistencies result in cognitive dissonance. How is
> inconsistency possible?
> 
> 
> 
> 1. Cognitions may not be important to the individual - hence inconsistency
> does not produce discomfort.
> 
> 2. Cognitions may not come in contact with each other - contradictions can go
> unnoticed. Behavior may be mindless. EX: We might enjoy a national park -
> without realizing we are overtaxing it.
> 
> NOTE: The following relate primarily to counterattitudinal behavior.
> 
> 3. Aversive consequences are not perceived. In order for cognitive dissonance
> to occur, a product must result from the counterattitudinal behavior. That
> product is the bringing about, or possible occurrence, of an aversive event.
> Aversive event = something that goes against your self interest, or that you
> would rather not have occur.
> 
> EX: In a variation of the boring tasks experiment, some subjects were led to
> believe they had actually deceived their fellow student, while others thought
> they had not deceived them. Only those who thought they had succeeded
> experienced dissonance.
> 
> EX: In another variation, subjects were led to like or dislike the other
> student. The only subjects who changed their attitude about the task were
> those who successfully convinced a student they liked.
> 
> Note that the consequences need not actually occur; it is the subjects
> perceptions that the consequences will result from their actions that is
> important.
> 
> 
> 
> 4. Person must feel personally responsible. If the person feels that
> environmental forces caused the action, or that the unwanted events were
> unforeseeable, they won't feel dissonance. How voluntary is the behavior? Were
> the consequences foreseeable. Note that foreseeable is not the same as
> foreseen - if you could have foreseen it but didn't, you can feel dissonance.
> 
> 
> 
> We close with a commonly proposed alternative to dissonance theory.
> 
> 4. Bem's Self-perception theory. Says we infer our attitudes from our
> behavior. There is no tension, rather, behavior just serves an informative
> purpose. We calmly observe our behavior, and draw reasonable inferences from
> it, just as we do when observing other people.
> 
> EX: In the Festinger experiment, those who got $20 would assume their behavior
> was forced by the environment. Those who only got $1 would assume they did
> what they did because what they said was true.
> 
> EX: Bem showed that the results of cognitive dissonance experiments could be
> replicated quite well by observers. People read descriptions of the
> procedures, and predicted people's attitudes correctly.
> 
> EX: "I must have really been tired, I slept a long time."
> 
> "I must not like him, I was really rude to him."
> 
> "I must really like this course, I studied really hard for the exam."
> 
> It is hard to choose between self-perception and cognitive dissonance theory
> since both usually make the same predictions. However, there is evidence that,
> as c. d. theory predicts, physiological arousal (that is, tension) accompanies
> dissonance conditions. Further, when arousal is eliminated (through the use of
> drugs or alcohol), attitude change does not occur.
> 
> On the other hand, self-perception can explain some things dissonance can't.
> For example, when people are suddenly rewarded for doing something they did
> before just because they liked it, they can come to like it less.
> 
> EX: (From Myers): Child was reading 6-8 books a week. Library then started a
> reading club which promised a party to those who read 10 books in three
> months. Child started checking out only 1 or 2 books a week. Why? "Because you
> only need to read 10 books."
> 
> Myers suggests dissonance theory successfully explains what happens when we
> act contrary to our clearly defined attitudes. We feel tension, so we adjust
> our attitudes to reduce it. Dissonance explains attitude change. When
> attitudes aren't well-formed, self-perception theory explains attitude
> formation that occurs as we act and reflect. (I think he may be right about
> the latter point, but I'm not so sure about the first.) Key thing, then, is
> how discrepant is the behavior with the attitude.
> 
> 
> 
> III. Real world applications
> 
> 
> 
> a. Racism. It has often been said you can't legislate morality. Yet, changes
> in civil rights laws and policies have been accompanied by changes in
> attitudes. Since Brown vs. Board of Education in 1954, the percentage of white
> Americans favoring integrated schools has more than doubled. Since Civil
> rights act of 1964, the percentage of white Americans who described their
> neighborhoods, friends, co-workers, or fellow students as all white declined
> by 20 percent for each of these measures. Possible explanations:
> 
> 1. Disconfirmed expectations. Predicted calamities did not occur.
> 
> 2. Information inconsistent with previous beliefs led to attitude change.
> 
> 3. People were forced to behave in a counter-attitudinal manner. People who
> said they would not comply with laws did. Ergo, they reasoned blacks must not
> be so bad.
> 
> 4. Racist attitudes became non-instrumental, because of the high costs of
> violating laws. You had to interact with blacks, so you might as well like
> them.
> 
> 5. Value-expressive - racism became inconsistent with the images most people
> like to hold, so they adopted anti-racist attitudes.
> 
> b. Suppose you wanted a friend to support a political candidate. What might
> you do?
> 
> 1. Get them to do some small task as a favor to you. Counter-attitudinal
> actions might influence attitudes; exposure to dissonant info might change
> their minds; classical or instrumental condition could take place - they
> receive praise for working for the candidate, which leads to positive
> attitudes.
> 
> 2. If friend is for another candidate - provide them with dissonant info.
> Point out candidate is weak in areas friend likes him.
> 
> 3. What if friend doesn't change his mind? This could occur because (a) friend
> discredits the source of the info - you (b) instead of liking the candidate,
> friend could decide he doesn't like you.
> 
> 
> 
> IV. Attitudes and Behaviors
> 
> 
> 
> 1. Is there an attitude-behavior relationship?
> 
> A. LaPiere's work apparently said no.
> 
> B. Subsequent work over next 35 years did little better. As Abelson (quoted in
> Myers) said, "we are, apparently, very well trained and very good at finding
> reasons for what we do, but not very good at doing what we find reasons for."
> 
> 
> 
> 2. Later work found a relationship
> 
> A. Expressed attitudes are not always the same as true attitudes, especially
> when dealing with sensitive topics. Methods such as the "bogus pipeline" and
> other methods for dealing with sensitive questions are helpful here.
> 
> B. Specificity of measures was found to be important - items used were not
> specific enough. Should determine attitudes toward the specific behavior,
> rather than some more general topic. Fishbein and Aizen note that, ideally,
> measures should correspond in Target, Action, Context, and Time.
> 
> 1. Target. Suppose I say I think drugs are bad - yet I smoke marihuana, or
> drink alcohol. There are different targets here. When you say drugs, I may
> think more of thinks like cocaine and heroin than I do marihuana or alcohol. I
> might have favorable attitudes toward the environment, but have negative
> attitudes toward recycling because I find it inconvenient.
> 
> In LaPiere's case, subjects may have viewed the target as a devious oriental,
> rathern than a nicely dressed oriental couple traveling with a white man.
> 
> 2. Action. I can be against selling cocaine, but still willing to use it
> personally. I might support somebody's right to have an abortion, while being
> opposed to having an abortion myself. (We see this in public opinion polls
> today - a lot of people oppose abortion, while still supporting the right of
> others to have abortions, at least under certain circumstances.)
> 
> 3. Context. I might support the right to have an abortion under certain
> circumstances (save the life of the mother, rape, incest) while being opposed
> to it in others. Indeed, depending on the question asked, you get widely
> varying levels of support for abortion. I might think it is ok to drink when I
> am going to stay at home, but not when I am going to drive.
> 
> 4. Time. It is ok to drink at night or on the weekends, but not in the
> morning.
> 
> C. Type of attitude measured is important - cognitive, affective, conative.
> These are not identical or totally consistent - our minds are not efficient
> enough to process all information immediately and consistently. The behavioral
> component of attitudes best determines what we do.
> 
> 
> 
> 3. Fishbein/Ajzen Model of reasoned action.
> 
> 
> 
> Fishbein-Ajzen Model of Reasoned Action:
> 
> 
> 
> Beliefs about * Evaluation of > Attitude
> 
> consequences consequences toward the
> 
> of behavior behavior
> 
> > BI > B
> 
> Beliefs about * Motivation to > Subjective
> 
> what others comply norms
> 
> think I
> 
> should do
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A. Fishbein refers to beliefs, attitudes, and intentions. We have referred to
> these as the cognitive, affective, and conative (behavioral) components of
> attitudes.
> 
> B. Assumptions of model:
> 
> 1. Behavioral intentions are the only direct determinant of behavior.
> 
> 2. Behavioral intentions are determined by affective attitudes and subjective
> norms.
> 
> 3. Affective attitudes are a function of beliefs about consequences *
> subjective evaluation of those consequences.
> 
> EX: I believe that smoking causes cancer. I believe that cancer is very bad.
> Ergo, I have negative feelings about smoking.
> 
> EX: I believe that studying leads to higher grades. I do not care what my
> grades are. Ergo, I do not have favorable attitudes toward studying.
> 
> 4. Subjective norms are a function of beliefs about the expectations of others
> times my motivation to comply with them.
> 
> EX: My friends expect me to smoke. I want to please my friends. Ergo, I feel I
> should smoke.
> 
> EX: My parents expect me to study. I want to please my parents. Ergo, I feel I
> should study.
> 
> C. Implications of the model.
> 
> 1. Only behavioral intentions directly affect behavior. Effects of any other
> kind of attitude will only be indirect, and relationship with behavior could
> be weak.
> 
> 2. Sometimes affective attitudes will determine our intentions, other times
> subjective norms will. Even if we dislike something, we may do it anyway,
> because of subjective norms. Further, the relative importance of affective
> attitudes and subjective norms may differ across people. EX: You might think
> that somebody who doesn't like to study would not study. But, s/he may do so
> because of subjective norms.
> 
> 3. Model shows the importance of considering how valued the consequences are.
> For example, two people might agree that smoking leads to cancer. But if one
> person doesn't care that much about cancer ("we're all going to die sometime")
> their belief about cancer may not keep them from smoking. You shouldn't assume
> that your evaluation of the consequences is the same as theirs.
> 
> 4. Shouldn't just measure attitudes toward the object - should measure
> attitudes toward the behavior.
> 
> EX: You might think that somebody who doesn't like blacks may discriminate
> against them. But maybe not. Non-discriminatory behavior may be favorably
> viewed because of its positive consequences (More customers and more money for
> my business - a bigger pool of laborers I can call upon). Or, subjective norms
> may force non-discrimination. MORAL: Don't just ask people how they feel about
> blacks - ask them how they feel about specific behaviors. (At least if you are
> interested in prediction).
> 
> 5. Several beliefs may determine your affective attitudes or subjective norms.
> Affective attitudes are based on the total set of salient beliefs about
> performing a behavior. Changing one or more beliefs may not be enough to bring
> about a change in the overall attitude or intention.
> 
> EX: I may believe that studying leads to high grades and that high grades are
> desirable. I may also believe that studying cuts down on party time, and I
> love to party. Hence, overall I may have a negative feeling towards studying.
> 
> EX: I believe smoking causes cancer and that cancer is bad. I also believe
> that quitting smoking will cause me to gain weight. If I fear gaining weight
> more than I fear cancer, my overall evaluation of smoking may be positive.
> REMEMBER: Several beliefs can be involved in the determination of your final
> evaluation and your intention.
> 
> EX: I might change affective attitudes toward smoking - but if normative
> pressures are the primary determinant of behavior, behavior won't change.
> 
> EX: I might convince you that your friends expect you to study - but if you
> don't care what your friends think, your behavior won't change.
> 
> MORAL: If you want to change behavior, you have to figure out what beliefs are
> having the strongest impact on behavior.
> 
> 
> 
> 4. Criticisms and proposed modifications of Fishbein - when, and how strongly,
> do attitudes affect behavior? When do attitudes not affect behavior? Fishbein
> said intentions were the only direct influence on Behavior - but many question
> this.
> 
> A. Many have found that feelings (the affective component of attitudes) may be
> a better predictor of what you will do than your intentions. Often, we don't
> bother to figure out what we want to do until it is time to do it. When
> intentions are weak or ill-formed and other beliefs are strong, affective
> attitudes may be the best predictor of behavior.
> 
> EX: 1980 elections. Liberal Democrat incumbents showed big leads in the polls,
> yet one after one they fell. People had not finalized their intention to vote,
> but they had strong feelings against liberal policies (or at least against the
> current state of the country.)
> 
> Why is this? The model views attitude formation and change as a product of
> information processing. Yet, as information processing takes time, changes in
> attitudes may lag behind changes in beliefs, perhaps by months or even years.
> Intentions are often not even formed until immediately before behaving. This
> helps explain why variables besides intentions can be better predictors of
> behavior.
> 
> B. Resources, degree of volitional control may affect A/B consistency. More
> difficult it is to follow through on intentions, less likely it is you will.
> Also sometimes need cooperation from others.
> 
> EX: Suppose a prejudiced person does not intend to hire Hispanics. Suppose it
> turns out to be extremely difficult to staff his business otherwise. He may
> give up on his intention, whereas he would not do so under more favorable
> conditions.
> 
> EX: N.D. intends to hire minority scholars. Hopefully, it will do so, but it
> would be easier to follow through on its intentions if it intended to hire a
> bunch of white males.
> 
> C. Psychological traits - willingness to take responsibility - Locus of
> control.
> 
> EX: Locus of control. How much control do you feel you have over what happens
> in your life. If you don't feel you have control, why bother acting
> consistently?
> 
> D. Experience affects how consistent you are. Affects attitude intensity. Also
> may affect your knowledge of how to achieve your goals.
> 
> E. Some would say he has it backwards - behavior influences attitudes, rather
> than the other way.
> 
> 6. Application. Few unwed teenagers want to get pregnant - yet many do. How
> can A/B theory explain this inconsistency?
> 
> A. Not wanting to get pregnant is an attitude toward an object; pregnancy is
> not a behavior in and of itself, it is a result of other behaviors. Attitudes
> toward premarital sex and use of contraceptive might not show such
> discrepancies.
> 
> B. Attitudes may not be firmly held, because of lack of prior experience.
> Those who have been pregnant before may act more consistently.
> 
> C. Lack of resources. People may not know about, or have access to, effective
> means of contraception.
> 
> D. Subjective norms may be determining behavior, rather than affective
> attitudes.
> 
> E. Beliefs about consequences - may not believe their behavior is likely to
> produce a pregnancy. There is some rational basis for this - some teenagers
> have sex at very young ages, when they are subfecund; their failure to get
> pregnant leads them to think they can't.
> 
> F. Other beliefs enter into their evaluation of the behavior. It is very
> costly to use contraceptives - have to admit that you are "that kind of girl."
> Those who think of themselves as "good girls" are often the ones who get
> pregnant, because the so-called "bad girls" don't have the same inhibitions
> about contraceptives. Also, sacrifice spontaneity, run the risk of behavior.
> 
> G. Personality traits might offer some insights.